Nedarim 56a (נו.) — the Talmud in English

The Mishnayot before us discuss several formulations that a person may utter, and what each formulation includes, in order to determine by what he becomes prohibited and by what he does not.

Mishna:

One who vows

and accepts upon himself a prohibition against deriving benefit

from the house

is prohibited only from the first floor of the house, but

is permitted

to derive benefit

in the upper story.

For the formulation “house” includes only the house itself and not the upper story of the house,

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: The upper story is included in “house”

for when a person prohibits a house to himself, the entire house is included, and this includes the upper story; therefore, the upper story is also prohibited.

However, the Sages concede in the opposite case, that

one who vows from the upper story,

the law is that he is

permitted

to derive benefit

in the house.

Since it is certainly not the formulation “upper story” that includes the entire house; rather, it refers only to the upper story, and only it is prohibited.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages: Does the formulation “house” include the upper story, or does it not include the upper story? According to Rabbi Meir, the formulation “house” does not include the upper story.

The Gemara now wishes to establish, on this basis, which tanna taught the following baraita:

Who is the tanna

who taught us, with regard to the affliction of houses, that from the fact that the Torah wrote

“in a house”

and did not write “house,” it follows that the Torah came

to include the gallery.

It is also learned from the fact that the Torah wrote

“in a house”

and did not write “house” that the Torah intended

to include the upper story,

so that the laws of the affliction of houses apply there as well.

It is thus evident that the plain meaning of “house” does not include the upper story, since the upper story is included within “house” only because of an explicit inclusion in the Torah. And who is the tanna who holds this view?

Rav Ḥisda said:

It is the view of

Rabbi Meir,

who said in our Mishna that when a person prohibits a house to himself, this does not include the upper story.

For if it is the Sages

of our Mishna,

the Sages say

in the Mishna that when a person prohibits a house to himself, he is also prohibited from the

upper story,

as it

is included in the

formulation

“house,”

and the upper story is also included. If so,

why do I need a verse

Why is a special verse needed concerning the afflictions of houses, from the superfluous wording

“in a house,”

to derive

an inclusion

of the upper story as well?

It is included in the meaning of the formulation in any event!

Rather, it is necessarily the case that this baraita is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who holds that the upper story is not included in the formulation “house”; therefore, a special verse is needed to include the upper story.

Abaye said:

The baraita can be understood

even

if

you say

[that it was stated by]

the Sages.

taught it.

And regarding what we asked: If so, why

is a verse needed,

why does the Torah need to include the upper story by means of a special verse?

Since

it might have entered your mind to say

that, with regard to the afflictions of houses,

“in a house in the land of your possession” is written,

and if so, I would say

that

specifically the house itself, which is

connected to the ground,

specifically that

is called “house.”

But

the upper story,

which

is

not

con

nected

to the ground

would not be considered a house with regard to the afflictions of houses, even though it is included in the formulation “house,” since we might have thought that the Torah was particular about something connected to the ground.

ground,

would not be considered a house with regard to the afflictions of houses, even though it is included in the term “house,” because we might have thought that the Torah was concerned specifically with something attached to the ground.

Therefore, a special verse is needed to include the upper story, despite the fact that we hold, in accordance with the Sages, that the upper story is included in “house.”

The Gemara discusses another law that seemingly depends on the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Meir as to whether the upper story is included in “house.” This is the law of Rav Huna, which is brought before us:

In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Ulla:

If a person said to another:

“I am selling you a house of my house,”

he need not give him the entire house; rather, he

shows him

the

upper story,

and says to him: Here is what you purchased!

Since he did not say that he was selling him the house, which would have indicated the entire house, but rather said “a house of my house,” which can be interpreted as referring to the upper story, he cannot demand more than this from him.

And the Gemara infers:

The reason is that he said to him, “A house that is in my house I am selling you,”

and only for this reason can he turn him away and give him only the upper story.

But

if he said, “I am selling you a

house,”

and said this

without specification,

and did not add “a house that is in my house,”

he may not show him the upper story,

but is obligated to give him the entire house.

Let us say that this is the opinion of Rabbi Meir

and not that of the Sages, because according to the Sages, when a person says “house,” the upper story is included in his words as well. Therefore, when a person says that he sold the house, he can claim that he sold the upper story, which is also called a house. Why, then, did Rav Huna say that only if he said “a house that is in my house” can he claim that he intended the upper story?

It must be that he holds in accordance with Rabbi Meir, that the unqualified formulation “house” does not mean the upper story; only when he says “a house that is in my house” can he claim that he sold the upper story.

And the Gemara rejects this:

Even

if

you say

[that Rav Huna holds in accordance with]

the Sages,

even so, he shows him the upper story.

However, this does not mean that he can turn him away and say that he sold him the upper story and not the house.

Rather,

what

is meant by “he shows him”

the upper story

as Rav Huna said?

Since he said “a house that is in my house,” he must give him

the finest of the houses,

as this is what he intended to include in his formulation “a house that is in my house”: the finest house among the houses that I have.

It follows that Rav Huna can also be explained in accordance with the Sages.

Mishna:

One who vows

to forgo benefit

from a bed

is

permitted to use a dargesh,

the meaning of which will be explained in the Gemara, since a dargesh is not included in the formulation “bed,”

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say:

He is prohibited from deriving benefit also from a

dargesh,

as it

is included

in the formulation

“bed.”

as well.

Since he prohibited the bed to himself, his prohibition applies to the dargesh as well.

The Gemara below will explain what is called a dargesh.

And the Sages concede in the opposite case, that

one who vows

and accepts upon himself a prohibition

from the dargesh,

has included only the dargesh itself in his vow; therefore, he is

permitted to use a bed,

as the bed is not prohibited when he prohibits the dargesh to himself, since the bed is not included in “dargesh.”

Gemara:

What is a dargesh?

What is the dargesh concerning which Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree as to whether it is included in the formulation “bed”?

Ulla said:

Dargesh means

an empty bed of fortune.

It is an empty bed that is kept in the house and is made for good fortune.

The Sages said to Ulla:

According to your explanation of dargesh, it is not understandable

that which we learned

with regard to the mourning practices of the High Priest, when people come to console him, as we learned in a Mishna in tractate Moed Katan:

When they,

the comforters of the High Priest,

serve him the mourner’s meal,

they eat a mourner’s meal with him, and the arrangement of the seating is as follows:

All the people recline on the ground, while he,

the High Priest,

reclines on the dargesh.

And if we say that a dargesh is a bed made for good fortune, which remains empty throughout the year and on which no one sits, is it conceivable that

the entire year,

all year,

he does not sit upon it,

but דווקא now, on

that day,

when he is mourning,

he sits upon it!?

Ravina raised an objection to this:

What is surprising about this? We have found that the conduct on the day of mourning differs from that of the other days!

As is the case

with

meat and wine: throughout the entire year, if he wishes, he eats, and if he wishes, he does not eat.

Throughout the year, it depends on his will whether to eat and drink meat and wine, and he does as he wishes. But on

that day

of mourning,

we give him

wine to drink in order to restore him.

Therefore, there is no difficulty concerning the dargesh if people do not sit upon it throughout the year but do sit upon it on the day of mourning.

Rather,

if you wish to raise a difficulty and prove that a dargesh is not an empty bed of fortune,

here is the difficulty:

As it was taught in a baraita

with regard to the laws of mourning, one must overturn the beds in the house, meaning that one must turn the beds over.

This applies to beds, which must be turned onto their other side, so that they are completely overturned. But the

dargesh, one does not overturn; rather, one sets it upright

when it is lying on its side, resting on its two legs on one side, and one does not overturn it completely like a bed.

And if you say

that

it is an empty bed of fortune,

a dargesh—which is essentially an ordinary bed—why does one not need to overturn the dargesh as well?

But it was taught:

A mourner

who overturns his bed does not overturn only his bed; rather, he overturns all the beds that he has in his house.

If so, he should also have to overturn the dargesh, since it is like an ordinary bed.

That is not difficult!

We cannot prove from this difficulty that a dargesh is not an empty bed of fortune, since it is possible to resolve it by saying,