Nedarim 48b (מח:) — the Talmud in English

A case involving

a certain man who had a son who would steal bundles of flax

who had a son who would steal bundles of flax. And he had another son who was worthy.

He prohibited

the father

his property to him

to his son.

They said to him

to that man:

And if this son’s son will be a Torah scholar

and if this son’s son will be a Torah scholar,

what then?

Will he lose the property?!

He said to them: Let this one acquire it.

That is, let the son acquire the property now.

And if my son’s son will be a Torah scholar—

let him acquire it

that son’s son. And if not, the other son will acquire all the property.

What then?

What is the halakha in such a case?

The scholars of Pumbedita said:

In such a case,

acquire it

you should acquire it—

in order to transfer it

to another;

that is what he intended.

For he transferred the property to this son only so that his son’s son would acquire it.

And whenever one acquires in order to transfer—

he does not acquire.

And Rav Naḥman said:

Even in such a case, one who acquires in order to transfer it—

acquires it.

A proof of this:

For

when one acquires through an act of exchange, and the purchaser gives the seller

a cloth

a cloth, so that the seller will transfer land to him in exchange for the cloth—

it is an acquisition in order to transfer,

for he transferred the cloth to him only so that he would transfer the land to him, and not for any other purpose!

Rav Ashi said: And who can tell us that, if the seller takes possession of the cloth

the seller—

he does not acquire it?

Perhaps the seller can acquire the cloth for himself!

Furthermore,

even if we say that

the cloth

is an acquisition in order to transfer it,

nevertheless, it has an additional advantage, for

he acquires it from this moment,

before the seller returns the cloth to the purchaser, since an ordinary act of acquisition takes effect retroactively from now.

This is not so with

this property,

that man’s property;

when does he acquire it

when will the son acquire it?—only

when his son becomes a Torah scholar

when his son becomes a Torah scholar, for since he transferred it to him only so that it would belong to his son, he certainly did not intend that he acquire it until that time. And

when he does become one,

when the son becomes a Torah scholar,

the cloth returns to its owner!

That is, the acquisition through which he transferred it to him has already ended!

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: But the gift of Beit Horon is an acquisition in order to transfer it, and yet he does not acquire it

that man does not acquire the courtyard and the meal. For if he acquired them, his father would be permitted, since someone else had acquired them in the interim!

At times

sometimes

Rav Naḥman said to him

in response to his question: The reason that he did not acquire it there was

because his meal demonstrates his intention

that the one who prohibited the benefit wanted his father to derive benefit from his own meal, for he certainly had no interest in his father deriving benefit from another person’s meal!

This is not so in our case. On the contrary, that man who prohibited his property to his son was pleased that his son’s son would derive benefit from his father, and not from him, since this is the order of inheritance, rather than the inheritance skipping over him to his son’s son.

And at times he said to him

Rav Naḥman said: Our Mishna follows the view of

Rabbi Eliezer, who says: Even waiving a benefit is prohibited for one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit.

That is, just as Rabbi Eliezer is stringent with regard to vows more than with regard to other monetary laws concerning the right of passage: In other monetary laws, passing through another’s property is permitted, and this does not constitute robbery, whereas with regard to one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit, it is prohibited for him to enter his courtyard. The same applies in our case: Although ordinarily one who acquires in order to transfer it acquires it, nevertheless, because of the stringency of vows, we say that he did not acquire it.

We learned in the Mishna: The Sages said: Any gift such that, if he consecrated it, it would not be consecrated—

is not a gift.

The tanna taught

“any”—

to include what?

Is it

to include this matter of one who throws bundles of flax,

namely, the incident involving that son who would steal bundles of flax, teaching that an acquisition in order to transfer it does not effect acquisition even as a matter of law?!

And we reject this:

No. It is to include the latter formulation of Rava’s teaching

above: Even if he said, “Let my father come and eat,” and did not state it as a condition, it is prohibited for one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit, because his meal demonstrates his intention.

We shall return to you, Chapter Ha-Shutafin.

It was already explained above that with regard to vows, we follow the language of ordinary people. That is, the vow is interpreted according to its accepted meaning in ordinary speech. The chapter before us comes to teach that one who vowed to prohibit a particular food to himself is permitted to eat all other foods that are not included within the name of that food according to ordinary usage.