Nedarim 48b — the Talmud in English

An incident involving

a certain man who had a son who used to steal bundles of flax

[the man had a son who used to steal bundles of flax]. And he had another son who was an outstanding person.

The father prohibited

his

property to him

[to his son].

They said to him

to that man:

But what if this son’s son becomes a Torah scholar

[what if the son of this son becomes a Torah scholar]?

What then?

Would he lose the property?!

He said to them: Let this one acquire it.

That is, let this son acquire the property now.

And if my grandson becomes a Torah scholar—

let him acquire it,

that son of his son. And if not, the other son will acquire all the property.

What then?

What is the law in such a case?

The scholars of Pumbedita said:

In such a case,

acquire it

[you acquire it]—

in order to transfer it

to someone else;

that is what he does.

For he transferred the property to this son only so that his grandson would acquire it.

And anyone who acquires something in order to transfer it—

does not acquire it.

And Rav Nahman said:

Even in such a case, when one acquires something in order to transfer it—

he acquires it.

The proof for this is:

For

when people acquire something through an exchange of objects, and the buyer gives the seller a

sudara

[a cloth], so that the seller will transfer land to him in exchange for the cloth—

this is an acquisition made in order to transfer,

for he transferred the cloth to him only so that he would transfer the land to him, and not for any other purpose!

Rav Ashi said: And who can tell us that if the seller takes possession of the sudara

the seller

does not acquire it?

Perhaps the seller can acquire the cloth for himself!

Furthermore,

even if we say that

the cloth

is an acquisition made in order to transfer it,

nevertheless, it has an additional advantage, for

it is acquired from this moment,

before the seller returns the cloth to the buyer, since an ordinary acquisition takes effect immediately.

This is not so with

these assets,

the assets of that man:

when will he acquire them

[when will the son acquire them]? Only

when his son becomes a Torah scholar

[when his son becomes a Torah scholar], since he transferred the property to him only so that it would belong to his son, he certainly did not intend that he acquire it before that time. And

when that happens,

when the son becomes a Torah scholar,

the cloth returns to its owner!

That is, the acquisition by which he transferred it to him has already come to an end!

Rava said to Rav Nahman: But the gift of Beit Horon is an acquisition made in order to transfer it, and yet the recipient does not acquire it,

the courtyard and the meal. For if he acquired them, his father would be permitted to benefit, since someone else had acquired them in the meantime!

Sometimes

[at times]

Rav Nahman said to him

in answer to his question: The reason the recipient did not acquire it there was

because his meal proves its purpose,

as the person who prohibited the benefit wanted his father to benefit from his own meal; surely, he had no interest in his father benefiting from someone else’s meal!

That is not so in our case. On the contrary, the man who prohibited his property to his son was pleased that his grandson would benefit from his father rather than from him, because that is the normal order of inheritance, and he did not want the inheritance to bypass him and go to his grandson.

And sometimes he said to him

Rav Nahman: Our Mishna follows the view of

Rabbi Eliezer, who says: Even waiving a minor benefit is prohibited to one who is prohibited from benefiting.

That is, just as Rabbi Eliezer is stringent with regard to vows more than with other monetary laws concerning the right to walk through another’s property: Under other monetary laws, walking through another’s property is permitted and does not constitute theft, whereas in the case of one prohibited from benefiting, it is forbidden to enter his courtyard. The same applies here: Although in general one who acquires something in order to transfer it acquires it, because of the stringency of vows we say that he did not acquire it.

We learned in the Mishna: The Sages said: Any gift such that, if its recipient consecrated it, it would not become consecrated—

is not a gift.

The fact that the tan­[unclear: source spelling segmented as “התנא”]

“any”

comes to include what?

Does it

perhaps come to include this matter of the one who threw it into bundles,

meaning the incident involving the son who used to steal bundles of flax, teaching that an acquisition made in order to transfer it does not constitute an acquisition even by basic law?!

And we reject this:

No. It comes to include the final version of Rava’s statement

above: Even if he said, “Let my father come and eat,” and did not express it as a condition, it is nevertheless forbidden for one prohibited from benefiting, because his meal proves its purpose.

We have completed the chapter “Partners.”

It was already explained above that, with regard to vows, one follows the language of people. That is, the vow is interpreted according to its accepted meaning in the language of people. The chapter before us comes to teach us that one who vowed to forbid a certain food to himself is permitted all the other foods that are not included under the name of that food according to the language of people.