Nedarim 39a (לט.) — the Talmud in English

And we raised an objection:

What are we dealing with here?

If it is a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to

the

patient,

then

even

when he is

also sitting

it should be permitted, since the visitor is fulfilling the mitzva incumbent upon him, while the patient merely derives benefit incidentally.

If it is a case where the property of the patient is forbidden to the visitor, even when he is standing it should also not be permitted!

For he derives benefit from treading upon the patient’s property!

Shmuel said: Actually, it is a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the patient. And

it is speaking

of a place where people take payment for sitting

with the patient,

but do not take payment for standing.

Therefore, if he does not wish to accept payment from him, he may visit him specifically while standing, since people do not take payment for this in any event, and he provides him with no benefit whatsoever. But if he visits him while sitting and does not accept payment, it turns out that he is providing him with a benefit!

And we raised an objection:

What is the reason for this distinction?

Why should people take payment specifically for sitting and not take payment for standing?! And we explain: In truth, there are places where people have adopted the stringency of not taking payment even for sitting, although it is permitted to take payment for this. Since standing is sufficient for fulfilling the mitzva of visiting the sick, nevertheless, in order to ensure that they would not come to take payment for standing, they adopted the stringency of not taking payment even for sitting. And in those places it is permitted to visit him whether standing or sitting.

Rather,

this comes to teach us,

incidentally,

that even in a place where

people do not adopt this stringency and

take payment for sitting—

it is necessary

to be permitted

to take

payment, but

for standing—

it is not necessary

for him to be forbidden

to take

payment.

And therefore the tanna taught: “He enters to visit him while standing,” because this applies everywhere. But visiting him while sitting is forbidden in some places. That is, in a place where people do not adopt the stringency of not taking payment for sitting, it turns out that the patient is liable to pay him, and when he does not take anything from him, it turns out that he is providing him with a benefit.

And if you wish, say:

the tanna is speaking of every circumstance, even in a place where people do not take payment at all; rather, the Sages decreed that one should not visit him while sitting,

in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim,

who said in another context:

A decree lest he remain standing for an excessive amount of time.

Here too,

therefore it is forbidden to visit him while sitting,

due to a decree lest he remain sitting

longer than is necessary for visiting the sick, in which case he would be providing him with a benefit beyond what is necessary for his mitzva.

But there is no concern when he is standing. Since you require him to stand, this serves as a reminder, and he will not remain longer than is required for his mitzva.

Ulla said: Actually,

our Mishna is speaking

of a case where the property of the patient is forbidden to the visitor, and where

he did not prohibit him from what is necessary for his livelihood [The meaning is that he did not exclude explicitly the necessities of his life from the prohibition, but that his intention was not to prohibit his fellow from something that he himself needs, even though his fellow incidentally derives benefit from it. See the Ran.], and therefore it is permitted to visit him even though he derives benefit from treading upon his property.

to est on ne zapretil poluchat polzu ot togo, chto neobkhodimo samomu bolnomu, i ne namerevalsya zapretit drugomu polzovatsya tem, chto emu samomu neobkhodimo, khotya drug pri etom sluchayno poluchaet polzu. Poetomu emu razresheno poseshchat bolnogo, khotya on poluchaet polzu ot togo, chto stupayet na ego zemlyu.

And we challenge this:

If so, even when he is sitting as well

it should be permitted!

And we answer:

This

for what is necessary for his livelihood

can be accomplished while standing!

The objection is raised

from what we learned:

If he himself became ill—

one enters to visit him.

If his son became ill—

one asks about him in the marketplace.

Granted, according to Ulla, who said: It is a case where the property of the patient is forbidden to the visitor, and where he did not prohibit him from what is necessary for his livelihood—

it is well.

For with regard to his own needs, he did not prohibit benefit from his fellow, and therefore he may visit him. But with regard to the needs of his son, it is possible that he did prohibit him, even though his son too would be restricted by his vow; and if so, he may not visit him, since he derives benefit from treading upon his property.

But according to Shmuel, who said

that it is speaking

of a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the patient,

and the prohibition is due to the custom of taking payment for this service, so that he provides the patient with a benefit by not taking payment from him, if so,

what is the difference between him and his son?

On the contrary, it is more reasonable that it should be permitted to visit the son of the person subject to the vow than to visit the person subject to the vow himself, since he should have taken payment from the son, but not from the person subject to the vow!

He could have said to you

Shmuel: In truth,

the Mishna—

speaks of a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the patient

is dealing with,

but the

beraita—

is speaking

of a case where the property of the patient is forbidden to the visitor.

What is the reason for this distinction?

From where does Shmuel derive that he should distinguish between the Mishna and the beraita?