Nedarim 39a — the Talmud in English

And we raised it:

With what are we dealing?

If it is a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to

the

sick person,

then,

even

when he is

also sitting,

it should be permitted, for the visitor is fulfilling the mitzva incumbent upon him, while the sick person merely benefits incidentally.

If it is a case where the property of the sick person is forbidden to the visitor, even when he is standing it should also not be permitted!

For he benefits from treading upon the ground!

Shmuel said: It is always a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the sick person. And

it is speaking

in a place where they take payment for sitting

with the sick person

, but they do not take payment for standing.

And therefore, if he does not wish to take payment from him, it is permitted for him to visit him specifically while standing, for in any event they do not take payment for this, and he does not provide him with any benefit at all. But if he visits him while sitting and does not take payment, it turns out that he provides him with a benefit!

And we raised it:

What is the decisiveness?

Why should they take payment specifically for sitting, and not take payment for standing?! And we explain: In truth, there are places where they imposed stringency upon themselves not to take payment even for sitting, although it is permitted to take payment for this, because for fulfilling the mitzva of visiting the sick, standing is sufficient. Even so, in order that they should not come to take payment for standing, they imposed stringency upon themselves not to take payment even for sitting. And in those places it is permitted to visit whether standing or sitting.

Rather,

this comes to teach us,

incidentally,

that even in a place where

they do not impose stringency upon themselves, and

they take payment for sitting—

it is necessary,

it is permitted

to take

payment, but

for standing—

it is not necessary;

it is forbidden for him

to take

payment.

And therefore the tanna taught, “He enters to visit him while standing,” because this matter applies everywhere. But visiting while sitting is forbidden in some places. That is, in a place where they do not impose stringency upon themselves regarding sitting, not to take payment, it turns out that the sick person is obligated to pay him, and when he takes nothing from him, it turns out that he provides him with a benefit.

And if you wish, say:

The tanna is speaking of every circumstance, even in a place where they do not take payment at all; rather, the Sages decreed that they should not visit him while sitting,

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim,

who said in another matter:

A decree lest he linger while standing.

Here too,

therefore it is forbidden to visit him while sitting,

a decree lest he linger while sitting

longer than is necessary for visiting the sick, and it turns out that he provides him with a benefit without the need of his mitzva.

But regarding standing, we are not concerned. Since you require him to stand, he has a distinguishing indication, and he will not linger longer than his mitzva.

Ulla said: It is always

speaking of our Mishna

in a case where the property of the sick person is forbidden to the visitor, and such as

that he did not prohibit him from his livelihood [that is, he did not prohibit him from the necessities of his life, and his intention was not to prohibit his fellow where he himself has a need, even though his fellow incidentally benefits from it in the process. See the Ran.], and therefore it is permitted for him to visit him even though he benefits from treading upon the ground.

to est on ne zapretil poluchat polzu ot togo, chto neobkhodimo samomu bolnomu, i ne namerevalsya zapretit drugomu polzovatsya tem, chto emu samomu neobkhodimo, khotya drug pri etom sluchayno poluchaet polzu. Poetomu emu razresheno poseshchat bolnogo, khotya on poluchaet polzu ot togo, chto stupayet na ego zemlyu.

And we object:

If so, even when sitting as well

it should be permitted!

And we answer:

That

for the sake of his livelihood

can be done while standing!

We challenge

from what we learned:

If he became sick—

he enters to visit him.

If his son became sick—

he asks about him in the marketplace.

Granted, according to Ulla, who said: It is a case where the property of the sick person is forbidden to the visitor, and such as that he did not prohibit him from his livelihood—

well.

For he did not prohibit benefit from his fellow for his own needs, and therefore it is permitted for him to visit him. But for the sake of his son’s life, it is possible that he did prohibit him, even though his son too would be restricted by his vow, and if so, it is forbidden for him to visit him, for he benefits from treading upon the ground.

But according to Shmuel, who said

that it is speaking

in a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the sick person,

and the prohibition is because of the custom to take payment for this, and he provides him with a benefit by not taking payment, if so,

what is the difference between him and what is the difference between his son?

On the contrary, it is more logical that it should be permitted to visit the son of the one who is forbidden by the vow than the one who is forbidden by the vow himself, for from his son he should have had to take payment, and not from him!

He could say to you

Shmuel: In truth,

the Mishna—

is speaking of a case where the property of the visitor is forbidden to the sick person

—is dealing with,

but in the

beraita—

it is speaking

of a case where the property of the sick person is forbidden to the visitor.

What is the decisiveness?

From where does Shmuel have grounds to distinguish between the Mishna and the beraita?