Nedarim 30a (ל.) — the Talmud in English

This is because, at the initial consecration, when he said, “until they are cut down,” he intended to consecrate them today, and he also intended to consecrate them again after he redeemed them. If so,

resolve

from our Mishna the matter

that Rav Hoshaya raised:

Since, when one says to his wife, “You are betrothed to me after I divorce you,” she is not betrothed, as this falls within the category of something that has not yet come into the world—for today he cannot betroth her to him, since she is already betrothed to him, and anything that one cannot do today, he cannot do tomorrow—what is the law in the case of

one who gives a woman two perutot and says to her: With one, you are betrothed to me today, and with the other, you are betrothed to me after I divorce you

if she is betrothed to him after he divorces her?

Is it to be said that, since he is able to betroth her today, this is not included in the category of something that has not yet come into the world? Or perhaps, since in the interim, from the time he betrothed her until the betrothal takes effect, this will be something that has not yet come into the world, he cannot betroth her today?

And according to Bar Peda’s interpretation, resolve from our Mishna that

so too, the betrothal takes effect

[that the betrothal takes effect], as follows:

One who says concerning an item consecrated to the Temple that it should become consecrated when he redeems it from its consecration—his consecration does not take effect, even if he redeems it. For at the time that he consecrated it, he was unable to impose consecration upon it, since the object was already consecrated. Just as when one says to his wife, “You are betrothed to me after I divorce you,” the betrothal does not take effect.

Nevertheless, it is clearly taught in our Mishna that if, at the time he consecrated the object, it was not yet consecrated, and he consecrated it to take effect after he redeemed it, the consecration takes effect. For this reason, when he redeemed the saplings from their consecration, they became consecrated again. From here you learn the same with regard to a woman who is betrothed, and Rav Hoshaya’s problem is resolved.

He awakened

[an expression of awakening from drowsiness]

among them, Rabbi

Jeremiah;

that is, Rabbi Jeremiah rose against them and

said to them:

Why are you comparing

consecration after redemption, when

he himself redeemed them

[the one who consecrated them],

to

the betrothal of a woman, which is like

others redeemed them

[and what comparison are you making—between the law of the saplings when the one who consecrated them redeemed them, and the betrothal of a woman, which is comparable to others redeeming them]?! As he proceeds to explain.

For

this is what Rabbi Yohanan said:

If he himself redeemed them,

that is, the one who consecrated them redeemed the saplings himself from the Temple treasury, then the saplings indeed

become consecrated again

because, since the saplings never entered another domain and remained throughout in the domain of the consecration—which is the domain destined to acquire the object even after he redeems it—or in the domain of the one who consecrated them, the consecration takes effect when the one who consecrated them redeems them.

But if

others redeemed them

from the Temple treasury, then at the time they were redeemed, before the second consecration took effect, they were neither in his domain nor in the domain of the consecration—

the saplings do not

become

consecrated again,

even though they subsequently returned to his domain.

And a woman,

when she is divorced, is

comparable to others redeeming them,

because at that time she is in her own domain. Therefore, the betrothal he performs, intended to take effect after he divorces her, is ineffective.

It was also stated

in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, as Rabbi Jeremiah said in his name:

Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yohanan said: The teaching applies only when he himself redeemed them.

But if others redeemed them, they do not become consecrated again.

Mishna:

The general principle with regard to vows is: “Follow ordinary human usage

”

That is, the way people ordinarily use language determines whether their words constitute a vow, and, accordingly, what their vow includes.

The

one who vows not to derive benefit

from “

those who go down to the sea”—

he is

permitted to benefit from “

those who dwell on the land,” even if they occasionally travel by sea, because the designation “those who go down to the sea” applies only to people who regularly sail on the sea in ships.

But one who vows

not to benefit from “

those who dwell on the land”—

he is

forbidden

also to benefit

from those who go down to the sea,

since

even

those who go down to the sea

are

included among “

those who dwell on the land,” since everyone who goes down to the sea eventually comes up onto the land.

The Mishna explains who “those who go down to the sea” are:

“Not like those who travel

,” who sail in a ship a short distance along the coast of the Land of Israel,

from Akko to Jaffa,

but rather those whose practice is to sail out

to distant places at sea.

The Gemara will explain whether the final sentence continues the preceding sentence, or whether it continues the statement made at the beginning of the Mishna.

Gemara:

Rav Pappa and Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika,

disagreed about the interpretation of the final sentence in the Mishna.

One teaches,

one of them recites the phrase, “Not like those who travel from Akko to Tiberias

”

with regard to the first clause, meaning that the Mishna intends to be lenient, as will be explained below.

And one teaches “

Not like those who travel from Akko to Tiberias”

with regard to the latter clause, meaning that the Mishna intends to be stringent, as will be explained below.

The Gemara explains:

The Gemara explains:

The one who teaches,

who recites, “Not like those who travel from Akko to Jaffa,”

with regard to the first clause—

teaches it as follows,

he recites the Mishna in this manner:

One who vows concerning those who go down to the sea—

is permitted to benefit from those who dwell on the land,

who are not accustomed to sail on the sea.

This applies specifically to those who go down to the sea—

he is

forbidden to benefit from them.

The Mishna continues to explain, and to be lenient, that he is not forbidden to benefit from every person who goes down to the sea—