Nedarim 26a (כו.) — the Talmud in English

And Rava

disagrees with Rabbah, and

said:

Beit Shammai also fundamentally hold that when part of a vow is released, the entire vow is void.

Everyone

holds that

wherever one says: “

Had I known that my father was among you, I would have said: So-and-so and so-and-so are forbidden, but my father is permitted” —

all of them are permitted.

Since both aspects have changed—that not everyone is forbidden, and that the wording does not remain as it was—the matter is considered a case in which part of the vow has been voided, and Beit Shammai agree with Beit Hillel that the entire vow is void.

Their entire dispute concerns the definition of the situation in which his father was not included in the vow and he retracts the wording of the vow: Is this considered a vow in which part was released, or not?

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree

about this,

but rather in the case of one who says: “Had I known that my father was among you, I would have said: All of you are forbidden except my father.”

Rava thus links their dispute to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda concerning one who says two things: Does the beginning of his statement determine his meaning, or is the end of his statement the essential part?

Beit Shammai follow the view of Rabbi Meir, who says: One takes hold of the initial wording,

and since his statement, “All of you are forbidden,” is the essential one, it remains in force even when he wishes to amend his vow. For even after he says, “Had I known that my father was among you, I would have stated my vow differently,” he leaves the beginning of his statement, in which he said “all of you,” in its place; he merely adds that he would have said “except my father.” We are not concerned with his statement “except my father,” because the beginning of his statement is the essential part, and it remains as it was. Therefore, this is not a vow in which part was voided, and consequently the entire vow is not released.

And Beit Hillel follow the view of Rabbi Yosei, who says: A person is held to the conclusion of his statement.

Since he now claims that he would have said “except my father,” and the end of his statement is the essential part, it turns out that he has also partially nullified the wording of his vow. Therefore, this is considered a vow in which part was voided, and the entire vow is released.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to Rava

from what we learned below [66a]:

How did Rabbi Akiva say: When part of a vow is released, the entire vow is released?

a. If one said: “

It is Konam for me to derive benefit from all of you” —

when

one of them is released, all of them are released.

b. And if he said: “

I will not derive benefit from this one and from that one” —

when

the first is released, all of them are released.

c. But if

the last is released —

only

the last is permitted, while all the others remain forbidden.

The first two matters are called the reisha, and the third matter is called the seifa.

This is how Rav Pappa challenged Rava:

Granted, according to Rabbah, he can establish the

two cases of the

reisha

as referring to one who

said: “

This one and that one.”

And

the third case, which is explained in the

seifa,

he can establish as referring to one who

said: “For all of you.”

That is, according to Rabbah’s view, it is possible to establish that Rabbi Akiva considers the vow partially voided because his father was among them, and once he learned that his father was among them, he now wished to retract both his vow concerning his father and the wording of his vow.

When there is a retraction both from part of the vow and from the wording of the vow, the matter is considered a vow in which part was released; therefore, according to Rabbi Akiva, the entire vow is released.

The Mishna brings two examples of this matter:

The first case concerns one who initially said, “All of you are forbidden,” and upon learning that his father was among them, claims that had he known that his father was among them he would have said, “This one and that one,” so that he would not include his father in the wording “all of you.”

Therefore, when “one is released”—that is, his father—the entire group is released.

The second case is the reverse: Initially, without knowing that his father was there, he said, “This one and that one.” Upon learning that his father was among them, he makes the opposite claim: Had he known that his father was among them, he would first have said, “All of you,” and afterward specified “except my father,” so as not to prolong the time during which he excludes his father from the general statement. For when he points one after another to the people present, they may think that he intends to forbid his father as well, and it will take time until it becomes clear to them that he is not forbidding his father; this is not respectful toward his father.

Here too, the Mishna’s intent in saying, “I will not derive benefit from this one and from that one; when the first is released, all of them are released,” is that once the vow concerning his father is released, all of them are released.

Thus, in the reisha, the Mishna presents two cases in which there is a change both in the vow and in its wording; Rabbi Akiva then holds that when part of a vow is released, the entire vow is released.

And in the seifa, the Mishna presents a third case, in which he upholds his statement and does not alter it; he merely wishes that the vow should not apply to his father.

Since he does not change his wording but only the application of his vow, this is not a vow in which part was released. Rather, only his father is permitted, because he was not included in the vow, while the rest remain forbidden.

The wording used by the Mishna, “the last is released,” refers to his father.

That is, whether he initially said “all of you” or initially said “this one and that one,” since he remains with his original statement and does not wish to alter it, this is not a vow in which part was released; therefore, the rest remain in their state of prohibition.

But

Rava,

according to you,

according to your view—

granted, concerning the reisha,

it is understandable that Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree;

he can establish it,

he can establish it as referring to one who

said initially, “I hereby forbid”

“

all of you,”

and he upholds his statement, but wishes that it should take effect except with regard to his father. Since he does not change his statement, only according to Rabbi Akiva is the matter considered a vow in which part was released, but not according to the Rabbis.