Nedarim 26a — the Talmud in English

And Rava

disagrees with Rabbah, and

said:

Even Beit Shammai fundamentally hold that a vow that was permitted in part is entirely permitted.

According to everyone

they hold: that

wherever he said “

Had I known that my father was among you, I would have said: So-and-so and so-and-so are forbidden, and my father is permitted” —

all of them are permitted.

Since both things change—both that not all of them are forbidden, and that the wording does not remain as it was—the matter is considered a partial annulment of the vow, and Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel that it is entirely annulled.

And their entire dispute is in defining the situation in which his father was not included in the vow and he retracts from the wording of the vow: whether this is a vow that was permitted in part or not.

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not dispute,

about this,

but rather when he says: “Had I known that my father was among you, I would have said: All of you are forbidden except my father.”

And Rava ties their dispute to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda concerning the question of one who says two things: whether the beginning of his words determines, or the end of his words is the principal part of his words.

Beit Shammai hold like Rabbi Meir, who says: Seize the first wording,

and since his words, “all of you are forbidden,” are the principal part, and they remain in force even if he wishes to correct his vow—for even after he claims, “Had I known that my father was among them, I would have said my vow differently,” he leaves in place the beginning of his words, in which he said “all of you,” except that he adds to them that he would have said “except my father.” And we do not concern ourselves with his statement, “except my father,” because the beginning of his words is the principal part, and it remains as it was. Therefore this is not a vow that was annulled in part, and consequently there is no basis for annulling all of it.

And Beit Hillel hold like Rabbi Yosei, who says: A person is held to the completion of his words.

And since he now claims that he would have said “except my father,” and the end of his words is the principal part, it follows that the wording of his vow was also annulled in part. Therefore the matter is considered a vow that was annulled in part, and all of it is permitted.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to Rava,

from what we learned below [66a]:

How did Rabbi Akiva say: A vow that was permitted in part is entirely permitted?

a. If he said, “

A konam: I shall not derive benefit from all of you” —

when

one of them was permitted, all of them were permitted.

b. And if he said, “

I shall not derive benefit from this one and this one” —

when

the first was permitted, all of them were permitted.

c. But if

the last was permitted —

only

the last is permitted, and all the others are forbidden.

The first two matters are called the reisha, and the third matter the seifa.

And this is how Rav Pappa argued with Rava:

Granted, according to Rabbah, he establishes the

two cases of the

reisha

as being where he

said “

this one and this one.”

And

the third case, which is explained in the

seifa,

he would establish as being where he

said, “all of you.”

That is, according to Rabbah’s method, it is possible to establish that the vow was annulled in part according to Rabbi Akiva, since his father was among them, and once he learned of his father’s presence among them, he now wishes to retract both from his vow concerning his father and from his wording.

And when there is a retraction both from part of the vow and from the wording of the vow, the matter is considered a vow that was permitted in part; therefore, according to Rabbi Akiva, all of it was permitted.

And the Mishna brings two examples of this matter:

The first case speaks of one who initially said, “All of you are forbidden,” and once he learned that his father was among them, he claims that had he known that his father was among them, he would have said, “this one and this one,” so as not to include his father in the wording “all of you.”

Therefore, when “one was permitted,” that is, his father, all of them were permitted.

And the second case speaks of the opposite situation: initially he said, “this one and this one,” without knowing that his father was there, and once he learned that his father was among them, he makes the opposite claim—that had he known that his father was among them, he would have first said, “all of you,” and afterward specified “except my father,” so as not to prolong the time during which he excludes his father from the general category. For when he points one after another at the people who are there, they will think that he intends to forbid his father as well, and it will take time until it becomes clear to them that he is not forbidding his father; and this is not to his father’s honor.

And here too, the intention of the Mishna when it says, “I shall not derive benefit from this one and this one; the first was permitted, all of them were permitted,” is that since the vow concerning his father was permitted, all of them were permitted.

That is, the Mishna stated in the reisha two cases in which there is a change both in the vow and in its wording; in such a case Rabbi Akiva holds: a vow that was permitted in part is entirely permitted.

And in the seifa the Mishna stated a third case, in which he upholds his words and does not change them, but merely wishes that the vow should not take effect concerning his father.

And since he does not change his wording but only the application of his vow, this is not a vow that was permitted in part; rather, only his father was permitted, since he was not included in his vow, and the rest remain permitted.

And the wording that the Mishna stated, “the last was permitted,” refers to his father.

That is, whether he initially said “all of you” or initially said “this one and this one,” since he remains with his statement and does not wish to change it, this is not a vow that was permitted in part; therefore the others remain in their forbidden status.

Rather,

Rava,

according to you,

according to your method—

Granted, the reisha,

it is understandable that Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis dispute,

he establishes it,

it can be established as being where he

said initially, “I hereby forbid”

“

“all of you,”

and you are establishing that he upholds his words, but wishes that it should take effect except concerning his father; and since he does not change his words, only according to Rabbi Akiva is the matter considered a vow that was permitted in part, but not according to the Rabbis.