Nedarim 25b (כה:) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

How are

erroneous vows

that do not take effect?

a. One who says: “This thing is konam to me,”

if I ate and if I drank,

and then remembered that he had eaten and drunk.

b. Or he made the konam contingent on the condition

that I eat and that I drink,

and forgot

his vow,

and ate and drank.

c.

He said: “Konam, my wife is forbidden to benefit from me

because

she stole my purse and struck my son,

and it became known that she had not struck him, and it became known that she had not stolen it.

d.

He saw them eating figs and said: “You are all forbidden to me as a korban,” and it turned out that his father and brothers were among them, and there were other people with them—

Beit Shammai say: They are permitted, and those who were with them are forbidden.

And Beit Hillel say: Both these and those are permitted,

because when a vow does not take effect with regard to part of its subject, it does not take effect in its entirety.

Gemara:

The tanna

in a beraita states:

Just as erroneous vows are permitted, so too erroneous oaths are permitted.

And we raise a question about this:

What are the circumstances of erroneous oaths?

For example, Rav Kahana and Rav Asi,

when they disagreed about Rav’s statement:

This one,

that is,

said: “An oath,”

I swear

that this is what Rav said.

And the other,

while this one,

said: “I swear that this is what Rav said,”

the opposite.

For each one—

according to his own understanding, he was justified in making the assertion.

Therefore, although it is clear that one of them was mistaken, neither is liable for his oath, since the one who was mistaken was certain that his statement was correct and swore according to his mistaken understanding.

We learned in the Mishna:

“He saw them eating,”

and prohibited them from eating, and his father and brothers were among them—all of them are permitted.

The Gemara now discusses a vow or an oath that was permitted with regard to part of its subject, asking whether it is thereby permitted in its entirety.

We learned there: “They seek an opening”

for the annulment of his vow from one who prohibited himself from meat and wine for one year, and he knows that during the year there are Shabbatot and Festivals on which there is a mitzva to drink wine and eat meat—

on Shabbatot and Festivals—

saying to him: “Had you remembered at the time of your vow that it is forbidden to refrain from drinking wine and eating meat on Shabbat and Festivals, would you also have vowed with regard to them?” And if he says no, on this basis they annul the vow for him.

At first they would say: Those days

—Shabbatot and Festivals—

are permitted, but all the other days are forbidden.

Until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: A vow that was permitted with regard to part of its subject—

is permitted in its entirety!

Rabbah and Rava disagreed concerning the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages.

According to Rabbah’s approach, one must first understand that after the one who made the vow learns that his father was among those included in it, he can retract his prohibition of his father, since it was certainly an erroneous vow, in one of two ways:

First, he can completely retract the wording by which he included his father among those whom he prohibited, and say: “Had I known that my father was among them, I would not have said ‘all of you’; rather, I would have specified the names of those who were forbidden, and I would not have included my father among them.”

Second, he can retain the wording “all of you” that he uttered, but retract his failure to add to his statement: “except my father.”

Rabbah said: Everyone agrees—

whenever he says: “Had I known

at the time I made my vow

that my father was among you, I would have said

‘All of you are forbidden, except my father’”—

all of them are forbidden, and his father is permitted.

This is because the vow remains as it was, and this is not a vow that was permitted with regard to part of its subject, since it is clear that he did not intend to prohibit his father; it has now become clear that he did not include him when he said “all of you,” and this is therefore not a vow that was permitted with regard to part of its subject.

They did not disagree,

the Sages and Rabbi Akiva,

except where he says: “Had I known that my father was among you, I would have said

‘So-and-so and so-and-so are forbidden, and my father is permitted,’”

thereby revoking the wording of the vow.

His claim that, had he known, he would have said this is on account of the honor of his father: he should not have said “all of you” when his father was among them, since it would appear as though he were prohibiting his father.

And in this they disagreed, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, as to whether we say that a vow that was permitted with regard to part of its subject is permitted in its entirety, since here, too, the vow of “all of you” does not remain intact, and the wording of the vow does not remain as it was, but is amended with regard to part of the vow.