Nedarim 24a (כד.) — the Talmud in English

Come and hear,

from

as we learned [below, 63b]:

below, 63b]:

One who says to another

“It is konam that I may not derive benefit from you if you do not take

from me

a kor of wheat and two jugs of wine for your son”—

this

is what he said to him;

he can

do so

release his vow without the authorization of a Sage.

Because

he can say to him: Did you say

this

only

for my honor,

so that people would see how honored I am in your eyes?

But now,

this is my honor

in the eyes of the people: that I do not take anything from you, and your desire has thereby been fulfilled; consequently, the vow is dissolved, since you made it only in order to fulfill your desire to honor me!

The Gemara infers:

The reason

that his vow is not a vow is

that

the other said: “

This is my honor.”

If that were not so—

it would be a vow.

Who is the tanna,

and which tanna taught this Mishna?

If it is Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov,

then according to his view, in our Mishna, anyone who refuses his fellow’s offer and imposes a vow upon him has

a vow of exhortation!

Rather, conclude from this that the Rabbis disagree with him.

And the Mishna below follows their opinion.

The Gemara rejects this:

Actually,

the Rabbis do not disagree with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, and the Mishna below also follows the view of

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

And Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov concedes in this case

that if the other does not say, “This is my honor, that I do not take anything from you,”

it is a genuine vow,

and not a vow of exhortation.

Because

he says to him,

the one who imposed the vow, who derives benefit from his fellow and asks that his fellow also derive benefit from him:

“I am not a dog;

I am not a dog that merely derives benefit and does not provide benefit;

for I derive benefit from you,

whereas you

do not derive benefit from me.”

But our Mishna is speaking of a case in which the one who provides the benefit is also the one who imposed the vow, and not the one who derives the benefit; therefore, it is a vow of exhortation.

Come and hear

from the continuation of that same Mishna below:

One who says to another: “It is konam that you may not derive benefit from me if you do not give my son a kor of wheat and two jugs of wine”—

Rabbi Meir says:

he is forbidden

until he gives them.

And the Sages say: In this case too, he can release his vow without the authorization of a Sage,

because

he can say: “

I consider myself as though I had received it,”

and your desire has been fulfilled; there is no longer any possibility for the vow to take effect, since you made the vow only for the sake of fulfilling your desire, and it has indeed been fulfilled.

The Gemara infers:

The reason is that he said: “

I consider myself as though I had received it;”

if that were not so—

it would be a vow.

Who?

If it is Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov,

then such a vow

is a vow of exhortation!

Rather, is it not the Rabbis

who taught it?

And

this proves that

they disagree

with him!

The Gemara rejects this:

No; actually,

they did not disagree with him, and this Mishna also follows the view of

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov

as well.

And Rabbi Eliezer concedes in this vow

that

it is a genuine vow.

Because he says to him,

the one who imposed the vow:

“I am not a king, who provides you with benefit while you provide me with no benefit.”

Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear

from the Mishna below, in our chapter [27a]:

Vows made under duress,

which do not take effect—how so?

If one imposed a vow upon his fellow

in order

that he eat with him, and he or his son became ill, or a river impeded him,

this is a vow made under duress, and it does not take effect.

If that were not so—

it would be a vow.

Who is the tanna?

If it is Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov,

then according to his view, the vow

is a vow of exhortation!

Rather, is it not the Rabbis

who taught it,

and

this proves that

they disagree

with him!

The Gemara rejects this:

Actually, it is the view of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov,

and the Rabbis do not disagree with him.

And do you think that the one who invited him imposed the vow upon the invitee,

meaning that the one who invited him to the meal imposed a vow upon the invited guest?

No,

that is not the case. Rather,

it is the invitee

who

imposed a vow upon the one who invited him,

the one who invited him.

For the invitee said to him,

the one who invited him: “Are you

inviting me to your meal?”

He said to him,

the one who invited him:

“Yes.”

The invitee then said again to the one who invited him: Impose

this vow upon yourself:

that if you do not feed me a meal, you will be forbidden to derive benefit from my property;

and he imposed the vow

because the invitee urged him to do so.

And

now

he became ill,

the invitee,

or his son became ill, or a river impeded him,

and he is unable to come to the meal—

these are vows made under duress,

and not vows of exhortation. For the one who invited him did not make this vow because he wanted to urge the invitee to come; rather, he made it only because the invitee asked him to impose it.

Come and hear

from a beraita in the Tosefta [chapter 2]:

“Moreover, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: One who says to another, ‘It is konam that I may not derive benefit from you if you do not stay as a guest with me, eat hot bread with me, and drink a cup of hot drink with me,’ and

after all this

the other became angry with him

and did not come—

these too are vows of exhortation.

And the Sages did not concede to him.

And we infer:

What is meant by “

the Sages did not concede to him”?

Is it not