Nedarim 16b (טז:) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “This” — these are the distinctions taught in the earlier mishnayot — “is the greater stringency of oaths than of vows”:

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Since the tanna taught the expression

“greater stringency”

of oaths than of vows,

by inference

the oath alone is more stringent than the vow, in that it takes effect by Torah law; but even with regard to vows,

there is a vow

by rabbinic law

!? But

in the Mishna above, on page 15b, in the formulations through which the Mishna distinguishes between the expression “offering” and the expression “oath,” it

teaches

“permitted”

with regard to vows expressed with the term “offering.” If so, it is not a vow at all, even by rabbinic law!? And we answer: The expression “greater stringency” taught by the tanna indeed does not refer to the second distinction between oaths and vows; rather,

it is taught concerning the conclusion of the other tractate

[Mishna]

it teaches:

As we learned above, on page 15b:

“An oath that I will not sleep, that I will not speak, or that I will not walk—he is prohibited,”

and it is with reference to this clause that the tanna uses the expression “greater stringency,” saying:

“This”

is

the greater stringency of oaths than of vows,

for indeed even vows take effect by rabbinic law with regard to something that has no substance. We learned in the Mishna:

“The greater stringency of vows than of oaths: How so?”

and so on—that one may not swear to violate the mitzvot:

Rav Kahana taught

Rabbi Kahana recited [he would transmit the following teaching] as follows:

Rabbi Giddel said that Rav said,

and

Rav Taviumi recited

[he would transmit that teaching in the name of another amora]:

Rabbi Giddel said that Shmuel said:

From where is it derived that one may not swear to violate the mitzvot,

as we learned in our Mishna?

The verse states: “[A man who takes a vow to the Lord or swears an oath to prohibit a prohibition upon himself,]

he shall not profane his word”;

“He shall not profane his word,” but he may profane [his oath] with regard to matters of Heaven.

but the view of the Ran above, on 8a, is that one who swears to uphold a positive commandment, although he is not liable for an offering, nevertheless transgresses “he shall not profane ; and from the words of the Ramban it is compelled that it is as the author of Birkat Avraham explained. d. Even from the words of the Ran in our sugya one can prove the words of Birkat Avraham, from what the Ran wrote [brought in the note above] to explain the expression “the stringency of vows over oaths” with regard to nullifying a mitzva: for this reason we teach “stringency,” because indeed an oath at least exists with regard to a vain oath; see there. And if you should say that an oath to nullify a mitzva is included within the category of an oath, but the Torah “permitted” one to transgress the oath for matters of Heaven, the Ran’s words have no place ; necessarily, an oath concerning matters of Heaven does not have the status of an oath at all. This is what the Ran wrote: only with regard to upholding the oath is such an oath not included within the category of an oath, but with regard to the prohibition of a vain oath, it is included within the category of an oath.

The Gemara challenges this: From this verse, just as you exclude an oath concerning the requirements of Heaven, you should likewise exclude a vow concerning the requirements of Heaven. It must be that the reason a vow takes effect even with regard to the requirements of Heaven, as explained in our Mishna, is that it is written: “A person who takes a vow to the Lord,” and the additional word “to the Lord” expands the law to include a vow concerning the requirements of Heaven. Now the question is:

We object: But from this verse, just as you exclude an oath concerning matters of Heaven, so too you should exclude a vow concerning matters of Heaven. Necessarily, the reason that a vow takes effect even with regard to matters of Heaven, as explained in our Mishna, is that it is stated: “A man who takes a vow to the Lord,” and through the additional word “to the Lord,” a vow concerning matters of Heaven is included. Now this is difficult:

What is different about a vow

that it takes effect to nullify the mitzva of the Lord, because

it is written, “A man who takes a vow to the Lord”

“He shall not profane his word”?

and see an explanation of his reasoning in the tractate printed at the end of Chiddushei Rabbi Shmuel to Nedarim, beginning of section 1, and see there an extensive discussion of the words of the Nimukei Yosef. And in Sha'ar HaMelekh, chapter 3 of Nedarim, he was astonished at the very question of the Rashba, for is it not a scriptural decree: “To the Lord—he shall not profane his word,” so that there is a prohibition even against a mitzva!? And in Birkat Avraham he wrote, based on what he proved [see the note above], that the character of the derivation “but he may profane [his oath] for matters of Heaven” is not permission to transgress for the sake of matters of Heaven, but a disclosure that an oath does not apply to matters of Heaven. Accordingly, “to the Lord he shall not profane his word” is not a prohibition, but a disclosure that matters of Heaven are included in every vow; and if everywhere a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment, then by law this negative commandment should have been overridden.

But

But

an oath too—is it not written:

“Or swears an oath to the Lord—he shall not profane his word,”

that is: Since it is written, “[when he takes] a vow to the Lord or swears an oath,” the expression “to the Lord” is expounded as referring to the oath that follows it, just as though it had been written, “swears an oath to the Lord.” Thus it is learned that even if his oath involves nullifying a mitzva, he should be prohibited from profaning his word!?

He said

in answer,

Abaye:

This is when he says,

“The benefit of the sukka is forbidden to me.”

This is when he says,

“I swear that I will not derive benefit from the sukka.”

That is: It is logical that “to the Lord” refers only to a vow to nullify a mitzva, since a vow necessarily uses the formulation “The benefit of the sukka is forbidden to me,” for this is the formulation of a vow everywhere: he prohibits the object to himself. Since he prohibited the object, and not himself, while in the case of a mitzva it is the person, and not the object, who is obligated, the vow takes effect.

But an oath formulated as “I swear that I will not derive benefit from the sukka,” which is the formulation of “the person is prohibited with regard to the object,” logically should not take effect, since it contradicts the mitzva that obligates the person to perform it.

He said

and challenged

Rava

objected to Abaye’s formulation, according to which one who says, “The benefit of the sukka is forbidden to me,” is prohibited from sitting in the sukka:

Are mitzvot given for benefit,

that the one who took the vow should become prohibited from deriving benefit from the sukka? Is this not benefit at all? For the mitzvot were given as a yoke upon the necks of Israel, and not in order to derive benefit from them?

Rather, Rava said

in accordance with Abaye’s answer, but in different wording:

This

—a vow to nullify a mitzva that takes effect—

is when he says

“Sitting in the sukka is forbidden to me”

[that is, he said: “The sukka for its sitting is forbidden to me”],

for he prohibited the act of sitting to himself, and therefore the vow takes effect.

But

—an oath that does not take effect to nullify a mitzva—

is when he says, “I swear that I will not sit in the sukka,”

for since he prohibits himself from sitting, the oath does not take effect.

We raise a further objection to the source cited by Rabbi Giddel for the law that “one may not swear to violate the mitzvot,” from what is stated: “He shall not profane his word, but he may profane with regard to matters of Heaven”:

And

is it really the case that

“one may not swear to violate the mitzvot” is derived from here

—from “He shall not profane his word”—

it is derived from it [that is, is it learned from here]!?

?

But

from there

—from another verse—

is it not derived from there!?

As it is taught in a beraita:

One might have thought: If he swore to nullify the mitzva but did not nullify it, one might have thought that he would be liable?