Nedarim 16b — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: This is—the distinctions that we learned in the Mishnayot above—the stringency of oaths over vows:

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Since the tanna taught the expression:

“stringency”

in oaths over vows,

it follows that

the oath is merely more stringent than the vow, in that it takes effect by Torah law, but also with regard to vows,

there is a vow

by rabbinic law

! But

in the Mishna above, on 15b, concerning the expressions in which the Mishna distinguished between the expression “offering” and the expression “oath,”

“permitted”

it teaches

with regard to vows expressed with the word “offering”; and if so, it is not a vow at all, even by rabbinic law!? And we answer: The expression “stringency” that the tanna taught indeed does not refer to the second distinction between oaths and vows, but

to the conclusion of that other section

[Mishna]

it teaches: ;

and from the middle of the Mishna on 15b until the end of the Mishna here is a second Mishna ; and it emerges that the section “An oath that I will not sleep, etc.” is the conclusion of the preceding Mishna. This is what they said in the Gemara: “To the conclusion of that other section it teaches”; and the expression bava means Mishna, [and the expression “vows is unusual]. that we learned above, on 15b:

“An oath that I will not sleep, that I will not speak, that I will not walk is forbidden,”

and here the tanna refers to this passage with the expression “stringency,” and says:

“This”

is

the stringency of oaths over vows,

for indeed even vows take effect by rabbinic law with regard to an entity that has no substance. We learned in the Mishna:

“The stringency of vows over oaths—how so?”

etc., for one does not swear to transgress the mitzvot: ;

however, Tosafot there wrote that everyone agrees on this. b. The Ran wrote: “And as for the fact that we also do not infer, with regard to ‘the stringency of vows over oaths’ [that vows take effect to nullify a mitzva, whereas one does not swear to transgress the mitzvot], ‘it follows that an oath at least exists,’ it is because indeed it exists, and one is flogged for it on account of a vain oath, but it does not take effect to nullify a mitzva,” [and see the note on this below in the course of the sugya]. Rav Kahana taught

[he would recite the following teaching] as follows:

Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav,

and

Rav Tavyomi taught

[he would recite that teaching in the name of another amora]:

Rav Giddel said in the name of Shmuel:

From where is it established that one does not swear to transgress the mitzvot,

as we learned in our Mishna?

The verse states:

“[If a man makes a vow to the Lord, or swears an oath to impose a prohibition upon himself]

he shall not profane his word,”

“His word he shall not profane, but he may profane [his oath] for matters of Heaven.” ;

but the view of the Ran above, on 8a, is that one who swears to uphold a positive commandment, although he is not liable for an offering, nevertheless transgresses “he shall not profane ; and from the words of the Ramban it is compelled that it is as the author of Birkat Avraham explained. d. Even from the words of the Ran in our sugya one can prove the words of Birkat Avraham, from what the Ran wrote [brought in the note above] to explain the expression “the stringency of vows over oaths” with regard to nullifying a mitzva: for this reason we teach “stringency,” because indeed an oath at least exists with regard to a vain oath; see there. And if you should say that an oath to nullify a mitzva is included within the category of an oath, but the Torah “permitted” one to transgress the oath for matters of Heaven, the Ran’s words have no place ; necessarily, an oath concerning matters of Heaven does not have the status of an oath at all. This is what the Ran wrote: only with regard to upholding the oath is such an oath not included within the category of an oath, but with regard to the prohibition of a vain oath, it is included within the category of an oath.

And we raise an objection: From this verse, just as you exclude an oath concerning matters of Heaven, so you should exclude a vow concerning matters of Heaven. Necessarily, the reason that a vow takes effect even concerning matters of Heaven, as explained in our Mishna, is that it is stated: “If a man makes a vow to the Lord,” and through the addition “to the Lord” the vow concerning matters of Heaven is included—and now it is difficult:

What is different about a vow

that it takes effect to nullify the commandment of the Lord, because

it is written, “If a man makes a vow to the Lord

[etc.]

he shall not profane his word”? ;

and see an explanation of his reasoning in the tractate printed at the end of Chiddushei Rabbi Shmuel to Nedarim, beginning of section 1, and see there an extensive discussion of the words of the Nimukei Yosef. And in Sha'ar HaMelekh, chapter 3 of Nedarim, he was astonished at the very question of the Rashba, for is it not a scriptural decree: “To the Lord—he shall not profane his word,” so that there is a prohibition even against a mitzva!? And in Birkat Avraham he wrote, based on what he proved [see the note above], that the character of the derivation “but he may profane [his oath] for matters of Heaven” is not permission to transgress for the sake of matters of Heaven, but a disclosure that an oath does not apply to matters of Heaven. Accordingly, “to the Lord he shall not profane his word” is not a prohibition, but a disclosure that matters of Heaven are included in every vow; and if everywhere a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment, then by law this negative commandment should have been overridden.

But

an oath also—behold, it is written:

“or swears an oath to the Lord

he shall not profane his word,”

that is: Since it is written, “[if he makes a vow] to the Lord, or swears an oath,” “to the Lord” is expounded with regard to the oath that follows it, just as it is expounded with regard to the vow that precedes it, as though it were written, “he swears an oath to the Lord”; and we learn that even if his oath contains the nullification of a mitzva, it is forbidden for him to profane his word!?

He said

he answered,

Abaye:

This

is when he says, “The benefit of the sukka is forbidden to me.”

This

is when he says, “An oath that I will not benefit from the sukka.”

That is: It is logical that “to the Lord” refers only to a vow to nullify a mitzva, for the vow is necessarily expressed as “the benefit of the sukka is forbidden to me,” for this is the expression of a vow everywhere: it prohibits the object to him. Since he prohibited the object, and not himself, whereas with regard to a mitzva it is he who is obligated and not the object, the vow takes effect.

But an oath expressed as “an oath that I will not benefit from the sukka,” which is the expression of: the person is prohibited with regard to the object, it is logical that this oath should not take effect, for it contradicts the mitzva that obligates the person to perform it. ;

but one who prohibits his mouth is no worse than one who prohibited any other object from using it to perform the mitzva, for the vow takes effect to nullify matters of Heaven. b. Above, in the Gemara on 15b, the Gemara asked concerning what we learned: “Konam, I will not engage in intercourse with you; behold, this is subject to ‘he shall not profane his word’”—“But he is biblically bound to her, as it is written: ‘Her food, her clothing, and her marital relations he shall not diminish.’” And the Shita Mekubetzet explained in the name of the Ra’ah [and see also the Rashba there]: But he is nullifying the mitzva, etc. And as for the fact that vows take effect upon a matter of mitzva as upon an optional matter, we establish it below [in our sugya] as referring to one who attached the prohibition to the object, saying: “The sitting in the sukka is forbidden to me,” for he does not appear to be nullifying a mitzva. But “Konam, I will not sit in the sukka” [that is, he said: “My body shall be forbidden for sitting in the sukka,” for otherwise this would be a vow concerning an entity that has no substance] does not take effect, since he appears to be nullifying a mitzva by attaching the prohibition to himself; and here too he attached it to himself, saying: “Konam, I will not engage in intercourse with you.” It appears from his words that one who says: “My mouth shall be forbidden for the recitation of Shema” is obligated to recite Shema. The reason is as the language of the Gemara above: “But he is bound to her” [for we do not find this expression anywhere when discussing a vow, an oath, or nezirut to nullify a mitzva]; that is, a person’s limbs are bound to fulfill his mitzvot, and in the obligation of marital relations they are bound to the woman. c. According to the method of the Ra’ah, the language of the Gemara in our sugya, “This is when he says” and “This is when he says,” is well understood. According to the Ran it is not so well settled, since this is not an ukimta but is necessarily so; but according to the Ra’ah it is indeed an ukimta: even a vow does not take effect to nullify a mitzva except in the manner stated by the Gemara, as the Ra’ah says, “We establish it below.” d. We further learn from the method of the Ra’ah that, in his view [unlike what is implied by the language of the Ran and other early authorities], the essential distinction is because with a vow “he does not appear” to be vowing to nullify the mitzva, whereas with an oath he appears to be swearing to nullify the mitzva [and examine carefully the language of the commentary of the Rosh here]. According to this method, the essential reason that an oath does not take effect upon the nullification of a mitzva is that he is “swearing to nullify the mitzva,” and not that his oath lacks the power to nullify the mitzva ; and something similar was brought in the note in the Mishna from the responsa of the Rosh; see there. There would also be a practical difference in this principle in the case of one who swore concerning an object that, at the time of his oath, did not involve the nullification of a mitzva, and afterward it became a mitzva—for example, he swore concerning an object that he would not eat it, and afterward dedicated it as an offering and became obligated to eat it. He said

he challenged

Rava

Abaye’s wording, that one who says “the benefit of the sukka is forbidden to me” is forbidden to sit in the sukka:

“Were the mitzvot given for benefit,

so that the one who vowed should be forbidden through benefit from the sukka? But this is not benefit at all, for the mitzvot were given as a yoke upon the necks of Israel, and not for deriving benefit from them.”

Rather, Rava said

like Abaye’s resolution, but in different wording:

This

—a vow to nullify a mitzva that takes effect—

is when he says

“The sitting in the sukka is forbidden to me,”

[that is, he said: “The sukka, for sitting in it, is forbidden to me” ], for he prohibited the sitting to himself, and therefore it takes effect. and see there. ; and the Ran explained that Rava was not precise in his wording, but intended to exclude the expression “benefit” used by Abaye. However, he brought in the name of Tosafot that even if he said “the sitting in the sukka is forbidden to me,” this is not considered an entity that has no substance, “for an entity that has no substance is called such only when he does not mention the name of the object that he prohibits to himself, such as ‘I will sleep’ or ‘I will speak’; but when he mentions the prohibited object, it is an entity with substance. b. We learn from the words of Tosafot that one who says “Konam, I will sleep” is not considered to have mentioned the name of the object, although if he said “Konam, my body is forbidden in sleep,” it would certainly be effective, just as “Konam, my eyes are forbidden in sleep ; and the reason is along the lines explained above in the note in the name of Rabbi Dovid Povarsky, of blessed memory: “I” does not include a person’s limbs, but his identity. c. The Rashba above, on 15b, wrote that “the benefit of your intercourse is forbidden to me” is not a vow concerning an entity that has no substance, “for since he mentions the name of the object whose intercourse-benefit he prohibits to himself, although he does not utter the prohibition in his mouth and with his expression, but only concerning its benefit, it is as though he prohibited the object for his benefit; and so I have seen from some of the rabbis of France, of blessed memory, in Tosafot concerning ‘the sitting in the sukka is forbidden to me ; however, from the words of the Ran, who wrote above concerning “the benefit of your intercourse is forbidden to me” that it is a vow concerning an entity that has no substance, and did not bring the words of Tosafot that he brought here, it appears that “the benefit of your intercourse is forbidden to me” is similar to “Konam, I will sleep,” which is not considered as mentioning the name of the object.

But

—an oath that does not take effect to nullify a mitzva—

is when he says

“An oath that I will not sit in the sukka,”

and since he prohibits himself from sitting, the oath does not take effect.

We raise another objection to the source that Rav Giddel stated for the law “one does not swear to transgress the mitzvot,” from what is stated: “He shall not profane his word, but he may profane [his oath] for matters of Heaven”:

And

is it so that

“one does not swear to transgress the mitzvot” is derived from here

—from “he shall not profane his word”—

it is derived

[it is learned from here]!?

But

from there

—from another verse—

it is derived!?

For it was taught:

One might say: If he swore to nullify the mitzva and did not nullify it, one might say that he should be liable?