Nedarim 10a (י.) — the Talmud in English

Even if you say:

you may say that our Mishna follows the view of

Rabbi Yehuda

—

For

where

did Rabbi Yehuda say

that one who makes a vow and fulfills it is “better than both”—only

in

one who makes a

voluntary offering.

For example, one who consecrates an animal and says, “This is an olah offering,” or something similar, in which case he does not assume liability for fulfilling his vow.

But

with a vow,

in which he obligates himself and says, “It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah offering”—

Rabbi Yehuda did not say

that one who makes a vow and fulfills it is better than both.

And we challenge this:

But it is taught

explicitly in the statement of Rabbi Yehuda:

“Better than both”—

one who makes a vow and fulfills it!?

And we answer:

Read

the statement of Rabbi Yehuda as follows: “Better than both”—one who

makes a voluntary offering and fulfills it.

And Rabbi Yehuda expounds the verse in accordance with Rabbi Meir: the one who is better than both is one who does not make a vow at all. However, Rabbi Meir applies the words of the verse both to one who makes a vow and to one who makes a voluntary offering, whereas Rabbi Yehuda applies them only to one who makes a vow and not to one who makes a voluntary offering. For according to Rabbi Yehuda, one who makes a voluntary offering and fulfills it is better than both.

We inquire:

What is different about one who makes a vow, who is not

better off making a vow—because

perhaps he will come to a mishap,

if he does not fulfill his vow?

If so, a

voluntary offering also

should not be considered preferable to making a voluntary offering—because

perhaps he will come to a mishap,

by failing to bring to the Temple within three Festivals the animal he consecrated as an offering, thereby violating the prohibition of bal te’acher, “do not delay”!?

And we answer: There is no need for such concern! For

Rabbi Yehuda

follows

his own reasoning, as he said: A person

who wishes to make a voluntary offering should not consecrate the offering at home. Rather, he

brings his ewe

while it is still unconsecrated until close

to the Temple courtyard, and

only there does he

consecrate it; then he brings it into the courtyard,

and

leans his hands upon it

there

and slaughters it.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Yehuda, there is no concern regarding a voluntary offering that he might delay bringing his offering.

And we challenge this:

That works well with voluntary offerings of offerings,

as there is no concern that he might delay bringing it, since he consecrates it close to the courtyard.

But a

voluntary offering

of nazirite status,

where at the time he accepts nazirite status he also accepts upon himself, as part of his nazirite vow, to bring the offerings of a nazirite after he completes thirty days of nazirite status—

what can be said?

Here, after all, the offering is brought only thirty days after accepting nazirite status, and there is concern that he might delay bringing the offering!

And we answer:

Rabbi Yehuda

follows

his own reasoning,

for there are righteous people who yearn to bring obligatory offerings, in addition to voluntary offerings. Consequently, they undertake nazirite status and thereby become obligated to bring the obligatory offerings of a nazirite. They are called “those who make voluntary offerings” rather than “those who make vows,” since the intention of their vow stems from their generous impulse.

And with regard to these righteous nazirites, there is no concern that they will come to the mishap of bal te’acher, “do not delay.” It is of them that Rabbi Yehuda said: “Better than both—the one who makes a voluntary offering and fulfills it.”

For it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: The early pious ones yearned to bring a sin offering, because the Holy One, blessed be He, does not cause an accidental transgression

of committing a sin inadvertently

through them,

and they did not have the opportunity to fulfill the mitzva of bringing a sin offering.

What would they do?

They

would stand and voluntarily accept nazirite status for the sake of Heaven, so that they would become obligated to bring

a

sin offering for the sake of Heaven,

since at the end of his nazirite status a nazirite brings a sin offering, in addition to an olah offering and a peace offering.

Rabbi Shimon says: The early pious ones did not undertake

the status of

a nazirite!

Rather, one who wishes to bring an olah offering—

makes a voluntary offering and brings it.

A peace offering—

makes a voluntary offering and brings it.

A thanksgiving offering and the four types of loaves—

makes a voluntary offering and brings them.

But with regard to nazirite status—they

did not make a voluntary offering

at all,

so that they would not be called

“sinners.”

As

it is stated

[Numbers 6] concerning a nazirite who became impure, when he brings the offerings of an impure nazirite:

“And he shall make atonement for him, for that he sinned against the person.”

Abaye said: Shimon the Righteous, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Elazar HaKappar—

they all follow one approach, that a nazirite—

is a “sinner”

indeed!

And the Gemara explains:

Shimon the Righteous and Rabbi Shimon—

that which we have said.

And Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished—

For it was taught: Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished says:

It is stated concerning the sin offering of a nazirite:

“And he shall make atonement for him, for that he sinned against the person.”

And in what

person

did

this

nazirite sin?

Rather,

he requires atonement for the sin that he committed against his own person by

afflicting himself by abstaining from wine.

And is this not a kal va-chomer: If one who afflicted himself only by abstaining from wine is called a “sinner”—

one who afflicts himself

through a vow

from

eating

any food—

how much more so

is he called a “sinner”!

From here

the Sages said:

Anyone who sits in a fast—

is called

a “sinner”!

And we challenge this:

But

this

verse itself,

this verse—

is written concerning an impure nazirite,

who sinned through impurity,

is it not!?

How can you derive from it a ruling concerning one who did not sin?

And we answer: The verse is in fact speaking of every nazirite, even one who did not sin through impurity.

And the reason the verse states this specifically in connection with an impure nazirite is

because he has committed a doubled sin,

as he compounded his sin: He accepted nazirite status, and he also failed to observe his nazirite status.

Mishna:

We learned in the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter: “All substitute expressions for vows are like vows.” The Mishna now explains what the substitute expressions are:

One who says: Konam, Konah, Kons—

these are substitute expressions for an offering.

One who says:

Harak, Harakh, Haraf—

these are substitute expressions for a herem.

One who says:

Nazik, Naziah, Paziah—

these are substitute expressions for nazirite status.

And one who says:

Shevuta, Shekuka,

or who says: “I hereby

vow”

[swear]

by

an oath of

Mohei [“Mohei” is a substitute expression for Moses, who swore to Jethro that he would remain with him in Midian]—

“Mohi” is a substitute expression for Moses, who swore to Jethro that he would remain with him in Midian—

these are substitute expressions for an oath.

Gemara:

It was stated: Substitute expressions—

Rabbi Yohanan said: They are the language of the nations,

for in their language they call an offering “Konam” or “Konah.”

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: They are a language

that is distinctive,

which the Sages invented

for themselves, to make vows with it.

Ritva wrote at the beginning of the chapter that only in a place where people are accustomed to vow or swear with these substitute expressions do the vow and the oath take effect by Torah law. And it is apparent that a foreign language, Arabic, and the like are considered substitute expressions, and it is forbidden [to vow or swear] with them. In light of this, the Mishna Berura ruled [in Biur Halakha, section 62] concerning the recitation of the Shema [the halakha is that one fulfills it in every language], that only in a place where the people of the country speak this language does one fulfill there the obligation of reciting the Shema; but one does not fulfill the obligation of reciting the Shema in a foreign language if he recites it in a place where this language is not the spoken language of that place, except if he recites it in the Holy Tongue, since all languages are substitute expressions, whereas the Holy Tongue is the language itself. See the novellae of Rabbi Shmuel [section 1, paragraph 2], who proved from Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh that only with regard to considering substitute expressions to be the language itself is there a distinction between a place where they use this substitute expression and a place where they do not use it; but a foreign language, which is not a substitute expression but a language, fulfills [the obligation] with it everywhere. And he explained there that this matter depends upon the dispute between Ritva and Ran on the one hand and Maimonides on the other. For it is possible to explain that the point of their dispute is the question of whether a section concerning substitute expressions was newly established with regard to vows, or whether substitute expressions are considered like the language itself everywhere, and all that was newly established with regard to vows is only that they may be uttered in every language, and consequently the substitute expressions too are part of the language. It is proven from Ran at the beginning of the chapter that according to his view no verse is needed to establish the matter of substitute expressions insofar as they are the languages of non-Jews; rather, the entire innovation of the Mishna that substitute expressions for vows are like vows is to say that vows are uttered in all languages. And this is likewise proven from Ritva, who holds that the foreign languages are included among the substitute expressions mentioned in the Mishna, and wrote that they apply only in a place where they are spoken. According to this explanation, one can fulfill the obligation of reciting the Shema only in a place where this language is used. However, the Jerusalem Talmud expounds the substitute expressions for vows from the verse, and it is proven that there is an innovation in the substitute expressions themselves, and they are not included within the language. And Maimonides will likewise hold this; therefore, according to him, with a language there is no deficiency of language in a place where it is not used, and one can fulfill the obligation of reciting the Shema [and likewise vow a vow] even in a place where this language is not used. And he brought there [in paragraph 4] that he heard in the name of the GRIZ that one does not fulfill the obligation of reciting the Shema with substitute expressions, but only with the language itself.

And likewise it says [I Kings 12]: “

And so it says

[I Kings 12]:

“In the month that he had devised in his own heart.”

And what is the reason the Sages instituted

the distinctive language of

“substitute expressions”

?

So that he should not say,

so that a person would train himself not to say, when making a vow, “This thing is incumbent upon me as a

sacrifice,”

but would become accustomed to saying, “This thing is incumbent upon me as a Konam,” or “This thing is incumbent upon me as a Konah,” and similarly with the other substitute expressions.

We inquire:

And let him say,

let him say

“sacrifice,”

as what concern is it to us that he should say this!?

And we answer: We must be concerned

lest he say,

perhaps he will say, “This thing is incumbent upon me as a

sacrifice to the Lord.”

But we still inquire:

And let him say,

let the one making the vow say, “This thing is incumbent upon me as a

sacrifice to the Lord,”

as what concern is it to us that he should say this!? We answer: The Sages were concerned

lest he say,

perhaps the one making the vow will intend to say, “This thing is incumbent upon me—a sacrifice to the Lord,” and will begin to say, “This thing is incumbent upon me

to the Lord,”

but before he finishes expressing his vow and says “sacrifice,” he will withdraw his intention to make a vow,

and will not say

“sacrifice.”

And

it will turn out that by saying merely “to the Lord,” without making a vow, he

utters

the

Name of Heaven in vain.

Therefore, the Sages instituted substitute expressions for offerings, since when a person consecrates something as an offering he is accustomed to say, “This is an offering to the Lord,” in accordance with the wording of the verse. There was concern that he might use this wording when he comes to make a vow, and perhaps regret it after mentioning the Name of Heaven and fail to make the vow, with the result that he will have uttered the Name of Heaven in vain.

But once the Sages instituted a distinctive language for making vows, using the expression “Konam” or “Konah,” a person would no longer say, “This thing is incumbent upon me—to the Lord, Konam,” since he is not accustomed to consecrating an offering with this wording.