Nazir 9a (ט.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

One who said: “

I am a nazirite from dried figs

(dried figs)

and

(or from)

pressed figs”

(dried figs pressed together), which are not forbidden to a nazir—

Beit Shammai say:

he is

a nazir

in all its laws, but he is permitted to eat dried figs and pressed figs.

And Beit Hillel say: He is not a nazir,

and there is no substance to his words.

Rabbi Yehuda said

to disagree with the words of the first tanna according to the view of Beit Shammai:

Even when Beit Shammai said

that one who says, “I am a nazirite from dried figs,” has substance to his words,

they did not say

this with regard to naziriteship,

but only when he says: “

They are hereby a sacrifice for me.”

That is: He does not become a nazir at all; rather, he is forbidden to eat dried figs or pressed figs as though he had said, “They are hereby a sacrifice for me,” in which case they would be forbidden to him by virtue of a vow. And his use of the expression “naziriteship” is an expression of separation, as though he had said: “I hereby separate myself from dried figs.”

Gemara:

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning what we learned:

“I am a nazirite from dried figs and from pressed figs”—Beit Shammai say: He is a nazir

:

And why?

For

the Merciful One said: ‘From anything that is made from the grapevine’s wine’

that a nazir is forbidden to consume. Had he accepted naziriteship from one of these items, he would indeed be a nazir, as explained above, on 3b; but dried figs and pressed figs are not forbidden to a nazir. Why, then, should he become a nazir if he separates himself from them?!

a. One who says, “My valuation is upon me,” or, “The valuation of so-and-so is upon me,” is obligated to give to the Temple treasury the value of his valuation, according to the measure established by the Torah in the passage concerning valuations [in the portion of Bechukotai]. He is not assessed according to the market value of the person evaluated, but according to the fixed valuation given by the Torah, depending on what the person is—male or female—and according to his or her age.

b. The term “valuation” applies only to a person, as is explicit in the passage concerning valuations. The passage concerning valuations does not apply to utensils; therefore, if one says, “The value of this utensil is upon me,” he is obligated only by virtue of a vow.

c. Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree [Arakhin 20a] concerning one who “evaluated” a utensil, saying, “The valuation of this utensil is upon me”: Is he obligated to give its value by virtue of a vow?

According to Rabbi Meir, the one who “evaluated” it is obligated to give its value to the Temple treasury, because we say that a person does not utter his words in vain. Since he knows that a utensil has no “valuation,” he certainly intended to obligate himself by virtue of a vow. According to the Sages, he is entirely exempt.

d. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Meir disagree concerning one who exchanged an unconsecrated animal for two sacrificial animals standing before him, one an olah and one a shelamim, and uttered a contradictory formulation: “This is the substitute of an olah, the substitute of a shelamim.” According to the Sages, “the first expression is decisive,” and the animal is the substitute of an olah. Rabbi Yosei maintains:

Even

a person is held by the conclusion of his words; we take both parts of his statement into account, and two sanctities took effect on this animal. Therefore, it is redeemed when it develops a permanent blemish, and with the proceeds of half of it he brings an olah, and with the proceeds of the other half he brings a shelamim.

And we answer:

Beit Shammai follow the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said

with regard to one who said, “The valuation of this utensil is upon me,”

a person does not utter his words in vain,

and since he knows that a utensil has no “valuation,” he certainly did not intend to obligate himself through the passage concerning valuations; rather, he intended to say, “The value of this utensil is upon me.”

Here too, since he knows that there is no naziriteship from dried figs, he certainly did not utter his words in vain. When he said, “I am a nazir,” he intended to become a nazir from wine.

And

the reason for

Beit Hillel

is that they maintain that the principle that a person does not utter his words in vain is not applicable here, because:

They

follow

Beit Hillel with regard to “I am a nazirite from dried figs”

the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said

that in general,

a person is also held by the conclusion of his words

[and therefore, one who says, “This is the substitute of an olah, the substitute of a shelamim,” is held even by the conclusion of his words. When the animal develops a blemish, half of it is sold for the money of an olah and half for the money of a shelamim. In this he disagrees with the Sages, who said with regard to substitution: “The first expression is decisive,” and it is only the substitute of an olah].

That is: When one says, “I am a nazirite from dried figs”— -

Since there is no contradiction between the conclusion of his words and the beginning of his words—for the conclusion of his words clarifies that his intention was naziriteship from dried figs and not from wine—Beit Hillel maintain that his entire formulation must be taken into account, in accordance with Rabbi Yosei’s view in a case where the expressions contradict one another.

And

since his entire formulation is a single unit, it follows that

this

[the acceptance that he made]

is a vow together with its opening

[a vow accompanied by an opening through which it can be annulled], for the conclusion of his words eliminates the possibility of construing his words as a vow of naziriteship.

It is not appropriate to say here, “A person does not utter his words in vain,” and thereby make him a nazir, because this is said only when one says, “The valuation of this utensil is upon me.” In that case, the expression “valuation” can be interpreted as referring not to the passage concerning valuations but to monetary value, as though he had said, “The value of this utensil is upon me.” But the expression, “I am a nazirite from dried figs,” cannot at all be interpreted as referring to naziriteship; it necessarily follows that he indeed uttered his words in vain.

And we challenge this:

But according to Beit Shammai as well,

it is

a vow together with its opening

itself,

for the conclusion of his words explains the beginning of his words, indicating that this is not a vow, in accordance with the reasoning of Beit Hillel. Why, then, do Beit Shammai say that he is a nazir?

And we answer:

a. One who made a vow and regretted his vow, or found an “opening” through which to seek its annulment—meaning that he would not have made the vow had he known this—asks a Sage concerning his vow, and the Sage annuls it.

b. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree concerning the law of seeking annulment for vows of consecration. According to Beit Shammai, “There is no annulment for consecration,” because they maintain [below, 30b] that consecration made in error is consecration, and the questioning and annulment by a Sage are effective only because through them the vow is rendered a vow made in error. Beit Hillel maintain that consecration made in error is consecration, and they do not distinguish among vows; all vows can be annulled.

c. It also emerges from our discussion that just as according to Beit Shammai there is no annulment and no error with regard to consecration, so too there is no retraction within the time required to utter a short statement with regard to consecration.

It further emerges from our discussion that the law of naziriteship is like the law of consecration with regard to annulment, for a nazir is also called holy, as it is stated: “He shall be holy; he shall let the growth of the hair of his head grow wild.” Therefore, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree concerning naziriteship just as they disagree concerning consecration.

Rather,

the reason for

Beit Shammai

is that they

follow the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: A person does not utter his words in vain,

as we initially explained. We indeed take all his words into account, as the Gemara challenged, and we interpret his words as follows:

Since he said: “

I am a nazir,”

he became a nazir.

And

when he says “

from dried figs and from pressed figs,”

he is coming to seek annulment.

That is: He is coming to regret

and retract within the time required to utter a short statement from his acceptance of naziriteship.

And Beit Shammai,

who maintain that retraction from the acceptance of naziriteship is ineffective even within the time required to utter a short statement,

are consistent with their reasoning,

[their method],

for they say: There is no annulment for consecration,

because “consecration made in error is consecration,” and consequently the same law applies: there is no retraction within the time required to utter a short statement from consecration.

And since there is no annulment for consecration, there is also

no annulment for naziriteship.

For naziriteship is like consecration, since it is stated: “He shall be holy; he shall let the growth of the hair of his head grow wild.”

And Beit Hillel, too, are consistent with their method: They maintain that there is annulment for consecration, because consecration made in error is not consecration. Since there is annulment for consecration, there is also annulment, error, and retraction within the time required to utter a short statement with regard to naziriteship.

The Gemara further explains the position of Beit Hillel.

For apparently one could say: Although he is not a nazir, nevertheless let him be one who has vowed to abstain from dried figs, since what he said, “I am a nazirite from dried figs,” can be interpreted as though he had vowed to abstain from dried figs. To explain why this is not so, the Gemara says:

And Beit Hillel follow Rabbi Shimon,

who says that anything not vowed in the manner in which people make vows is not a vow. Since he did not vow from dried figs in the manner in which people make such vows—namely, by saying, “Dried figs are forbidden to me”—but said, “I am a nazirite from dried figs,” there is here neither naziriteship nor a vow. For we learned [Menahot 103a, and it was cited here on 9b]

One who makes a donation and says, “A meal-offering of barley is upon me”—although a voluntary meal-offering cannot be brought from barley—must bring one from wheat.

And Rabbi Shimon exempts him, because

he did not make his donation in the manner in which donors make donations.

because

he did not make his voluntary offering in the manner in which those who make voluntary offerings do so.