Nazir 62b (סב:) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

At the beginning of the chapter, we learned in the Mishna: Women and slaves have naziriteship.

There is a stringency with regard to women over slaves: He can compel his slave, but he cannot compel his wife [except by way of nullification].

This Mishna before us is the conclusion of the preceding Mishna, and explains that there is also a stringency with regard to slaves over women.

The stringency with regard to slaves

who accept naziriteship upon themselves,

over women

who accept naziriteship upon themselves:

a.

He can nullify his wife’s vows

and once he has nullified them, he can no longer retract his nullification,

but he cannot nullify the vows of his slave

Rather, he can protest to his slave, and this protest is not absolute like nullification. If the master subsequently consents that the slave should observe his naziriteship, the slave is obligated to complete his naziriteship.

b.

He nullified for his wife

her naziriteship:

He nullified it permanently

This nullification is effective forever.

But if

he nullified for his slave,

that is, if he protested to his slave:

The slave

has

gone free and completes his naziriteship,

that is, once the slave goes free, he completes his naziriteship.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

Why [with a sheva under the lamed; for what matter]

[with a sheva beneath the letter lamed; that is, for what purpose]

does his master compel him?

For naziriteship

If the slave accepted naziriteship upon himself, his master protests to him so that he will not observe his naziriteship.

But he does not

make his slave

take vows [

nor oaths ],

and

he does not

for valuations,

for if the slave prohibited something to himself by means of a vow, his master cannot compel him not to observe his vow. [Likewise, if he took an oath, he must fulfill his oath, and his master does not protest to him.] And if the slave became liable through the section concerning valuations, and he has the means with which to pay, his master cannot compel him not to pay.

And we raise an objection:

What is different with regard to a nazir

that the master compels him, because

the Merciful One said

in the section concerning vows:

“To prohibit a prohibition upon himself”,

and we learn that the verse speaks only

of one whose soul is his own [

of himself];

excluding

a slave whose soul is not his own,

but belongs to his master. And naziriteship is juxtaposed to vows, as it is stated: “When a man explicitly vows a vow, a nazirite vow, to consecrate himself to the Lord.”

If so, even with regard to vows as well,

if the slave prohibits himself by a vow from everything from which a nazir is prohibited, we should likewise say that the master can compel him—

Yet from the wording of the beraita it appears that the very same prohibition, if he accepted it upon himself by way of naziriteship, the master can compel him not to observe his naziriteship, whereas when he accepted it upon himself by way of a vow, the master cannot compel him. What is the difference between the two!?

Rav Sheshet said:

Here—

in the beraita that distinguishes between naziriteship and vows—

with what are we dealing?

For example, a cluster of grapes was lying before him

belonging to the slave. The beraita teaches that if he prohibited the cluster to himself by accepting naziriteship from it, the master can compel him; but if the slave prohibited the cluster to himself by a vow, the master cannot compel him. The distinction is as follows:

With regard to vows, when the slave becomes prohibited

to

this

cluster,

he does not become prohibited by others [When the slave becomes prohibited by a vow to this particular cluster, he becomes prohibited only to this cluster and not to other grapes or wines]. Therefore

[when the slave prohibits himself from this particular cluster through a vow, he becomes prohibited only from this cluster and not from other grapes or wines]. Therefore,

he cannot

the master

compel him, since the master suffers no loss if the slave does not eat the particular cluster lying before him.

for the master suffers no loss if the slave does not eat the particular cluster lying before him.

But

with regard to naziriteship, when he becomes prohibited by this

cluster, by accepting naziriteship from it,

he becomes prohibited

also

by all of them [the slave becomes prohibited also to other grapes and wines], as we learned above, in tractate Nazir 11a: If they mixed a cup for him and he said, “I am a nazir from it,” he is a nazir.

[he becomes prohibited from other grapes and wines as well], as we learned in the earlier Mishna, on folio 11a: If they poured him a cup and he said, “I am a nazirite from it,” he is a nazirite.

Therefore

he can

the master

compel him

not to observe his naziriteship, because since, by preventing the slave from consuming everything prohibited to a nazir, the slave will become weakened and will not have the strength to work, it is reasonable that it is only in such a case that the Torah said that he cannot prohibit himself; rather, the master can protest to him.

The Gemara questions this:

And

is it so that

with regard to vows,

where we learned in the beraita that the master does not compel him,

are we not dealing

also with a situation

where, if he does not eat

that cluster,

his heart becomes weak [his heart will become weak],

and he will not have the strength to work!?

Surely the beraita is speaking even of such a situation, and nevertheless the master cannot compel him. In this case, the question remains: What is the difference between naziriteship and vows!?

Rather, Abaye said:

Here, in the beraita, with what are we dealing?

For example, a grape seed was lying before him,

which is not fit for eating. If he said, “I am a nazir from it,” the master can protest to him, whereas if he said, “This grape seed is prohibited to me,” the master cannot protest to him. The distinction is as follows:

With regard to vows,

when

it is this

grape seed

alone that becomes prohibited,

and not the other things from which a nazir is prohibited. Therefore

he cannot

the master

compel him, since his heart will not become weak through refraining from eating a grape seed.

for his heart will not become weak through abstaining from eating a grape seed.

But

with regard to a nazir, when

he says concerning the grape seed, “I am a nazir from it,”

he also becomes prohibited by other things [he becomes prohibited also to other grapes and wines]. Therefore

[he becomes prohibited from other grapes and wines as well]. Therefore,

he can

the master

compel him,

since his heart will become weak and he will not have the strength to work.

We nevertheless raise another objection:

And with regard to vows—

where it is established in the beraita that the master does not compel him—

are we not dealing

also with a situation

where, if he does not eat it,

this grape seed,

he becomes weak,

that is: Is it not the case that the beraita is also speaking of one who needs to eat the grape seed, and if he does not eat it, his heart will become weak!?

Rather,

because of this question,

Rava said

a different interpretation of the beraita: Its intention is not to say that with regard to naziriteship he can compel him, whereas with regard to vows he cannot compel him; rather, the opposite is true:

Why does his master “

need”

to compel him—

that is, in what matter does the slave’s acceptance take effect and remain valid unless the master protests? Only

for naziriteship—

And he does not need

the master

to compel him with regard to vows,

that is, even without the master’s protesting to his slave, the vow does not take effect at all when he vowed in a manner that would impair his master’s work;

and

likewise, he

does not need to compel him with regard to an oath,

which likewise does not take effect at all when it impairs his master’s work—

And what they said in the beraita, “nor for valuations,” is not equivalent to vows and oaths. Rather, it means that the master’s protest is ineffective to annul the slave’s acceptance.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that the vows and oaths of a slave do not take effect at all?

For the verse says

in the section concerning oaths: “When a person takes an oath, expressing it verbally,

to do harm or to do good,”

and we expound:

Just as doing good [

swearing “to do good”]

is optional,

so

also doing harm [

swearing “to do harm”] only when it is

optional—

We have therefore learned:

Excluding

a slave whose oath is

to do harm

to others—

for it weakens his strength and renders him incapable of performing his master’s work—

he does not have the authority

to take an oath. And just as an oath does not take effect, so a vow does not take effect.

Mishna:

If

the slave who accepted naziriteship upon himself

passed from before the face

of his master, that is, he fled,

Rabbi Meir says: He may not drink

wine, because of his naziriteship.

Rabbi Yosei says: He may drink

wine; their dispute will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

It might have been thought that the Mishna is dealing with a case in which the master had protested to his slave, and the slave fled and the master despaired of recovering him. Since the master despaired of recovering him, the slave left his authority. If so,

shall we say that they disagree with regard to the ruling of Shmuel, as Shmuel said:

One who renounces ownership of

his

slave,

or whose slave fled and he despaired of recovering him,

the slave has gone

free,

and does not need

any further

document of emancipation

from his master in order to be permitted to marry a Jewish woman—

Rabbi Meir—

who maintains that he may not drink—

holds in accordance with Shmuel,

and since he is no longer under his master’s authority, he is obligated to complete his naziriteship, as we learned above in the Mishna: “He has gone free and completes his naziriteship.”

But

Rabbi Yosei does not hold in accordance with Shmuel,

and he remains under his master’s authority. Therefore, he may drink wine.

And we reject this:

No,

it is not as you explained, that our Mishna deals with a case in which the master despaired of recovering him, in which case Rabbi Yosei necessarily does not agree with Shmuel. Rather,

everyone holds in accordance with Shmuel,

and if the master indeed despaired of recovering him, this is like a slave who was emancipated by a document, and the master’s protest to him is ineffective—

Rather,

our Mishna deals with a case in which the master did not despair of recovering him, and they disagree concerning the slave’s status during the time of his flight, until he returns to his master. And this is the point of their disagreement:

The one who says—

Rabbi Yosei—

he may drink

wine during his flight, because

he thinks

the master to himself:

Ultimately, he will return and come back to me [he will ultimately return to me]. If so, my wish is

[in the end, he will return to me]. Therefore, my desire is

that he should drink wine [

that the slave should drink wine],

so that he will not become weakened [

so that the slave will not become weakened].

And according to the one who says—

Rabbi Meir— “

he may not drink,”

for, on the contrary, this is what

the master thinks

to himself:

Let him have

the slave

distress [

let the slave suffer through being prevented from drinking wine],

so that he will return to me [

so that he will return to me], and then he will drink wine.