Nazir 62b — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

In the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter we learned: Women and slaves have nezirut.

There is a stringency with women over slaves: he can compel his slave, but he cannot compel his wife [except by way of annulment].

And this Mishna before us is the conclusion of the preceding Mishna, and explains that there is also a stringency with slaves over women:

A stringency with slaves

who accept nezirut upon themselves,

over women

who accept nezirut upon themselves:

a.

He annuls his wife’s vows

and once he has annulled, he can no longer retract,

but he does not annul his slave’s vows

rather, he can protest to his slave, and this protest is not absolute like annulment, for if the master subsequently becomes willing that the slave observe his nezirut, he must complete his nezirut.

b.

He annulled for his wife

her nezirut:

He annulled permanently,

this is an annulment forever.

But if

he annulled for his slave,

that is, if he protested to his slave:

the slave

goes

to freedom and completes his nezirut,

that is, once the slave goes free, he completes his nezirut.

Gemara:

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

Why

does his master compel him?

For nezirut

that if the slave accepted nezirut upon himself, his master protests to him that he should not observe his nezirut.

But he does not

compel his slave

with regard to vows,

nor with regard to oaths,

and

not

with regard to valuations,

for if the slave prohibited something to himself by a vow, his master cannot compel him not to observe his vow, [and likewise, if he swore, he must fulfill his oath, and his master does not protest to him], and if the slave became liable through the section of valuations, and he has what to pay with, his master does not compel him not to pay.

And they raise an objection:

What is different concerning a nazirite

that the master compels him, because

the Merciful One said

in the section of vows:

“to prohibit a prohibition upon himself”

and we learned that Scripture speaks only

of one whose soul is his own

[to himself],

excluding

a slave whose soul is not his own,

but belongs to his master; and nezirut was equated with vows, as it is stated: “When a man explicitly vows a vow, a vow of a nazirite, to abstain for the sake of the Lord.”

If so, even concerning vows as well,

if the slave prohibits himself by a vow with regard to everything from which a nazirite is prohibited, we should likewise say that the master can compel him—

Yet from the wording of the beraita it appears that that very prohibition, if he accepted it upon himself by way of nezirut, the master compels him not to observe his nezirut, whereas when he accepted it upon himself by way of a vow, the master cannot compel him; what is the difference between this and that!?

Rav Sheshet said:

Here—in the beraita that distinguished between nezirut and vows—

in the beraita that distinguishes between naziriteship and vows—

with what are we dealing?

For example, a cluster of grapes was lying before him,

belonging to the slave, and the beraita teaches: if he prohibited himself from the cluster by accepting nezirut from the cluster, the master compels him, but if the slave prohibited the cluster to himself by a vow, the master cannot compel him; and the distinction is:

Concerning vows, for when the slave becomes prohibited

to

this

cluster,

he does not become prohibited by means of others

[when the slave became prohibited by a vow from this cluster, he was prohibited only from this cluster and not from other grapes or wines]; therefore

he cannot

the master

compel him,

for the master suffers no loss if the slave does not eat the particular cluster lying before him.

But

concerning nezirut, for when he becomes prohibited from this

cluster by accepting nezirut from it, he

becomes prohibited

also

from all of them

[the slave also becomes prohibited from other grapes and wines], as we learned in the Mishna above, 11a: They mixed him the cup, and he said, “Behold, I am a nazirite from it”—he is a nazirite.

And therefore

he can

the master

compel him

not to observe his nezirut, since because, through the slave’s abstention from everything from which a nazirite is prohibited, the slave will become weakened and will not have the strength to work, it is reasonable that it is only in this manner that the Torah said that he cannot prohibit himself, but the master can protest to him.

The Gemara raises an objection:

And

is it so that

concerning vows,

about which we learned in the beraita that the master does not compel him,

are we not dealing

also in a situation

where, if he does not eat

that cluster,

his heart becomes weak

[his heart will become weak], and he will not have the strength to work!?

For surely the beraita is dealing even in this situation, and nevertheless the master cannot compel him; and in this situation the question is difficult: what is the difference between nezirut and vows!?

Rather, Abaye said:

Here, in the beraita, with what are we dealing:

for example, a grape seed was lying before him,

which is not fit for eating, for if he said, “Behold, I am a nazirite from it,” the master can protest to him, whereas if he said, “This grape seed is upon me,” the master cannot protest to him; and the distinction is:

Concerning vows,

that

from this

grape seed

he alone becomes prohibited,

and not from the other things from which a nazirite is prohibited; therefore

he cannot

the master

compel him,

for his heart will not become weak through abstaining from eating a grape seed.

But

concerning a nazirite, when

he said concerning the grape seed, “Behold, I am a nazirite from it,”

he also becomes prohibited from other things

[he becomes prohibited also from other grapes and wines]; therefore

he can

the master

compel him,

for his heart will become weak and he will not have the strength to work.

We still raise a question:

And concerning vows—

as it is explained in the beraita that the master does not compel him—

are we not dealing

also in a situation

where, if he does not eat it,

this grape seed,

he becomes weak,

that is: Is it so that the beraita is not dealing also in a situation in which he requires eating the grape seed, and if he does not eat it, his heart will become weak!?

Rather,

because of this question

Rava said

another interpretation of the beraita: its intention is not to say that with nezirut he can compel him, whereas with vows he cannot compel him, but the reverse:

Why does his master

need

to compel him,

that is: in what matter does the slave’s acceptance take effect and is nullified only by the master’s protest—only

with regard to nezirut—

And he does not need

the master

to compel him with regard to vows,

that is: even without the master protesting to his slave, the vow does not take effect at all when he vowed in a manner that harms his master’s work,

and

so

he does not need to compel him with regard to an oath,

which likewise does not take effect at all when it harms his master’s work—

And what they said in the beraita, “nor with regard to valuations,” is not equivalent to vows and oaths; rather, it means that the master’s protest is ineffective to nullify the slave’s acceptance.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that the vows and oaths of the slave do not take effect at all?

For Scripture says

in the section of oaths: “When a soul swears, expressing with the lips

to do harm or to do good,”

and we expound:

Just as doing good

[swearing “to do good”]

is optional,

so it is,

so too doing harm

[swearing “to do harm”] only when it is

optional—

Thus we learned:

excluding

a slave whose oath is

to do harm

to others—

for it weakens his strength and he is not strong for his master’s work—

who has no authority

the slave does not have to swear; and just as an oath does not take effect, so a vow does not take effect.

Mishna:

Mishna:

The slave passed

from before his face

of his master, that is, he fled.

Rabbi Meir says: He may not drink

the slave may not drink wine because of his nezirut.

Rabbi Yosei says: He may drink

the slave may drink wine; and their dispute will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

It might have entered our minds that the Mishna is dealing with a situation in which the master protested to his slave, and the slave fled and the master despaired of him, and once he despaired of him, the slave left his authority; and if so,

shall we say that they disagree with regard to the statement of Shmuel, for Shmuel said:

One who renounces ownership of

his

slave,

or he fled and he despaired of him,

the slave goes

to

freedom, and he does not need

any longer

a bill of manumission

from his master in order to be permitted to marry an Israelite woman—

Rabbi Meir—

who maintains: he may not drink—

holds in accordance with Shmuel,

and since he is no longer under his master’s authority, he is obligated to complete his nezirut, as we learned above in the Mishna: “He goes free and completes his nezirut.”

But

Rabbi Yosei does not hold in accordance with Shmuel,

and he is still under his master’s authority; therefore he may drink wine.

And we reject this:

No,

not as you explained, that our Mishna is dealing with a situation in which he despaired of him, in which case it would necessarily follow that Rabbi Yosei does not hold in accordance with Shmuel; rather:

everyone holds in accordance with Shmuel,

and if the master indeed despaired of him, this is like one who was emancipated by a bill, and the master’s protest, with which he protested to him, is ineffective—

Rather,

our Mishna is dealing with a situation in which he did not despair of him, and they disagree concerning the slave’s law at the time of his flight until he returns to his master; and this is what they disagree about:

The one who says—

Rabbi Yosei—

he may drink

the slave may drink wine at the time of his flight, because he

thinks

the master in his heart:

Ultimately, he will return and come back to me

[in the end, he will return to me], and if so, my desire is

that he drink wine

[that the slave drink wine],

so that he will not become weakened

[so that the slave will not become weakened].

And according to the one who says—

Rabbi Meir—“

he may not drink,”

for, on the contrary, thus

he thinks

the master in his heart:

Let there be

for the slave

distress

[the slave will suffer through being prevented from drinking wine],

so that he will return to me

[so that he will return to me], and then he will drink wine.