Nazir 4a — the Talmud in English

And

behold

it is impossible that the verse came to prohibit this wine, for

what of

one who is sworn and bound concerning it

—concerning the wine of kiddush and havdala, to drink it—

from Mount Sinai

so that you would say that nezirut does not take effect upon it!?

For indeed, there is a mitzva from the Torah to sanctify Shabbat at its entrance and at its departure with words of praise and sanctification, but from the Torah one need not sanctify or make havdala over wine; rather, the Sages instituted that the kiddush or the havdala should be over wine. It follows that there is no mitzva from the Torah concerning wine, and how can we say that the verse came to prohibit the drinking of this wine? And we explain:

rather,

the mitzva wine that the verse came to prohibit to the nazir is

as in this

[for example, what]

Rava said:

one who said,

“An oath that I shall drink wine,”

and then said,

“Behold, I am a nazir”—

the nezirut comes

and

takes effect upon the oath.

The obligation to conduct oneself as a Nazirite takes effect, prohibiting him from drinking wine, and nullifies the obligation that he had undertaken to drink wine because of the oath.

The obligation to conduct oneself with nezirut came and prohibited him from drinking wine, and nullified the obligation that he had undertaken to drink wine because of the oath.

And this wine is “mitzva wine,” and the verse came—“From wine and strong drink he shall abstain”—to include this wine, so that it too would be forbidden to the nazir.

And we challenge:

But the Rabbis also,

who learned from the verse “From wine and strong drink he shall abstain” that one who vows concerning one of the prohibitions of the nazir becomes forbidden by all of them—

this is needed by him:

behold, there is a need for this verse in order

to prohibit mitzva wine like ordinary wine.

If so, how did they derive from it that if he vowed concerning one of the prohibitions of the nazir, he becomes a nazir in every respect!?

And we answer: Even though the verse came to teach about mitzva wine, nevertheless one can also learn from it that one who vows concerning one of the prohibitions of the nazir becomes forbidden by all of them,

for

if so,

if you say that the verse came only to teach one law,

let the verse say

[let the verse say] only

“from wine

he shall abstain”—

what

is the reason that the verse added and said

“and strong drink”

[meaning strong drink made from wine]?

Rather,

you learn from it

from the repetition of the verse’s wording, “wine and strong drink,”

two

laws: a. To prohibit mitzva wine like ordinary wine.

b. One who vows concerning one of the prohibitions of the nazir becomes forbidden by all of them.

The Gemara now discusses Rabbi Shimon’s words:

But Rabbi Shimon,

who does not derive from this verse also to include one who vows concerning one of the prohibitions of the nazir, that he is forbidden by all of them—says to you:

This is the reason that it is written:

therefore the verse used extra wording and said

“strong drink,”

in order

to teach

by a gezera shava,

“strong drink, strong drink,”

from nezirut

to

one who enters the

Temple

while intoxicated—

as it is written:

“Wine and strong drink, do not drink—you

[Aaron]

and your sons with you

when you enter the Tent of Meeting, lest you die.” One who transgresses this is liable to death at the hands of Heaven and to lashes. And from this gezera shava we learn:

Just as concerning a nazir,

only

wine is what is forbidden

[wine is what was prohibited],

but other intoxicating beverages

[that intoxicate]

are not

prohibited to the nazir.

So too concerning

those intoxicated with wine who enter the

Temple,

as it is also said concerning it, “strong drink”—

also,

they are liable only if they drank wine or strong drink made from wine.

For only one intoxicated by

wine is what is forbidden,

he is the one prohibited from entering the Temple.

But

one who was intoxicated from

other intoxicating beverages—

not

prohibited.

And

this exposition is

to exclude

[to remove]

Rabbi Judah,

who holds liable for lashes even one intoxicated from other intoxicating substances who enters the Temple.

And

as it was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Judah says:

A kohen who

ate a dried fig

called

“Ke’ilit”

[so called after its place], whose eating intoxicates—

and drank

[or who drank]

honey and milk,

which likewise intoxicate when drunk—

and entered the Temple

in his intoxication—

is liable

for lashes.

a. We hold that “one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition.”

That is, anything that became prohibited to a person, and afterward another prohibition was renewed that prohibits what had already been prohibited—the second prohibition does not take effect. And one does not punish the person who transgresses the second prohibition; rather, he is punished only with the punishment due to him for the prohibition that took effect first.

b. The tannaim disagreed concerning a case in which the second prohibition is a “comprehensive prohibition,” which includes things that were not prohibited by the first prohibition: does the second prohibition then also take effect, so that he becomes liable on account of both prohibitions, or do we also say in the case of a comprehensive prohibition that one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition?

For example, an animal carcass, upon which the prohibition of eating a carcass first takes effect, and when Yom Kippur arrives it becomes forbidden to eat on account of Yom Kippur. But the second prohibition “comprehensively” includes all foods, including permitted foods.

Those who say that the prohibition of Yom Kippur takes effect upon the prohibition of the carcass explain their reasoning as follows: Since the second prohibition now takes effect upon the other things, it also takes effect upon the carcass that was prohibited earlier, for the principle that one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition was stated only where the second prohibition cannot take effect at all.

The Gemara now returns to explain Rabbi Shimon’s approach to the superfluous wording “From wine and strong drink he shall abstain” in another way—

If you wish, say:

if you wish, you may now explain it as follows:

The verse did not come to include mitzva wine, such as when one swore to drink wine, as the Gemara explained above. For according to this explanation, we needed everything that the Gemara said above concerning the position of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, that the dissenting Rabbis also derive this verse from the superfluous wording of “wine and strong drink.”

Rather, the teaching from the superfluity of “From wine and strong drink he shall abstain” applies only according to Rabbi Shimon, who required this inclusion. But according to the Sages, this verse is not superfluous for them, and they do not need to derive Rabbi Shimon’s law from this superfluity.

For only Rabbi Shimon, according to his position, holds that the verse “From wine and strong drink he shall abstain” is superfluous, since he does not expound, like the Sages, that this verse came to include one who vows concerning one of the prohibitions. Therefore he derives from the verse “From wine and strong drink he shall abstain” to include one who swore not to drink this cup of wine and then vowed nezirut: if he drank that cup, he receives two sets of lashes, and we do not say, “one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition.”

And now there is no difficulty: The Sages, who derive from the verse “From wine and strong drink he shall abstain” their position—where will they learn this law from? For according to their position, it is obvious that he receives two sets of lashes, because “one prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition” when the second prohibition is “comprehensive” and includes what was not prohibited by the first prohibition. Here too, he became prohibited through the nezirut even from other wines besides this cup concerning which he swore; therefore the prohibition of nezirut takes effect even upon this cup, and he receives two sets of lashes.

And the verse “From wine and strong drink he shall abstain” was needed to teach that he receives two sets of lashes only according to

Rabbi Shimon

himself, who

does not hold that one prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition

even in a “comprehensive” case, and therefore the Torah had to innovate that he receives lashes also on account of nezirut.

And

as it was taught

in a beraita, that according to Rabbi Shimon one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition, even in a comprehensive case:

Rabbi Shimon says: One who eats a carcass on Yom Kippur is exempt

on account of Yom Kippur, since the prohibition of Yom Kippur does not take effect upon the prohibition of the carcass that preceded it.

Thus, the prohibition of Yom Kippur does not take effect upon a carcass, even though it is “comprehensive” and also includes other foods that had not yet been prohibited.

Here the Gemara returns to explain the opinion of the Sages, who hold that one who vows concerning one of the prohibitions of the nazir is forbidden by all of them, and do not expound like Rabbi Shimon, who learned from the verse “From everything that is made from the grapevine” that one is not a nazir until he abstains from all of them:

And according to the Rabbis as well,

and

it is written

“from everything that is made from the grapevine,”

and we have to learn from this verse that there is no nazir except one who vows concerning all of them, as Rabbi Shimon holds?

And we explain:

The Rabbis could say to you: There

where the verse said “from everything” that is made from the grapevine—

the verse taught

that

concerning

all

the prohibitions of the nazir—such as fresh and dried grapes, seeds and grape skins

—

that they combine with one another

to complete the measure that makes the nazir liable for lashes.

So that you should not say: the Torah obligated only if he ate or drank a complete measure

of one of these species. And therefore the Torah said: “Of anything that is made from the grapevine, from wine, he shall not eat.”

And Rabbi Shimon,

who derives from “of anything that is made from the grapevine, from wine” that he is not a nazir until he vows abstinence from all of them, and for whom “anything” is not superfluous to teach about combination, follows his own position, because Rabbi Shimon

does not hold of combination.

He does not need a superfluity from the verse for this, because in his view there is no need to resort to combination, since he maintains that even with other prohibitions, such as forbidden fat and blood, one is liable to lashes for eating any amount.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says:

A. It is sufficient to eat a prohibited substance

any amount

in order

to

obligate him to

lashes.

B.

They said [that is, the halakha transmitted to Moses at Sinai was not stated to measure the eating of a prohibited substance]

in

an olive-bulk, אלא

only

with regard to

the obligation of a

sin-offering

alone [when he eats inadvertently something for whose intentional eating one is liable to excision, such as one who eats forbidden fat or blood inadvertently].

But a measure of eating an olive-bulk was not stated with regard to the obligation of lashes; rather, he receives lashes for eating any amount of a substance prohibited by a negative commandment.

And since the prohibitions of a nazir involve only lashes, and according to Rabbi Shimon he becomes liable for any amount, there is no longer any need to teach us that the prohibitions of a nazir combine with one another, and the verse is superfluous for deriving from it that he is not a nazir until he vows abstinence from all of them.

Mishna:

A. Samson son of Manoah—the angel of the Lord made him a nazir from the womb. As it is stated [Judges 13]: “There was a certain man from Zorah, from the family of the Danites, and his name was Manoah. And an angel of the Lord appeared to the woman,” and he said to her, “For behold, you shall conceive and give birth to a son, and a razor shall not come upon his head, for the child shall be a nazir of God from the womb, and he shall begin to save Israel from the hand of the Philistines.”

B. The tannaim disagreed [on the second side] whether a person can accept upon himself “Samson’s nezirut.” And our Mishna is according to the view that a person can accept upon himself “Samson’s nezirut.”

D. The name of Samson’s wife was “Delilah,” as it is stated [Judges 16]: “And it was afterward, and he loved a woman in the valley of Sorek, and her name was Delilah.”

And he tore out the doors of the city of Gaza, as it is stated [Judges 16]: “And Samson went to Gaza. And Samson lay until midnight, and he arose at midnight and grasped the doors of the gate of the city and the two doorposts, and he pulled them out together with the bar, and placed them upon his shoulders.”

And the Philistines pierced out his eyes, as it is stated [Judges 16]: “And [Delilah] said, ‘The Philistines are upon you, Samson!’ And the Philistines seized him and pierced out his eyes.”

Whoever said: “

I am like Samson,”

and also added to say

“like the son of Manoah,”

and added and said

“like Delilah’s husband,”

and “

like one

or like one

who tore out the doors of Gaza”; “

and like one whose eyes the Philistines pierced out”—

this person is Samson’s nazir.

But when he says “I am like Samson,” even though he added to say “like the son of Manoah,” he is not a nazir unless he added one of these three expressions, because without this addition, the meaning of his expression does not clearly demonstrate that he intended Samson the nazir.

However, if he said one of these three expressions by itself, he is likewise “Samson’s nazir,” for with such an expression there is no possibility of erring regarding his intention.

Gemara:

And the Gemara wonders:

Why do I need to teach all these!?

Why is it not sufficient to say “I am like Samson” or “I am like the son of Manoah” in order to become like a nazir, but it is necessary to add: “I am like Samson, like the son of Manoah, like Delilah’s husband” [or the other two expressions taught in the Mishna]!? And we answer:

They are necessary,

that is, he must add!

If he said “

I am like Samson”

alone,

I might have said [it is possible to interpret his intention] that he did not intend Samson the nazir, but

another Samson—

another Samson—

It teaches us “

like the son of Manoah.”

Therefore he must add “like the son of Manoah.”

And if it had taught only “like Samson

And if it taught

“like Samson and like the son of Manoah”

alone, this too would not be sufficient. For

I might have said,

I would say,

there is someone who is called by this name,

there is a person whose name is Samson son of Manoah, and he intended to say that he would be like him—therefore

it teaches us

the tanna, that he must add and say: “

like Delilah’s husband” “

and like one

or “like one

whose eyes the Philistines pierced out.”

Mishna:

One who accepts upon himself nezirut without a time limit, who said, “I am a perpetual nazir,” is a nazir forever, and during the fulfillment of the nezirut he has a special law, which will be explained in our Mishna.

What is the difference between a perpetual nazir and Samson’s nazir?

A perpetual nazir:

if

his hair became heavy

he may

lighten

his hair

with a razor,

if he wishes.

And he brings

And he brings

three animals

the perpetual nazir, when he lightens his hair, for a sin-offering, a burnt-offering, and peace-offerings, like the offerings of a nazir at the completion of his nezirut, even though a perpetual nazir does not complete his nezirut.

And if he became impure,

the perpetual nazir, he

brings an impurity-offering

[two turtledoves or two young pigeons, and a guilt-offering, like the other nazirs].

But

Samson’s nazir,

even if

his hair became heavy, he does not lighten

it.

And if he became impure, he does not bring an impurity-offering.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: What is the difference between a perpetual nazir and Samson’s nazir:

And we object: “

A perpetual nazir”—

who mentioned it!?

Who mentioned until now the matter of a perpetual nazir, such that the tanna refers to it as a known matter!? And we answer:

Our Mishna is incomplete,

and this is what it teaches

there:

One who says: “

I am a perpetual nazir,”

this person is a perpetual nazir!

And

what is the difference between a perpetual nazir and Samson’s nazir?

A perpetual nazir,

if

his hair became heavy, he lightens it with a razor, and brings three animals, and if he became impure, he brings an impurity-offering.

Samson’s nazir,

if

his hair became heavy, he does not lighten it with a razor,

his hair becomes heavy, he may not lighten it with a razor,

в нашей Мишне не сказано относительно назира Шимшона «бритвой».