Nazir 35b — the Talmud in English

An undomesticated animal is included within the category of domesticated animals."

Although the Torah said, “from the domesticated animals,” this is as though it had written, “from the domesticated animals and from the undomesticated animals.” Therefore, one may not exclude an undomesticated animal and say that it is altogether unfit for sacrifices.

He said to him

Rav Yehuda of Diskarta said to Rava: Is it really the case that

an undomesticated animal is included within the category of domesticated animals

!?

But

it is written

in the second specification: “

Cattle and flock.”

This specification certainly excludes an undomesticated animal, and this specification teaches us about the earlier specification, “from the domesticated animals,” that it too excludes an undomesticated animal.

Thus, it is a specification followed by a generalization,

apart from the specification that follows the generalization,

and one may infer only what is similar to the specification.

The Gemara now returns to the statement of the Sages, who expound the verse according to the method of “a generalization, a specification, and a generalization,” and asks:

And from where do we know that this is so?

That is: From where do we know that this is the method according to the opinion of the Sages—to include things similar to the specification when the Torah writes “a generalization, a specification, and a generalization”?

As it was taught in a beraita:

It is stated in the passage concerning the second tithe (Deuteronomy 14:24–26): “And when the place is too far from you, so that you cannot carry it [the second tithe] … then you shall turn it into money, and bind up the money in your hand, and you shall go to the place … And you shall spend the money [in Jerusalem] on whatever your soul desires, on cattle, or on flock, or on wine, or on strong drink, or on whatever your soul requests.” And it is expounded as follows: “

And you shall spend the money on whatever your soul desires” —

a generalization. “

On cattle, or on flock, or on wine, or on strong drink” —

a specification. “

And on whatever your soul requests” —

it again generalizes. “

A generalization, a specification, and a generalization: one may infer only what is similar to the specification,”

and this teaches:

Just as the specification —

cattle and flock —

is explicitly

something that is

the product of a product

—the animals become pregnant from one another and give birth—

and

they are

produce of the land [

they grow from the earth, from the vegetation of the earth] —

So too, everything

that one purchases with second-tithe money must be food that is

the product of a product and produce of the land.

Birds, which are similar to the specification, are included; water and salt, which are not the product of a product, are excluded ; and fish, which are not produce of the land, are excluded.

The Gemara explains the method of a generalization, a specification, and a generalization:

Now,

here we have “

a generalization, a specification, and a generalization”;

we infer according to the nature of the specification

—we include everything that is similar to the specification.

If so,

what benefit is there from the final generalization

—what does the final generalization add

? We would have said the same thing even if only a generalization and a specification had been written.

And we explain: This is the benefit of the second generalization:

to include everything that resembles it

—to include anything that is similar to the specification.

That is: Had only a generalization and a specification been stated, we would have said: In a generalization followed by a specification, the generalization includes only what is stated in the specification. The second generalization therefore serves to include everything similar to the specification, even though it is not the specification itself.

Furthermore,

the Gemara raises another question:

Here we have “

a specification, a generalization, and a specification”;

we infer according to the nature of the specification

—we include everything similar to the specification. If so,

what benefit is there from the final specification

—what did the final specification accomplish? We would have expounded it this way even if we had only a specification and a generalization.

And we explain:

Had it not been for the final specification

—had the final specification not been written—

I would have said: Let the generalization add to the specification,

and we would have included everything.

And

we challenge this:

Now,

between

two generalizations and a specification

—that is, “a generalization, a specification, and a generalization”—

and

between

two specifications and a generalization

—that is, “a specification, a generalization, and a specification”—

we infer according to the nature of the specification

—we include anything similar to the specification—

what difference is there between them

? That is: What is the distinction between these two methods?

The Gemara explains that there

is

indeed the following distinction between these two methods:

For if there are two generalizations and a specification [“

a generalization, a specification, and a generalization”],

if there is something similar to it even in one respect, we include it

—we include even something that resembles the specification in only one respect.

But

with two specifications and a generalization [“

a specification, a specification, and a generalization”], only

if there is something similar to the specification in two respects

—if the thing we seek to include resembles the specification in all its respects—do we

include

it. But if it resembles the specification only

in one respect, we do not include it,

because two generalizations include more than one generalization.

The Gemara discusses another matter:

Now,

when we expound

“a specification and a generalization,”

the rule is that

the generalization adds to the specification, and everything is included

—everything is included.

And

when we expound:

“an exclusion and an inclusion,”

it likewise includes everything, and everything is included.

If so,

what difference is there between “

an exclusion and an inclusion”

and “

a specification and a generalization”

—is there any practical difference whether we expound the verses through generalizations and specifications or through inclusions and exclusions?

And we explain:

There is

indeed a distinction between these two methods:

For if,

when we expound the verses of the passage concerning a nazirite by the method of

“a specification and a generalization,”

we include even leaves and palm branches

among the prohibitions of a nazirite.

That is: Even hard leaves, which are like branches, are included among the prohibitions of a nazirite.

But

when we expound the verses of the passage concerning a nazirite by the method of

“an exclusion and an inclusion,”

then

palm branches are not included

: We do include very soft leaves, which are fit to eat, but

hard leaves,

which are like branches, are

not included.

Introduction to the discussion of “

permitted matter joins prohibited matter.”

The following discussion will explain three fundamental concepts.

The first is: permitted matter joins prohibited matter.

The second is: combining an act of eating within the time required to eat a peras.

The third is: the taste is equivalent to the substance.

The first concept

—permitted matter joins prohibited matter.

We find in several places, as will be explained below, that the Torah established that permitted matter joins prohibited matter in order to complete the deficient measure of the prohibited matter, making one liable for it just as one is liable for a complete measure of prohibited matter.

Our early and later authorities discussed the definition of this concept: Did the Torah establish that when permitted matter joins prohibited matter, the situation is considered as though there is a complete measure of prohibited matter here, so that by eating in this manner one also transgresses with regard to the permitted matter that one ate?

Or does the joining merely establish that an act of “eating” has taken place? For eating less than an olive-bulk is not considered an act of eating at all. Therefore, when one completed the measure required for an act of eating by eating the permitted matter, one is liable only for eating the half of the prohibited matter contained in the act of eating; the eating of the permitted half is not considered eating prohibited matter.

According to the second possibility, one who ate less than an olive-bulk of prohibited matter has not performed an act called “eating,” and is therefore exempt from lashes. The reason for the exemption of one who eats less than an olive-bulk is that he did not “eat,” rather than that the prohibited matter lacked the required measure.

A. We learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Akiva says: Even a nazirite who soaked his bread in wine and the bread contains enough to combine to form an olive-bulk is liable.

According to the conclusion of the Gemara in our discussion, this applies even when the bread does not contain an olive-bulk of wine.

Although according to Rabbi Akiva the measure of wine for which one becomes liable is an olive-bulk, nevertheless, here he is liable because the bread in which the wine was absorbed joins the wine to complete the measure, even though the bread itself is not prohibited to a nazirite.

But the Sages disagree with him and maintain that permitted matter does not join prohibited matter to complete the measure.

B. In tractate Pesachim (43a) we read: It was taught in a beraita: For completely fermented grain-based leaven, one is liable to receive excision; for its mixture, one violates a prohibition, according to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

That is: With regard to a mixture of leaven with permitted matter, when the leaven itself does not contain an olive-bulk and reaches that measure only by joining with the permitted matter in which it is mixed, one receives lashes for eating it, according to Rabbi Eliezer.

And the Sages say: One is liable to receive excision only for completely fermented grain-based leaven; but for its mixture, one is not liable at all;

that is, Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree over whether permitted matter joins prohibited matter in the case of leaven.

We also learned a beraita there: “

Every

fermented substance you shall not eat,” to include Babylonian kutaḥ [a dairy food mixed with grain flour].

One might have thought that one is liable to receive excision for it.

The verse therefore states: “For everyone who eats a fermented substance, that soul shall be cut off.” For completely fermented grain-based leaven, one is liable to receive excision, but for its mixture, one violates only a prohibition.

This beraita, as explained in the discussion there, follows the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. But the Sages do not expound the word “every,” and therefore permitted matter does not join prohibited matter.

C. Similarly, we find the principle that permitted matter joins prohibited matter with regard to the fat of a sin-offering [which may be eaten only by male members of the priestly family and only for one day and one night] when this fat was absorbed into the flesh of a peace-offering [which may be eaten by Israelites for two days and one night]. In that case, the flesh of the peace-offering must be eaten with the restrictions that apply to the flesh of a sin-offering, because the fat of the sin-offering was absorbed into it.

If one ate an olive-bulk of the flesh into which fat from the sin-offering had been absorbed, without observing the restrictions applying to a sin-offering, one is liable for this eating. Although the absorbed fat does not itself amount to an olive-bulk, the permitted flesh of the peace-offering joins it and completes the measure of the prohibited fat.

According to the conclusion of our discussion, this law is agreed upon by all; there is no dispute about it, and it is derived from the verses.

D. Rashi’s method in the discussion in Pesachim and the Tosafot’s method in our discussion understand the meaning of “permitted matter joins prohibited matter” as follows:

If one ate a total of an olive-bulk of permitted and prohibited matter at one time, one is liable, even if the prohibited matter was not absorbed into the permitted matter and the two were not mixed together.

This is on condition that one eats both halves of the measure [the permitted half and the prohibited half] at one time. For when permitted matter joins prohibited matter, one is liable only if one ate them at one time.

The liability for such eating differs from eating a complete olive-bulk of the prohibited matter without any permitted matter joining it. In the latter case, it is not necessary to eat it all at once in order to become liable; even if one ate half an olive-bulk and then another half olive-bulk within the time required to eat a peras, one is liable.

The second concept

—combining an act of eating within the time required to eat a peras.

“Peras” is a term meaning “a portion,” that is, half of a loaf.

The loaf used for this measure is a bread loaf containing eight egg-volumes, which is the measure of two meals. Half of this loaf, the measure of one meal, is therefore four egg-volumes.

The measure of “the time required to eat a peras” is the estimated time needed to eat half of this loaf when the loaf is made of wheat and the person eating it is reclining and eating it with a relish, all of which hastens the eating.

This measure is fixed for eating any food, whether one ate bread or other foods.

This is so even though the time needed to eat four egg-volumes of other foods is shorter or longer than the time needed to eat four egg-volumes of bread.

This measure applies both to eating prohibited foods—one who eats an olive-bulk of prohibited matter within the time required to eat a peras receives lashes—and to mitzvot, such as matza, where one who eats an olive-bulk of matza within the time required to eat a peras fulfills the obligation.

It makes no difference whether the measure of the mitzva or transgression is an olive-bulk or a quarter-log [for example, grapes for a nazirite, according to the opinion that their measure is a quarter-log], or an egg-volume or a date-bulk.

The third concept

—the taste is equivalent to the substance.

There are instances in which the Torah prohibited the taste of a prohibited substance just as it prohibited the substance itself.

Our Sages discussed the meaning of the prohibition of taste: Did the Torah establish that one is liable even for taste, which is not the substance of the prohibited matter? Without this special teaching of the Torah, one would not be liable for taste, since it does not contain the actual prohibited substance.

Or perhaps even without a special teaching of the Torah, the taste would be prohibited like the substance itself; however, since the taste is mixed with permitted matter, it would have to be nullified by the majority. The Torah therefore taught that since the taste of the prohibited matter is detected in the permitted food, it is not nullified by the majority.

The early authorities also engaged in a fundamental discussion concerning the measure for which one becomes liable on account of taste.

The basic question is: When a prohibited substance amounting to less than an olive-bulk imparts taste to an olive-bulk of permitted matter, does one become liable for eating the olive-bulk of permitted matter because of the prohibited taste in it, when the prohibited substance itself does not amount to an olive-bulk [in a case where the principle that permitted matter joins prohibited matter was not stated]?

Some maintain that permitted matter containing the taste of prohibited matter becomes prohibited, and therefore one is liable for eating an olive-bulk, since the permitted matter itself is now considered prohibited matter.

Others maintain that prohibited taste contained in an olive-bulk of permitted matter itself constitutes the measure of prohibited matter.

Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

With regard to all prohibitions of the Torah,

permitted matter does not join prohibited matter

to complete its measure.

For example, if one ate half an olive-bulk of meat and half an olive-bulk of forbidden milk, one is exempt, and one becomes liable only when one eats an olive-bulk of milk by itself.

Except for the prohibitions of a nazirite,

where permitted matter eaten at the same time as prohibited matter joins it to complete its measure.

For the Torah said

in the passage concerning a nazirite: “And every grape infusion [bread soaked in wine] he shall not eat.”

Therefore, the Torah said

“grape infusion,”

rather than saying, “He shall not eat any grapes,” in order to teach that the bread joins the wine to complete the measure.

And the same law applies to the other prohibitions of a nazirite, that permitted matter joins with prohibited matter to complete its measure.