Nazir 35b (לה:) — the Talmud in English

An animal is included within livestock."

Although the Torah said, “from livestock,” this is as though it had been written, “from livestock and from animals.” And you may not exclude and say that an animal is altogether unfit for offerings.

He said to him

Rav Yehuda of Diskarta said to Rava: Is

an animal included within livestock

or not!?

But

it is written

in the second particular specification: “

Cattle and sheep.”

This specification certainly excludes an animal, and this specification teaches with regard to the earlier specification [“from livestock”] that it too excludes an animal,

and it is therefore a particular specification followed by a generalization,

in addition to the particular specification that follows the generalization,

and you may infer only what is similar to the particular specification.

The Gemara now returns to the statement of the Sages, who expound “generalization, particular specification, and generalization,” and asks:

And from where do we know that this is so?

That is to say: From where do we know that this is the hermeneutical principle according to the Sages, to include what is similar to the particular specification where the Torah wrote “generalization, particular specification, and generalization”?

As it was taught: “

And it shall be that when the place will enlarge you, because you will not be able to carry it [the second tithe to Jerusalem]. And you shall exchange it for money, bind up the money in your hand, and go to the place, etc. And you shall spend the money [in Jerusalem] on whatever your soul desires, on cattle, on sheep, on wine, on strong drink, and on whatever your soul requests.” And this is how it is expounded: “

And you shall spend the money on whatever your soul desires” —

a generalization. “

On cattle, on sheep, on wine, and on strong drink” —

a particular specification. “

And on whatever your soul requests” —

it again generalizes. “

A generalization, a particular specification, and a generalization: You may infer only what is similar to the particular specification,”

and this teaches:

Just as the particular specification —

cattle and sheep —

explicitly

states that it is

produce derived from produce

— animals conceive from one another and give birth —

and

they are

produce of the ground [

they grow from the earth, from the vegetation of the earth] —

So too, everything

that you purchase with second-tithe money must be food that is

produce derived from produce and produce of the ground.

Birds, which are similar to the particular specification, are therefore included, while water and salt, which are not produce derived from produce, are excluded, and fish, which are not produce of the ground, are excluded.

The Gemara explains the principle of a generalization, particular specification, and generalization:

Now,

[after all,] “

a generalization, a particular specification, and a generalization,”

we infer according to the nature of the particular specification

[we include everything that is similar to the particular specification].

If so,

what benefit does the final generalization

provide

[what did the final generalization add]? We would have said the same even if only a generalization and a particular specification had been written.

And we explain: This is the benefit of the second generalization:

to add everything that resembles it

[to add everything that is similar to the particular specification].

That is to say: Had only a generalization and a particular specification been stated, we would have said: In a generalization and a particular specification, the generalization includes nothing beyond what is stated in the particular specification. The second generalization serves to include everything that resembles the particular specification but is not the actual particular specification.

Furthermore,

the Gemara raises another question:

After all, “

a particular specification, a generalization, and a particular specification,”

we infer according to the nature of the particular specification

[we include everything that is similar to the particular specification]. If so,

what benefit does the final particular specification provide

[what did the final particular specification accomplish]? We would have inferred in this manner even had we been dealing only with a particular specification and a generalization.

And we explain:

Were it not for the final particular specification

[if the final particular specification had not been written],

I would have said: The generalization is made additional to the particular specification,

and we would have included everything.

And

we challenge this:

Now,

after all, whether between

two generalizations and a particular specification

[two generalizations and a particular specification, namely, “a generalization, a particular specification, and a generalization,”]

or

between

two particular specifications and a generalization

[two particular specifications and a generalization, namely, “a particular specification, a generalization, and a particular specification,”]

we infer according to the nature of the particular specification

[we include everything that is similar to the particular specification].

What difference is there between them,

that is to say: What is the distinction between them?

The Gemara explains that

there is

indeed the following distinction between these two principles:

For if there are two generalizations and a particular specification [“

a generalization, a particular specification, and a generalization”],

if there is something that resembles it even in one respect, we include it

[we include even something that resembles the particular specification in only one respect].

But

with two particular specifications and a generalization [“

a particular specification, a particular specification, and a generalization,”] only

if there is something that resembles it in two respects

[if the item we seek to include resembles the particular specification in all its respects] do we

include

it; but if it resembles the particular specification only

in one respect, we do not include it, because two generalizations include more than a single generalization.

because two generalizations include more than one generalization.

The Gemara raises another question:

Now,

after all, when we expound

a particular specification and a generalization,

the law is that

the generalization is made additional to the particular specification, and everything is included

[everything is included].

And

when we expound: “

a limitation and an amplification,”

it likewise amplifies everything, and everything is included.

If so,

what difference is there between “

a limitation and an amplification”

and “

a particular specification and a generalization”

[is there any practical difference whether we expound by means of generalizations and particular specifications or by means of amplifications and limitations]?

And we explain:

There is

indeed a distinction between these two principles:

For if,

when we expound the verses of the section dealing with the nazirite by means of

a particular specification and a generalization,

we include even leaves and lulavim

among the prohibitions of the nazirite.

That is to say: Even hard leaves that are like shoots are included among the prohibitions of the nazirite.

But

if, when we expound the verses of the section dealing with the nazirite by means of

a limitation and an amplification,

then

lulavim are not included,

although we do include even very soft leaves that are fit to eat. But

hard leaves,

which are like shoots,

are not.

So the Tosafot interpreted it;

Introduction to the discussion of “

permitted matter combines with prohibited matter.”

This discussion already appears in the Gemara, Pesachim 44a, and is repeated here with several changes. In tractate Pesachim we explained it according to Rashi’s approach there, whereas here the discussion will be explained according to the approach of the Tosafot here. Accordingly, there are many differences between what was explained in Pesachim and what will be explained here. Matters that the Tosafot did not explain in our discussion will be supplemented from Rashi’s commentary in Pesachim when it does not contradict the words of the Tosafot in our discussion, and at times their source will not be noted.

The discussion below will explain three fundamental concepts.

The first: permitted matter combines with prohibited matter.

The second: combining the acts of eating within the time of eating a half-loaf.

And the third: the taste is equivalent to the substance.

The first concept

— permitted matter combines with prohibited matter.

We find in several places, as will be explained below, that the Torah introduced the principle that a permitted matter combines with a prohibited matter in order to complete the deficient measure of the prohibited matter and make one liable for it, just as one is liable for a complete measure of a prohibited matter.

Our early and later authorities discussed the parameters of this concept: Did the Torah introduce the principle that when permitted matter combines with prohibited matter, the result is considered as though there is a complete measure of prohibited matter here, so that by such an act of eating one also transgresses with regard to the permitted matter that one ate?

Or does the combination merely cause the act to be considered an “eating,” because eating less than a kezayit is not considered eating at all? Therefore, when one completes the measure of the act of eating by eating the permitted matter, one is liable only for eating the half-measure of prohibited matter contained in the eating, but the eating of the permitted half is not considered the eating of a prohibited matter.

According to the latter view, one who ate less than a kezayit of a prohibited matter has not performed an act that is called “eating,” and is therefore exempt from lashes. The reason for the exemption of one who eats less than a kezayit is that he did not “eat,” and not that the prohibited matter itself lacked the requisite measure.

A. We learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Akiva says: Even a nazirite who soaked his bread in wine, and it contains enough [when combined] to make a kezayit, is liable.

According to the conclusion of the Gemara’s discussion here, this refers even to a case where the bread contains less than a kezayit of wine.

Although according to Rabbi Akiva the measure of wine for which one becomes liable is a kezayit, nevertheless, in this case he is liable, since the bread in which the wine is absorbed combines with it to complete the measure, even though the bread itself is not prohibited to a nazirite.

But the Sages disagree with him and maintain that permitted matter does not combine with prohibited matter to complete the measure.

B. We read in Pesachim 43a: It was taught: For completely leavened grain one is liable to karet. For its mixture, one violates a prohibition, according to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

That is, with regard to a mixture of leavened matter with a permitted substance, when there is not a kezayit of leavened matter by itself, but only when combined with the permitted matter with which it is mixed, one is flogged for eating it, according to Rabbi Eliezer.

And the Sages say: Only for completely leavened grain is one liable to karet, but for its mixture one is liable for nothing;

that is, Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree as to whether permitted matter combines with prohibited matter in the case of leaven.

We also learned a beraita there: “

Every

leavened substance you shall not eat,” to include Babylonian kutah [a dairy food mixed with grain flour].

One might have thought that one is liable to karet for it.

The verse therefore states: “For whoever eats anything leavened, that soul shall be cut off.” For completely leavened grain one is liable to karet, but for its mixture one violates a prohibition.

This beraita, as explained in the discussion there, follows the view of Rabbi Elazar. But the Sages do not expound the word “every,” and therefore permitted matter does not combine with prohibited matter.

C. We likewise find the principle that permitted matter combines with prohibited matter with regard to the fat of a sin-offering [which may be eaten only by male priests and only for one day and one night] when this fat becomes absorbed in the flesh of a peace-offering [which may be eaten by Israelites and for two days and one night]. In that case, the flesh of the peace-offering must be eaten with the stringencies of the flesh of a sin-offering, because the fat of the sin-offering is absorbed in the flesh of the peace-offering.

If one ate a kezayit of the flesh into which fat from the sin-offering had been absorbed, without observing the stringencies of the sin-offering, then although the absorbed fat does not contain a kezayit, one is liable for this eating, because the permitted flesh of the peace-offering combines with it and completes the measure of the prohibited fat.

According to the conclusion of the discussion here, this law is agreed upon and is not subject to dispute; it is derived from the verses.

D. Rashi’s approach in the discussion in Pesachim and the Tosafot’s approach in our discussion is that the meaning of “permitted matter combines with prohibited matter” is as follows:

Whenever one eats a total of a kezayit of permitted and prohibited matter at one time, one is liable, even if the prohibited matter was not absorbed in the permitted matter and the two were not mixed together.

This is provided that one eats the two halves of the measure [the permitted half and the prohibited half] at one time, since in eating by means of “permitted matter combines with prohibited matter,” one is liable only if one ate them at one time.

The liability for such an eating therefore differs from eating a complete kezayit of the prohibited matter, without the combination of permitted matter. In the latter case, it is not necessary to eat it all at once in order to become liable; rather, even if one ate half a kezayit and then another half-kezayit within the time of eating a half-loaf, one is liable.

The second concept

— combining an eating within the time of eating a half-loaf.

“Half-loaf” is the term for a “portion,” that is, half of a loaf.

The loaf by which we measure is a loaf of bread containing eight eggs’ volume, which is the measure of two meals. Half of this loaf, which is the measure of one meal, has a measure of four eggs’ volume.

The measure of “the time of eating a half-loaf” is the estimated time required to eat half of this loaf when the loaf is made of wheat and the person eating it is reclining and eating it with a relish, all of which hastens the eating.

This measure is fixed for eating any item, whether one ate bread or whether one ate other foods.

[This is so even though the time required to eat a measure of four eggs’ volume of other foods is shorter or longer than the time required to eat a measure of four eggs’ volume of bread.]

This measure applies both to eating prohibited foods, for one who eats a kezayit of a prohibited matter within the time of eating a half-loaf is flogged, and to mitzvot, such as matza, for one who eats a kezayit of matza within the time of eating a half-loaf has fulfilled his obligation.

It makes no difference whether the measure of the mitzva or transgression is a kezayit or a revi'it [for example, grapes for a nazirite, according to the one who says that their measure is a revi'it], or the volume of an egg or the volume of a dried fig.

The third concept

— taste is equivalent to the substance.

There are instances in which the Torah prohibited the taste of a prohibited matter just as it prohibited its substance.

Our authorities discussed the meaning of the prohibition of taste: Did the Torah introduce the principle that one is liable even for taste, which is not the substance of the prohibited matter, and without this innovation of the Torah there would be no liability for taste, since it contains no actual prohibited substance?

Or perhaps taste would have been prohibited even without the Torah’s innovation, just like the substance of the prohibited matter; rather, since the taste is mixed with a permitted matter, it should have been nullified by the majority, and the Torah came and introduced the principle that since when one tastes the permitted matter one tastes the taste of the prohibited matter, it is not nullified by the majority.

The early authorities engage in a particularly fundamental discussion concerning the measure for which one is liable on account of taste.

The fundamental question is this: When a prohibited matter that is less than a kezayit imparts taste to a kezayit of permitted matter, is one liable for eating the kezayit of permitted matter because of the taste of the prohibited matter within it, when the prohibited matter itself does not contain a kezayit [in a case where the principle that permitted matter combines with prohibited matter was not stated]?

Some maintain that permitted matter containing the taste of a prohibited matter becomes prohibited, and therefore one is liable for eating a kezayit, since the permitted matter itself is now considered prohibited.

Others maintain that tasting a prohibited matter in a kezayit of permitted matter itself constitutes the measure of a prohibited matter.

Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

With regard to all prohibitions of the Torah,

permitted matter does not combine with prohibited matter

to complete its measure.

For example, if one ate half a kezayit of meat and half a kezayit of milk [with a tzeirei] that is prohibited to eat, one is exempt; one becomes liable only if one eats a kezayit of milk by itself.

Except for the prohibitions of a nazirite,

where eating permitted matter together with the prohibited matter at one time combines with it to complete its measure.

For the Torah said

in the section dealing with the nazirite: “And every grape product [bread soaked in wine] he shall not eat.”

Therefore the Torah said

grape product,

rather than saying, “He shall not eat any grapes,” in order to teach that the bread combines with the wine to complete the measure.

The same law applies to the other prohibitions of a nazirite: the permitted substance joins the prohibited substance to complete its measure.