Nazir 35a — the Talmud in English

As he specified for you concerning the nazirite

“from grape-stones to grape-skin.”

And we raise an objection:

And according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah, who establishes this

“from grape-stones to grape-skin”

the one who establishes this verse, that it comes

to say: he is not liable until he eats two grape-stones and a grape-skin—

If so,

the particular

that follows the general,

from where does he derive it

where is there a particular for him?

That is to say: it follows that according to his view there is here only a particular and a general, and the general becomes an addition to the particular!

And we answer:

He holds

Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah

like Rabbi Elazar

ben Shamua, in the beraita brought above,

who expounds

“a limitation and an amplification.”

And he amplifies even the leaves and the tendrils, and limits the shoots, and he does not require the limitation that follows the amplification.

And if you wish, say:

Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah always holds

like the Rabbis,

who expound the verses by means of “a particular, a general, and a particular,” and limit even the leaves and the tendrils, and amplify only unripe grapes.

And although according to his words the second particular is needed to teach us “until he eats two grape-stones and a grape-skin,” nevertheless it is also possible to expound “a particular, a general, and a particular”—

For if it enters your mind

that the verse came only to innovate that he is not liable until he eats two grape-stones and a grape-skin,

as

the innovation of

Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah—

If so,

the Merciful One should have written this

“from grape-stones to grape-skin”

among the particulars

had the verse specified grape-stones and grape-skin together with the other particulars written before the general.

For what halakhic purpose did He write it after the general

and why was “from grape-stones to grape-skin” written after the general—

Infer from it

but certainly it was written so in the Torah in order

to expound it by “

a general and a particular”

to expound it by the method of “generals and particulars”; that is to say: by “a particular, a general, and a particular.”

And we raise an objection:

But

since “from grape-stones to grape-skin” is needed for the second particular, if so,

say: the whole of it came for this purpose

perhaps “from grape-stones to grape-skin” was written only for the second particular; and from where is it known that he is liable only for two grape-stones and a grape-skin?!

And we answer:

If so—

that the verse was written only for the second particular—

the Merciful One should have written

the following:

“or:

grape-stones and grape-skins”

or:

“a grape-stone and a grape-skin.”

For what halakhic purpose did the Merciful One write

and why was it written in the Torah

“from grape-stones to grape-skin,”

infer from it

but certainly the verse was written in this manner in order to:

a.

expound by means of it

“a general and a particular,”

to expound it by the method of “generals and particulars”; that is to say: so that it should be “a particular, a general, and a particular.”

b.

And it is also possible to expound by means of it

and it is also possible to derive from the wording “from grape-stones to grape-skin”:

until he eats two grape-stones and a grape-skin.

The Gemara asks:

And Rabbi Elazar, who expounds

the verses in the section of the nazirite by the method of

“a limitation and an amplification,”

if so, throughout the entire Torah

“a particular, a general, and a particular” —

from where does he derive it

from where does he derive it? That is to say: in what place in the Torah is this hermeneutical principle realized?

Rabbi Abbahu said:

He derives it from this verse

that is stated in the section of the paid guardian [Exodus 22:9]: “When a man gives to his fellow a donkey or an ox or a sheep, and any animal, to guard,” and it is expounded: “

When a man gives to his fellow a donkey or an ox or a sheep”—

this is

a particular. “

And any animal”—

this is

a general. “

To guard”:

he specified again,

for bears and lions are not included in this generalization, since they are not fit for guarding — “

A particular, a general, and a particular—

you may reason only concerning what is similar to the particular.”

Just as the particular—donkey, ox, and sheep—is explicitly an object that is movable and whose substance has monetary value, so too, anything that is movable and whose substance has monetary value; land is excluded, and slaves, which were likened to land, are excluded, and documents, whose substance does not have monetary value, are excluded.

Rava said: he derives it—

for Rabbi Elazar, “a particular, a general, and a particular”—

from this verse

that is stated in the section of the burnt-offering [Leviticus 1:10].

That is to say: in this matter too, the hermeneutical principle of “a particular, a general, and a particular” is realized:

For it is written: “And if his offering is from the flock, from the sheep or from the goats, for a burnt-offering, a male without blemish, he shall offer it,” and it is expounded: “

And if from”

meaning: part of the flock, and not all the flock—

a particular. “

The flock”—

a general. “

Sheep and goats”—

he specified again. “

A particular, a general, and a particular; you may reason only concerning what is similar to the particular.”

Rav Yehuda of Diskarta said to Rava:

And let us derive it from this verse

and derive “a particular, a general, and a particular” from this verse; that is to say: why should we not say that in this verse Rabbi Eliezer expounds “a particular, a general, and a particular”?!

For it is written at the beginning of the section of offerings [Leviticus 1:2]: “When a man brings an offering from you to Hashem, from the animal, from cattle, and from the flock shall you bring your offering”; and it is expounded: “

From”

the animal—this is

a particular.

And the meaning is: although a wild animal is included in the category of animal, one does not bring a wild animal as an offering. “

The animal”—

this is

a general.

And even the wild animal is included, since a wild animal is included in the category of animal everywhere. “

Cattle and flock”—

he specified again,

to exclude the wild animal. “

A particular, a general, and a particular; you may reason only concerning what is similar to the particular,”

and a wild animal is not included in the category of animal with regard to offerings.

He said to him

Rava to Rabbi Yehuda of Diskarta:

From this—

it cannot be inferred!

That is to say: in this place we cannot say that Rabbi Elazar should expound “a particular, a general, and a particular.”

For if [you derive it] from there, I would say: “

from

the animal”

does not exclude a wild animal, because: