Nazir 35a (לה.) — the Talmud in English

As it specifies for you in the passage concerning the nazirite “

from grape seeds to grape skin.”

And we raise a difficulty:

But according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who interprets this “

from grape seeds to grape skin”

as referring to the verse that comes

to say that he is not liable until he eats two grape seeds and a grape skin—

If so,

the particular

that follows the general,

from where does he derive it

[where is there a particular for him]?

That is: It follows that according to his view there is here only a particular and a general, and the general serves to add to the particular!

And we answer:

He holds that

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya

follows the view of Rabbi Elazar

[ben Shamua, in the beraita cited above]

who expounds “

a limitation and an amplification.”

And he includes even the leaves and tendrils, while excluding the branches, and he has no need for the limitation that follows the amplification.

And if you wish, say instead:

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya actually holds

like the Rabbis,

who expound the verses according to “a particular, a general, and a particular,” and exclude even the leaves and tendrils, including only unripe grapes.

Although according to his view the second particular is necessary to teach us that he is liable only once he eats two grape seeds and a grape skin, it is nevertheless also possible to expound the passage according to “a particular, a general, and a particular”—

For if it enters your mind

that the verse came only to introduce the novel teaching that he is not liable until he eats two grape seeds and a grape skin,

like

the novel teaching of

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya—

If so,

the Torah should have written this “

from grape seeds to grape skin”

among the particulars

[had the verse specified grape seeds and grape skin together with the other particulars written before the general].

For what halakhic purpose did it write it after the general

[and why was “from grape seeds to grape skin” written after the general]—

Learn from this

[rather, certainly it was written in this manner in the Torah in order]

to interpret it according to “

a general and a particular”

[to expound it by the method of “generals and particulars”; that is, according to “a particular, a general, and a particular”].

And we raise a difficulty:

But

since “from grape seeds to grape skin” is necessary as the second particular, if so,

say that the entire phrase came for this purpose alone

[perhaps “from grape seeds to grape skin” was written only as the second particular]; and from where do we know that he is liable only for two grape seeds and a grape skin?!

And we answer:

If so—

that the verse was written only as the second particular—

the Torah should have written

the following: “

or: ‘

grape seeds’”

or: “

a grape seed and a grape skin.”

For what halakhic purpose did the Torah write

[and why was it written in the Torah] “

from grape seeds to grape skin”?

Learn from this

[rather, certainly the verse was written in this manner in order]:

a.

To expound it by “

a general and a particular,”

[to expound it by the method of “generals and particulars”; that is, so that it would be “a particular, a general, and a particular.”

b.

And it can also be expounded from it

[and it is also possible to derive from the wording “from grape seeds to grape skin”]:

until he eats two grape seeds and a grape skin.

The Gemara asks:

But Rabbi Elazar, who expounds

the verses in the passage concerning the nazirite by the method of

“a limitation and an amplification,”

if so, throughout the Torah,

“a particular, a general, and a particular”—

from where does he derive it

[from where does he learn it]? That is: In what place in the Torah is this hermeneutical principle found?

Rabbi Abahu said:

He derives it from this verse

said in the passage concerning a paid bailee [Exodus 22:9]: “When a man gives his fellow an ass or an ox or a sheep or any animal to guard,” and it is expounded as follows: “

When a man gives his fellow an ass or an ox or a sheep”—

this is

a particular. “

Or any animal”—

this is

a general. “

To guard”:

It then specifies again,

because bears and lions are not included in this general category, as they are not fit to be guarded — “

A particular, a general, and a particular—

you may infer only what is similar to the particular.”

Just as the particular—an ass, an ox, and a sheep—is explicitly a movable object whose substance has monetary value, so too anything movable whose substance has monetary value; this excludes land, and excludes slaves, who are equated with land, and excludes promissory notes, whose substance does not have monetary value.

Rava said: He derives it—

for Rabbi Elazar, “a particular, a general, and a particular”—

from this verse

said in the passage concerning an burnt offering [Leviticus 1:10].

That is: Here too, the hermeneutical principle of “a particular, a general, and a particular” applies:

As it is written: “And if his offering is from the flock, from the sheep or from the goats, for a burnt offering, he shall offer it, a male without blemish,” and it is expounded as follows: “

And if it is from”

[this implies: from part of the flock, but not from the entire flock]—

a particular. “

The flock”—

a general. “

Sheep or goats”—

it then specifies again. “

A particular, a general, and a particular: You may infer only what is similar to the particular.”

Rav Yehuda of Diskarta said to Rava:

Let us derive it from this verse

[and derive “a particular, a general, and a particular” from this verse]; that is, why should we not say that in this verse Rabbi Elazar expounds “a particular, a general, and a particular”?!

It is written at the beginning of the passage concerning offerings [Leviticus 1:2]: “When a person brings an offering to the Lord, from animals, from cattle or from the flock, you shall bring your offering”; and it is expounded as follows: “

From”

the animals—this is

a particular.

This implies: Although a wild animal is included within the category of animals, a wild animal may not be brought as an offering. “

The animals”—

this is

a general.

A wild animal is thereby included as well, since a wild animal is included in the category of animals everywhere. “

Cattle and flock”—

it then specifies again,

excluding a wild animal. “

A particular, a general, and a particular: You may infer only what is similar to the particular,”

and a wild animal is not included in the category of animals with regard to offerings.

He said to him,

Rava said to Rav Yehuda of Diskarta:

From this—

nothing can be inferred!

That is: Here we cannot say that Rabbi Elazar would expound “a particular, a general, and a particular.”

For if it were from there, I would have said: “

From”

the animals”

does not exclude a wild animal, because: