Nazir 21b (כא:) — the Talmud in English

And he raised a contradiction:

a contradiction:

One who said, “

My hand is a nazirite,”

and “

my foot is a nazirite,”

has said nothing.

But if he said, “

My head is a nazirite,”

or “

my liver is a nazirite,”

he is a nazir.

This is the principle:

If he attached his naziriteship to

a thing upon which the soul depends—

such as the head or the liver—

he is a nazir.

If so, the difficulty arises: But one who says, “My mouth is like his mouth,” is merely saying: “May my mouth be a nazirite like his,” and this is not naziriteship, since neither the mouth nor the hair is among the things upon which the soul depends!?

Said

he answered,

Rav Yehuda:

He said that

the one who undertakes naziriteship

in this manner—

that is, since he heard his fellow undertake naziriteship and said, “My mouth is like his mouth,” it is as though he said: “

May my mouth be like his mouth with regard to wine,”

for had he said this, it would have been effective, because this is no worse than the incomplete expressions that establish a nazirite vow.

And

it becomes as though he said: “May

my hair be like his hair”

with regard to cutting.

We learned in the Mishna:

“I am a nazirite, and her husband heard and said, ‘And I’; he cannot annul.”

They raised a dilemma before them;

the scholars of the academy were uncertain:

The

husband who annuls his wife’s naziriteship, does he

uproot

it entirely

retroactively, as though she had never undertaken naziriteship,

or perhaps

the husband does not uproot it retroactively, but rather

cuts it off

[cutting and severing it] from this point forward?

And we explain:

What practical difference does it make?

For a woman who undertook naziriteship, and her friend heard and said: “

And I,”

and the husband of the first woman heard and annulled it

her naziriteship—

If

you say that he uproots it entirely,

the husband, by his annulment, uprooted the first woman’s naziriteship retroactively, then

the other woman is also permitted

because this is analogous to what we learned in our Mishna: If one is permitted by a Sage, who uproots the vow retroactively, all of them are permitted.

But if you say that he cuts it off,

and the naziriteship was in existence when the second woman associated her naziriteship with it, then

she is permitted

the wife of the man who annulled it, but

her friend is forbidden.

Once the practical difference has been clarified, the Gemara returns to its question:

What—

does he uproot it entirely, or does he cut it off?

Come and hear

from our Mishna that the husband

“I am a nazirite, and her husband heard and said, ‘And I’; he cannot annul,”

and it was initially understood that this is because if the husband were to annul it, the naziriteship that he accepted upon himself would be nullified, and he is not permitted to cause anything that would nullify his vow, as it is stated: “He shall not profane his word.”

The Gemara proves:

And if it enters your mind that the husband cuts it off,

then

let him annul his wife’s vow, and he himself should remain forbidden,

and if so, why should he not annul it!?

Rather, does it not follow that the husband uproots it entirely,

and once her naziriteship was nullified retroactively, his naziriteship was also nullified.

And we reject this:

No,

not as you have proved; rather,

actually,

I can tell you that the husband

cuts it off.

And

indeed,

it would be proper for him to annul it —

And this is the reason that he cannot annul it

[rather, this is why he cannot annul it]:

since he said to her “

And I,”

it is like one who said “

I have established it for you”

and is considered as such

[as though he established her nazirite vow, and he can no longer annul it].

Therefore,

if he has his establishment dissolved

[if he asks a Sage and they release his establishment],

he can annul it, but if not, he cannot annul it.

Come and hear a proof

Come and hear from the Mishna below, on page 24a, that the husband cuts it off:

A woman who undertook naziriteship

and completed the days of her naziriteship,

and set aside her animal

for the sin-offering, burnt-offering, and peace-offering that she is obligated to bring upon completing the days of her naziriteship,

and afterward her husband annulled it for her.

If the animal belonged to him

which the woman consecrated,

it goes out and grazes among the herd

that is, it becomes non-sacred, as the reason is explained in the Gemara below [24a]: The husband transferred the animal to her for her offering only if she required it; since she does not require an offering after her husband annulled her vow, it is retroactively evident that sanctity never took effect upon the offering, for a person cannot consecrate something that does not belong to him.

But if the animal belonged to her, the sin-offering must die.

And if it enters your mind,

that the

husband,

through his annulment,

uproots entirely

the naziriteship retroactively, then the consecration was a mistaken consecration, and

the sin-offering should go out

become

non-sacred.

Rather, does it not follow that the husband cuts it off.

And we answer:

Actually, I can tell you that the husband uproots it entirely.

And this is the reason

that the sin-offering must die:

Since she requires

some

atonement,

as will be explained, she resolves to consecrate the sin-offering even if she is not a nazirite, and once the sin-offering became consecrated,

it is like a sin-offering whose owners died

for once her husband annulled the vow, she was no longer obligated to bring a sin-offering,

and

there is

a received tradition—

a halakha given to Moses at Sinai—

that

a “

sin-offering whose owners died”

must die.

The reason that she requires some atonement is that this Mishna follows Rabbi Elazar HaKappar

who holds that the sin-offering is brought because she caused herself anguish by abstaining from wine. Therefore, even though she is not a nazirite and is not obligated to bring an offering, nevertheless, she ultimately did cause herself anguish by abstaining from wine, and therefore she resolves to consecrate the sin-offering.

Come and hear

from the Mishna below, on page 23a, that the husband cuts it off:

A woman who undertook naziriteship and drank wine and became impure through contact with the dead must receive forty lashes.

But

what are the circumstances—

in what situation does the Mishna teach us that she receives forty lashes if she violated her naziriteship?

If we say that her husband did not annul it,

is it so that

it needs to be said

that she receives forty lashes if she violated her naziriteship!?

Rather, it is obvious that her husband annulled it for her.

And if it enters your mind that the husband uproots it entirely

the naziriteship retroactively, as though she had never undertaken naziriteship, then

why does she receive

the

forty

lashes? There is no naziriteship here at all!?

Rather, does it not follow that the husband cuts it off,

and since the naziriteship was in existence when she violated it, she violated it and therefore receives forty lashes.

And we reject this:

Actually, I can tell you that the husband,

when he annuls it,

uproots it entirely

the naziriteship retroactively, and the Mishna is not dealing with a case in which her husband annulled it. And as for what is difficult for you—what novelty is there in the Mishna?—I can tell you: Actually, there is no novelty here—

And because it teaches in the latter clause

of that Mishna:

“Her husband annulled it for her, and she did not know, and she was drinking wine and becoming impure through contact with the dead; she does not receive the

forty lashes,”

and there is a novelty in this, teaching you that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who disagreed in the Mishna there and held that she receives makkat mardut, because she intended to violate a prohibition.