Menachot 82b (פב:) — the Talmud in English

You might say: In the case of the Passover-offering of later generations, which requires the application of the blood and the

burning of the sacrificial portions

on the altar, is that also the case with regard to the

He said to him

Rabbi Eliezer to Rabbi Akiva:

It says [

Exodus 13:5]: “

And you shall perform this service [

of the Passover-offering]

in this month,”

meaning:

that all the services of this month—

shall be like this [

like the Passover-offering of Egypt]. Just as the Passover-offering of Egypt could not be brought from unconsecrated funds, so too the Passover-offering of later generations that is performed in this month may be brought only from unconsecrated funds.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rabbi Akiva: Initially, he rejected Rabbi Eliezer’s statement because one may not derive what is possible from what is impossible; and then he returned and raised another objection, because the Passover-offering of Egypt did not require the application of the blood or the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar:

And Rabbi Akiva

what is his reasoning? In either case, the difficulty remains:

If he holds [

if he indeed maintains]

that one may not derive what is possible from what is impossible,

as he argued initially, then there is a difficulty:

Let him stand by his statement [

let him remain with this objection]. Why did he need to add another objection?

And

if he retracted [

if Rabbi Akiva retracted his position and conceded to Rabbi Eliezer that one may derive what is possible even from what is impossible],

and the reason that he did not derive it from the Passover-offering of Egypt

is only

because of this objection

that he raised: What can be said about the Passover-offering of Egypt, which did not require the application of the blood or the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar? There is still a difficulty:

The Passover-offering

that the Israelites brought in the

wilderness will prove it,

as it too could be brought only from unconsecrated funds—for there was no tithe in the wilderness before they entered the Land—and it required the application of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar!

And we answer: What Rabbi Akiva added in raising his objection—

he said it according to the position of Rabbi Eliezer:

According to my position,

there is no need for this objection, because even without this objection

one may not derive what is possible from what is impossible—

but

according to your position, that you say “

one may derive what is possible from what is impossible,”

there is still a difficulty:

What can be said about the Passover-offering of Egypt, which did not require the application of the blood or the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar? You might say that this is not so with regard to the Passover-offering of later generations, which requires the application of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar.

And Rabbi Eliezer said to him [

he answered him concerning this]:

Rabbi Eliezer:

It is written, “

And you shall perform.”

And

we raise a difficulty against

Rabbi Eliezer:

Why did he need to derive it from “And you shall perform”?

Let Rabbi Eliezer say to him

to Rabbi Akiva in response to his second objection:

The Passover-offering in the wilderness will prove it,

as it required the application of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial portions, yet could be brought only from unconsecrated funds.

And we answer: What Rabbi Eliezer derived from “And you shall perform”—

he said to him according to the position of Rabbi Akiva:

According to my position, one may derive what is possible from what is impossible; and even because of this objection

there is no difficulty either, because

the Passover-offering in the wilderness will prove it—

but

according to your position, that you say “

one may not derive what is possible from what is impossible,”

it is written, “

And you shall perform.”

And we raise a difficulty:

But even so—

as it is written, “And you shall perform”—

let him object

Rabbi Akiva to him: One may not derive what is possible from what is impossible. That is, since the response “And you shall perform” does not come to refute his second objection, but rather to refute his first objection—that one may not derive what is possible from what is impossible—what kind of answer is this? The difficulty nevertheless remains: Does one, in fact, derive what is possible from what is impossible!?

He said

he explained

Rav Sheshet: This indicates—

that is, we necessarily learn from this baraita that

one does not respond to a hekesh

and “And you shall perform” is a hekesh, to which one does not respond: one may not derive what is possible from what is impossible.

And it was stated in the beit-midrash [

in the house of study, the place where Torah is disseminated]: A difficulty was raised against our Mishna, which derives for all offerings that they may be brought only from unconsecrated funds through a hekesh to the Passover-offering:

But does a matter that is derived through a hekesh,

namely, the Passover-offering of later generations, which is derived through a hekesh from the Passover-offering of Egypt, which could be brought only from unconsecrated funds,

then go on to teach

about other offerings

through a hekesh,

based on “And you shall sacrifice the Passover-offering to the Lord your God, of the flock and the cattle,” so that they too may be brought only from unconsecrated funds!?

And we answer:

It was stated as a general principle, for the entire Passover-offering is one matter.

That is, all the offerings are derived from all the Passover-offerings together, because they bear one designation, Passover-offering, and have one law.

The Gemara further explains:

And Rabbi Akiva—

who disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer’s derivation—

the Passover-offering, that it may be brought only from unconsecrated funds, from where does he derive it?

That is, from where does he derive that all offerings may be brought only from unconsecrated funds, since according to his view it cannot be derived from the Passover-offering!?

And we answer:

He derives it from that which Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer.

That is, from the same verse that Shmuel expounded in the name of Rabbi Eliezer for one matter, Rabbi Akiva derives, with regard to offerings, that they may be brought only from unconsecrated funds.

For Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, explaining the verse [

Leviticus 7:37]: “

This is the Torah of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the inauguration-offering, and of the offering of peace-offerings”—

the entire verse is superfluous, since “This is the law of” has already been stated with regard to each of them; rather, the verse comes to compare all the offerings mentioned in it to one another: “

The burnt-offering”

comes to teach:

Just as a burnt-offering requires a service vessel,

as will be explained,

so too every

other offering mentioned in the verse

requires a service vessel,

as well.

The Gemara asks:

What is it?

With which vessel are we dealing?

If you say it is a bowl,

that is, a service vessel used to receive the blood, from which it is sprinkled on the altar: In the case of a burnt-offering, we can derive this from the verse preceding the giving of the Torah at Mount Sinai [

Exodus 24:5]: “And he sent the young men of the Children of Israel [the firstborn], and they offered burnt-offerings, and they sacrificed peace-offerings to the Lord, bulls. And Moses took half of the blood [of the burnt-offering and of the peace-offerings] and placed it in basins [vessels; two basins, one for half the blood of the burnt-offering and one for half the blood of the peace-offerings, to sprinkle them on the people], and half the blood he sprinkled on the altar”—

with regard to

the communal peace-offerings [

the peace-offerings mentioned together with the burnt-offerings]

it is also written “

and placed it in basins,”

and we could derive from them that all offerings require a vessel for receiving the blood; there would be no need for “burnt-offering” for this purpose.

Rather, “burnt-offering,” which comes to teach that the other offerings require a vessel, refers to

burnt offering," which comes to teach that the other offerings require a vessel, refers to a

a knife

for slaughtering, which must be a service vessel.

The Gemara asks:

And from where do we know regarding the burnt-offering itself

that it requires a vessel?

We derive it from

as it is written concerning the binding of Isaac [

Genesis 22:10]: “

And Abraham stretched forth his hand and took the knife to slaughter his son,”

and

therefore

there it is a burnt-offering [

Isaac ascended upon the altar as a burnt-offering],

for

therefore

it is written concerning the ram that Abraham found [there, verse 13]: “

with regard to the ram that Abraham found [there 13]: “

And he offered it”—

the ram—

as a burnt-offering in place of his son,”

indicating that his son was a burnt-offering.

Shmuel, in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, continues to explain the verse: “

Meal-offering”

comes to teach:

Just as a meal-offering may be eaten only by male members of the priesthood,

as is explicit in the verses,

so too every

offering mentioned in the verse, as will be explained,

may be eaten only by male members of the priesthood.

The Gemara asks:

What is it?

With regard to which offerings does the verse come to teach that they may be eaten only by male members of the priesthood?

If

it refers to

the sin-offering and the guilt-offering

mentioned in the verse, this cannot be said, for: