Menachot 69a (סט.) — the Talmud in English

First fruits"

we are speaking of the produce

[The first produce of the grain that was supposed to become permitted through the two loaves, as the Torah stated]! Is that not so? No, this is not the case, for “first fruits” does not refer to the wheat “belonging” to the two loaves that he brings. Rather: "

First fruits"

we are speaking of the altar; that is, “first fruits” refers to the year, meaning that no grain from this year may be sacrificed on the altar before the two loaves! If so, the fact that the wheat from which the omer was brought had already been subject to the two loaves and had already become permitted on their account is of no avail, for:

but

already

the altar has consumed produce from this year

[the produce of this year has already been sacrificed on the altar], and the two loaves coming from the produce of that same year are not “first fruits.”

a. We learned in the Mishna below, on 70a: Wheat and barley … are forbidden as ḥadash before the omer … If they took root before the omer, the omer permits them; and if not, they are forbidden until the next omer arrives. The same applies with regard to the two loaves: produce that took root before the two loaves the two loaves permit it ; and see this in the Keren Ora Keren Ora in his comments on the preceding question.

b. The sugya before us discusses the fruit of trees: At what stage of their growth must they be with regard to the permission granted by the two loaves?

b. Blossoming: Elsewhere

Rami bar Ḥama raised a question: The two loaves

that permit the fruit of trees:

Do they permit

the blossoming

of the fruit

or

[do they permit it],

or

the

setting of the fruit

of the fruit

?

That is, with regard to the fruit of trees, what is the law? Is it sufficient for the fruit to have blossomed before the two loaves in order for the fruit to become permitted through them, or, until the fruit has set, do the two loaves not permit it?

And we challenge this:

What are “blossoming” and “setting”?

[With regard to the blossoming and setting of what was the doubt raised]!?

If

Rami bar Ḥama’s doubt concerned

the blossoming of the fruit and the setting of the fruit

[the actual blossoming and setting of the fruit], then surely there is no doubt that blossoming is sufficient, for:

Now, if the taking root

of grain—which has not yet exhibited any discernible growth at all—

is permitted

[the two loaves permit it], then

the blossoming and setting

of the fruit of trees

requires a question?

That is, certainly the blossoming of the fruit—which has already exhibited discernible growth—should be sufficient for it to become permitted through the two loaves!?

Rather,

Rami bar Ḥama’s doubt concerned

the blossoming of the leaf and the setting of the leaf

[the blossoming and setting of the “flowers” of the fruit]:

Does it become—

the blossoming of the flowers on the tree—

like taking root

in grain, so that the fruit of the tree becomes permitted if the flowers blossomed before the two loaves,

or not?

The blossoming of the flowers does not become like taking root in grain, and the fruit of the tree is not thereby permitted—

And we conclude with regard to the substance of the question:

Teyku.

Rava bar Rav Ḥanan raised a question:

Wheat that one sowed in the ground

[the Gemara proceeds to explain the case]: Does

the omer permit it, or does the omer not permit it?

And we challenge this:

What are the circumstances!?

If

it is

already

taken root,

the wheat has taken root in the ground, and the doubt concerns the growth that will emerge, whether it is permitted, then

we have already learned

its law in the Mishna: It becomes permitted through the omer—

And

if it is

still

not taken root,

then with regard to the growth as well

we have already learned

its law there, that it does not become permitted,

as

this is what

we learned

[below, on 70a]:

“Wheat and barley … are forbidden as ḥadash before the omer …

If they took root before the omer, the omer permits them; and if not, they are forbidden until the next omer arrives.”

If so, what was Rava bar Rav Ḥanan’s doubt about!?

And we answer:

It is necessary;

that is, his doubt did not concern the growth, but rather:

It is a case

where he reaped them and sowed them before the omer

[he reaped wheat from the new produce—which the omer had not yet permitted—and sowed it before the omer] and it had not taken root in the ground,

and the omer came and passed over them

[the omer passed over them] while they were sown in the ground—

And he raised the question,

concerning the status of those very grains of wheat that he sowed in the ground:

What is the law regarding taking them and eating them

[once they are removed from the ground, will it be permitted to eat them]? The sides of the doubt are:

Are they considered as though they had been thrown into a container—

and the omer permitted them

[are the grains considered as though they had been in a container, so that the omer that passed over them while they were in the ground permits them]—

or perhaps: They became nullified with regard to the ground

[the ground nullified them], and this omer does not permit them; rather, they become permitted through the following omer?

The Gemara further raises a question concerning the status of wheat sown in the ground: whether it is like the ground

with regard to two laws unrelated to the laws of ḥadash:

b. The law of exploitation applies only to movable property. But one who exploits or is exploited with regard to land is not subject to the law of exploitation; and concerning the annulment of a sale of land, the amoraim disagreed in Bava Metzia 57a.

Do they have

with regard to wheat sown in the ground that has not taken root

exploitation

like other movable property,

or do they not have exploitation

like land?

And we challenge this:

What are the circumstances?

If

it is a case

where

he sold him wheat sown in the ground, and

he said to him

the seller said to the buyer: "

I sowed six

[I sowed six kor of produce in the ground],"

and witnesses came and said that he sowed only five

[and witnesses came and said that he sowed only five]; thus it is impossible to explain:

I ved Rava skazal: vse, chto opredeleno meroyu ili vesom

ili chisлом, dazhe esli nedostacha men'she mere ona'a

[men'she shesti protsentov],

vozvrashchaet

emu pokupku, to est' tot, kto obmanul drugogo v mere, dav emu men'she, chem dogovorennaya mera, ili obmanul ego v vese ili chisle, dazhe esli ona'a byla men'she shesti protsentov, vozvrashchaet pokupku. Eto potomu, chto zdes' imeet mesto oshibochnaya sdelka: emu bylo skazano, chto predmet nakhoditsya v takom sostoyanii, a v deystvitel'nosti eto ne tak —

I togda tak zhe i v nashem sluchae: poskol'ku on skazal emu: «Ya poseyal na ney shest' kurimov», a v deystvitel'nosti tam okazalos' men'she, eto oshibochnaya sdelka, i on vozvrashchaet ee; ved' zemel'nye uchastki byli isklyucheny tol'ko iz zakona ob ona'a, no ne iz zakona ob «oshibochnoy sdelke».

No

vopros voznikaet v sluchae,

kogda on skazal emu: «

Ya poseyal na ney stol'ko, skol'ko polagaetsya»

[prodavets skazal pokupatelyu: ya poseyal na ney pshenitsu v sootvetstvii s ee nadlezhashchey emkost'yu],

a prishli svideteli i skazali, chto on ne poseyal stol'ko, skol'ko polagaetsya

[i prishli svideteli i skazali, chto on ne poseyal na ney stol'ko, skol'ko polagaetsya]. V takom sluchae zakon zavisit ot zakonov ona'a, poskol'ku veshch', zavisyashchaya ot predpолагаemogo namereniya, v kotорой oshibka vstrechaetsya chasto, otnositsya k ona'a. I togda voznikayet vopros:

Byli li u pshenitsy

ona'a,

potomu chto

ona schitaetsya kak pshenitsa, nakhodyashchayasya v kuvshine

[kak budto semena lezhat v kuvshine i yavlyayutsya obychnym dvizhimym imushchestvom] —

ili, mozhet byt': oni anulirovalis' po otnosheniyu k zemle

[semena byli anulirovany po otnosheniyu k zemle], i ikh zakon takov zhe, kak u zemli, u kotoroy net ona'a?

I podobnym obrazom voznikaet vopros:

Dолжны li po nim prinimat' klyatvu

kak po dvizhimomu imushchestvu — naprimer, kogda chelovek skazal drugomu: ya dogovorilsya s тобой, chto poseyu na peredannom mne uchastke shest' kurimov, a ty poseyal tol'ko pyat'; a tot otvechaet emu: ya poseyal pyat' s polovиной. Dolzhen li on prinyat' klyatvu, kak v sluchae chastichnogo priznaniya po dvizhimomu imushchestvu —

ili po nim ne prinimayut klyatvu

kak po zakonu o zemel'nykh uchastkakh?

Osnovaniya dlya voprosa takovy:

Mozhet byt',

oni podobny pshenitse, kotoruyu poseyali v kuvshine, i schitayutsya dvizhimym imushchestvom, i po nim prinimayut klyatvu; ili, mozhet byt': oni anulirovalis' po otnosheniyu k zemle, i schitayutsya zemel'nymi uchastkami, i po nim ne prinimayut klyatvu.

G. Navoz: eshche

Rami bar Hama sprosil:

Pshenitsa v navozе krupnogo skota i yachmen' v navozе zhivotnogo

chto s nimi?

I dal'she on razbiraet vopros: sprashivaem:

dlya chego,

o kakom zakone zdes' vopros? Ved' —

Neuzheli rech' idet o том, chtoby sdelat' ikh nechtstivymi skверной pishchi?

Ved'

my uzhe uchili:

Pshenitsa v navozе krupnogo skota i yachmen' v navozе zhivotnogo:

esli tol'ko

zagadali o nikh

v myslyakh

dlya upotrebleniya v pishchu

[chtoby izvlech' ikh i s"est'],

oni ne stanovятsya

nechtstivymi

nechtstivost'yu pishchi.

No esli

sobrali ikh

rukami

dlya upotrebleniya v pishchu,

to vot oni

stanovyatsya

nechtstivymi

nechtstivost'yu pishchi.

No

skazhi, chto vopros otnositsya

k

prineseniyu

minhot

iz etoy pshenitsy ili yachmenya. Ved' —

Ochevidno, chto net

[ochevidno, chto oni ne godny dlya minhot], potomu chto oni otvratitel'ny; ved' prorok skazal [Malakhi 1:8]: «Vy prinosite na moy altar oskvernennyy khleb i govorite: “Chem my oskvernili Tebya?” Tem, chto govorite: “Stol Gospodin' prezren”. I kogda vy prinosite slepoe v zhertvu, razve eto ne durno [razve eto ne durno!?], i kogda prinosite khromoe ili bol'noe, razve eto ne durno

? Prinesi-ka eto pravitel'yu tvoemu: budet li on dovolen тобою ili primet li tebya

[ispytay eto delo: prinesi odno iz etikh veshchey v podarok pravitelyu. Budet li on dovolen etim podarkom ili primet li tebya

!?]»?!

Ne nuzhno

[govorit' o takom sluchae], naprimer

esli ikh vzяли i poseyali

[izvlekli ikh iz navozа, poseyali i vyrastili urozhay]

i khotyat prinesti minhot iz nikh

[i sobirayutsya prinosit' minhot iz urozhaya, vyrashchennogo iz etoy pshenitsy]; i v takom sluchae my somnevaemsya:

kak

delo obstoit s ikh prigodnost'yu dlya minhot?

Osnovaniya dlya voprosa takovy:

Mozhet byt', prichina v ikh otvratitel'nosti, i poskol'ku ikh poseyali, ikh otvratitel'nost' ischezla,

to est' mozhet byt', u etoy pshenitsy est' tol'ko nedostatok otvratitel'nosti, i togda eto otnositsya tol'ko k ney samoy, no ne k urozhayu, kotoryy ot nee vyrastil i ne yavlyaetsya otvratitel'nym —

ili, mozhet byt': prichina v ikh istoshchennosti, i teper' oni tozhe istoshcheny,

to est', mozhet byt', etot zernosnovoy material oslablen poskol'ku perevarilsya v kishechnike zhivotnogo, i to, chto vyrastayet iz etikh semyan, vnov' ne tak polno i zdorovo, kak obychnaya pshenitsa; i iznachal'no ne podobayut dlya prineseniya v minhot.

I delaem vyvod:

teyku.

D. Slon: eshche

Rami bar Hama sprosil: slon, progлотivshiy egipetskuyu korzinu

[korzina, sdelannaya iz pal'movykh volокон],

i izvergshiy ee

v tom zhe vide

cherez zadniy prokhod, chto s ney?

I dal'she on razbiraet vopros:

I sprashivaem:

dlya chego?

Neuzheli dlya togo, chtoby otmenit' ee nechtstivost',

kotoraya u nee byla, naprimer, esli korzina byla nechtstiva, i vopros v tom, schitaetsya li ee progлатыvanie perevarivaniem i otmenyaetsya li ee status sosuda, tak chto ee nechtstivost' prekrashchaetsya? Ved'

my uzhe uchili:

Ved' bylo skazano:

Vse sosudy perekhodyat v sostoyanie nechtstivosti

to est' v status, pri kotorom oni mogut poluchat' nechtstivost' —

namereniem,

naprimer kozha, kotorya obychno prednaznachena dlya obuvi i ne poluchaet nechtstivost' do okonchaniya ee obrabotki i izdelaniya iz nee obuvi; no esli on namerевalsya sdelat' iz etoy kozhi stol, i dlya etoy tseli ne trebuetsya nikakoy raboty, ona uzhe schitaetsya sosudom v otnoshenii polucheniya nechtstivosti —

i ne vyhodyat iz sostoyaniya nechtstivosti

posle togo, kak uzhe stali nechtstivymi,

inoe kak posredstvom izmeneniya deystviya

naprimer, esli oni slomalis'; a poskol'ku zdes' net izmeneniya deystviya, ee nechtstivost' ne otmenyaetsya.

I otvechaem:

ne nuzhno,

vopros otnositsya k sluchayu,

kogda slon progлотil

[ne prozhevyvaya polnost'yu]

pal'movye volокna

i vyvel ikh cherez zadniy prokhod,

a izgotovili iz nikh

i sdelali iz etikh volокон

egipetskuyu korzinu:

poluchaet li etot sosud nechtstivost'?

Osnovaniya dlya voprosa takovy:

Mozhet byt' —

takoe progлатыvanie

yavlyaetsya perevarivaniem,

i na nikh rasprostranyaetsya nazvanie «navoz»,