Menachot 69a — the Talmud in English

first fruits"

we are saying this with regard to the produce

: "first fruits" does not refer to the grain that is “associated” with the shtei ha-lechem that he is bringing. Rather: "

first fruits"

we are saying this with regard to the altar, meaning, “first fruits” refers to the year: nothing from the grain of this year may be brought upon the altar before the shtei ha-lechem! And if so, the fact that the grain—from some of which the omer was offered—was grain over which the shtei ha-lechem had already passed, and which had already become permitted on its account, is of no avail, for:

то есть слово «первые плоды» относится к году: на жертвеннике нельзя приносить зерно этого года раньше, чем будут принесены два хлеба! И если так, не имеет значения, что пшеница, из которой был принесён омэр, уже относится к пшенице, над которой прошёл срок принесения двух хлебов и которая уже стала разрешённой благодаря им, поскольку:

but

already

the altar has already consumed from the produce of this year

already something from the produce of this year was offered upon the altar, and the shtei ha-lechem that comes from the produce of that year is not “first fruits.”

A. We learned in the Mishna below, 70a: Wheat and barley are forbidden as hadash before the omer... If they took root before the omer, the omer permits them; and if not, they are forbidden until the following omer comes. The same applies with regard to the shtei ha-lechem: produce that took root before the shtei ha-lechem the shtei ha-lechem permits; and if it took root after it, the shtei ha-lechem does not permit it.

B. The sugya before us discusses the matter of tree fruits: at what stage of their growth must they be for purposes of the permission of the shtei ha-lechem.

B. Blossoming: further:

Rami bar Hama asked: The shtei ha-lechem

which permit the fruits of the tree:

Does the

blossoming

of the fruit

permit

them,

or the

the

setting of the fruit

of the fruit

permit them?

That is, what is the law with regard to the fruits of a tree? Is the blossoming of the fruit before the shtei ha-lechem sufficient for the fruit to become permitted through them, or perhaps, until the fruit has set, the shtei ha-lechem does not permit it?

And we challenge:

What are “blossoming” and what is “setting”

[with regard to the blossoming and setting of what was the uncertainty]?!

If you say

Rami bar Hama was uncertain concerning

the blossoming of the fruit and the setting of the fruit

[concerning the actual blossoming and setting of the fruit], then there is no uncertainty that blossoming is sufficient, for:

Now, taking root

of produce—which has not yet displayed any recognizable growth at all—

is permitted

[the shtei ha-lechem permit it],

the blossoming and setting

of the fruits of a tree

is it necessary to ask—that is, all the more so, the blossoming of the fruit—which has already displayed recognizable growth—is sufficient for it to become permitted through the shtei ha-lechem?!

That is, certainly the blossoming of the fruit—which has already exhibited discernible growth—should be sufficient for it to become permitted through the two loaves!?

Rather,

Rami bar Hama’s uncertainty concerned

the blossoming of the leaf and the setting of the leaf

[the blossoming and setting of the “flowers” of the fruit],

is it—

the blossoming of the flowers on the tree—

like taking root

in produce, and the fruits of the tree become permitted if the flowers blossomed before the shtei ha-lechem,

or not

is the blossoming of the flowers not like taking root in produce, and the fruits of the tree do not become permitted through this—

And we conclude concerning the question itself:

the matter shall stand unresolved.

Rava bar Rav Hanan asked:

Wheat that one sowed in the ground

[he proceeds to explain it]: Does

the omer permit it, or does the omer not permit it?

And we challenge:

What are the circumstances?!

But

if

already

they have taken root,

the wheat took root in the ground, and the uncertainty concerns the growths that will come, whether they are permitted, then

we already learned

their law in the Mishna, that they are permitted by the omer—

and

if

still

they have not taken root,

and concerning the growths, likewise

we already learned

their law there, that they are not permitted,

for

this

we learned [below, 70a]:

[below, on 70a]:

Wheat and barley... are forbidden as hadash before the omer...

If they took root before the omer, the omer permits them; and if not, they are forbidden until the following omer comes.

And if so, concerning what was Rava bar Rav Hanan uncertain?!

And we answer:

It is necessary—that is, his uncertainty was not concerning the growths, but rather:

that is, his doubt did not concern the growth, but rather:

It is a case

where he harvested them and sowed them before the omer

[he harvested wheat from the new produce—over which the omer had not yet passed—and sowed it before the omer] and they did not take root in the ground,

and the omer came and passed over them

[the omer passed over them] while they were sown in the ground—

And he was uncertain,

and Rava bar Rav Hanan was uncertain concerning the law of that very wheat that he sowed in the ground:

What is [the law] to take it and eat from it

[when he removes it from the ground, will it be permitted for him to eat it]? And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Is it like something placed in a jug—

and the omer permitted them

[are the wheat considered as though they had been in a jug, so that they are permitted by the omer] that passed over them while they were in the ground—

or perhaps: he nullified them with regard to the ground

[he subordinated them to the ground], and this omer does not permit them; rather, they become permitted by the following omer? The Gemara further considers the law of wheat that one sowed in the ground, whether it is like land with regard to two laws that do not pertain to the laws of hadash:

A. The law of a seller who was deceived, or a buyer who was deceived, is as follows: If the ona'a was more than one-sixth, the sale is void; less than one-sixth, it is waived; exactly one-sixth, he acquires [the object] and returns the ona'a. Ordinary ona'a concerns the price; however, in our sugya another type of ona'a will be explained.

B. Ona'a applies only to movable property; but one who deceives or is deceived with regard to land is not subject to the law of ona'a. And concerning the law of voiding a sale of land, the amoraim dispute in Bava Metzia 57a.

Does

there apply to them

to wheat sown in the ground that has not taken root

the law of ona'a

as with other movable property,

or is there no ona'a for them

as with land?

And we challenge:

What are the circumstances?

If you say

in a case

that

he sold him wheat sown in the ground, and

he said to him

the seller to the buyer: "

I sowed six

[I sowed six kor of produce in the ground],”

and witnesses came and said that he sowed only five

[and witnesses came and said that he sowed only five in it]; thus it is impossible to explain:

And Rava said: Anything that is by measure or by weight

or by number, even less than the measure of ona'a [

less than one-sixth] this one

returns

from the transaction; that is, one who overreached his fellow in measure, giving him less than the measure that he stipulated with him, or overreached him in weight or in number—even if the overreaching was less than one-sixth, this one returns, because it is a mistaken transaction: for he specified to him that it was presumed to be so, and it is not so -

And if so, also in our matter, since he said to him, “I sowed six kor in it,” and there is only less than that, this is a mistaken transaction, and he returns, for the lands were excluded only from the law of ona'a and not from the law of “a mistaken transaction".

Rather,

the uncertainty is in a case where

he said to him “

I sowed in it as was proper for it” [

the seller said to the buyer: I sowed wheat in it as was proper for it],

and witnesses came and said that he did not sow in it as was proper for it [

and witnesses came and said that he did not sow in it as was proper for it]; and in this manner the law depends on the laws of ona'a, for something dependent upon an estimation of intention, in which error is common, is included within ona'a. And if so, the uncertainty is:

Whether

they have ona'a,

and because

they are like one who has cast them into a vessel [

like seeds placed in a vessel, and they are like other movable property] -

or perhaps: they are nullified with regard to the land [

he nullified the seeds with regard to the land], and their law is like land, which has no ona'a.

And similarly, the uncertainty is:

They take an oath concerning them

like movable property; for example, a person claimed to his fellow: I stipulated with you to sow six [measures] in the land that I gave you, whereas you sowed only five; and the other claimed to him: I sowed five and a half. Is he obligated to take an oath like one who admits to part of a claim concerning movable property? -

Or they do not take an oath concerning them

according to the law of land?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Whether

they are like one who cast them into a vessel, and they are like movable property, and one takes an oath concerning them; or perhaps: they are nullified along with the land, and they are like land, and one does not take an oath concerning them.

3. Dung: Further

Rami bar Hama inquired:

Wheat in the dung of cattle, and barley in the dung of an animal

what is [their law]?

And he explains it as he proceeds. And we challenge this:

For what purpose,

for concerning which law is the uncertainty? For:

If you say, concerning rendering them impure with the impurity of food?

For

we have already learned:

Wheat in the dung of cattle and barley in the dung of an animal:

If he merely

had in mind concerning them

in his heart

for eating [

to remove them and eat them],

they do not render

impure with

the impurity of food.

But if he

collected them

with his hands

for eating,

these

do render

impure with

the impurity of food.

Rather,

say that the uncertainty is whether it is fit

to

offer

meal-offerings from this wheat or barley; but:

from this wheat or barley. But:

It is obvious that they are not [

it is obvious that they are invalid for meal-offerings], because they are repulsive, for thus the prophet said [Malachi 1:8]: “You bring upon My altar food that is defiled, and you say, ‘How have we defiled You?’ By your saying, ‘The table of the Lord is contemptible.’ And when you bring a blind animal to sacrifice, there is no evil [is this thing not evil!?], and when you bring a lame or a sick animal, there is no evil,”

“Offer it, please, to your governor; will he be pleased with you, or will he show you favor” [

Test the matter: offer one of these as a gift to your governor; will he be pleased with you because of this gift, or will he show you favor]!?

And we answer:

It is necessary

for a case such as

where he took them and sowed them [

he removed them from the dung and sowed them, and they produced growths]

and he wishes to bring meal-offerings from them [

and he wishes to bring meal-offerings from the growths produced by these wheat grains]; and in this manner we are uncertain:

What

is their law concerning making them fit for meal-offerings?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Because it is repulsiveness, and once he sowed them, their repulsiveness has gone,

that is, whether these wheat grains have nothing but the deficiency of repulsiveness; and if so, this applies only to them themselves and not to their growths, which are not repulsive -

or perhaps: it is because of emaciation, and now too they are emaciated,

that is, perhaps there is a deficiency of leanness in these wheat grains, since they were digested in the animal’s intestines, and what grows from these seeds is again not full and healthy like other wheat; and initially it is not fitting to offer them as meal-offerings.

And we conclude:

teyku.

4. Elephant: Further

Rami bar Hama inquired: An elephant that swallowed an Egyptian basket [

a basket made from palm fronds],

and expelled it

as it was

through the place of excrement, what is [its law]?

And he explains it as he proceeds:

And we challenge this:

For what purpose?

If you say, to remove its impurity

that it had, for example, the basket was impure, and the uncertainty is whether its being swallowed is considered digestion, and the status of a vessel was nullified from it, and its impurity ceased—then

we have already learned:

As it was taught:

All vessels descend into their state of impurity,

that is, into the status of being capable of receiving impurity—

through thought,

for example, leather, whose ordinary purpose is footwear, and it does not receive impurity until its work is completed and shoes are made from it; nevertheless, if he had in mind to make the leather into a table, and for this purpose no work is lacking, it is like a vessel for receiving impurity -

And they do not rise from their impurity

that they have already contracted

except through a change in action,

such as when they break; and since here there is no change in action, its impurity is not nullified.

And we answer:

It is necessary,

the uncertainty is in a case

where the elephant swallowed [

without complete chewing]

fronds

and expelled them through the place of excrement,

and made them,

and they made from those fronds

an Egyptian basket;

whether that vessel receives impurity.

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Was it—

a swallowing of this kind—

digestion,

and the name “dung” applies to them,