Menachot 59b (נט:) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this:

On the contrary,

the two loaves should have been included,

as they resemble the meal-offering of the omer,

for they share the following characteristics:

a.

They are communal offerings.

The two loaves and the meal-offering of the omer are communal offerings.

b.

They are obligatory.

Both of them must be brought.

c.

They are subject to ritual impurity.

Both override the prohibition against ritual impurity, as impurity is permitted in the case of a communal offering.

d.

They are eaten.

Both are eaten: the two loaves in their entirety, and the remainder of the meal-offering of the omer.

e.

They are subject to piggul.

The two loaves are rendered permissible by the offering of the sheep, and the meal-offering of the omer is rendered permissible by its handful. But a meal-offering of priests has no element that renders it permissible, as it is burned in its entirety; therefore, it cannot become piggul.

f.

They override Shabbat.

Both override Shabbat, as communal offerings.

g.

They render something permissible.

The omer renders the consumption of the new produce permissible, while the two loaves render permissible the offering of meal-offerings from the new grain.

h.

They require waving.

The omer is waved, and the two loaves are waved, whereas the other meal-offerings are not waved.

i.

They must come from the Land.

The omer and the two loaves may come only from the produce of the Land of Israel, whereas the other meal-offerings may even come from produce of outside the Land of Israel.

j.

They have a fixed time.

The omer and the two loaves have a fixed time, whereas the other meal-offerings do not have a fixed time.

k.

They must be from the new produce.

The omer and the two loaves may come only from the new produce, whereas the other meal-offerings may also come from the old produce.

And these characteristics,

in which the two loaves resemble the meal-offering of the omer,

are more numerous.

For there are many more matters in which the meal-offering of the omer resembles the two loaves than in which it resembles a meal-offering of priests. If so, we should have included the two loaves as subject to the requirement of oil and frankincense, rather than the meal-offering of priests!?

And we answer:

It is more reasonable

to include the meal-offering of priests, based on the fact that the term

“person”

is written with regard to the fine-flour meal-offering; and from it we derive that all meal-offerings of an individual require oil and frankincense.

Mishna:

a.

We learned in the previous Mishna that neither oil nor frankincense is placed on a meal-offering of a sinner.

And

if one nevertheless transgressed and placed it, he is

liable

to lashes

for

placing

the oil

by itself ,

and for

placing

the frankincense by itself.

And if he placed both oil and frankincense, he is lashed on account of each of them. Thus, altogether he receives eighty lashes [less two]. For it is stated with regard to the meal-offering of a sinner: “He shall not place oil upon it, and he shall not put frankincense upon it.”

b.

If he placed oil upon it—

he disqualifies it.

For he cannot remove the oil from the fine flour.

And if he placed upon it

frankincense—

he may collect it,

and it becomes fit.

c.

If he placed oil on its remainder

of a meal-offering of a sinner, after the handful had been removed, he

no longer violates a prohibition ,

because the prohibition applies only while it is still destined for the removal of the handful from it for burning.

d.

If he placed a vessel

with oil

on top of a vessel

containing a meal-offering of a sinner—

he does not disqualify it.

The disqualification applies only when the oil is mixed into the meal-offering itself, and not when oil is placed in a separate vessel above it.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

With regard to the meal-offering of a sinner, it is stated,

“He shall not place oil upon it,” and if he placed

oil upon it—

he disqualifies it.

I might

also apply this to placing frankincense, as it is stated,

“He shall not put frankincense upon it,” and if he put

frankincense upon it—

he disqualifies it.

The verse states: “For it is a sin-offering,”

to teach that even if he placed frankincense upon it, it remains a valid sin-offering, and it effects atonement.

I might also apply this to oil:

I might read the phrase “for it is a sin-offering” as teaching that even though he violated the prohibition by placing oil upon it, the meal-offering nevertheless remains valid?

The verse states: “It is,”

which is an exclusion, teaching that only when he placed frankincense upon it does it remain valid, but not when he placed oil upon it, in which case it is disqualified.

And what have you seen that leads you to disqualify it in the case of oil, but declare it valid in the case of frankincense?

I disqualify it in the case of oil

because

it is impossible to collect it

from the meal-offering,

whereas I declare it valid in the case of frankincense, because it is possible to collect it

and thereby restore the meal-offering to validity.

Rabba bar Rav Huna asked Rabbi Yoḥanan:

With regard to a meal-offering of a sinner, if he

placed crushed frankincense upon it,

which cannot be collected from the fine flour—

what is

the halakha? The two sides of the doubt are:

Is the reason that we declared it valid when he placed frankincense upon it

because it is possible to collect it

from the fine flour,

but

crushed frankincense

cannot be collected,

and the meal-offering is therefore disqualified?

Or perhaps

the reason that we declared it valid when he placed frankincense upon it is

that it is not absorbed

by the fine flour, unlike oil, which is absorbed by the fine flour and disqualifies the meal-offering because it is absorbed into it. Frankincense, by contrast, is merely mixed with the fine flour and is not absorbed into it, and therefore does not disqualify it.

And this too,

crushed frankincense, although it cannot be collected from the fine flour, does not disqualify it, since

it too is not absorbed.

Come and hear:

We learned in our Mishna:

And frankincense,

if he placed frankincense on a meal-offering of a sinner—

he may collect it.

It follows that the entire basis for declaring it valid is that it can be collected, and not that it is not absorbed by the fine flour.

And we reject this:

Perhaps

the tanna of our Mishna

stated one

reason

and another

reason,

as well.

That is:

one

reason for declaring it valid is

that the frankincense is not absorbed

by the fine flour.

And another

reason is—

he may collect it

and it becomes valid.

Come and hear:

We learned in a beraita:

I declare it valid in the case of frankincense

because

it is possible to collect it.

It follows that it is valid only if he collected it, and if he did not collect it, it is disqualified, even though the frankincense is not absorbed by the fine flour.

And we reject this:

Here too, it states: “one reason and another.”

We inquire:

What was the conclusion

regarding the question that Rabba bar Rav Huna asked Rabbi Yoḥanan?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It was taught: With regard to a meal-offering of a sinner or a meal-offering of jealousy upon which one placed frankincense—

he collects the frankincense, and it becomes valid

for burning and for effecting atonement.

And if, before he collected its frankincense, he formulated an intention concerning it,

during the procedures of the meal-offering, to burn the handful or eat its remainder improperly—

whether

he formulated the intention of

beyond its designated time, or

he formulated the intention of

outside its designated place—

the offering is disqualified

of the meal-offering,

but there is no karet

for eating it, since liability for karet applies only when one eats an item disqualified solely because of the intention of beyond its designated time. Here, however, at the time he formulated the intention, the offering of the sinner was already disqualified for the additional reason that frankincense was in it.

And if, after he collected its frankincense, he formulated an intention concerning it

to burn the handful or eat the remainder

outside its designated place—

it is disqualified, but there is no karet.

And if he formulated an intention

beyond its designated time—

it is piggul, and one is liable for it,

for eating it,

with karet.

And since it says that as long as the frankincense is in it, it is invalid, it is evident that its fitness depends on the removal of the frankincense, and not on the fact that it was not absorbed into the fine flour.

And we raised a difficulty: Why did the thought of [offering it] outside its designated time or outside its designated place invalidate it while the frankincense was still in it? It was already invalid at that point, because the frankincense was in it,

so let it be

like a sinner’s offering upon which there fell

a drop of

oil. It is obvious that a thought of pigul does not take effect with regard to it, since it is permanently invalid because of the oil absorbed into it.

And

if so, this offering into which frankincense fell,

why did it become invalid through the thought,

and should we not say: Since at the time when the frankincense was in it, it was invalid, it

is permanently rejected

—that is, the initial assumption was that this beraita follows the view of the one who says that there is deḥuy with regard to consecrated offerings—?

And we answer:

Abaye said: “The Merciful One called it a sin-offering”

—He called the sinner’s offering a sin-offering even after one placed frankincense upon it, as it is written: “He shall not place frankincense upon it, for it is a sin-offering.” Therefore, a thought can indeed invalidate it and subject it to the law of pigul, despite its having been rejected.

Rava said: This

tanna of the beraita,

who is it?

It is Ḥanan the Egyptian, who does not hold

the law of

rejection.

As it was taught: Ḥanan the Egyptian says:

The two goats of Yom Kippur, upon which lots are cast—one for the Lord, whose blood is brought inside the innermost place, and one sent to Azazel—and the goat sent to Azazel dies: We do not say that the inner goat should be rejected because its counterpart was lost, and it is now impossible to sprinkle its blood, and that consequently it should be rejected permanently. Rather,

even if

the

blood

of the goat

was in the cup,

meaning that it had already been slaughtered and the blood was rejected after the slaughter, he

brings

the goat sent to Azazel,

its counterpart, without a lottery,

and pairs it with the first goat.

Now that its counterpart, the goat sent to Azazel, exists, he can sprinkle the blood in the innermost place and in the Sanctuary.

It is evident that Ḥanan the Egyptian held that the law of rejection does not apply to consecrated offerings, even when the rejection occurred after slaughter.

Rav Ashi said:

You may even say that this is the opinion of the Sages. Here, however, we do not apply the law of rejection, because

anything that is in his power

to rectify the cause that brought about the rejection—for example, in this case, it is in his power to remove the frankincense—

is not considered rejected,

and therefore a thought can invalidate it.

Rav Adda said: The view of Rav Ashi

—that when it is in his power to rectify the matter, it is not considered rejected even according to the one who holds that there is a law of rejection—

is logical.

And the proof is:

Whom do you know to hold

the law of

rejection?

It is Rabbi Yehuda.

As we learned: Rabbi Yehuda said further: If the blood

of the inner goat

was spilled, the goat sent away shall die.

For it was rejected when the blood of its counterpart was spilled. And likewise, if the

goat

the

goat sent away

dies, the blood shall be spilled

of the inner goat onto the ground, and one may not sprinkle it inside; and they shall bring a new pair of goats in place of the first two. That is, Rabbi Yehuda holds that there is no remedy of bringing another goat and pairing it with the goat that was not disqualified, for once it was rejected for one moment, when its counterpart was disqualified, it is permanently rejected.

But where it is in his power

to rectify the matter, we find that Rabbi Yehuda holds that the law of rejection does not apply to it. For

it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: The priest would

fill

a cup with the blood of the mixtures

of the Paschal offerings that had spilled onto the floor of the Temple courtyard,

and he would sprinkle

the blood of the mixtures

with one sprinkling toward the base of the altar,

because we are concerned that perhaps the blood spilled from the cups into which the blood of the Paschal offering had been received onto the floor, and the owners did not fulfill their obligation. Therefore, he would fill the cup with the blood of the mixture on the ground and sprinkle it on the altar, so that some of the spilled blood [which was now found within the mixture] would reach the altar, and the owners would thereby fulfill their obligation.

Evidently, we do not say that since the blood was rejected when it spilled onto the ground and was no longer available for sprinkling, it is permanently rejected. Rather, we say that since it is in his power to gather it into a vessel and sprinkle it on the altar, it is not considered to have been rejected.

Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one placed any amount of oil upon an olive-bulk of the sinner’s offering

he invalidated

the offering.

What is the reason

that the measure for placing oil is any amount, whereas the measure of the offering is at least an olive-bulk? Because it is stated with regard to oil,

“He shall not place,”

which implies

placing even the slightest amount

of oil disqualifies it. And afterward it is stated,

“upon it,”

which implies an inclusion,

until there is a measure.

This teaches that there must be a measure for the offering upon which oil is placed, and the smallest measure is an olive-bulk.

And Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one placed an olive-bulk of frankincense upon any amount of an offering

of a sinner,

he invalidated

the offering.

What is the reason

that this is the reverse of the law governing the placing of oil?

“He shall not place” is written

with regard to frankincense, and we derive from “He shall give the sacred portion to the priest” that one must give the priest something fit to become sacred. That is, the giving must be an olive-bulk; and likewise, the giving of frankincense is not called “giving”

until there is a giving

of an olive-bulk of frankincense.

And afterward, with regard to the measure of the offering, there is written an inclusion in the phrase

“upon it,”

after an inclusion in the phrase “upon it” had already been written previously with regard to oil.