Menachot 43a (מג.) — the Talmud in English

And with urine

from a baby

forty days old [

and another interpretation in Rashi: urine that had passed forty days since it left the human body],

and soak them in it from evening until morning [

and the dye remains immersed in it from night until morning]. If

its appearance changes

so that the appearance of the dye is spoiled, it is

invalid

for tzitzit, for it is kela ilan; but if

its appearance does not change

and its appearance is not spoiled, this is a sign that it is tekhelet, and it is

valid

for tzitzit.

And Rav Avya, before Rava, said in the name of Rav Avira that this is how it is tested:

the dye is tested:

one brings very sour barley leaven, [

a hard leaven that has fermented extensively],

and bakes it in it, [

and bakes the dye within it]. If

it changes for the better, it is valid,

but if it changes

for the worse, it is invalid. And your mnemonic is

to know which change renders it valid and which change renders it invalid:

“A change of falsehood, a change of truth!”

That is, when a person alters his statement for the worse, everyone knows that it is bad; but if he alters his statement to add to it and substantiate it, everyone knows that it is good. This is the sign for testing tekhelet: if it changes for the worse, it is invalid, and if it changes for the better, it is valid.

The question now arises against the beraita that said that tekhelet cannot be tested: Yet the amoraim said how to test the dye in order to determine whether it is tekhelet.

And it answers:

What

“tekhelet

cannot be tested” also

means

that it is not referring to testing the dye to determine whether it is tekhelet or kela ilan, since that can indeed be tested. Rather, the reference is

to testing its initial use,

as a person cannot test wool dyed with tekhelet to determine whether it was dyed for the sake of tekhelet and is valid, or merely as a trial, for experimental purposes, and is therefore invalid. Since this cannot be tested, one may purchase tekhelet only from an expert who knows that dyeing for experimental purposes renders it invalid. 26 .

A certain man

[the name of a sage]

from Mashki

[the name of a place]

brought tekhelet in the days of Rav Aḥai

[he brought tekhelet during Rav Aḥai’s lifetime], and he wished to test whether it was tekhelet or kela ilan.

They tested it according to the test of Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda,

according to the test mentioned above,

and its appearance changed.

Its appearance was spoiled. We said above that if its appearance is spoiled, it is invalid. They then tested this tekhelet again

with

the test

of Rav Avya,

baking the tekhelet in very sour leaven, as explained above,

and it changed for the better,

and we said above that if it changes for the better, it is valid.

He thought

that the man

intended to invalidate it

as dye, since its appearance had changed.

Rav Aḥai said to them: Rather,

what conclusion can we draw from the tests? Is it the case that

“This is not tekhelet, and it is not kela ilan?!”

For according to the test of Rav Yitzḥak, its appearance was spoiled, and if so, it is not tekhelet. Conversely, according to the test of Rav Avya, it changed for the better, and if so, it is not even kela ilan?

Rather,

certainly

conclude from it that the teaching

of Rav Yitzḥak and Rav Avya

was stated concerning one another,

and both tests are performed together; they do not represent a dispute. Rather, Rav Avya adds to the statement of Rav Yitzḥak. This is what one does: First, one performs the test of Rav Yitzḥak, and

where we tested it according to Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda,

and

its appearance did not change, it is valid.

But if

its appearance changed,

it is not yet invalid. Rather,

we test it

again

according to Rav Avya,

baking the dye

in very sour leaven [

leaven that has fermented extensively]. If

it changes for the better, it is valid.

But if it changes

for the worse, it is invalid.

And similarly

they sent from there [

the Land of Israel]:

This teaching

—regarding

one another it was stated,

and it is not a dispute.

Rabbi Mani was exact and purchased [

he was careful to purchase tekhelet only from an expert who knew that dyeing for experimental purposes is invalid],

in accordance with the stringency of the Mishna

above, which states that experimental dyeing is invalid, and therefore it must be purchased from an expert.

A certain elder said

to Rabbi Mani:

This is how my predecessors acted before you [

this is how the generation preceding yours acted: they purchased tekhelet only from an expert],

and their dealings prospered.

The Sages taught: One who purchases a garment with tzitzit from the marketplace,

if he purchased it

from a Jew, it retains its presumptive status

that it is valid. But if he purchased it

from a gentile, from a merchant it is valid,

as he certainly purchased this garment from a Jew, and since he is a merchant, he will not jeopardize his reliability by selling a garment that is invalid. But if he purchased it

from

a gentile

layman

it is invalid,

as perhaps he dyed it himself, and this dyeing was not performed for the sake of the mitzva of tzitzit.

And although they said

the Sages that

a person may not sell a garment with tzitzit to a gentile until he has removed its tzitzit,

nevertheless, we say that a Jewish merchant sold him a garment with tzitzit.

And

for what reason

may one not sell a garment with tzitzit to a gentile?

Here they explained [

here in Babylonia they explained this law]: It was prohibited

because of a prostitute,

as perhaps this gentile has a Jewish prostitute, and she will have relations with him because she thinks he is a Jew, since he is wrapped in tzitzit. She does not realize that through this intercourse she violates the prohibition, “You shall not intermarry with them,” which is stated with regard to intercourse with gentiles. For this reason, the Sages prohibited selling a garment with tzitzit to a gentile.

Rav Yehuda said:

The reason the Sages prohibited selling it to him is the concern

lest a Jew accompany

a

with him

with this gentile

on the road

and think that he is a Jew, since he has tzitzit on his garment,

and he will kill him.

Rav Yehuda would attach tekhelet to the garment of the women of his household,

meaning that he would attach tzitzit to the garment in which his wife covered herself.

Rabbi Yehuda would do something else as well: He would

recite a blessing every morning

when wrapping himself in his garment:

“to wrap oneself in tzitzit.”

And we raise an objection against Rav Yehuda: Since

when Rav Yehuda attached

tekhelet to the garment of his wife, it is proven that he holds that women are obligated in tzitzit. If so,

he holds

that tzitzit

is a positive mitzva that is not time-bound,

as its time applies both during the day and at night [for if this mitzva were time-bound and applied only during the day, women would be exempt]. And since nighttime is also the time for tzitzit,

why

did

Rav Yehuda recite a blessing

every

morning and morning?

He should have recited a blessing only when he first wrapped himself in it, when it was new; from then onward, it should be considered one long day, since nighttime does not interrupt the fulfillment of the mitzva?

And we answer: Rav Yehuda held

in accordance with Rabbi.

As it was taught in a beraita: With regard to tefillin, whenever one puts them on, he recites a blessing over them,

even if he removes them and puts them on one hundred times during the day,

the words of Rabbi.

And the Sages say: He recites a blessing only in the morning.

And since he held in accordance with Rabbi, he recited a blessing over the tzitzit every morning, even though the entire period is considered one long day.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

since he held in accordance with Rabbi, why did he recite a blessing only every morning?

Every hour

that he wore his garment, he should have recited a blessing, even in the middle of the day. And we answer:

Rav Yehuda was a modest person, and he did not remove his cloak,

he did not remove his garment

the entire day

except at night. Therefore, he recited a blessing only in the morning.

And we raise an objection:

And what is different

about the fact that he recited a blessing

in the morning?

He should have recited the blessing over it even if he wrapped himself in it before dawn, during the watch of the night, when he wrapped himself in it for Torah study.

And we answer: Rav Yehuda had two garments with tzitzit, one for the day and one for the night. In the morning,

when he changed from the nighttime garment to the daytime garment,

he recited a blessing.

The Sages taught: Everyone is obligated in tzitzit: kohanim, Levites, and Israelites; converts, women, and slaves.

Rabbi Shimon exempts women, because it is a positive mitzva whose performance is time-bound.

For Rabbi Shimon, nighttime is not the time for tzitzit; rather, its time is during the day בלבד.

And with regard to every positive mitzva whose performance is time-bound, women

are exempt.

The Master said: Everyone is obligated in tzitzit: kohanim, Levites, and Israelites.

The Gemara asks: This is

obvious,

for

if

it were said that

the kohanim, Levites, and Israelites are exempt

from tzitzit,

who would be obligated?

And we answer:

priests

are the ones for whom

it was necessary

for the tanna to teach that they are obligated in tzitzit. For

it might enter your mind to say: Since it is written

in the verse,

“You shall not wear shaatnez, wool and linen together,”

and the Torah juxtaposed to it

“You shall make for yourself twisted threads,”

it is possible to expound:

Whoever is not permitted shaatnez with regard to himself when wearing it,

meaning that he is subject to the prohibition against wearing shaatnez,

is the one who is obligated in

the mitzva of

tzitzit,

but

these priests, since

the prohibition

of shaatnez

was permitted with regard to them

when wearing the priestly garments [for the belt was made of wool and linen, as it is written in Exodus 39:29, “linen and sky-blue wool”], there might be reason to say that they

should not be obligated

in tzitzit.

Therefore,

the tanna teaches us

that

although it was permitted

for priests to wear shaatnez in priestly garments, this was specifically

during

the time of

the Temple service.

But

when it is not the time of the Temple service, it was not permitted

for them to wear shaatnez. Since they too are subject to the prohibition against shaatnez, they are obligated in tzitzit.

We also learned in this beraita:

Rabbi Shimon exempts

from tzitzit

women.

What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon?

As it is taught:

With regard to tzitzit, it is written,

“And you shall see it,”

and we expound:

to exclude a garment

designated to be worn at

night,

which is exempt from tzitzit, since it is not subject to seeing, as at night one does not see.

You say

that the verse comes to exclude

a garment designated for night, or perhaps it does not

come

except

to exclude

a garment of a blind person,

which is not included in “and you shall see it”?

When it says

in the passage of tzitzit,

“with which you cover yourself,”

there is an inclusion in the verse for purposes of exposition,

a blind person’s garment is mentioned;

that is what the verse comes to teach: that a blind person is obligated. If so,

how do I fulfill

the exclusion from

“and you shall see it”? —

To exclude a garment designated for night.

And what did you see that led you to include a blind person’s garment

from “with which you cover yourself,”

and exclude a garment designated for night

from “and you shall see it”? Why should we not expound in the opposite manner, that the verse “with which you cover yourself” includes a garment designated for night, while the verse “and you shall see it” excludes a blind person’s garment?

I include a blind person’s garment

to obligate it in tzitzit,

because

it

is

in any event

subject to seeing by others,

as everyone sees his garment, and “and you shall see it” is fulfilled with regard to others during the day.

And I exclude a garment designated for night

to exempt it from tzitzit,

because

at night it

is not subject to seeing

even

by others.

Therefore, it is more reasonable to expound “and you shall see it” as excluding a garment designated for night, and the verse “with which you cover yourself” as including a blind person’s garment.