Menachot 43a — the Talmud in English

and urine

from an infant

forty days old [

and another interpretation in Rashi: urine that had passed forty days from when it left the person's body],

and he soaks them in it from evening until morning [

and the dye remains in it from night until morning],

if its appearance separates

that the appearance of the dye was spoiled,

it is invalid

for tzitzit, for it is kela ilan. But if

its appearance does not separate

and its appearance was not spoiled, that is a sign that it is tekhelet, and

it is valid

for tzitzit.

And Rav Avya before Rava, in the name of Rav Avira, said

that this is how one tests it:

one brings strongly soured barley leaven, [

a hard leaven that had fermented greatly],

and bakes it within it, [

and he bakes the dye within it]. If

it changes for the better, it is valid,

but if it changes

for the worse, it is invalid. And your sign is

to know which change is valid and which change is invalid:

“A change of falsehood, a change of truth!”

That is, one who changes his statement for the worse—everyone knows that it is bad; and if he changes his statement in order to add to it and uphold it, everyone knows that it is good. And this is the sign for testing tekhelet: if it changes for the worse, it is invalid, and if it changes for the better, it is valid.

And now the beraita is difficult, for it said that tekhelet has no test, whereas the amoraim said how to test the dye in order to know whether it is tekhelet

and he answers:

What

“tekhelet

has no test,” also

means

not a test of the dye to know whether it is tekhelet or kela ilan, for that indeed can be tested. Rather, the intention is

to tasting,

for a person cannot test wool dyed with tekhelet to determine whether it was dyed for the sake of tekhelet and is valid, or for tasting, for the sake of experimentation, and is invalid. And since this matter cannot be tested, one should buy tekhelet only from an expert who knows that dyeing for experimentation is invalid 26.

A certain master [

a sage's name]

of Mishkhei [

a place-name]

brought tekhelet in the time of Rav Aḥai [

he brought tekhelet in Rav Aḥai's time], and he wished to test it whether it was tekhelet or kela ilan.

They tested it according to Rav Yitzḥak son of Rav Yehuda,

according to his test mentioned above,

and its appearance separated.

Its appearance was spoiled. And we said above that if its appearance was spoiled, it is invalid. And they again tested this tekhelet

with

his test

of Rav Avya,

and they baked the tekhelet inside hard leaven, as explained above,

and it changed for the better,

and we said above that if it changes for the better, it is valid.

The master thought

that

he should invalidate it

as a dye, since its appearance had separated.

Rav Aḥai said to them: Rather,

what do we prove from the tests? Is it that

“This is not tekhelet, and it is not kela ilan?!”

For in Rav Yitzḥak's test its appearance was spoiled, and if so, it is not tekhelet. But, on the other hand, in Rav Avya's test it changed for the better, and if so, it is not even kela ilan?

Rather,

certainly

derive from it that the teaching

of Rav Yitzḥak and Rav Avya

was stated concerning one another,

and both are used together for testing, and it is not a dispute. Rather, Rav Avya adds to the words of Rav Yitzḥak. And this is how it is done: first one tests according to Rav Yitzḥak's test, and

where we tested according to Rav Yitzḥak son of Rav Yehuda

and

its appearance did not separate, it is valid.

And if

its appearance separated,

it is not yet invalid; rather,

we test it

again

according to Rav Avya,

who bakes the dye

in strongly soured leaven [

in leaven that had fermented greatly]. And if

it changes for the better, it is valid.

But if it changes

for the worse, it is invalid.

And similarly

they sent from there [

from the Land of Israel]:

this teaching

regarding

one another was stated,

and it is not a dispute.

Rabbi Mani was exacting and bought [

he was careful to buy tekhelet only from an expert who knew that experimental dyeing is invalid],

in accordance with the stringency of the Mishna

above, that tasting is invalid, and therefore one must buy it from an expert.

A certain old man said to him

to Rabbi Mani:

“Thus did my predecessors do before you” [

thus did they act in the generation preceding yours, buying tekhelet only from an expert],

“and their business prospered.”

The Sages taught: One who buys a fringed garment from the market,

if he bought it

from an Israelite, it is presumed valid,

that it is valid. And if he bought it

from a gentile, from a merchant, it is valid,

for he certainly bought this garment from an Israelite, and since he is a merchant, he will not cause himself to lose his trustworthiness by selling a garment that is not valid. But if he bought it

from

a gentile

layman

it is invalid,

for perhaps he dyed it, and this dyeing was not done for the sake of the mitzva of tzitzit.

And even though they said

the Sages that

a person may not sell a fringed garment to a gentile until he removes its fringes,

nevertheless, we say that an Israelite merchant sold him a fringed garment.

And

what is the reason

that one may not sell a fringed garment to a gentile?

Here they explained, [

here in Babylonia they explained this law] that they prohibited it

because of a prostitute,

lest this gentile have an Israelite prostitute, and she have intercourse with him because she thinks that he is an Israelite, since he is wrapped in tzitzit, and she does not know that through this intercourse she transgresses the prohibition “You shall not intermarry with them,” stated regarding intercourse with gentiles. And for this reason the Sages prohibited selling a fringed garment to a gentile.

Rav Yehuda said:

The reason that the Sages prohibited selling it to him is because of the concern

lest an Israelite join

with

him

with this gentile

on the road

and think that he is an Israelite, since he has tzitzit on his garment,

and he will kill him.

Rav Yehuda would place tzitzit on the cloak of the people of his household,

he would place tzitzit on the garment with which his wife covered herself.

And Rabbi Yehuda would do something else: he would

recite a blessing every morning

when wrapping himself in his garment:

“to wrap oneself in tzitzit.”

And they raise an objection against Rav Yehuda: since

when Rav Yehuda placed

tekhelet on his wife's garment, it is evident that he held that women are obligated in tzitzit. If so,

he held

that tzitzit

is a positive commandment not dependent on a particular time,

for its time is both by day and by night [for if this mitzva were time-dependent and applied only by day, women would be exempt from it]. And since night too is a time for tzitzit,

why

did

Rav Yehuda recite a blessing

every

every morning?

He should have recited a blessing only when he wrapped himself in it the first time, when it was new; from then onward, everything is considered one long day, since night does not interrupt the performance of the mitzva?

And they answer: Rav Yehuda held

like Rabbi.

И возражают: если так,

For it was taught: Regarding tefillin, whenever one puts them on, he recites a blessing over them,

even if he removes them and puts them on one hundred times in a day,

the words of Rabbi.

But the Sages say: he recites a blessing only in the morning.

And since he held like Rabbi, he would recite a blessing over the tzitzit every morning, even though everything is considered one long day.

And they raise an objection:

If so,

that he held like Rabbi, why would he recite a blessing only every morning? Surely

every hour

when he wore his garment he should have recited a blessing, even in the middle of the day? And they answer:

Rav Yehuda was a modest person, and he did not release his cloak,

he did not remove his garment

the entire day

except at night. Therefore he recited a blessing only in the morning.

And they raise an objection:

And what is different

that he would recite a blessing

in the morning?

He should recite a blessing over it even if he wrapped himself in it before daylight, during the watch of the night, when he wrapped himself in it for his study?

And they answer: Rav Yehuda had two fringed garments, one for the day and one for the night. And in the morning,

when he changed from the nighttime garment to the daytime garment,

he would recite a blessing.

The Sages taught: Everyone is obligated in tzitzit: priests, Levites, and Israelites; converts, women, and slaves.

Rabbi Shimon exempts women, because it is a positive commandment dependent on a particular time.

For according to Rabbi Shimon, night is not a time for tzitzit; rather, its time is only during the day.

And regarding every positive commandment dependent on a particular time, women

are exempt.

The master said: Everyone is obligated in tzitzit: priests, Levites, and Israelites.

And the Gemara asks:

Is it obvious

that

if

it were said that

priests, Levites, and Israelites are exempt

from tzitzit,

who would be obligated?

And we answer:

kohanim

are the ones for whom

it was necessary

for the tanna to teach us that they are obligated in tzitzit. For

it might enter your mind to say: since it is written

in the verse, “[A0008]You shall not wear a mixture of wool and linen together,”

“You shall not wear shaatnez, wool and linen together,”

and the Torah juxtaposed to it

“You shall make for yourself twisted threads,”

and it is possible to expound:

the one for whom a mixture is not permitted with regard to him in wearing,

who is subject to the prohibition of wearing a mixture,

is the one who is obligated in

the mitzva of

tzitzit,

but

these kohanim, since

it was permitted

the prohibition of

a mixture with regard to them

in wearing the priestly garments [for the belt was made of wool and linen, as it is written in Exodus 39:29, “linen and blue”], there would be room to say that they

should not be obligated

in tzitzit.

Therefore

it teaches us

the tanna that

although it was permitted

for kohanim to wear a mixture in the priestly garments, this was specifically

at the time of

the time of

the service.

But

when it is not the time of the service, it was not permitted

for them to wear a mixture. And since they too are subject to the prohibition of a mixture, they are obligated in tzitzit.

We learned further in this beraita:

Rabbi Shimon exempts

from tzitzit

women.

What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason?

As it is taught:

It is written concerning tzitzit, “[A0069]]and you shall see it,”

“And you shall see it,”

and we expound:

excluding a garment

made for wearing at

night,

which is exempt from tzitzit, because it is not subject to seeing, for at night one does not see.

You say

that the verse came to exclude

excluding a night garment, or perhaps it

comes

only

to exclude

excluding a blind person’s garment,

which is not included in “and you shall see it”?

When it says

in the passage of tzitzit, “[A0085]]with which you cover yourself,”

“with which you cover yourself,”

there is here an inclusion in the verse for exposition,

behold, a blind person’s garment is included,

for this is what the verse comes to teach: to obligate a blind person. If so,

how do I understand

the exclusion from

“and you shall see it”? —

Excluding a night garment.

And what did you see to include a blind person’s garment

from “with which you cover yourself,”

and to exclude a night garment

from “and you shall see it”? And why should we not expound in the opposite manner, that the verse “with which you cover yourself” includes a night garment, and the verse “and you shall see it” excludes a blind person’s garment?

I include a blind person’s garment

to obligate it in tzitzit,

because

it

is

in any event

subject to seeing by others,

for the whole world sees his garment, and “and you shall see it” is fulfilled with regard to others during the day;

and I exclude a night garment

to exempt it from tzitzit,

because

at night it

is not subject to seeing

even

by others.

Therefore, it is more reasonable to expound from “and you shall see it” to exclude a night garment, and from the verse “with which you cover yourself” to include a blind person’s garment.