Menachot 42b (מב:) — the Talmud in English

And from

tefillin

the opposite is proven, and this is

the refutation: But tefillin are invalid when made by a gentile, as Rav

Ḥinana, son of Rava, taught

A Torah scroll, tefillin, or mezuzot written by a heretic, an informer, a gentile, a slave, a woman, or a minor,

or

an apostate,

are

invalid, as it is stated: “And you shall bind them ... and you shall write them.”

And we derive:

Anyone who is subject to binding is subject to writing; anyone who is not subject to binding is not subject to writing.

All those mentioned are not subject to binding, as they are all exempt from tefillin [and an informer and an apostate, despite being obligated, are considered not subject to binding, since they have cast off the yoke from themselves. Gittin 45b].

And

on the other hand,

a Jew need not recite a blessing

when making tefillin,

as Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Huna, sent in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Upon

putting on

the arm-tefillin, one says: “Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to don tefillin”; and upon

putting on

the head-tefillin, one says: “Blessed are You ... Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us concerning the mitzva of tefillin”; but one does not recite a blessing when making tefillin

when making them , which is difficult for Rav Ḥisda, who said that for anything that a gentile is unfit to make, one recites a blessing over it?

And we conclude:

Rather, is this not the reason:

Rather, the principle is that

with regard to any mitzva whose making completes

the

mitzva, such as circumcision, although it is valid when performed by a gentile,

nevertheless,

a Jew must recite a blessing; but with regard to any mitzva whose making does not

constitute

the completion

of the

mitzva, such as tefillin,

since making them does not complete the mitzva, but rather putting them on does,

although they are invalid when made by a gentile,

nevertheless,

a Jew need not recite a blessing.

And with regard to tzitzit,

concerning which Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda disagreed in accordance with Rav as to whether one must recite a blessing upon making them,

they disagree about this: One Sage holds that it is an obligation of the garment,

and even if one does not wear it, he is obligated to attach tzitzit to it. If so, attaching the tzitzit is the completion of its making, and therefore one must recite a blessing.

And the other Sage holds that it is an obligation incumbent upon the person,

and its mitzva is completed only when he wears it. Therefore, one need not recite a blessing upon making it.

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: Is this how you learned it

with regard to this law—that Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav above that tzitzit made by a gentile is invalid—and this is why you found it difficult that one need not recite a blessing upon making it?

We learned it this way:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: From where is it derived that tzitzit made by gentiles is valid? As it is stated: “Speak to the children of Israel and let them make for themselves tzitzit.”

And we derive:

“Let others make them for themselves”;

that is, others, meaning gentiles, are also fit to make tzitzit 15 .

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

If

he made them

[the tzitzit threads]

from the thorns,

that is, threads hanging at the end of the cloth, which he cut from the garment and made into tzitzit for that garment; or if he made them

from the threads,

for example, a tallit that was sewn, or in which a hem was made with a needle, leaving the ends of the sewing threads hanging from it, and he made the tzitzit from them; or

from the leftover threads,

the weaving threads that remained hanging at the end of the garment, and from them he made tzitzit for the garment to which they were attached—as long as these threads remain attached to the garment,

it is invalid,

because they were attached to the garment not for the sake of the mitzva of tzitzit 16 .

But if he made them

from the coils

[ball-shaped bundles of thread, Rashi, Sukkah 9a],

they are valid,

since when they were attached to the garment, they were attached for the sake of tzitzit, and this is considered making them lishmah, even though these threads were not spun lishmah.

Rav Yehuda said:

When I stated

these laws

before Shmuel, he said: Even

if he made them

from the coils, they are invalid,

for although the threads were attached for the sake of the mitzva of tzitzit, nevertheless, the spinning of the threads was not done for the sake of tzitzit, and with regard to tzitzit,

we require spinning to be done lishmah 17 .

And we say: The dispute between Rav and Shmuel as to whether spinning must be done lishmah

is subject to a tannaitic dispute

.

As it was taught in a beraita: If one overlaid

tefillin with

gold,

making the tefillin compartments of gold rather than leather,

or overlaid them

[an expression meaning a patch or covering] with

the hide of an impure animal,

making the tefillin compartments from the hide of an impure animal, these tefillin compartments are

invalid,

because the compartment must be made of leather 18 .

Likewise, they must specifically be made from the hide of a pure animal. We learned from the verse, “so that the Torah of the Lord shall be in your mouth,” that the writing of a Torah scroll and other sacred objects must be made from something permitted to enter your mouth, whereas the hide of an impure animal is forbidden to enter your mouth. However, if he made them from

the hide of a pure animal, they are valid, even though he did not process it for their sake,

for the sake of the mitzva of tefillin.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even the hide of a pure animal

is invalid until he processes it for their sake.

Just as the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree regarding preparing the hide for making the tefillin compartments, as to whether it must be done lishmah, so too Rav and Shmuel disagree regarding spinning the tzitzit threads—which is the preparation of the threads for attaching them—as to whether they must be spun lishmah. It follows that Rav and Shmuel disagree in the same dispute as the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel 19 .

Abaye said to Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yehuda: This techelet,

the techelet threads of the tzitzit,

how do you dye it?

He said to him: We bring

[we bring]

the blood of a ḥillazon and dyes, put them into a cauldron, and boil them.

[We cast the blood and the dyes into the cauldron and boil them.]

And we take a little of it in an eggshell

[we take a little of the dye in an eggshell in order to test the dye]

and test it on wool.

[We dye wool inside that eggshell, to determine whether this techelet is of good quality.]

And

afterward

we throw away that eggshell and burn the wool,

discarding the dye in the eggshell and burning the wool that was dyed with it.

And from this statement

derive three laws

: 1.

Derive

from the fact that they burn the wool used for testing, so that it will not be used to make tzitzit, that

testing renders it invalid,

meaning that the wool dyed for testing is invalid for tzitzit 20 .

b.

And derive from it

also

that dyeing must be for its own sake for the sake of the mitzva of tzitzit], and therefore what was dyed for testing is invalid.

for the mitzva of tzitzit]. Therefore, what was dyed for testing is disqualified.

c.

And derive from it

from the fact that one must discard the dye in the egg and may not cast the egg into the dye kettle,

that testing renders it invalid,

meaning, if one poured into the kettle the dye that had been used for testing, he invalidates the entire kettle. 21 .

And we challenge: how did you say that we learned three separate laws from here? Surely

And we challenge this: How could you say that we learned three separate laws from here? For

“testing renders it invalid” is “dyeing for its own sake,”

as these are one and the same law: testing is invalid because dyeing must be for its own sake?

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said,

in truth, these are not two different laws, but

“for what reason”

is what he

said. What is the reason that testing renders it invalid? Because dyeing must be for its own sake.

And we say: The law that testing renders techelet for tzitzit invalid

is subject to a dispute between tanna’im

.

As it was taught in a beraita:

Testing is invalid because it is stated

with regard to the making of the robe of the High Priest,

“entirely of techelet”

which indicates that the entire appearance of the ḥilazon must be dyed into the wool of the tzitzit, and it must not have been dyed with the techelet in this kettle after some other object had previously been dyed in it—

the words of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Dehavai says: Even its second appearance,

after other wool has already been dyed in this kettle,

is fit

for subsequently dyeing wool for tzitzit,

because it is stated, “and scarlet wool,”

which indicates that even the second appearance of zehorit is still called “wool.” If so, the same applies to the techelet mentioned in that verse: its second appearance is called techelet. 23 .

The Sages taught: Techelet cannot be tested

[and the Gemara understood that the beraita means that it is impossible to test whether the techelet is genuine or perhaps kela ilan, which most closely resembles the techelet made from the blood of the ḥilazon].

And since it cannot be tested,

it may not be purchased [

techelet may not be purchased]

except from an expert

who knows that kela ilan is forbidden for tzitzit. 24 .

But

tefillin can be tested,

as one can examine the passages of the tefillin to determine whether the scribe was meticulous regarding missing and extra letters.

And

even so,

they may not be purchased except from an expert

who knows that the parchment must be processed for the sake of tefillin.

Scrolls [

Torah scrolls]

and mezuzot can be tested,

as it is possible to examine the writing to determine whether it was done according to halakha,

and

even

may be purchased

by them

from anyone,

because they do not need to be processed for their own sake. 25 .

And we challenge the first law: But does techelet have no test? Yet Rav Yitzhak, son of Rav Yehudah, tested it

And we challenge the first law:

“And techelet cannot be tested? But Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, tested it,”

testing the dye in order to determine whether it was techelet or kela ilan.

(Mnemonic: in rain):

He brings

a substance,

magbia gila [

a type of dye]

and

fenugreek water,

the liquid that emerges from fenugreek,