Menachot 25b — the Talmud in English

And he raises an objection:

We learned in a beraita:

For what does the tzitz effect acceptance?

For the blood and for the flesh

and for the fats

that became impure, whether inadvertently or deliberately, whether under compulsion

or willingly, whether in an individual offering or in a communal offering !

Thus, even in an individual offering the tzitz effects acceptance when it became impure deliberately, and this contradicts the previous beraita, which said that when it became impure deliberately, the tzitz effects acceptance only in a communal offering, but does not effect acceptance in an individual offering!? And we answer:

Rav Yosef said: It is not difficult: this is Rabbi Yosei, and that is the Rabbis!

For we find that they disagreed whether the Rabbis imposed a penalty on one who acted deliberately.

As it was taught

with regard to separating teruma:

One may not separate from impure produce for pure produce, but if he separated inadvertently,

not knowing that it was impure,

his teruma is teruma. Deliberately—

his teruma is not teruma!

For they imposed a penalty on one who acted deliberately.

Rabbi Yosei says: Whether inadvertently or deliberately—

his teruma is teruma!

And just as they disagreed with regard to teruma, so is the law with regard to the tzitz. And the beraita in which it is written that when it became impure deliberately, it did not effect acceptance in an individual offering, follows the view of the Rabbis, who imposed a penalty on one who acted deliberately; and the beraita in which it is written that it effected acceptance when it became impure deliberately in an individual offering follows the view of Rabbi Yosei, who does not penalize one who acted deliberately. And we raise an objection: Can it be said that the beraita in which it is written, “when it became impure deliberately, it effected acceptance,” follows Rabbi Yosei? But in this beraita it is written that the tzitz effects acceptance even for sacrificial flesh designated for eating that became impure [not that it becomes permitted to eat, but as explained below; see also Shita Mekubetzet, letter bet], and

I would say that you have heard Rabbi Yosei

only

that he does not penalize

one who acted deliberately, but

that the tzitz effects acceptance for portions to be eaten

that is, the tzitz effects acceptance not only for what ascends upon the altar, but even for what is eaten from a sacrifice and became impure—

have you heard this from him?

For we have heard the opposite: according to Rabbi Yosei, the tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions to be eaten?

But it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says: The tzitz effects acceptance for portions to be eaten. Rabbi Yosei says: The tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions to be eaten.

And we answer:

Reverse it

Reverse the statements of the beraita, and this is how it should be read in the beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer says: The tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions to be eaten. Rabbi Yosei says: The tzitz effects acceptance for portions to be eaten.

And now it is resolved: the beraita in which it is written, “when it became impure deliberately, it effected acceptance,” and “the tzitz effects acceptance for portions to be eaten,” follows Rabbi Yosei, who holds both of these positions.

Rav Sheshet strongly objected to this: Can you reverse it?

Is it possible to read the beraita in reverse and say that according to Rabbi Eliezer the tzitz does not effect acceptance for portions to be eaten?

But it was taught: One might have thought that if flesh became impure before the sprinkling of the blood

and an impure person ate it before the sprinkling,

they would be liable for it

for karet

because of

eating sacrificial food in

impurity

of the body?

The verse states: “Every pure person may eat flesh, but the person who eats the flesh of the sacrifice of well-being that is the Lord’s, while his impurity is upon him

shall be cut off,”

and we derive from the words, “Every pure person may eat flesh,” that flesh

which is permitted

for eating

by pure persons,

and an impure person ate it,

they are liable for it because of impurity; but that which is not permitted to pure persons,

such as flesh before the sprinkling of the blood, which is not eaten even by pure persons,

they are not liable for it because of impurity! [

But if he ate the impure flesh after the sprinkling, he is liable for it because of impurity of the body, even though impure flesh is not eaten by pure persons, as will be explained below].

Or is it only

that we should expound as follows:

If it is eaten by pure persons, they are liable for it because of impurity; but that which is not eaten

by pure persons,

even though the blood was sprinkled and it had already become permitted to pure persons, since afterward a disqualification occurred to it, so that now it is not eaten,

they are not liable for it because of impurity,

and

I would exclude

also

the

flesh

that remained overnight and that which went out

from the Temple courtyard after the sprinkling, for one is not liable for them for karet if he eats them in bodily impurity, because

they are not eaten by pure persons!

The verse states,

it is written in that same verse,

“that is the Lord’s”! It includes

these disqualified items as liable because of impurity.

One might have thought that I include

from “that is the Lord’s” also

the piggul offerings and the offerings that remained overnight?

The beraita is astonished:

“Offerings that remained overnight”—we already have “that remained overnight,”

for we said that they were indeed included as subject to liability?

Rather,

this is the explanation of the beraita: One might have thought that I include

also

the

piggul offerings

as ones for which one is liable because of impurity

as

one is liable for the

offerings that remained overnight?

The verse states

it is written in the verse,

“the altar of the offerings of well-being”

and the word “altar” implies part of the offering, and not the entire offering—

it excluded

these disqualified items from liability because of impurity!

And what did you see to include these

the offering that remained overnight and the offering that went out, for which one is liable because of impurity,

and to exclude these

the piggul offerings, for which one is exempt because of impurity?

After

since

that

also

the verse included, and

also

excluded, you say: I include

these disqualified

items that had a time when they were fit,

for they were permitted for eating from the time of the sprinkling until they were disqualified through remaining overnight or going out,

and I exclude these, which did not have a time when they were fit,

for the piggul offering was disqualified from the time of the sprinkling, and was not fit for eating even for a single moment.

And if you say: Flesh that became impure before the sprinkling of the blood, and he ate it after the sprinkling of the blood

in bodily impurity,

why are they liable for it because of impurity—

for it too did not have a time when it was fit? And above we excluded only piggul, implying that for impure flesh one is liable after the sprinkling. 130 .

Because the tzitz effects acceptance

for the impure flesh, so that the sprinkling of the blood is effective for it with regard to its being considered permitted to pure persons, even though in practice it is not eaten.

And Rav Sheshet concludes his objection:

It became impure

before the sprinkling—

yes!

Specifically in its case it is written in the beraita that one who eats it in bodily impurity after the sprinkling is liable, but

that which went out

from the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling—

no,

one is not liable for it even after the sprinkling, since the tzitz does not effect acceptance for that which went out.

Whom have you heard say

who is the tan-nay whom you have heard hold that

the sprinkling is not effective for that which went out

so that the sprinkling should be effective for it as though it had been inside [and there are practical consequences to this for several matters]—

Rabbi Eliezer,

for we find elsewhere that he holds this, and our beraita is also Rabbi Eliezer’s, for according to the one who holds that the sprinkling is effective for that which went out, it follows that one should be liable for it after the sprinkling because of impurity, even though it was outside at the time of the sprinkling, since the sprinkling was effective for it and it is considered permitted to pure persons,

and it teaches

in the beraita

that the tzitz effects acceptance for portions to be eaten—thus Rabbi Eliezer holds, “the tzitz effects acceptance for portions to be eaten,” and it is impossible to say, “Reverse it,” regarding the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yosei, and the difficulty returns to its place: the contradiction between the beraitot above concerning the law of the tzitz effecting acceptance for an individual sacrifice that became impure deliberately?

And we answer:

Rather, Rav Ḥisda said: It is not difficult: this

beraita, which says that the tzitz effects acceptance when it became impure deliberately even in an individual offering,

is Rabbi Eliezer,

for in that same beraita it also teaches that the tzitz effects acceptance for portions to be eaten, in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

That

beraita, which teaches that it does not effect acceptance,

is the Rabbis’

view.

And we raise an objection:

I would say that you have heard Rabbi Eliezer

only

that the tzitz effects acceptance for portions to be eaten,

but this law written in the beraita,

that he does not penalize

one who acted deliberately—

have you heard this from him,

that Rabbi Eliezer holds so?

And we answer:

Yes! Just as you have heard from Rabbi Yosei

that he does not impose a penalty for deliberate action,

you have heard

also

from Rabbi Eliezer. As it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says:

if he separated from impure produce for pure produce,

whether inadvertently or deliberately, his teruma is teruma.

And we raise an objection:

I would say that you have heard Rabbi Eliezer

that he does not penalize one who acted deliberately only

with regard to teruma, which is lenient,

but with regard to the acceptance effected by the tzitz

for kodashim, which are stringent, have you heard this from him?

And we answer:

If so, this

beraita concerning the acceptance effected by the tzitz when it became impure deliberately—

to whom will you attribute it?

To which tan-nay will you attribute it? Perforce, we must say that there is no distinction between teruma and kodashim, so that we can establish the beraita according to Rabbi Eliezer.

Ravina said:

It is possible to resolve the contradiction between the beraitot in another manner, that the two beraitot are not speaking of the same matter. Rather, the beraita that says, “whether inadvertently or deliberately,” is speaking of the impurity having occurred deliberately, and this is the explanation of the beraita:

Its impurity

of the blood

whether

it occurred

inadvertently or deliberately—

it effected acceptance.

And the beraita that says, “when it became impure deliberately, it did not effect acceptance,” is speaking of the sprinkling of the blood having been performed deliberately, and this is the explanation of the beraita:

Its sprinkling,

specifically if it was

inadvertent,

for the priest did not know that the blood was impure—then

it effected acceptance.

But if he sprinkled it

deliberately—

it did not effect acceptance.

And Rav Sheila said:

The resolution of the beraitot is like Ravina, but in reverse:

Its sprinkling, whether inadvertently or deliberately, effected acceptance. Its impurity, when inadvertent, effected acceptance; when deliberate, it did not effect acceptance!

And we raise an objection:

But according to Rav Sheila, this

explicitly

teaches: that it became impure whether inadvertently or deliberately

it effected acceptance, and this accords with Ravina, that its impurity, whether inadvertently or deliberately, effected acceptance?

And we answer: What is written, “whether inadvertently or deliberately,” does not refer to “it became impure,” but

this is what it says:

Blood that

became impure inadvertently, and he sprinkled it whether inadvertently or deliberately.