Menachot 25b (כה:) — the Talmud in English

And it raises an objection:

We learned in a beraita:

For what does the tzitz effect acceptance?

For the blood and the flesh

and for the sacrificial fats

that became impure, whether inadvertently or intentionally, whether through circumstances beyond one’s control,

whether willingly or unwillingly, whether in an individual offering or in a communal offering !

Thus, even in the case of an individual offering, the tzitz effects acceptance when the impurity occurred intentionally. This contradicts the earlier beraita, which stated that when the impurity occurred intentionally, the tzitz effects acceptance only in the case of a communal offering, but not in the case of an individual offering. And we resolve the contradiction:

Rav Yosef said: It is not difficult: This statement is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and that statement is the opinion of the Rabbis!

As we find that they disagree as to whether the Rabbis imposed a penalty in the case of one who acted intentionally.

As it was taught

with regard to separating teruma:

One may not separate teruma from impure produce on behalf of pure produce; but if he separated it inadvertently,

without knowing that it was impure,

his teruma is valid. If he did so intentionally—

his teruma is not valid!

For they imposed a penalty upon one who acted intentionally.

Rabbi Yosei says: Whether inadvertently or intentionally—

his teruma is valid!

And just as they disagree with regard to teruma, so too do they disagree with regard to the tzitz. The beraita that states that when the impurity occurred intentionally the tzitz did not effect acceptance in the case of an individual offering follows the opinion of the Rabbis, who imposed a penalty upon one who acted intentionally. And the beraita that states that it effected acceptance in the case of an individual offering when the impurity occurred intentionally follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who does not impose a penalty upon one who acted intentionally. And we challenge this: Is it possible to say that the beraita in which it is written, “when it occurred intentionally, it effected acceptance,” follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? But in this beraita it is written that the tzitz effects acceptance even for sacrificial flesh designated for eating that became impure [not that it becomes permitted for eating, but as explained below; see also the Shita Mekubetzet, letter bet], and

say that you heard Rabbi Yosei

only

that he does not impose a penalty

upon one who acted intentionally, but

that the tzitz effects acceptance for flesh designated for eating—

that is, that the tzitz effects acceptance not only for what is offered upon the altar, but also for sacrificial flesh that is eaten and became impure—

did you hear that from him?

But we heard the opposite: According to Rabbi Yosei, the tzitz does not effect acceptance for flesh designated for eating?

Wasn’t it taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: The tzitz effects acceptance for flesh designated for eating. Rabbi Yosei says: The tzitz does not effect acceptance for flesh designated for eating.

And we resolve the difficulty:

Reverse it.

Reverse the statements of the beraita, and this is how the beraita must be read:

Rabbi Eliezer says: The tzitz does not effect acceptance for flesh designated for eating. Rabbi Yosei says: The tzitz effects acceptance for flesh designated for eating.

Now the matter is resolved: The beraita in which it is written that “when it occurred intentionally, it effected acceptance” and that “the tzitz effects acceptance for flesh designated for eating” follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who maintains both of these positions.

Rav Sheshet strongly challenges this: Can you reverse it?

Is it possible to read the beraita in reverse and say that according to Rabbi Eliezer the tzitz does not effect acceptance for flesh designated for eating?

Wasn’t it taught in a beraita: One might have thought that if flesh became impure before the sprinkling of the blood

and a person who was impure ate it before the sprinkling,

he would be liable for it

to karet

because of

eating consecrated food in a state of

impurity

of the body?

The verse states: “Every pure person may eat flesh; but the person who eats the flesh of the sacrifice of the peace-offering that belongs to the Lord, while his impurity is upon him,

that person shall be cut off,”

and we derive from the wording “Every pure person may eat flesh” that the flesh

permitted

for eating

by pure persons

and a person who is impure ate it

is liable for it because of impurity; but flesh that is not permitted for pure persons,

such as flesh before the sprinkling of the blood, which may not be eaten even by pure persons,

one is not liable for it because of impurity! [But if one eats the impure flesh after the sprinkling, he is liable for it because of bodily impurity, even though impure flesh may not be eaten by pure persons, as explained below.]

But if he ate impure flesh after the sprinkling, he is liable for it because of impurity of the body, even though impure flesh may not be eaten by pure people, as will be explained below.]

Or perhaps

we should expound it as follows:

If it is eaten by pure persons, one is liable for it because of impurity; but if it is not eaten

by pure persons,

even though the blood has been sprinkled and it has already become permitted for pure persons, since afterward a disqualification occurred to it and it is now not eaten,

one is not liable for it because of impurity,

and

I would exclude

also

the

flesh

that remains overnight and that which leaves

the Temple courtyard after the sprinkling, for one is not liable to karet for eating them while impure through bodily impurity,

because they are not eaten by pure persons!

The verse states,

it is written in that same verse,

“that belongs to the Lord”! It includes

these disqualified offerings among those for which one is liable because of impurity.

One might have thought that I should include

by virtue of “that belongs to the Lord” also

the pigul offerings and the offerings left beyond their allotted time?

The beraita expresses surprise:

“Offerings left beyond their allotted time”—that is what remains overnight

which we already said was in fact included as liable?

Rather,

this is the meaning of the beraita: One might have thought that I should include

even

the

pigul offerings,

so that one is liable for them because of impurity

just

as one is liable for

offerings left beyond their allotted time?

The verse states,

it is written in the verse,

“the altar of the peace-offering”

and the word “altar” indicates part of the offering, rather than the entire offering—

it excludes

these disqualified offerings from liability because of impurity!

And what did you see that led you to include these

the offerings left overnight and those that left the courtyard, for which one is liable because of impurity,

and to exclude these

the pigul offerings, for which one is exempt because of impurity?

After

since

the

verse

both included, and

also

excluded, you say: I include

these disqualified offerings

that had a period of fitness,

for they were permitted to be eaten from the time of the sprinkling until they were disqualified through remaining overnight or leaving the courtyard;

and I exclude those that did not have a period of fitness,

for pigul is disqualified from the time of the sprinkling, and it was not fit to be eaten even for a single moment.

And if you say: Flesh that became impure before the sprinkling of the blood, and one ate it after the sprinkling of the blood

while impure through bodily impurity,

why is one liable for it because of impurity?

For it too did not have a period of fitness. Above, we excluded only pigul, implying that one is liable for impure flesh after the sprinkling. 130 .

Because the tzitz effects acceptance

for the impure flesh, so that the sprinkling of the blood is effective with regard to its being considered permitted for pure persons, even though in practice it may not be eaten.

And Rav Sheshet concludes his challenge:

If it became impure

before the sprinkling—

yes!

It is specifically in this case that the beraita states that one who eats it while impure through bodily impurity after the sprinkling is liable; but

if it left

the courtyard before the sprinkling,

no,

one is not liable for it even after the sprinkling, since the tzitz does not effect acceptance for flesh that left the courtyard.

Who is the one from whom you heard that he says

who is the tanna whom you heard holding that

the sprinkling is not effective for flesh that left the courtyard,

so that the sprinkling should be effective for it as though it had been inside [with several practical consequences]?—

Rabbi Eliezer,

as we find elsewhere that he holds this opinion. Our beraita likewise follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, for according to the one who holds that the sprinkling is effective for flesh that left the courtyard, it would follow that one is liable for it after the sprinkling because of impurity, even though it was outside at the time of the sprinkling, since the sprinkling was effective for it and it is considered permitted for pure persons.

And it teaches

in the beraita

that the tzitz effects acceptance for flesh designated for eating. Thus, Rabbi Eliezer holds that “the tzitz effects acceptance for flesh designated for eating,” and it is impossible to say “reverse it” with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yosei. The original difficulty therefore returns: the contradiction between the earlier beraitot concerning whether the tzitz effects acceptance for an individual offering that became impure intentionally.

And we resolve the difficulty:

Rather, Rav Hisda said: It is not difficult: This

beraita, which states that the tzitz effects acceptance when the impurity occurred intentionally even in the case of an individual offering,

is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer,

since that same beraita also teaches that the tzitz effects acceptance for flesh designated for eating, in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

That

beraita which teaches that it does not effect acceptance

is the opinion of the Rabbis.

That is their opinion.

And we challenge this:

Say that you heard Rabbi Eliezer

only

that the tzitz effects acceptance for flesh designated for eating,

but regarding the ruling stated in the beraita

that he does not impose a penalty

upon one who acted intentionally—

did you hear that from him

that Rabbi Eliezer holds this as well?

And we resolve the difficulty:

Yes! Just as you heard from Rabbi Yosei

that he does not impose a penalty when one acted intentionally,

you heard

also

from Rabbi Eliezer. As it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says:

If one separated teruma from impure produce on behalf of pure produce,

whether inadvertently or intentionally, his teruma is valid.

And we challenge this:

Say that you heard Rabbi Eliezer

that he does not impose a penalty upon one who acted intentionally, but only

with regard to teruma, which is lenient,

whereas with regard to the acceptance effected by the tzitz

in the case of consecrated offerings, which are stringent, did you hear that from him?

And we resolve the difficulty:

If so, this

beraita concerning the tzitz effecting acceptance when the impurity occurred intentionally—

to which tanna will you attribute it?

To which tanna could you attribute it? Necessarily, one must say that there is no distinction between teruma and consecrated offerings, so that we can establish the beraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

Ravina said:

It is possible to resolve the contradiction between the beraitot in another manner: The two beraitot are not speaking about the same matter. Rather, the beraita that says, “whether inadvertently or intentionally,” was speaking of the impurity having occurred intentionally. This is the meaning of the beraita:

Its impurity

of the blood,

whether

it occurred

inadvertently or intentionally—

it effected acceptance.

And the beraita that says, “when it occurred intentionally, it did not effect acceptance,” was speaking of the sprinkling of blood that was performed intentionally. This is the meaning of the beraita:

Its sprinkling,

only if it was performed

inadvertently,

when the koen did not know that the blood was impure,

effected acceptance.

But if he sprinkled it

intentionally—

it did not effect acceptance.

And Rav Sheila said:

The resolution of the beraitot is as Ravina said, but in reverse:

Its sprinkling, whether inadvertently or intentionally, effected acceptance. Its impurity, when inadvertent, effected acceptance; when intentional, it did not effect acceptance!

And we challenge this:

And according to Rav Sheila, this

explicitly

teaches: “That became impure, whether inadvertently or intentionally,”

and it effected acceptance. This is in accordance with Ravina, who explains that its impurity, whether inadvertent or intentional, effects acceptance.

And we resolve the difficulty: The statement “whether inadvertently or intentionally” does not refer to “became impure.” Rather,

this is what it says:

Blood that

became impure inadvertently, and he sprinkled it whether inadvertently or intentionally.