Menachot 20a (כ.) — the Talmud in English

As it was taught:

it is written: "

It is an eternal covenant of salt"

and we expound it:

that there shall be

a covenant stated with regard to salt!

That is, the salt must never cease to be applied to the offerings, and it follows that it is indispensable.

These are the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Shimon says:

From here you learn that it is indispensable:

It is stated here

with regard to the offerings,

“It is an eternal covenant of salt,” and it is stated there

with regard to Pinhas,

“an eternal covenant of priesthood”—

just as offerings cannot be offered without priesthood,

since only the kohanim offer them,

so offerings cannot be offered without salt!

It is explained in the beraita that according to everyone salt is indispensable. But this is difficult for Rav, who says that only what the verse repeated is indispensable?

And we answer:

Rav Yosef said: Rav

who says that salt is not indispensable,

holds like the tanna

of

our Mishna, who says: “If he did not salt,”—

it is valid!

Abaye said

to Rav Yosef:

If so,

since you said that what the Mishna states, “If he did not salt,” means that he did not salt at all, then what the Mishna states,

“he did

not pour,” also

let us interpret as meaning that he

did not pour at all.

But can this be said? Pouring is indispensable!?

Rather,

necessarily, what it states,

“he did not pour,”

means that he did not pour—

a non-kohen poured instead.

And if so,

here too

let us interpret

“he did not salt”

as meaning that he did not salt—

a non-kohen salted instead.

But if he did not salt at all, the tanna of the Mishna agrees with Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon that it is disqualified. And this is difficult for Rav!?

And we answer:

He said to him:

Rav Yosef said: “If he did not salt,” as written in the Mishna, cannot be interpreted to mean “a non-kohen salted instead,”

for would it enter your mind that a non-kohen could approach the altar,

where the offering is salted?

But a non-kohen is forbidden to enter the Court of the kohanim. Necessarily, “if he did not salt” means that it is valid even if he did not salt at all, in accordance with Rav. 39 .

Alternatively,

Rav agrees that salt is indispensable, since

because “covenant” is written with regard to it, it is considered as though the verse explicitly taught it

to be indispensable,

and therefore it is comparable!

From the Gemara’s discussion thus far, it has been explained that the verse did not repeat the law of salt to indicate that it is indispensable. Rather, either the view is that salt is not indispensable, or one who holds that salt is indispensable derives it from the fact that “covenant” is written.

We raise a difficulty:

But

why say that

the verse did not explicitly teach it

with regard to salt?

But it is written in another verse,

“And you shall salt every offering of your

mincha with salt”?

And we answer:

That

verse, “And you shall salt every offering of your mincha with salt,”

is needed for that which was taught in a beraita: Had it said, “Every offering with salt,” I would understand that even wood and blood

would require salt when they are offered,

as

they

are called “offering.” The verse therefore states “mincha,”

and we expound:

Just as a mincha is unique in that others are brought as an obligation for it,

that is, it cannot be offered on the altar in its present form, but other things must be brought along with it in order to offer it—namely, wood is brought for its offering—

so too every

offering

for which others are brought as an obligation

requires salt. This excludes blood and wood, with which wood is not brought, and which likewise do not require salt.

And

if

you might wish to say that the verse “every offering of your mincha” should be expounded differently, as follows:

Just as a mincha is unique in that it permits

others—the kometz permits the remainder to be eaten—

so too anything that permits

others

I would include blood

as requiring salt,

as

it

permits

the meat to be eaten, and I would have no basis to exclude from the verse anything but wood, since it does not permit anything else?

The verse therefore states: “From your mincha,” and not “from your blood”!

Could it be that the entire mincha,

including the remainder eaten by the kohanim,

requires salt? The verse states “offering,”

to teach you:

The offering,

that is, the kometz offered on the altar,

requires salt, but the entire mincha does not require salt!

And I have derived

that it

requires salt only in the case of a kometz. From where is there an extension to include the frankincense? I include the frankincense

by logical inference, since its law is like that of the kometz,

for

it

comes with it in one vessel.

From where is there an extension to include frankincense brought independently

[which one may voluntarily offer by itself, without a mincha],

and frankincense brought in the bowls

of the showbread,

and the incense ,

and the minchat kohanim

whose law differs from that of an Israelite’s mincha, since it is entirely burned,

and the minchat kohen

mashiah,

which is the minchat havitin offered every day by the High Priest,

and the minchat nesakhim

brought with an offering,

the fats of a sin-offering, the fats of a guilt-offering, and the fats of offerings of the most sacred order,

the lambs of the festival of Shavuot,

and the fats of offerings of lesser sanctity, the limbs of an elevation-offering, and the bird elevation-offering,

all of which require salt—yet the verse speaks of the offering of a mincha?

The verse therefore states: “With every offering of yours you shall offer salt.”

The Master said: I have derived only the kometz. From where is there an extension to include the frankincense? I include the frankincense, since it comes with it in one vessel.

From where is there an extension to include frankincense brought independently, and so on?

We raise a difficulty: Why do we need the verse “with every offering of yours” to include all these?

But you said: Just as a mincha is unique in that others are brought as an obligation for it,

so too anything for which others are brought as an obligation—and this includes all those listed by the beraita, since they require wood for their offering and can be derived from “mincha”?

Introduction to the Gemara’s answer: Among the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded is the principle of “generalization and specification.” This means that the Torah writes a word whose meaning is that the law under discussion applies to all things. It then specifies one thing, and we say that the law discussed by the Torah applies only to this particular thing. The reason the Torah initially wrote the generalization is to include one additional thing.

However, if after the “specification” the Torah writes another word whose meaning is that the law discussed by the Torah applies to everything, this is called “generalization, specification, and generalization,” and we expound it to include everything similar to the “specification.”

And we answer:

This is what the tanna

of the beraita

said:

Let us say that we should not expound the verse to include everything similar to a mincha, but instead expound it as follows:

“Offering” is a generalization, and “mincha”

is a specification; “generalization and specification”

means that the generalization includes only what is in the specification: a mincha requires salt,

a mincha requires salt,

but anything else

other offerings

does not

require salt?!

The beraita then said:

“

With every offering of yours” returns and generalizes,

so it is

a generalization, specification, and generalization—

and

you may derive only things similar to the specification: Just as the specification

of the offering of a mincha is

explicitly characterized by the fact that others are brought as an obligation for it, so too everything

among the offerings

for which others are brought as an obligation,

as the beraita stated at the outset, that all things similar to a mincha are included.

And we explain:

What is meant by “others are brought as an obligation for it”? Wood,

which is brought with the mincha.

So too everything

with which

wood

is brought requires salt.

We raise a difficulty:

Let us say

that the unique characteristic of a mincha—that “others are brought as an obligation for it”—means that together with the offering of a mincha, another offering is brought. And what is it?

Frankincense

that is brought as an obligation with the kometz. Let us say, then, that every offering with which another item is brought as an obligation requires salt,

and

if we expound it in this manner,

I would include

that even

blood

requires salt, because others are brought as an obligation for it,

as there are nesakhim

that are brought as an obligation with it, since nesakhim are brought with the animal offering?

And we answer:

The nesakhim

are not considered to be brought with the blood of the animal offering; rather,

they come together with the imurin!

What is the reason?

It stands to reason that the offering of an animal requires

“eating and drinking,”

and the wine of the nesakhim is the drinking, which comes with the imurin, which are the eating.

And we challenge this:

On the contrary,

it is more logical that the wine comes for the blood of the sacrifice, for the blood is

atonement and

the wine is

joy,

and it is the way of one who has attained atonement to rejoice after his atonement?

And we answer:

Rather,

the reason that we do not include blood among those offerings that are accompanied by libations, as a meal offering is accompanied by frankincense, is that they are not comparable, for

frankincense comes with it

with the meal offering

in one vessel,

whereas

libations do not come

with the blood

in one vessel. But

when we include every sacrifice that is accompanied by

wood,

this is comparable to a meal offering, for

just as it is rendered fit through them,

through wood,

a meal offering—

so all sacrifices are rendered fit through them!

We inquire:

And say

that we should expound the generalization, particular, and generalization in this manner:

Just as the particular explicitly refers to that for which other things come as an obligation and which renders something permitted,

since the kometz renders the remainder permitted for eating,

so too, every

thing similar in two respects,

for which other things come as an obligation and which renders something permitted—and what is it?

The frankincense brought in the bowls, which renders permitted

that which it permits, the

shewbread,

and which also requires wood;

but something else,

the other sacrifices,

do not

require salt?

And we answer:

Since it was necessary

for the verse

“from your meal offering”

to exclude

“and not from your blood,”

from the fact that the Torah wrote an exclusion indicating that blood does not require salt, infer that without the exclusion we would have included blood as well, even though it resembles the meal offering in only one respect, in that it renders something permitted as it does,

it follows that all these,

all the sacrifices that were not excluded,

are included

as requiring salt, since they resemble the meal offering

in one

respect,

that other things come as an obligation for them!

The Master said: “From your meal offering,” and not from your blood.

We inquire:

And say

that blood is not excluded; rather, let us expound it as follows: “

From your meal offering, and not from your limbs

”—the limbs that are offered upon the altar should not be required to have salt?

And we answer:

It is logical

that

the limbs should have been included, since

the limbs resemble the meal offering more than blood in the following respects:

a.

Other things come as an obligation for them, as for it.

b. It is burned upon the

fires, as is the meal offering,

unlike blood, which is not burned upon the altar.

c. It is offered only

outside, as is the meal offering,

for limbs and meal offerings are offered only upon the outer altar, whereas blood sometimes enters inside, into the Sanctuary, for sprinkling.

d. One is liable to karet for them on account of

notar, as for the meal offering.

e. Likewise, eating them in a state of

impurity incurs a liability to karet, as with the meal offering.

f. If one unlawfully derived benefit from them, one is liable to bring an offering for

sacrilege, as with the meal offering,

unlike blood, which is excluded from liability for notar, impurity, and sacrilege.