Menachot 108b (קח:) — the Talmud in English

We learned in the Mishna: “This ox is a burnt-offering,” and it became blemished; if he wishes, he may bring two animals with its value:

Gemara:

And we raise an objection:

But did you not say in the first clause [of the previous Mishna]: One who says, “I have undertaken

to bring

an ox worth one hundred dinars,”

and he brought two animals worth one hundred dinars, he has not fulfilled his obligation!?

And we answer: One who consecrates

“this ox”

and it became blemished is different;

that is to say, there is a distinction between a vow and a voluntary offering. If one vowed to bring a large ox, he may not bring two small ones. But in this case, since he did not vow but merely voluntarily consecrated an ox, once it became blemished he no longer has any obligation by virtue of his statement, for he consecrated only this animal; rather, the value of the ox is designated for a burnt-offering. Therefore, he may bring two animals with the value of the ox.

We learned in the Mishna:

“These two oxen are burnt-offerings,” and they became blemished; if he wishes, he may bring one animal with their value, but Rabbi prohibits this:

And we raise an objection against Rabbi: Why did he not likewise disagree in the first clause and prohibit bringing two small oxen with the value of one burnt-offering?

But

what is the reason

that Rabbi prohibits bringing one large ox with the value of two small oxen? Is it not

because it would be—

that is to say, it should be compared to one who vows to bring

a large animal and brings a small one,

who has not fulfilled his obligation [as explained in the previous Mishna]? This is because the large animal is more significant than the small one. The same applies to one who vows to bring two animals and brings one: he has not fulfilled his obligation, because the two are more significant than the one. -

And although it became blemished,

that is to say, although in truth the law of our Mishna should not be compared to the law of the first clause, because this concerns a vow and that concerns a voluntary offering, as the Gemara distinguished earlier, nevertheless

Rabbi does not permit it initially

even in the case of a voluntary offering, just as in the case of a vow -

If so, the following difficulty arises:

Why did Rabbi not also disagree

with what is stated

in the first clause,

that if one voluntarily consecrated one animal and it became blemished, he may bring two animals with its value? After all, with regard to a vow, Rabbi holds in the previous Mishna that even one who vowed to bring a small animal and brought a large one has not fulfilled his obligation. Thus, according to Rabbi, one may not bring something more significant than what he vowed. Consequently, since Rabbi himself compares a voluntary offering to a vow, in the case of a voluntary offering he should not be able to bring two animals in place of one, since the two are more significant than the one, contrary to what is stated in the first clause!? And we answer: Indeed,

Rabbi disagrees with the entire matter [both with the first clause and with the latter clause];

he

waits for the Rabbis until they have concluded their statement,

and Rabbi

then disagrees with them [and disagrees with them concerning the entire matter].

then disagreed with them

—that is, Rabbi waited until the Sages had finished presenting their position, and then disagreed with them concerning the entire matter.

[and afterward Rabbi disagreed with them concerning the entire matter].

Know

that Rabbi indeed also disagreed with the first clause, that is, with the case analogous to one who brought a small animal in place of a large one,

as it teaches

in the latter clause of our Mishna:

“

This ram is a burnt-offering,” and

it became blemished; if he wishes, he may bring a lamb with its value; “

This lamb is a burnt-offering,” and

it became blemished; if he wishes, he may bring a ram with its value, but Rabbi prohibits this” - It is thus explicit that Rabbi disagrees in the case of one who voluntarily consecrated a small animal and brought a large one, and the same law applies when one voluntarily consecrated one animal and brings two, which are more significant than the one: he may not bring them ab initio.

and the same law applies when one voluntarily consecrated one animal and brought two, which are more significant than one: he may not bring them initially.

And we conclude: Indeed,

derive from this

that Rabbi disagreed both with bringing two in place of one and with bringing one in place of two.

They raised a dilemma:

What is the law when changing from one species to another?

For example, if one voluntarily consecrated an ox and wishes to bring two rams, may he bring them?

Come and hear

from what we learned in a beraita:

One who voluntarily consecrates an animal and says, “

This ox is a burnt-offering”—

and it became blemished, he may not bring a ram with its value,

which is excessively smaller than the ox,

but he may bring two rams with its value -

But Rabbi prohibits this, because there is no blending,

that is to say, since he is obligated to bring two libations [one libation for each ram], and he cannot combine them in a single vessel; and since he must bring the meal-offering in two vessels, the offering he brings does not resemble the original offering, and he cannot bring them in place of the original offering.

In any event,

derive from this

that the Rabbis permit changing from one species to another when one voluntarily consecrated an animal rather than vowed to bring one.

And we raise a difficulty against this:

If so,

that there is no deficiency resulting from changing from one species to another, then

why specifically two? Even one would also suffice;

that is to say, why does the beraita state that he may not bring one ram in place of an ox because it is smaller, and that he was permitted only to bring two? By law, he should be able to bring even one ram, despite its being smaller -

For when it became blemished—that is, in the case of a voluntary offering that became blemished, and not in the case of a vow— according to the Rabbis there is no distinction between a large animal and a small one,

as is explicit in our Mishna, which states that if one voluntarily consecrated a ram, he may bring a lamb!?

do not distinguish between a large animal and a small one,

as is explicit in our Mishna, which states that if one voluntarily consecrated a ram, he may bring a lamb in its place!?

And we answer:

There are two tannaim, and they disagree concerning the opinion of the Rabbis;

the tanna of the Mishna, according to the Rabbis, and the tanna of the beraita, according to the Rabbis, disagree concerning the law of one who voluntarily consecrates a large animal: whether he may bring a small one.

We learned in a beraita:

Rabbi prohibits this, because there is no blending:

And we raise a difficulty:

The reason

that Rabbi prohibits bringing two in place of one is

because there is no blending; if there were blending, he would permit it,

allowing one to change and bring two in place of one -

But didn’t we learn

in our Mishna:

“This ram is a burnt-offering,” and it became blemished; if he wishes, he may bring a lamb with its value; “This lamb is a burnt-offering,” and it became blemished; he may bring a ram with its value, but Rabbi prohibits this”?

Thus Rabbi prohibits changing even from a small animal to a large one; likewise, he should not be able to change and bring two in place of one, since the two stand in relation to the one as the large stands in relation to the small, as explained earlier in the sugya!?

And we answer:

There are two tannaim, and they disagree concerning the opinion of Rabbi.

We learned in the continuation of the beraita:

And in the case of unblemished animals [that is, perfect animals],

which cannot be redeemed, but he accepted upon himself

a calf and brought a bull,

or he accepted upon himself

a lamb and brought a ram—

he has fulfilled his obligation:

And we explain it: The anonymous ruling

of the beraita is

in accordance with the Rabbis,

of our Mishna, who hold that one who vowed to bring a small animal and brought a large one has fulfilled his obligation, even in the case of a vow.

We learned in the Mishna: This ox is a burnt-offering, and it became blemished; if

he wishes, he may bring two animals with its value:

Rav Menashya bar Zevid said in the name of Rav:

They taught

—that he can bring two in place of one—

only

in a case where he

said, “

This ox is a burnt-offering” -

But if he said, “

This ox is incumbent upon me as a burnt-offering”:

his vow is fixed

to bring it as one offering and not as two, because since he said “incumbent upon me,” he assumed responsibility for it.

And we raise a difficulty against this:

Perhaps when he says “

It is incumbent upon me to bring it,”

that is what he

is saying,

but if it became blemished, he did not assume responsibility for it!?

Rather, if this statement was transmitted, it was transmitted as follows: Rav Menashya bar Zevid said in the name of Rav:

They taught only when he said, “

This ox is a burnt-offering,”

or alternatively [and the same law applies] if he

said, “

This ox is incumbent upon me as a burnt-offering”;

but if he

said, “

This ox and its value are incumbent upon me as a burnt-offering”:

his vow is fixed

to bring its value as one offering and not as two.

Mishna: :

One who says, “

One of my consecrated lambs

for the altar,”

or “

one [or, he said “one”]

of my consecrated oxen,”

and he had two,

then

the larger of them is consecrated.

And if he had

three,

then

the middle-sized one among them is consecrated.

And if he came before us and said, “

I specified, but I do not know what I specified,”

or “

My father told me

that he consecrated one,”

but I do not know what

he said,” then

the larger of them is consecrated.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who says, “One of my consecrated lambs,” or “one of my consecrated oxen,” and he had two—the larger of them is consecrated:

And we raise a difficulty:

Apparently,

that is, from the fact that we say that he consecrated the larger one,

one who consecrates consecrates generously;

he

consecrates

with a generous eye;

but

consider the latter clause

of our Mishna: if he had three,

the middle-sized one among them is consecrated

and not the largest.

Apparently, one who consecrates consecrates begrudgingly!?

Shmuel said:

This that we learned in the latter clause, “the middle-sized one among them is consecrated,” means that

we are concerned even that the middle-sized one may be consecrated,

for in relation to the small one it is

a generous eye.

And we explain: Since it is uncertain which animal has become consecrated,

what should he do [that is, how should he act]?

Rabbi Hiyya bar Rav said:

And we explain: Since it is uncertain which animal became consecrated,

what should he do [how should he act]?

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav said:

He waits for it,

the middle-sized animal,

until it becomes blemished, and he redeems it by transferring its sanctity to the larger animal [redeeming it upon the larger animal]. Thus, in either event, the larger animal is consecrated and not the middle-sized one: if it was unconsecrated from the outset, all is well, and if it was consecrated, he has redeemed it upon the larger animal. Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha:

They taught—that if he has three, we are concerned that the middle-sized one may be consecrated—

only when he said, “

One of my consecrated oxen”;

but if he said, “

an ox among my consecrated oxen”:

the largest among them alone

is

consecrated,

because he said,

“the ox among my oxen” [the ox, with the definite article, among my oxen].

And we raise a difficulty against this:

That is not so [and surely the matter is not so], for:

Did Rav Huna not say in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Ulla:

One who says to another, “

A house among my houses [which is analogous to “an ox among my oxen”]

I am selling to you,”

the seller

shows it

to the buyer—

an upper story -

that is, does this not mean that he shows him an inferior house among his houses, such as the upper story? This proves that he is not required to give him the finest house among his houses!?

And what is the implication?

Is it not because it is inferior,

that is to say, is the meaning not that he shows him the inferior house among his houses, such as the upper story? It is thus apparent that he need not give him the best house among his houses!?

And we answer:

No; not as you interpreted it, that “an upper story” means an inferior house. Rather, an upper story means

the finest of the houses.

We raise an objection

against Rabba bar Avuha from a beraita in which we learned:

“

An ox among my consecrated oxen

for a burnt-offering,”

and likewise a consecrated ox

for a burnt-offering

that became intermingled with others:

Then

the largest among them is consecrated,

that is, he should consecrate it and offer it as a burnt-offering, because perhaps it is the consecrated one.

And all of them—

the other oxen, which are likewise uncertain—

are sold

while they are unblemished

for the needs of burnt-offerings,

and they are consecrated and offered as burnt-offerings by the purchaser,

and their value

is unconsecrated.

to Rabbah bar Avuha from a beraita in which we learned: “

An ox among my consecrated oxen

for an olah,”

and likewise a consecrated ox

as an olah

that became mixed with others:

Thus it is apparent that when one says, “An ox among my consecrated oxen,” the consecration does not certainly apply to the largest; rather, all of them are subject to uncertainty!?

And we answer:

Interpret it as referring to what we learned—“and all of them are sold for the needs of burnt offerings”—only

in the case of a consecrated ox that became mixed with other animals.

But in fact, when he says, “An ox among my consecrated oxen,” the largest is consecrated, while the others do not need to be sold for the needs of burnt offerings.

It is thus apparent that when one says, “An ox among my consecrated oxen,” the consecration does not certainly take effect upon the largest one; rather, they are all uncertainly consecrated!?

And we answer:

Interpret it—the statement we learned, “and all of them are sold for the needs of burnt-offerings”—applies only

to a consecrated ox that became intermingled with others;

but in truth, when he said, “An ox among my consecrated oxen,” the largest one is consecrated, while the others do not need to be sold for the needs of burnt-offerings.

And we raise a difficulty against this:

But the beraita

says “and likewise”: “and likewise, a consecrated ox that became intermingled with others”

it says, indicating that the law of one who says, “An ox among my consecrated oxen,” differs from the law of a consecrated ox that became intermingled with others!?

It is therefore explicit that when one says, “an ox among my consecrated oxen,” the consecration does not certainly take effect upon the largest; rather, all of them are uncertain!?

And we answer:

Explain it as referring to what we learned, “and all of them shall be sold for the needs of olah offerings,” only

with regard to

a consecrated ox that became mixed with others,

but in truth, when he said, “an ox among my consecrated oxen,” the largest is consecrated, whereas the others need not be sold for the needs of olah offerings.

And we raise an objection to this:

But “

and likewise

a consecrated ox that became mixed with others”

it says

in the beraita. Thus, the law of one who says “an ox among my consecrated oxen” and the law of an ox that became mixed [with others] are different!?

And we answer:

The explanation is

[interpret it] as referring to what he said, “and likewise”—

a large one

that is consecrated, since in this regard the two cases are the same. But the ruling that all of them are sold for the sake of burnt offerings was stated only with regard to an ox that became mixed in with others.

They raise an objection from a source

from another baraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna, against Rav Nahman’s statement in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha:

If one says to his fellow, “

I am selling you a house from among my houses,” and

one collapsed

of his houses:

the seller

shows it

to the buyer—the house that

collapsed—and says to him: “This is what I sold you, and yours collapsed.” And likewise, if one says, “

I am selling you

a slave from among my slaves,” and

one died

of his slaves,

the seller shows him

to the buyer—the

dead one—