Meilah 9b (ט:) — the Talmud in English

MEYTIVI,

the Gemara brings a Mishna to raise an objection to Rav, from what we learned in tractate Zevahim (85b): The wool on the heads of sheep, the hair in the beards of goats, the bones, sinews, horns, and hooves—when they are attached [to the flesh], they may ascend [to the altar to be burned] together with the flesh of the olah. But if they became detached from the flesh, they may not ascend.

And we also learned there (86a):

And all of them,

the bones, sinews, and so on, whether attached to the flesh or whether they became detached,

that broke away

[if they broke away]

from upon the altar

to the ground,

he need not return them

there is no need to return them .

And similarly, a coal that broke away from upon the altar, he need not return it .

And it should be inferred: When a coal broke away

from upon the altar, it is then that he need not return it

, but

if it is still

upon the altar, he must return

the coal.

Granted, according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who maintains that the removal of the ashes is subject to a specific requirement,

it is understandable

why the coal must be returned, because the Torah said: “And he shall remove the ashes” . Therefore, he should return it in order to fulfill the mitzva of removal.

But according to Rav, it is difficult:

Why must he return it? It has already burned, become a coal, and its mitzva has been completed . And we answer:

Rav could say to you: A coal is different,

and therefore it should be returned in order to complete its burning, because

it contains

substance,

actual substance, and is still fit to be burned. It is unlike ash, which has no substance; once it has become ash and the terumat ha-deshen has already been performed, there is no obligation to return it, and one who derives benefit from it is not liable for me’ila.

Some report it in the opposite direction,

there is one who transmitted this teaching

in that direction,

on that side. That is, this Mishna provides proof for Rav’s position, and poses a difficulty to Rabbi Yohanan:

It should be inferred:

The reason

for the obligation to return it when it broke away while still upon the altar

is because it is

a

coal that contains substance,

and its burning has not been completed.

But

if it had already become

ash, which has no substance,

and its burning had been completed,

even

when it broke away while still

upon

[upon]

the altar, one who derives benefit from it is not liable for me’ila.

Granted, according to Rav,

who maintains that after the raising of the ashes has been performed, one who derives benefit from it is not liable for me’ila,

it is understandable.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who maintains that until it has been removed outside the camp, one who derives benefit from it remains liable for me’ila,

it is difficult:

Why should it not be returned? Its mitzva has still not been completed.

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan could say to you:

We should not infer specifically a coal. Rather,

the same law applies: even ash

must be returned, because the ash has not yet been removed.

And this is the reason that it teaches the case of a coal: but

it comes to teach us

a novel point.

Even a coal, which contains substance

and whose burning has not been completed,

when it breaks away from upon the altar

to the ground,

he need not return it.

Where should that money—the principal and the additional fifth—be given? The Gemara discusses this.

The discussion of payments for me’ila

One who derives benefit from consecrated property pays the principal and an additional fifth, in addition to the obligation to bring an asham offering.

To where are those monies—the principal and the additional fifth—given? The Gemara discusses this matter. The Torah said in the passage concerning me’ila (Leviticus 5): “And he shall pay what he wrongfully took from the sacred property, and he shall add its fifth to it,” and the Sages expounded: “He shall pay what he wrongfully took from the sacred property”—he shall pay it to the sacred property [Sifra]. That is, if he derived benefit from property consecrated for the repair of the Temple, he pays for it toward the repair of the Temple; and if he derived benefit from property consecrated for the altar, he pays for it toward offerings consecrated to the altar, and to that same sacred property. And “the sanctity within it is for that same sacred property.”

It was stated: One who derives benefit from the flesh of offerings of the highest sanctity before the blood is sprinkled, and

from

the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity after the blood is sprinkled,

and consequently became liable for the principal and an additional fifth:

Rav said:

The money corresponding to

what he benefited from shall be used for freewill offerings,

that is, to purchase olot, which are offered when the altar is idle [“the summer of the altar”], and the hides are given to the priests.

But

if

Levi said:

They should not bring olot from this money, since the hides go to the priests, rather

he should bring

from the money

something that is entirely for the altar,

namely, incense.

It was taught:

We learned a beraita in accordance with

Rav’s

view, and a beraita in accordance with Levi’s view .

It was taught in accordance with Levi’s view: Where does this payment for me’ila go?

Students

who study before the Sages

say: He should bring something that is entirely for the altar.

And the Gemara explains:

What is that?

What is the thing that is entirely for the altar?

Incense .

from part of the money he set aside to purchase a sin-offering, and from money designated for a guilt-offering, If he comes to make payment before his sin-offering has been sacrificed, adds the payment for the misuse to the money remaining for his sin-offering, and brings his sin-offering, a substantial sin-offering, and similarly, if he comes to make payment before his guilt-offering has been sacrificed, he adds the money and brings his guilt-offering.

It was taught in accordance with Rav’s view: One who derives benefit from the money designated for a sin-offering

from part of the money that he set aside for the purchase of a sin-offering,

or from the money designated for a guilt-offering,

his sin-offering had already been sacrificed , what should he do with that money? He cannot combine it with the money for his sin-offering.

If he comes to make payment

before his sin-offering has been sacrificed,

he gives the value of the me’ila to the owner of the offering, and he

adds

the value of the me’ila to the money for the sin-offering that remains for him,

and brings his sin-offering,

a sufficiently valuable sin-offering.

And

similarly, if he comes to make payment

before his guilt-offering has been sacrificed, he adds it and brings his guilt-offering.

But if

his sin-offering had already been sacrificed ,

what should he do with that money? He cannot add it to the money for his sin-offering.

The money shall go

the money

to the Dead Sea,

that is, to a place from which it cannot be taken out. This is analogous to a sin-offering whose owner achieved atonement through another offering: It must die [and it is one of the “five sin-offerings that must die” ]. Therefore, the money goes to the Dead Sea , which serves in place of death.

And likewise, if

his guilt offering has already been sacrificed, they shall fall

those funds

to freewill offerings.

Explanation: We hold that any item which, if it were a sin offering, would be left to die, if it is a guilt offering, is left to graze until it develops a blemish; it is then sold, and the proceeds fall to freewill offerings. Therefore, those funds for misuse shall fall to freewill offerings. This means that they are placed in the shofar, a collection box in the Temple, and communal offerings were brought from these funds.

Thus far, the beraita has discussed one who derives benefit from funds designated for a sin offering or a guilt offering. Their law is that if the funds can still be added to the offering, they are added. When this is no longer possible, the value of a sin offering goes to the Dead Sea, while the value of a guilt offering goes to freewill offerings. The beraita now continues by explaining the law governing one who derives benefit from the animal itself or from the meat:

One who derives benefit from most holy sacrifices before the sprinkling of the blood, or from the sacrificial portions of lesser sanctity after the sprinkling of the blood—the value of what he derived benefit from shall fall to freewill offerings,

as stated by Rav!

One who derives benefit from

all offerings of the altar,

shall give the value of the misuse

to the altar.

Offerings for the maintenance of the Temple,

that is, if one derives benefit from items dedicated for the maintenance of the Temple, the value of the misuse shall fall

to the maintenance of the Temple.

Communal offerings,

one who derives benefit from them shall give the value of the misuse

for communal freewill offerings.

And we raise an objection:

This itself is difficult:

the beraita is difficult, as there is a contradiction between its first clause and its final clause.

In the first clause, it

teaches

before his sin offering has been sacrificed,

he shall add to it and bring his sin offering.

Once his sin offering has been sacrificed, they shall go to the Dead Sea.

But

in the final clause it

teaches: All offerings of the altar—to the altar:

this implies all offerings, including a sin offering,

and it makes no difference whether the owners have achieved atonement,

even if the owners have already achieved atonement,

and it makes no difference where the owners have not achieved atonement,

if the owners have not yet achieved atonement, the money falls to the altar, meaning that it goes to freewill offerings.

The difficulty now is:

The first clause is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Any sin offering whose owners have achieved atonement must be left to die,

whereas the final clause, which states that the money does not go to “death”—that is, that it does not go to the Dead Sea, but falls to freewill offerings even though the owners have already achieved atonement—is in accordance with the Rabbis.