Meilah 10a — the Talmud in English

And it is difficult: is it possible that

the first clause is Rabbi Shimon, and

the latter clause is the Rabbis!?

Rashi] maintain that Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda also disagreed about this matter. According to Rabbi Shimon, the Gemara says there [23b] that an animal designated as a sin-offering that was not offered must die in every case, without exception [even in the case of a communal sin-offering; see there, 15a]. Therefore, the Tosafot explain that this is the meaning of the Gemara’s statement: “The first clause follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.” He is the one who maintains that the sin-offering dies, and consequently the money goes into the Dead Sea. The latter clause, which states that the money is transferred for voluntary offerings, follows the opinion of the Rabbis [that is, Rabbi Yehuda, who disagrees with him], who maintain that the sin-offering does not die and the money does not go into the Dead Sea. In other words, the money used to repay the misuse of consecrated property is comparable to the second animal [as will be explained further], and the money of the sin-offering is comparable to the first animal. Now, when the owner obtains atonement through the money of the sin-offering, it is as though he obtained atonement through the first animal. According to Rabbi Shimon, the money goes into the Dead Sea; according to the Rabbis, it is transferred for voluntary offerings. Before explaining the continuation of the Tosafot, we will present the question raised by Keren Ora. Keren Ora argues that, seemingly, this money, which he designated to pay for the sin-offering and through which he misused consecrated property, is comparable to the money of the second animal, since it was not lost: he used it to bring his offering, and it is comparable to obtaining atonement through the second animal, since he purchased the offering with it after misusing the first money, and the person who misused the property had already become liable to repay the principal and an additional fifth. By contrast, the principal and additional fifth from which he did not bring an offering are comparable to the first animal. In truth, however, this is not so. The person who misused the property did not misuse all the money [and this is also stated in the commentary attributed to Rashi], and the owner obtained atonement through the remaining money, with which he purchased his sin-offering. Certainly, this money is comparable to obtaining atonement through the first animal. The money owed for the misuse, which he should have combined with the other money but did not, is comparable to the second animal. The later authorities likewise cite this explanation in the name of Bikkurei Shlomo. We return to the words of the Tosafot. The Tosafot asked: We do not find an explicit source stating that Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagreed in a case where the owner obtained atonement through the first animal. If so, why did the Gemara not say that the first clause follows the opinion of Rabbi, and the latter clause follows the opinion of the Rabbis? We find explicitly that they disagreed about this matter, as explained above. The Tosafot considered answering that Rabbi and the Rabbis disagreed only when the first animal was not found until after the second animal had been designated. But if the first animal was found before the second was designated, Rabbi concedes that the second animal is left to graze. Rabbi Shimon, however, maintains that even if the first animal was found before the second was designated, the second animal must also die. It follows that Rabbi Shimon’s position is more extreme than Rabbi’s position; therefore, it is preferable to say that the first clause follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Before explaining the continuation of the Tosafot, we will present the words of Keren Ora. Keren Ora asks [and the Rashash raised the same question] that we do not find there, on page 15, that Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagreed in a case where the first animal was found before the second was designated, with Rabbi Shimon maintaining that even in this case it must die. Although this is not stated on page 15, the words of the Tosafot can nevertheless be understood as explained above: in all cases and circumstances, Rabbi Shimon maintains that a sin-offering whose owner obtained atonement through another offering must die. We return to the words of the Tosafot. This answer was not accepted. What difference does it make that Rabbi Shimon is more stringent than Rabbi in an entirely different matter? In the case under discussion, there is no practical difference between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi. The question therefore returns: Why did the Gemara not identify Rabbi as the tannaitic author of the first clause of the beraita? Rabbi stated this explicitly, whereas Rabbi Shimon did not state it explicitly [although he certainly holds this way]. Therefore, the Tosafot wrote in the name of Rabbi Meir that only Rabbi Shimon maintains this position and not Rabbi. Rabbi said that the second animal must die specifically when both animals are standing before us and one of them is offered. In that case, he actively rejected the second animal. If the person had come before us, we would have advised him to obtain atonement through the lost animal. [See Shita Mekubetzet and Birkat HaZevach.] Therefore, the second animal must die. But in our case, if he had wished, he could have combined the money owed for the misuse with the money of the sin-offering and brought a more valuable sin-offering. Since, by failing to do so and by not making the payment, he did not perform an act of rejection, Rabbi concedes that the money does not go into the Dead Sea but is transferred for voluntary offerings. Therefore, the Gemara did not say, “The first clause follows the opinion of Rabbi.” The case is different with regard to Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that even in such a case the second animal must die. Rabbi Shimon stated his ruling even in a case where the animal was not actively rejected—for example, when a person designated two sin-offerings, one as a backup for the other. In that case, he may offer whichever one he wishes, and the second is not rejected actively; nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the second animal must die. This is very similar to our case. Therefore, the Gemara said that the first and latter clauses depend specifically on the disagreement between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Finally, the Tosafot wrote that although the truth is that Rabbi Shimon maintains that the halakha transmitted to Moses at Sinai applies even when a person consecrates two animals as backups, this statement applies when he consecrated two animals. By contrast, when he consecrated two collections of money as backups, Rabbi Shimon concedes that the money does not have to be destroyed. The reason is that “his intention was only to bring one collection.” See the Tosafot in tractate Menahot [80a, s.v. Likadshu], Chazon Ish on Menahot [21:10], and the novellae of Rabbi Yitzhak Zev [Temura 15]. Rav Gavya from Bei Katil said to Rav Ashi: No! Indeed, this is what Abaye said: The first clause follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and the latter clause follows the opinion of the Rabbis. The discussion concerning the flesh of most sacred offerings that became impure and the sacrificial parts of lesser sanctity Earlier, we learned of the disagreement between Rav and Rabbi Yohanan regarding one who derives benefit from the ash heap: whether he has misused consecrated property or not. Rava explains that they disagreed only with regard to the ashes after they had been removed from the altar, since removing them constitutes a “Temple service” and is performed in the garments of the priesthood. Therefore, Rabbi Yohanan maintains that the offering’s mitzva is not completed until after the ashes are removed. This is not so with regard to other Temple services, as will be explained. Rava said: Everyone agrees that if one derives benefit from the flesh of most sacred offerings “ that became impure,”

Rav Gehiya of Bei

Katil said to Rav Ashi: Indeed!

Indeed,

so Abaye said: the first clause is Rabbi Shimon, and the latter clause is the Sages.

Tzon Kodashim, but not according to Hok Natan] that the case is one in which the flesh became impure before the sprinkling and one derived benefit from it after the sprinkling. The novelty of the ruling is according to Rabbi Akiva: although the flesh must be burned, and one might have thought that its mitzva was therefore not yet completed, nevertheless, the sprinkling was effective in removing it from the category of misuse of consecrated property. In summary: If the flesh became impure after the sprinkling, one does not misuse it. If it became impure before the sprinkling and one derived benefit from it after the sprinkling, then, according to Rava’s conclusion, one does not misuse it, whether only part of the flesh became impure or even all of it became impure. If it became impure before the sprinkling and one derived benefit from it before the sprinkling, one misuses it. The Tosafot asked: Even this contains no novelty, because Rabbi Akiva already taught us this law with regard to an offering taken outside its permitted area. Such an offering must also be burned, and nevertheless Rabbi Akiva did not say that the completion of its mitzva takes place through its burning. Rather, it takes place with the completion of the sprinkling, at the moment when it would have become permitted [had it been pure] for consumption by the priests. They answered that Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling only when part of the offering was taken outside, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yohanan [there]. It follows that the entire flesh is not subject to the mitzva of burning, and the sprinkling was effective at least with regard to the part that remained inside. By contrast, in the case of flesh that became impure, the case is one in which all the flesh became impure. Therefore, one might have thought that the sprinkling is ineffective, and that until the burning is completed, it remains within the category of “offerings of the Lord,” since it is still subject to a Temple service. Rava teaches us that this is not so. Even when all the flesh became impure [and the same applies when all of it was taken outside; see below in the name of Sefat Emet], it leaves the category of misuse of consecrated property immediately after the sprinkling. It is preferable for Rava to teach this novelty with regard to an offering that became impure because the primary biblical decree requiring the burning of disqualified offerings was stated with regard to an offering that became impure, as explained in the Gemara. Hok Natan, Rabbi Akiva Eiger, and the Rashash asked: How could the Tosafot say that when all of the offering was taken outside, or when all of it became impure, the sprinkling is effective according to Rabbi Akiva in removing it from the category of misuse of consecrated property? Rabbi Yohanan explicitly said that Rabbi Akiva concedes that when all of it was taken outside, the sprinkling is ineffective. The Rashash was not concerned by this question, since it is possible that Rava disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan. See the Shita Mekubetzet, which has the reading, “Ulla said.” [This requires further examination, since Rava or Ulla is now speaking according to the view of Rabbi Yohanan, as the Tosafot explained the phrase “everyone agrees” to mean that Rabbi Yohanan concedes to Rav.] Alternatively, Rabbi Yohanan may have made that statement only with regard to an offering that became disqualified through improper intention, was left over beyond its permitted time, or became impure, distinguishing there between the entire offering and part of it, but not with regard to misuse of consecrated property. In the responsa of Ahiezer, the words of the Tosafot are explained as follows: Rava’s statement does not contradict Rabbi Yohanan’s statement. Rabbi Yohanan is discussing a case in which all the flesh was taken outside while the sacrificial parts remained inside [see note 172]. The question there is whether the sprinkling is effective for the flesh, just as the sprinkling certainly is effective for the sacrificial parts. Rabbi Yohanan therefore teaches that if the sacrificial parts also went outside, so that the sprinkling is as though it had no effect, since it permits nothing, the sprinkling does not remove the flesh from the category of misuse of consecrated property even according to Rabbi Akiva. By contrast, in our passage Rava is discussing a case in which the sacrificial parts remained inside and did not become impure [as is also indicated by the straightforward wording of the Gemara: “the flesh of most sacred offerings that became impure”]. In that case, the sprinkling certainly was effective. The Tosafot wrote further: It is understandable that if part of the flesh did not become impure, and there is no mitzva to burn the flesh that did not become impure, so that it leaves the category of misuse of consecrated property, one does not misuse the offering, since the sprinkling was effective and the mitzva of part of the flesh had already been completed. But if all the flesh became impure before the sprinkling, and immediately after the sprinkling all the flesh became subject to the mitzva of burning, one might have thought that this flesh never entered the state of being permitted

The sugya of the flesh of most-sacred offerings that became impure, and the fats of lesser-sacred offerings

We learned above the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yohanan concerning one who benefited from the ash heap: whether he committed misuse or not .

And Rava explains that they disagreed only concerning ash after it had been removed, since through its removal an “act of Temple service” is performed, and it is performed in priestly garments. Therefore Rabbi Yohanan holds that its mitzva is not yet completed until after its removal, unlike other acts of Temple service, as will be explained.

Rava said:

Since the burning of the flesh of offerings of the highest degree of sanctity that became impure is not a “service,” the continuation of the burning of the sacrificial portions by means of “turning them with the fork” [turning them and bringing them closer to the fire with the implement designated for this purpose, so that they will be consumed properly] is likewise not a service, since it is done only to hasten their consumption by the fire; without turning them, they would also be consumed. This is unlike the removal of the ash, according to Rabbi Yohanan, for the removal itself is a “service.” And we object: Is this obvious! Why was it necessary to teach us this? What does he deprive the Temple treasury of? After all, one who benefits from them deprives the Temple treasury of nothing, since flesh of a sacred offering that became impure is fit neither for the priests nor for the altar , and its mitzva has already been performed. Similarly, with regard to the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, their mitzva has already been performed once they have been placed upon the fire. And we answer: Rava had to teach both laws, because each contains a novelty: One might have said that flesh of an offering of the highest degree of sanctity that became impure has a mitzva of burning for priests in the Temple, as the Torah says [Leviticus 7]: “And the flesh that touches anything impure shall not be eaten; it shall be burned in fire.” Therefore, one might have thought that it retains a degree of sanctity until after it is burned, and that one commits misuse with it.

Everyone agrees

that if one benefited from the flesh of most-sacred offerings

“that became impure,”

and

likewise if he benefited

from the fats of lesser-sacred offerings after he had placed them

on the altar fire,

he is exempt.

Because the burning of the flesh of most-sacred offerings that became impure is not an “act of Temple service.” Likewise, the continuation of the burning of the fats, through “turning with the fork” [turning them and bringing them near the fire, with the utensil designated for this, so that they will be consumed well], is not an act of Temple service, since it is done only to hasten their consumption in the fire; without the turning, they would also be consumed. This is unlike the removal of the ash, according to Rabbi Yohanan, where the removal itself is an “act of Temple service.”

And we object:

Is it obvious!

And why was it necessary to teach us this?

What does he cause to be lost?

After all, one who benefits from them causes nothing to be lost to the Temple treasury, since sacred flesh that became impure is fit neither for the priests nor for the altar , and their mitzva has already been performed. Likewise, as for the fats of lesser-sacred offerings, their mitzva has already been performed after they were placed upon the fire.

And we answer: Rava needed to teach both laws, because each one contains a novelty:

Lest you say: with regard to flesh of most-sacred offerings that became impure, there is a mitzva of burning for the priests

in the Temple, as the Torah said [Leviticus 7]: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten; it shall be burned in fire.” Therefore, one might have said that some sanctity remains in it until after its burning, and one commits misuse with it .

And likewise

the fats of lesser sanctity, there is a mitzva to turn them with the poker

so that they burn completely, and therefore there was room to say that their mitzva has not been performed until the completion of their burning in the fire.

Rava teaches us

that there is no misuse of them, for the reason explained above . The Gemara returns to the beraita that we learned above.

Rava said: That which you said,

what we learned in the beraita:

“The sin-offering has already been offered; let them go”

the money of the misuse

“to the Dead Sea”—these words

apply only in a case

where it became known to him

that he had committed misuse

before atonement,

before his sin-offering was offered, and he had the possibility of joining them to the money of the sin-offering,

but

if it became known to him that he had committed misuse

after atonement, let it fall

the money of his misuse

to a voluntary offering.

What is the reason? One does not initially set aside

ab initio

for loss,

so that the money should go to the Dead Sea.

This is not so when it became known to him before atonement: he set aside the money in order to join it, and it became “the money of a sin-offering.” And if in the end he did not join it, for whatever reason, and now he cannot join it because he has already offered the sin-offering, it goes to the Dead Sea, according to the law of a sin-offering whose owner obtained atonement through another.

Mishna:

Our Mishna is a continuation of the preceding Mishnayot.

A. All sacred offerings have the law of misuse from the time they were consecrated through verbal sanctification.

B. From the time they were consecrated with bodily sanctity, they became fit to be rendered unfit by contact with one who immersed that day, by contact with one lacking atonement, and through remaining overnight.

C. From the time the permitting rites were performed, one becomes liable on their account if he ate them in the prohibition of piggul, notar, or impurity.

The Mishna before us teaches the law of offerings that differ from all other offerings in that they have no “permitting rites.”

For whereas all the offerings taught in the preceding Mishnayot have a service that “permits” them—for example, with a sin-offering, a guilt-offering, and peace-offerings, there is the sprinkling of the blood that permits the fats for burning, and there is the burning of the fats that permits the flesh for eating. Before the sprinkling of the blood it is forbidden to burn, and before the burning it is forbidden to eat the flesh. And similarly with the bird olah, the animal olah, and the burned bulls and goats: the sprinkling of their blood permits the fats for burning. And with the two loaves, the sprinkling of the blood of the sheep permits them for eating. And with the showbread, the removal of the frankincense bowls permits it for eating. And with meal-offerings, the burning of the handful permits the remainder of the meal-offering for the priests to eat.

But those taught in our Mishna are themselves burned, but they have no other “permitting rite” that permits them.

Therefore, these matters differ in two laws.

The first is that one is liable on their account for notar and impurity immediately when they were consecrated with bodily sanctity. And in the beraita in the Gemara, this is expounded from a scriptural exposition.

The second is that there is no liability for piggul at all on their account. The reason will be explained further on.

This Mishna and the Gemara upon it until the end of the chapter are brought in several places in the Talmud, and will be explained according to Rashi’s commentary [Shevuot 11; Zevahim 45].

The handful,

of the meal-offering of an individual,

and the frankincense

of the meal-offering of an individual [which comes with most meal-offerings],

and the incense, and the meal-offering of priests,

which is entirely burned upon the altar and is not taken by handful,

and the meal-offering of the anointed priest,

the griddle meal-offering that the high priest brings every day, half in the morning and half in the evening,

and the libation meal-offering,

which comes with the animal—thirteen tenths for a bull, two tenths for a ram, and one tenth for a lamb , all three of these meal-offerings are not taken by handful, but are burned entirely upon the fires,

there is misuse of them from

the time

that they were consecrated

with verbal sanctity, like all sacred offerings of which there is misuse immediately when they are consecrated.

And when

they consecrated

in a vessel,

when they brought them into the Temple courtyard and placed them in a service vessel,

it became fit

its sanctity was completed

to be rendered unfit by

contact with

one who immersed that day, and by

contact with

one lacking atonement, and

they are rendered unfit

through remaining overnight.

And one is liable on its account for notar and for impurity,

from the time of their consecration with bodily sanctity, since they have no permitting rites.

The handful and the frankincense have no permitting rites; rather, on the contrary, they are what permit the meal-offering. The incense and the three meal-offerings have no permitting rites because they have no remainder, and they themselves are burned entirely.

And there is no piggul in them.

For the law of piggul was stated in the Torah [Leviticus 7] with regard to peace-offerings, and the other offerings are learned from it. And we expound [Zevahim 45a]: Just as peace-offerings are distinctive in that they have permitting rites—the sprinkling of the blood permits the fats for burning, and the fats permit the flesh for eating—so too, anyone that has permitting rites, whether for a person or for the altar, one is liable on their account for piggul. And from here we learn that for something that has no permitting rites, one is not liable on its account for piggul.

This is the general rule: Anything that has permitting rites, one is not liable on its account for piggul, notar, or impurity until the

permitting rites have been performed.

And anything that has no permitting rites,

such as those taught in our Mishna,

once he consecrated

them

with

the sanctity of

a

service vessel,

one is liable on its account for notar and impurity.

But there is no piggul in it

at all, as explained above.