Meilah 19b (יט:) — the Talmud in English

But other consecrated items, such as consecrated property for the maintenance of the Temple, leave the category of unconsecrated property from the time of the first meila, as explained [above, 18b]: “There is meila nowhere except through a change,” whereby it is changed from its sanctity .

Rabbi says: Anything that has no redemption [

Another version:

that has no defect ]

that is, its defect is not considered significant, because it is not disqualified on account of it, since it is not intended for redemption,

is subject to successive misuse.

Apparently, Rabbi is referring to an animal and to a sacred vessel, neither of which is intended for redemption. The Gemara will explain in what way he disagrees with the first tanna.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that sacred vessels, like an unblemished animal, are subject to successive misuse.

The Gemara explains that this statement does not reflect the view of all the tannaim. Rather,

whose view is reflected in the Mishna,

in accordance with whose opinion was the Mishna taught?

It is the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya.

As it was taught,

as we learned in a beraita:

There is no successive misuse

with consecrated property that has redemption,

except in the case of an animal alone,

whose sanctity is intrinsic sanctity, and which has no redemption [when it is unblemished], since it serves only as a sacrificial offering. But sacred vessels have redemption; therefore, when one misuses them, they leave the domain of consecration, and the second person does not commit misuse. This is the opinion of the first tanna.

Rabbi Neḥemya says:

There is no successive misuse except in the case of

an animal and a sacred vessel,

even though a sacred vessel can be redeemed. Nevertheless, it is subject to successive misuse. The reason will be explained.

The Gemara explains the reason for their dispute:

What is the reason of the first tanna ?

He holds that

the law of misuse

is written with regard to an animal.

That is, the Torah revealed that an animal is subject to successive misuse, and we may derive this only with regard to an animal.

As it is written

in the passage concerning misuse [Leviticus 5]: “He shall repay that which he sinned against from the sacred property, add its fifth to it, and give it to the priest; and the priest shall atone for him with the ram of the guilt-offering, and he shall be forgiven.” The phrase stated by the Torah,

“with the ram of the guilt-offering,”

is superfluous, since it was already stated [in the preceding verse]: “He shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord, an unblemished ram from the flock, according to your valuation in silver shekels, by the sacred shekel, as a guilt-offering.” Rather, it comes to teach us to expound that specifically “with the ram of the guilt-offering”—that is, a sacrifice fit to be offered—is subject to successive misuse, but nothing else, not even a sacred vessel.

And Rabbi Neḥemya could have said to you:

Indeed, the law is so with regard to an animal, but one should derive by means of a

kal va-homer: If

the sanctity of a sacred vessel is so severe that

it brings other things to sanctity,

as explained in tractate Zevaḥim [87b], that sacred vessels sanctify whatever enters them, then

itself,

the sacred vessel,

all the more so

should it not leave the domain of consecration through misuse! And although it has redemption, nevertheless it does not leave the domain of consecration through misuse .

We learned in our Mishna: Rabbi says:

“Anything that has no redemption is subject to successive misuse.”

The Gemara explains in what way Rabbi disagrees with the first tanna. And we challenge this: Rabbi’s statement

is identical,

exactly like the statement of

the first tanna.

For anything that has no redemption is everything possessing intrinsic sanctity, and the first tanna already said that such items are subject to successive misuse. In what way, then, does Rabbi’s statement differ? And we answer:

Rava said: The practical difference between them is

wood.

Indeed, with regard to the law of misuse there is no difference between Rabbi and the first tanna; rather, Rabbi came to include “wood,” as will be explained.

Rabbi holds in tractate Menaḥot [106b] that wood donated for the purpose of the wood for the altar fire has the complete sanctity of a sacrifice. Therefore, according to his view, Rabbi said, “Anything that has no redemption,” in order to include even wood for the altar fire, which is subject to successive misuse. The first tanna, however, holds that it does not have the sanctity of a sacrifice, and therefore it leaves the domain of consecration through misuse .

The Sages taught: One who says,

“It is incumbent upon me

to bring

wood

for the altar,”

may not bring fewer than two logs,

two large pieces of wood.

Rabbi says: Wood is a sacrifice, and requires salt,

just as sacrifices are salted,

and requires waving ,

as is done with sacrifices.

And we discuss this:

Rava said: According to Rabbi, wood

that was donated

requires wood

from other consecrated sources with which to burn it, like other sacrifices.

And Rav Pappa said: According to Rabbi, wood requires kemitza,

that is, one pulverizes it into fine pieces of wood until he takes a handful from it .

And it is with regard to this wood that Rabbi said in our Mishna: “Anything that has no redemption is subject to successive misuse.”

This is Rava’s interpretation of the phrase “the practical difference between them” in our Mishna.

Whereas

Rav Pappa said: The practical difference between them concerns unblemished consecrated offerings of the altar that became blemished,

and one derived benefit from them while they were still alive .

Rabbi follows his own position, that their sanctity is like intrinsic sanctity, as will be explained; therefore, they are subject to successive misuse. Accordingly, he said, “Anything that has no redemption is subject to successive misuse.” The first tanna, by contrast, holds that their sanctity is merely the sanctity of property consecrated for Temple maintenance, and when one misuses them, they leave the domain of consecration and are not subject to successive misuse.

But was it not taught,

as we learned in a beraita:

Unblemished consecrated offerings of the altar that became blemished,

and it is prohibited to slaughter them without redemption,

but he proceeded to slaughter them, Rabbi says:

Since with regard to blemished consecrated offerings we require “standing and valuation” in order to redeem them, as it is stated [Leviticus 27]: “He shall have the animal stand before the priest, and the priest shall value it,” and since it is impossible to have them stand once they have already been slaughtered, they have no remedy through redemption. Therefore,

they shall be buried,

like other disqualified consecrated offerings.

And the Sages say: They shall be redeemed,

and standing and valuation are not required.

Now, Rabbi follows his own position, that their sanctity is intrinsic sanctity. The first tanna agrees with the Sages, that since they have redemption, their sanctity is not intrinsic sanctity. Therefore, they disagree with Rabbi and maintain that the animals leave the domain of consecration through misuse, like other property possessing monetary sanctity.

Mishna:

If one took

a stone or a beam belonging to consecrated property,

but derived no benefit from it and did not cause it any loss of value,

he has not committed misuse.

The Gemara explains that this refers to a treasurer to whom the stone and the beam were entrusted, and they do not leave the domain of consecration through his taking them, because by taking them he does not remove them from the domain of consecrated property. For as long as they are in the treasurer’s possession, they remain in the domain of consecrated property —