Meilah 12a — the Talmud in English

The removal of ashes of

the outer altar

—the Torah established its place,

as it is written concerning it: “

And they shall place it beside the altar,”

but concerning the ashes of

the inner altar, from where do we know

that its place is there, in the place of the ashes?

And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar said,

for the verse says, “

And he shall remove its crop with its feathers, and cast it beside the altar eastward, to the place of the ashes.”

And we expound:

If what the Torah said, “to the place of the ashes,”

is not applicable

to the

teaching us

concerning the

ashes of

the outer altar,

since it has already been stated concerning it, “And they shall place it beside the altar” [and this will be explained below],

apply it

—it has come to teach

concerning the

ashes of

the inner altar.

For this is the method in the Torah: if it is not applicable to this matter, apply it to another matter resembling it.

And we challenge: The exposition is still not explained, because

say

—it is possible to say that

both this and that

the two verses speak

about the

ashes of

the outer altar.

For from what is stated, “And they shall place it beside the altar,” it is still not clear in which place beside the altar they shall place it, in its west or in its east. Therefore the Torah wrote, “to the place of the ashes,”

and

in order

to establish its place

on the “east” of the ramp; and it is stated: this comes to teach, and it is found to be learned.

And from where do we know that the ashes of the inner altar were also placed there, in that same place?

And we answer:

If so

, that the Torah came to teach us only about establishing the place of the removal of ashes of the outer altar,

let the verse say

—it would have been sufficient if the verse had said

“beside the altar”

, and we would have expounded a gzerah shavah, “beside” and “beside.” Here it says “beside,” and concerning the ashes of the outer altar it says “beside” [“And they shall place it beside the altar”]; and this would have been enough to teach us that there is the place for placing the removal of the outer altar’s ashes.

What

—why did the Torah add and say, “to the place of

the ashes”?

Rather, the verse came to teach us

that even

the ashes of

the inner altar

also have their place there.

And the Gemara continues to discuss:

We find

that we have found an exposition

for the inner altar,

but concerning the ashes of

the menorah, from where do we know

that their place is also there?

And we answer:

“Ashes,” “the ashes.”

That is, the fact that the Torah added the definite article and said “the ashes,” although it would have been sufficient to say “ashes”—from the extra letter we include also the ashes of the menorah.

Mishna:

We learned in the previous Mishna: “Turtledoves that have not reached their time, and young pigeons whose time has passed, one may not derive benefit from them and there is no misuse of consecrated property with them.”

And Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this.

Rabbi Shimon says: With turtledoves that have not reached their time there is misuse of consecrated property,

and the reason will be explained in the Gemara,

but

with young pigeons whose time has passed, one may not derive benefit from them and there is no misuse of consecrated property

with them.

Like the words of the first tanna.

Gemara: The Gemara

discusses the reason for the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages. The Gemara wishes to compare Rabbi Shimon’s words concerning turtledoves that have not reached their time with his words concerning “slaughtered outside.” For one who slaughters or offers sacrifices outside the Temple [Leviticus 17] is liable for karet.

When does this apply? To offerings fit to be brought inside. But offerings that are not fit to be brought inside, such as an animal that copulated with a person, an animal that was the object of bestiality, and all the others, if he offers them outside as a sacrifice, he is exempt. For it is stated [there], in the section concerning offerings slaughtered outside: “And he has not brought it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to offer it as an offering to the Lord before the dwelling-place of the Lord”; and we expound: anyone who is not fit before the dwelling-place of the Lord is not subject to liability for it.

There [Zevahim 112b] the Mishna discusses valid offerings, except that at present it is not the time for offering them, and he slaughters them outside. For example: “this one and its offspring,” one of which was already slaughtered today, and it is forbidden to slaughter the second; or one whose time is lacking, which is every animal within seven days of its birth, and it is forbidden to offer it, as it is stated [Exodus 22]: “Seven days it shall be with its mother.” Rabbi Shimon holds: although he is not liable for karet, since they are not fit today, nevertheless, since they will be fit later, he violates a prohibition. For it is stated [Deuteronomy 12]: “You shall not do according to all that we are doing here today, each man all that is right in his eyes.” And there [114a] his exposition from this verse for the prohibition concerning one whose time is lacking is explained. But the Sages disagree with him and do not expound this exposition; they hold: whatever does not involve karet does not involve a prohibition.

And the Gemara clarifies:

Granted, Rabbi Shimon

, his reason is explained—why is there misuse of consecrated property with turtledoves that have not reached their time?

As the reason is taught

, as we learned [there]:

“For Rabbi Shimon would say: Anything that is fit to be brought later

is subject to a prohibition, but does not involve karet.”

And since if he

slaughters them

outside he violates a prohibition, then they possess significance with regard to there being misuse of consecrated property with them,

But, according to the Rabbis

, even if they hold that one who slaughters one whose time is lacking outside does not violate a prohibition,

nevertheless it is difficult:

what is different

—what is different about the law of these turtledoves

from one whose time is lacking

, concerning which they are certainly consecrated and there is misuse of consecrated property with them , even when their time has not arrived—and why is there no misuse of consecrated property with turtledoves whose time has not arrived? And we answer:

They say!

One cannot compare turtledoves whose time has not arrived to one whose time is lacking among animals, for

one whose time is lacking

has misuse of consecrated property with it,

as is the case with an animal with a blemish

, just as there is misuse of consecrated property with an animal with a blemish,

And why is there misuse of consecrated property with an animal with a blemish?

For

it is

redeemable

, since its law is that it is to be redeemed, and its money will fall to voluntary offerings, to purchase another offering with it; therefore it has sanctity of value.

The same is true of one whose time is lacking: since if a blemish falls upon it, it can be redeemed, it follows that it has, at any rate, sanctity of value.

But these birds

, turtledoves whose time has not arrived, now are not fit for sanctity of the body, and they are also not fit for sanctity of value,

since a blemish does not disqualify birds

; therefore

birds have no redemption ,

Therefore, there is no misuse of consecrated property with them.

The Gemara brings a dispute between Ulla and Rav Hisda. It relates to the law of “turtledoves whose time has not arrived and young pigeons whose time has passed.” The main matter was already taught above, at the beginning of the tractate.

Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Consecrated animals that died

, since they are going to be lost and are not fit even for redemption,

have left the status of misuse of consecrated property by Torah law

, because they are not “holy things of the Lord.” Rather, there is misuse of consecrated property with them by rabbinic law. One who derives benefit from them pays only the principal.

He sat

, Ulla

and

said this teaching

, and stated this tradition.

Rav Hisda said to him: Who will listen to you

—who will listen to you—

and to Rabbi Yohanan, your teacher!

For how is it possible to say that there is no misuse of consecrated property with them by Torah law?

But is the sanctity

, the sanctity of misuse of consecrated property,

that

was

in them

before they died,

where did it go?

He said to him

—Ulla said to Rav Hisda: According to your words,

you raise a difficulty from the Mishna,

as we learned in our Mishna:

“Turtledoves whose time has not arrived and young pigeons whose time has passed, one may not derive benefit from them”

—it is rabbinically forbidden to derive benefit from them—

“and there is no misuse of consecrated property”

with them at all, not even by rabbinic law, and one who derives benefit from them does not pay even the principal!

And now, according to your words, Rav Hisda,

here too

concerning young pigeons whose time has passed,

let us say

—and should you say:

“Where did the sanctity that was in them go!?”

He said to him

, Rav Hisda to Ulla:

I concede to you

—I admit to you—

that

with consecrated animals that died there is no misuse of consecrated property by Torah law, but

there is misuse of consecrated property by rabbinic law,

But

I find it difficult

concerning Rabbi Yohanan’s words, who stated categorically, “consecrated animals that died,” implying that with all consecrated animals the law is that “there is misuse of consecrated property by rabbinic law,” even with “lesser holy things.”

And regarding these matters it is difficult for me:

Is there such a thing

that is, is it possible,

at the outset

that at its beginning

there is no me'ila in it,

even rabbinically,

and at the end

after they have died,

there is me'ila in it?!

And what Rav Hisda said, “And the sanctity that was in them—where did it go?”—he intended to say: And the sanctity that it did “not” have—where did it go? Who brought upon it the sanctity of me'ila after its death?

And we challenge this:

Is it not so?!

Have we indeed not found something that at its beginning has no me'ila at all, and at its end has me'ila?!

And here is blood: at the outset there is no me'ila

in it

and at the end there is me'ila

in it

,

as we learned,

as we learned above [11a]:

At first, one does not commit me'ila with blood; once it has gone out to the Kidron Valley, one commits me'ila with it,

rabbinically.

And we answer:

They say:

There is no proof from blood, for

there,

with blood,

there is also me'ila at the outset,

at its beginning, from the time of its consecration, one commits me'ila with it.