Meilah 12a (יב.) — the Talmud in English

The removal of the ashes of

the outer Altar

: the Torah established its place,

as it is written concerning it: “

And he shall place it beside the Altar,”

But concerning the ashes of

the inner Altar, from where do we know

that their place is there, in the ash-removal site?

And we answer:

Rabbi Elazar said,

as the verse states: “

And he shall remove its crop with its feathers, and cast it beside the Altar eastward, to the place of the ashes.”

And we expound:

If

what the Torah said, “to the place of the ashes,”

is not applicable

and was not stated to teach us

about

the ashes of

the outer Altar,

since it was already stated concerning it, “And he shall place it beside the Altar” [as will be explained below],

apply it

—it comes to teach

about

the ashes of

the inner Altar.

For this is the method of exposition in the Torah: if a verse is not applicable to one matter, apply it to another similar matter.

And we object: The exposition is still not explained, for

perhaps

it is possible to say that

both one and the other

the two verses speak

about

the ashes of

the outer Altar.

For from what is stated, “And he shall place it beside the Altar,” it is still unclear at which place beside the Altar they should place it—on its western side or on its eastern side. Therefore, the Torah wrote, “to the place of the ashes,”

and

in order

to establish its place

on the “eastern” side of the ramp. And it is said: This verse comes to teach, and the matter is thereby learned .

And from where do we know that the ashes of the inner Altar were also placed there, in that same location?

And we answer:

If so,

if the Torah came to teach us only about establishing the place of the removal of the ashes of the outer Altar,

let the verse say

it would have sufficed for the verse to say

“beside the Altar,”

and we would have derived a gzera shava “beside”–“beside.” Here it says “beside,” and concerning the ashes of the outer Altar it says “beside” [“And he shall place it beside the Altar”]; and that would suffice to teach us that this is the place for placing the ashes removed from the outer Altar.

What

is the reason that the Torah added and said, “to the place of

the ashes”?

Rather, the verse comes to teach us

that even

the ashes of

the inner Altar

also have their place there.

And the Gemara continues its discussion:

We have found

an exposition

for the inner Altar,

but concerning the ashes of

the Menora, from where do we know

that their place is also there?

And we answer:

“Ashes,” “the ashes.”

That is, the fact that the Torah added the definite article and said “the ashes,” when it would have sufficed to say “ashes,” teaches by means of the superfluous letter that this also includes the ashes of the Menora.

Mishna:

We learned in the previous Mishna: “Turtledoves that have not yet reached the required age, and young pigeons whose time has passed, one may not derive benefit from them, and there is no misuse of consecrated property with them.”

And Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this.

Rabbi Shimon says: With turtledoves that have not yet reached the required age, there is misuse of consecrated property,

and the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

But

with young pigeons whose time has passed, one may not derive benefit from them, and there is no misuse of consecrated property

with them,

in accordance with the view of the first tanna.

Gemara: The Gemara discusses the reason for the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages. The Gemara seeks to compare Rabbi Shimon’s ruling concerning turtledoves that have not yet reached the required age with his ruling concerning “slaughtered outside” offerings. For one who slaughters or offers sacrifices outside the Temple [Leviticus 17] is liable to karet.

What are the circumstances in which this applies? It applies to offerings fit to be brought inside. But for offerings that are unfit to be brought inside, such as an animal that mated with a person, an animal that was the object of bestiality, and all the others, if one offered them outside as a sacrifice, he is exempt. For it is stated [there], in the passage concerning offerings slaughtered outside: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord.” And we expound: For anything that is not fit to be offered before the Tabernacle of the Lord, one is not liable.

There [Zevaḥim 112b], the Mishna discusses valid offerings whose time for offering has not yet arrived, and one slaughtered them outside. For example, an animal and its offspring, one of which had already been slaughtered that day, so it was prohibited to slaughter the second; or an animal that is “lacking time,” meaning any animal within seven days of its birth, which may not be offered, as it is stated [Exodus 22]: “It shall be with its mother for seven days.” Rabbi Shimon holds that although one is not liable to karet, since they are not fit to be offered today, nevertheless, since they are fit to be offered later, one violates a prohibition. For it is stated [Deuteronomy 12]: “You shall not do according to all that we do here today, each person whatever is right in his eyes.” And there [114a], his exposition of this verse as establishing a prohibition concerning an animal lacking time is explained. The Sages, however, disagree with him and do not expound this verse in that manner, and they hold: Whatever does not involve karet does not involve a prohibition.

And the Gemara clarifies:

Granted, with regard to Rabbi Shimon,

his reason is clear: Why is there misuse of consecrated property with turtledoves that have not yet reached the required age?

As the reason is taught,

as we learned [there]:

For Rabbi Shimon would say: Anything fit to be brought after its time

is subject to a prohibition, but there is no liability for karet.

And since if he

slaughtered them

outside he violated a prohibition, they possess significance with regard to there being misuse of consecrated property with them.

But, according to the Sages, even if they hold that one who slaughters an animal lacking time outside does not violate a prohibition,

nevertheless, this is difficult:

In what way is it different,

what is different about the status of these turtledoves,

from an animal lacking time,

which are certainly consecrated and there is misuse of consecrated property with them ,

even when their time has not yet arrived? Why, then, is there no misuse of consecrated property with turtledoves that have not yet reached the required age? And we answer:

They said: There is no comparison between turtledoves that have not yet reached the required age and an animal lacking time, because

an animal lacking time

is subject to misuse of consecrated property,

just as is the case with a blemished animal—just as there is misuse of consecrated property with a blemished animal,

For it is subject to redemption: Since its status is that it must be redeemed, and its value will be allocated for a freewill offering, to purchase another offering with it, it therefore possesses sanctity of value. The same applies to an animal lacking time: Since, if it develops a blemish, it can be redeemed, it follows that it possesses, at least, sanctity of value. But these birds, turtledoves that have not yet reached the required age, at present are unfit for sanctity of the body, and they are also unfit for sanctity of value, since a blemish does not disqualify birds. Therefore , birds cannot be redeemed , Therefore, there is no misuse of consecrated property with them. The Gemara cites a dispute between Ulla and Rav Ḥisda. It is relevant to the law of “turtledoves that have not yet reached the required age and young pigeons whose time has passed.” The main points were already taught above, at the beginning of the tractate. Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Consecrated animals that died, since they are headed for destruction and are not fit even for redemption, are removed from the category of misuse of consecrated property by Torah law, because they are no longer “property consecrated to the Lord.” Rather, misuse of consecrated property applies to them by rabbinic law, and one who derives benefit from them pays only the principal . He sat, meaning, Ulla sat, and stated this teaching, and said this halakhic teaching. Rav Ḥisda said to him: Who will listen to you who will listen to you For how can one say that there is no misuse of consecrated property with them by Torah law? And did the sanctity the sanctity that gives rise to misuse of consecrated property, that was in them before they died, go somewhere? He said to him Ulla said to Rav Ḥisda: According to your words, a difficulty arises from the Mishna, as we learned in our Mishna: “Turtledoves that have not yet reached the required age and young pigeons whose time has passed, one may not derive benefit from them,” it is rabbinically prohibited to derive benefit from them, “and there is no misuse of consecrated property” with them at all, not even by rabbinic law, and one who derives benefit from them does not pay even the principal!

just as is an animal with a permanent defect,

just as there is misuse of consecrated property involving an animal with a permanent defect.

And why is there misuse of consecrated property involving an animal with a permanent defect?

For

it is

subject to redemption: Since its law is that it is to be redeemed, and its value is used for a voluntary offering to purchase another offering, it has sanctity of monetary value.

The same applies to an animal whose time has not arrived: Since, if it develops a defect, it can be redeemed, it follows that it possesses, at least, sanctity of monetary value.

But

these birds—

turtledoves whose proper age has not arrived—at present are unfit for bodily sanctity, and they are also unfit for sanctity of monetary value,

since a defect does not disqualify birds.

Therefore,

birds cannot be redeemed .

Therefore, there is no misuse of consecrated property involving them.

The Gemara brings the disagreement between Ulla and Rav Ḥisda. It is relevant to the law of “turtledoves whose proper age has not arrived and young doves whose proper age has passed.” The substance of the discussion was already taught above, at the beginning of the tractate.

And now, according to your words, Rav Ḥisda,

here too ,

in the case of young pigeons whose time has passed,

let us say,

and should you say: “Where did the sanctity that was in them go!?”

He said to him

Rav Ḥisda said to Ulla:

I concede to you

I agree with you

that in the case of consecrated animals that died there is no misuse of consecrated property by Torah law; rather, there is misuse of consecrated property by rabbinic law,

—who will accept your statement—

and to your teacher Rabbi Yoḥanan!

For how can it be said that there is no misuse of consecrated property involving them by Torah law?

And is it possible that the sanctity

—the sanctity that creates liability for misuse of consecrated property—

which

was

But

I find this difficult

concerning Rabbi Yoḥanan’s unequivocal statement, “Consecrated animals that died,” which implies that in the case of all consecrated animals the law is that “there is misuse of consecrated property by rabbinic law,” even in the case of “minor-grade consecrated property” ,

Ulla said to him

—to Rav Ḥisda: According to your words,

the Mishna presents a difficulty,

as we learned in our Mishna:

“Turtledoves whose proper age has not arrived and young doves whose proper age has passed, one may not derive benefit

from them; it is prohibited by rabbinic law to derive benefit from them,

but there is no misuse of consecrated property”

involving them at all, not even by rabbinic law, and one who derives benefit from them does not pay even the principal!

Now, according to your words, Rav Ḥisda,

here too

in the case of young doves whose proper age has passed,

let us say

—should you say:

“Where did the sanctity in them go?”

Rav Ḥisda said to him

—to Ulla:

I agree with you.

I concede to you

that

with consecrated animals that died there is no misuse of consecrated property by Torah law; rather,

there is misuse of consecrated property by rabbinic law.

But

I find a difficulty

with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s unequivocal statement, “Consecrated animals that died,” which implies that this law—that there is rabbinic misuse of consecrated property—applies to all consecrated animals, even “lesser sanctity” .

And regarding these matters I have difficulty:

Can there really be such a case

that is, is it possible,

initially

at the beginning,

there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property

even by rabbinic law,

but ultimately

after they die,

there is liability for misuse of consecrated property?! And when Rav Hisda said, “Where did the sanctity that they had go?” he meant: Where did the sanctity that they did not have go? Who caused them to acquire the sanctity that creates liability for misuse of consecrated property after their death?

And we raise an objection:

And we challenge this:

Is that not so?!

Have we not found something that initially has no liability for misuse of consecrated property at all, but ultimately does have such liability?!

Consider the blood, which initially has no liability

in it

but ultimately does have liability

in it

for misuse of consecrated property,

as we learned,

as we learned above [11a]:

Initially, one is not liable for misuse of the blood; once it leaves for the Kidron Valley, one is liable for its misuse,

by rabbinic law.

And they answer:

They say:

There is no proof from the blood, because

there

in the case of the blood,

there is also liability for misuse of consecrated property initially,

from the beginning, from the time it is consecrated, one is liable for its misuse.