Meilah 11b — the Talmud in English

Behold the offering of the ashes,

for every day he gathers [coals] with a coal-pan, and removes the ashes from upon the altar, and places them at the east of the ramp,

whose

mitzva has been performed, and there is misuse ,

as it is stated in the passage of the offering of the ashes [Leviticus 6], “And he shall place it beside the altar.” It implies that there is the place of its storage, and there it is absorbed in its place. It is proven that the ashes themselves, which were removed, are forbidden for benefit; and since, on account of their sanctity, they are forbidden for benefit, they also have the law of misuse]].

Do you have a thing whose mitzva has been performed, and yet there is misuse in it ?

And we answer: Indeed, there is misuse in the offering of the ashes after its mitzva has been performed, but we do not learn from it,

because it is the offering of the ashes and the limbs of the sent-away goat

to Azazel, which are forbidden for benefit even after their mitzva has been performed, as will be explained,

two verses that come as one, and every two verses that come as one do not teach

—we do not learn from it. For if the Torah wished us to learn from them, why did it write both of them? Let it write one of them, and we would learn the other from it]].

But regarding the other sacred things, indeed, we have not found a thing whose mitzva has been performed and yet there is misuse in it.

In tractate Yoma [67a], the Sages disputed concerning those limbs of the sent-away goat on the Day of Atonement, after it was sent to Azazel, whether they are permitted for benefit or forbidden. The one who says they are permitted derives it from what the Torah said in the passage of the Day of Atonement [Leviticus 16], “And he shall send the goat into the wilderness.” The word “wilderness” is superfluous, to expound from it: it is ownerless like the wilderness—that is, it is permitted for benefit. And the one who says they are forbidden derives it from what the Torah said there, “to a land of decree,” expounding it from the language of “matter and prohibition”; that is, they are forbidden for benefit]].

Therefore, we ask:

Granted,

the answer that we gave—“It is the offering of the ashes and the sent-away goat, two verses that come as one and do not teach”—is satisfactory

according to the one who says: The limbs of the sent-away goat may not be benefited from,

but according to the one who says:

the limbs of the sent-away goat

may be benefited from, what is there to say?

The question returns: How did we answer, “Do you have a thing whose mitzva has been performed and there is misuse in it?” Behold, the offering of the ashes has had its mitzva performed, and there is misuse in it]]?

And we answer:

Because it is the offering of the ashes and the priestly garments,

the four white garments in which the priest entered the Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement, which require everlasting storage, and a common priest may not serve in them throughout the year, nor may the High Priest wear them on another Day of Atonement. For it is stated [there], “And he shall remove the linen garments and leave them there,” and we expound: this teaches that they required storage,

and they are

two verses that come as one.

And every two verses that come as one do not teach.

But the Sages also disputed regarding the priestly garments, whether they are permitted for benefit. The Sages hold, as above, that they require storage, and consequently they are forbidden for benefit. Whereas Rabbi Dosa holds that what the Torah said, “and leave them there,” comes only to teach “that the High Priest should not use them on another Day of Atonement”; but for the use of a common priest during the other days of the year—and they are precisely the four garments of a common priest—they are permitted. And since they are permitted for the use of a common priest, there is no misuse in them, because “the Torah was not given to ministering angels”; that is, the Torah did not say that a common priest must remove them immediately upon completing his service [Yoma 61]].

Therefore, we ask:

Granted,

the answer that we gave—“It is the offering of the ashes and the priestly garments, two verses that come as one and do not teach”—is satisfactory

according to the Rabbis, who say:

what the Torah said,

“and leave them there,”

teaches that they require storage—properly,

the priestly garments are a thing whose mitzva has been performed and in which there is misuse,

but according to Rabbi Dosa, who says: They are permitted to a common priest ,

it is difficult:

what is there to say?

The question returns: If so, we have found only the offering of the ashes, which is a thing whose mitzva has been performed and in which there is misuse . And we answer:

Because it is the offering of the ashes and the heifer whose neck is broken,

which too is forbidden for benefit after its neck has been broken in the wadi, even though its mitzva has been performed. For it is stated in the passage of the heifer whose neck is broken [Deuteronomy 21], “And they shall break its neck there.” From the fact that the Torah said “there,” we expound: “There shall be its burial” [“There shall be its storage”], to say that it is forbidden for benefit]].

And they are

two verses that come as one, and every two verses that come as one do not teach .

And we ask:

Granted,

these answers are satisfactory

according to the one who says:

every two verses that come as one

do not teach, but according to the one who says [Sanhedrin 67b]: two verses that come as one

do teach a general rule

teach,

it is difficult:

what is there to say? Why should we not learn from them the law of misuse even in a thing whose mitzva has been performed? And the question returns regarding blood: why should we not expound, “Just as before atonement there is misuse in it, so after atonement there is misuse in it,” although its mitzva has already been performed, just as there is misuse in the offering of the ashes and in the heifer whose neck is broken even after their mitzva has been performed]]?

Why should we not derive from them that misuse applies even to an item whose mitzva has been performed? The question concerning blood returns as well: Why should we not expound, “Just as before atonement misuse applies to it, so too after atonement misuse applies to it,” despite the fact that its mitzva has already been performed, just as misuse applies to the removed ashes and the calf whose neck is broken even after their mitzvot have been performed?

And we answer: Even according to the one who says “they teach,” here they do not teach, because

two exclusions are written,

in two exclusions—the one in the passage of the heifer whose neck is broken and the other in the passage of the offering of the ashes—the Torah excludes them, to tell us that we should not learn from them.

It is written there,

regarding the heifer whose neck is broken:

“the one whose neck was broken,”

with a superfluous heh, to teach us: this one is forbidden for benefit after its mitzva has been performed, but not another.

And it is written there,

in the passage of the offering of the ashes:

“And he shall place it beside the altar,”

where it could have written “and there beside the altar”; and it comes to teach us: this one is forbidden for benefit and there is misuse in it after its mitzva has been performed, but not another]].

Therefore:

these,

these two—the offering of the ashes and the heifer whose neck is broken—

do

indeed remain forbidden for benefit even after the completion of their mitzvot, whereas

anything else,

such as blood after its mitzva has been performed,

does not,

it is not forbidden for benefit by Torah law. And since this is so, we expound “it”: “Just as after atonement there is no misuse in it, so before atonement there is no misuse in it.”]]

We learned in our Mishna:

The libations at first have misuse in them; once they have descended to the channels, there is no misuse in them .

The Gemara clarifies:

Let us say

—shall we say that

our Mishna is not

that

of Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok?

For it was taught,

we learned a

beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok says: There was a small opening

between the ramp and the altar,

on the western side of the ramp. And so that the channels would not become filled with the libations,

So that the channels would not become filled with the libations,

once every seventy years,

the

young priests

[children]

would descend through it

until they reached the channels,

and would bring

congealed wine,

which had spoiled and congealed,

which was similar to fig-cakes

[that is, they had turned into lumps from the great length of their storage],

and burn it in sanctity,

in a sacred place in the courtyard, because they are forbidden for benefit. Because

it is stated

[Numbers 28] in the passage of the daily burnt-offering, “And its libation shall be a quarter of a hin for one lamb,

in the sacred place pour out a libation of strong drink to the Lord,”

and we expound “in the sacred place” as requiring burning, as will be explained below. Therefore we expound:

Just as its pouring was in sanctity,

that is, in the courtyard,

so its burning is in sanctity.

And we inquire:

What is the implication,

how does “in the sacred place” imply a requirement of burning?

And Ravina said: It comes,

we learn a

verbal analogy, “sacred, sacred”;

it is written here,

regarding the libations:

“in the sacred place,” and it is written there

[Exodus 29]

“And you shall burn what remains with fire; it shall not be eaten, for it is sacred,”

and we expound:

Just as the remainder is burned in sanctity, so this,

the libations,

its burning also

is in sanctity .

Thus, Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok holds that after the libations descend into the channels, they require burning. If so, their mitzva has not been performed until they are burned, and according to him misuse indeed applies to them until that time. But in our Mishna we learned that misuse does not apply to them from the moment they descend into the channels. Therefore the Gemara clarifies: Shall we say that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok?

Thus Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok holds that after its descent to the channels it requires burning. If so, until its burning its mitzva has not been performed. And according to him, indeed, there is misuse in it until its burning. Whereas in our Mishna we learned that there is no misuse in it from the time of its descent to the channels. Therefore the Gemara clarifies: Let us say that our Mishna is not according to Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok?

And we answer: No,

even if you say

that our Mishna is according to

Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok,

rather, the Mishna is speaking of

if it caught,

that is, it caught the libations while they were still in the air and had not yet descended to the floor.

And in this manner its mitzva is not burning, even according to Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok; therefore the Mishna said that there is no misuse in it .

The Tosafot bring a different version in the question and answer of the Gemara, and it is the version of the Gemara in tractate Sukkah. And according to this version, the question of the first formulation is not a question, because although Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok holds that it requires burning, nevertheless he can hold that there is no meila in it, because the prohibition of meila is not dependent upon the obligation to burn it.

The version of the Tosafot is:

The Gemara asks: Is it so that

let us say,

that

our Mishna is Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok

and

not like the Rabbis?!

For if it is the Rabbis,

it is difficult:

but it descended to the depths.

For according to the Rabbis, the wine was absorbed into the earth,

and it does not apply in “reality” to commit meila with it. But according to Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok, since the wine gathers in the shitin, it does apply to commit meila with it.

And we answer:

even if you say,

that our Mishna is

the Rabbis,

but it is speaking in the circumstance of

if it was collected, that it collected the wine before it was absorbed into the earth, and there is a “reality” of benefiting from it, and the Mishna teaches us that one does not commit meila with it.

В версии, приписываемой Раши, и в Шита мекубецет здесь приведена «другая формулировка», и это соответствует формулировке «есть говорящие» в трактате Сукка.

In the version of the one attributed to Rashi and the Shita Mekubetzet, there is here “another formulation,” and it is the “there are those who say” in tractate Sukkah.

And according to this version the Gemara clarifies: Is it so that

let us say,

that our Mishna is

the Rabbis, and

is speaking in the circumstance of

if it was collected,

before its descent into the channel, and since from that point it is no longer needed for the sake of Heaven, therefore: one does not commit meila with it,

for if,

if we establish the Mishna as

Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok,

it is difficult: why did it say that one does not commit meila with it? After all,

they still remain in their sanctity,

the wine still remains in its sanctity, because there is upon it an obligation to burn it, and until it is burned, its sanctity is upon it?

And we answer:

even if you say,

that our Mishna is

Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok,

and he concedes that although it requires burning, nevertheless, there is no meila in it

. And

the reason is because

you have no thing whose mitzva has been performed and one commits meila with it,

and the pouring is, after all, its principal mitzva.

In our version there is a different wording:

there are those who say:

the Gemara clarifies: Is it so that

let us say,

that

the Mishna is according to Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok,

and speaks specifically of

if it was collected,

the wine before it descended to the floor [the paved floor over the shitin]; therefore, there is no meila in it. For if it had already descended to the floor, the floor sanctifies it, and it must be burned, and if so, its mitzva has still not been performed, and one commits meila with it.

And we answer:

No! Always

our Mishna is

according to Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok,

but

even if it was not collected

and one benefited from what had gathered on the floor, there is likewise no meila.

And

the matter that it said above in the beraita that it requires burning,

that is:

by rabbinic ordinance,

and since according to Torah law it is not fit for burning, therefore there is no meila in it, even after its descent to the shitin.

And we object: How did you answer that it is only by rabbinic ordinance

; but the verse is expounded for it

—after all, in the beraita Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok expounded the verses of Scripture? And we answer: Indeed, it is by rabbinic ordinance, and the exposition

is merely an asmachta.

The Rabbis attached the obligation to burn it to the exposition of the verses, but it is not from the Torah.

Mishna:

The Mishna continues to discuss things with which one does not commit meila.

The removal,

what remains of the incense after it was taken down from

the inner altar.

And

likewise, the removal of the wicks and oils, what remains and was taken down from

the menorah,

one may not benefit,

it is forbidden to benefit from them,

and one does not commit meila,

because their mitzva has already been performed.

One who consecrates the removal at the outset,

one who took the ashes after they had been removed and consecrated them, there applies to them

Sanctity, and one commits meila with it by Torah law. We learned in tractate Hullin [22a]: “Valid with turtledoves, invalid with young pigeons; valid with young pigeons, invalid with turtledoves. At the beginning of the yellowing, this one and that one are invalid.” That is, young pigeons are valid only when they are small, whereas turtledoves are valid only when they are grown. Therefore: turtledoves that have not reached their time, and young pigeons whose time has passed, one may not benefit from them, it is forbidden to benefit from them by rabbinic ordinance, and one does not commit meila with them at all.

one commits me'ila with it

And in the next Mishna Rabbi Shimon disagrees, and holds that with turtledoves that have not reached their time one does commit meila. And there it will be explained.

Gemara: We learned in the Mishna [Tamid 28b]: “He descended [the one who raised the ashes from the altar]; when he reached the floor [the floor of the courtyard], he turned his face northward, walked on the east side of the ramp about ten cubits, piled the coals on the floor three handbreadths away from the ramp—the place where the crop of the bird, the removal of the inner altar, and the removal of the menorah are placed.”

We learn from this that there was a particular place in the courtyard designated for three things, namely: the place where the crop of the bird was cast, the place where the removal of the inner altar and the menorah was placed, and the place where the raising of the ashes of the outer altar was piled and placed.

The Torah said in the section of the burnt offering of a bird [Leviticus 1]: “And he shall remove its crop [its gizzard] with its feathers [together with its entrails], and cast it beside the altar eastward, to the place of the ashes.” We learn several things: that the crop [its gizzard] was cast on the eastern side of the altar, twenty cubits away from the altar, because “casting” is not less than twenty cubits [and the Sages said that it was three handbreadths beside the ramp, which is about ten cubits from the base of the ramp], and that this was the place of the ashes.

Concerning which ashes did the Torah speak, which were placed there in that place?

Simply, it referred to the raising of the ashes of the outer altar, for it is stated in the section of the raising of the ashes [Leviticus 6]: “And they shall place it beside the altar.”

From our Mishna, which said, “the removal of the inner altar and the menorah—one may not benefit and one does not commit meila,” it is implied that the ashes of the inner altar and the menorah were also placed in that same location. And so it said: with the removal of the inner altar one does not commit meila; therefore, with that of the outer altar, which is placed together with it, one does commit meila. For if the place where it is placed is outside the camp, the place where “the rest of the ashes” of the outer altar are poured, why would one commit meila with it? After all, with the rest of the ashes of the outer altar one does not commit meila,

as explained above [9a]. Therefore, the Gemara inquires From where do we know [and likewise for the Mishna in tractate Tamid, cited above] that the ashes of the inner altar and of the menorah are also placed there, in that “place of the ashes”? Granted

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna [Tamid 28b]: “He descended [the one who took the ash from the altar]; when he reached the floor [the floor of the Courtyard], he turned his face northward, walked along the eastern side of the ramp for approximately ten cubits, and piled the coals on the floor three handbreadths away from the ramp—the place where the crop of the bird and the ash of the inner altar and the ash of the Menora are placed.”

We learn from this that there was a particular place in the Courtyard designated for three things: the place where the crop of the bird was cast, the place where the ash of the inner altar and the Menora was placed, and the place where the ash taken from the outer altar was piled and placed.

The Torah says in the passage concerning the bird burnt offering [Leviticus 1]: “He shall remove its crop [the bird's gizzard] together with its feathers [with its digestive tract] and cast it beside the altar, eastward, to the place of the ash.” We learn several things: The crop [of the bird] was cast on the eastern side of the altar, twenty cubits away from the altar, because “casting” cannot be less than twenty cubits [and the Sages said that it was three handbreadths beside the ramp, which is approximately ten cubits from the base of the ramp], and that this was the place of the ash.

What ash did the Torah refer to as being placed there, in that location?

Simply, it referred to the ash taken from the outer altar, for it says in the passage concerning the taking of the ash [Leviticus 6]: “And they shall place it beside the altar.”

From our Mishna, which says, “The ash of the inner altar and the Menora—one may not benefit from it and one does not commit me'ila,” it is implied that the ash of the inner altar and the Menora was also placed in that same location. And so it states: With the ash of the inner altar one does not commit me'ila; with that of the outer altar, which was placed together with it, one does commit me'ila. For if its place of deposit was outside the camp, the place where the “other ash” of the outer altar was poured, why would one commit me'ila with it? After all, one does not commit me'ila with the other ash of the outer altar as explained above [9a]. Therefore, the Gemara clarifies “From where do we know [and likewise concerning the Mishna in tractate Tamid, cited above] that the ashes of the inner altar and of the menorah were also placed there, in that ‘place of the ashes’?”

Granted