Meilah 11b (יא:) — the Talmud in English

Behold, the removal of the ashes,

for every day he gathered ashes with a coal pan, removed the ashes from the altar, and placed them to the east of the ramp,

whose

mitzva had been performed, and there is me’ila in it ,

as it is stated in the passage concerning the removal of the ashes [Leviticus 6]: “And he shall place it beside the altar.” This implies that there is its place of storage, and that there it is absorbed in its place. It is thus evident that the ashes themselves, once removed, are forbidden for benefit; and since they are forbidden for benefit on account of their sanctity, the law of me’ila also applies to them.

Do you therefore have an item whose mitzva has been performed, yet me’ila applies to it ?

And we answer: Indeed, me’ila applies to the removal of the ashes after its mitzva has been performed, but no inference may be drawn from it,

because the removal of the ashes and the limbs of the scapegoat

sent to Azazel are items forbidden for benefit even after their mitzvot have been performed, as will be explained .

They are two verses that come as one, and whenever two verses come as one, they do not teach

anything beyond themselves. For if the Torah intended us to derive a general principle from them, why did it write both? Let it write one of them, and we would derive the other from it.

But with regard to other consecrated items, indeed, we find no item whose mitzva has been performed and to which me’ila applies.

In tractate Yoma [67a], the Sages disputed the status of those limbs of the scapegoat on Yom Kippur after it had been sent to Azazel: whether benefit from them is permitted or forbidden. The one who says that benefit from them is permitted derives this from what the Torah states in the passage concerning Yom Kippur [Leviticus 16]: “And he shall send the goat into the wilderness.” The word “wilderness” is superfluous, and is expounded as follows: It is ownerless like the wilderness, meaning that benefit from it is permitted. The one who says that benefit from them is forbidden derives this from what the Torah states there: “to a land of gezeira,” expounding it in the sense of “matter and prohibition”; that is, benefit from them is forbidden.

Accordingly, we ask:

Granted

that the answer we gave—“the removal of the ashes and the scapegoat are two verses that come as one, and do not teach”—is satisfactory

according to the one who says: Benefit may not be derived from the limbs of the scapegoat,

but according to the one who says

that benefit may be derived from the limbs of the scapegoat,

what can be said?

The question returns: How did we answer, “Do you have an item whose mitzva has been performed and to which me’ila applies?” Behold, the mitzva of the removal of the ashes has been performed, and me’ila applies to it?

And we answer:

Because it consists of the removal of the ashes and the priestly garments,

the four white garments in which the High Priest entered the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur. They require permanent storage, and neither an ordinary priest may serve in them throughout the year nor may the High Priest wear them on another Yom Kippur. As it is stated there: “And he shall remove the linen garments and leave them there,” and we expound: This teaches that they required storage.

And they

are two verses that come as one.

And whenever two verses come as one, they do not teach.

However, the Sages also disputed whether benefit may be derived from the priestly garments. The Sages maintain, as stated above, that they require storage and therefore benefit from them is forbidden. But Rabbi Dosa maintains that what the Torah states, “and leave them there,” comes only to teach “that the High Priest may not use them for another Yom Kippur.” But for use by an ordinary priest during the rest of the year—and these are indeed the four garments of an ordinary priest—they are permitted. Since they are permitted for use by an ordinary priest, me’ila does not apply to them, because “the Torah was not given to ministering angels”; that is, the Torah did not require an ordinary priest to remove them immediately upon completing his service [Yoma 61a].

Accordingly, we ask:

Granted

that the answer we gave—“the removal of the ashes and the priestly garments are two verses that come as one, and do not teach”—is satisfactory

according to the Rabbis, who say

that what the Torah states,

“and leave them there,”

teaches that they require storage—then it is well:

the priestly garments are an item whose mitzva has been performed and to which me’ila applies.

But according to Rabbi Dosa, who says: They are permitted to an ordinary priest ,

there is a difficulty:

what can be said?

The question returns: If so, we have found only the removal of the ashes as an item whose mitzva has been performed and to which me’ila applies . And we answer:

Because it consists of the removal of the ashes and the beheaded heifer,

which is also forbidden for benefit after it has been beheaded in the valley, even though its mitzva has been performed. For it is stated in the passage concerning the beheaded heifer [Deuteronomy 21]: “And they shall break its neck there.” From the Torah’s use of the word “there,” we expound: “There shall be its burial” [“There shall be its storage”]—to teach that benefit from it is forbidden.

And they

are two verses that come as one, and whenever two verses come as one, they do not teach .

And we ask:

Granted

that these answers are satisfactory

according to the one who says

that whenever two verses come as one

they do not teach; but according to the one who says

[Sanhedrin 67b] that two verses that come as one

do teach,

there is a difficulty:

what can be said?

Why should we not derive from them the law of me’ila even for an item whose mitzva has been performed? The question concerning blood returns: Why should we not expound, “Just as before atonement me’ila applies to it, so too after atonement me’ila applies to it,” despite the fact that its mitzva has already been performed, just as me’ila applies to the removal of the ashes and the beheaded heifer even after their mitzvot have been performed?

And we answer: Even according to the one who says that they do teach, here they do not teach, because

two exclusions are written

in two exclusions: one in the passage concerning the beheaded heifer and the other in the passage concerning the removal of the ashes, the Torah excludes them to teach us that we may not derive a general rule from them .

It is written there,

with regard to the beheaded heifer:

“the beheaded one,”

with a superfluous letter heh, to teach us: This one is forbidden for benefit after its mitzva has been performed, but no other item.

And it is written there,

in the passage concerning the removal of the ashes:

“And he shall place it beside the altar,”

although it could have written, “And there, beside the altar.” This comes to teach us: This item is forbidden for benefit and subject to me’ila after its mitzva has been performed, but no other item.

Accordingly: these

two items—the removal of the ashes and the beheaded heifer—

, these two—the removal of the ashes and the calf whose neck is broken—

are

indeed forbidden for benefit even after their mitzvot have been completed, whereas

something else,

such as blood after its mitzva has been performed,

is not

forbidden for benefit by Torah law. Since that is so, we expound “it”: Just as after atonement there is no me’ila in it, so too before atonement there is no me’ila in it.”

We learned in our Mishna:

Libations at the outset are subject to me’ila; once they have descended into the shittin, they are not subject to me’ila .

The Gemara clarifies:

Shall we say

that

our Mishna is not

that

of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok?

As it was taught,

we learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok says: There was a small opening

[like a skylight extending from above to below]

between the ramp and the altar,

on the western side of the ramp .

And so that the shittin would not become filled with the libations,

once every seventy years

the

young priests

[children]

would descend through it

until they reached the shittin,

and would bring

congealed wine,

which had spoiled and coagulated,

which resembled cakes of dried figs

[that is, they had turned into clumps because of their great age],

and burn it in a state of sanctity,

in a sacred place in the courtyard, because benefit from it was forbidden. This was because

it is stated

[Numbers 28], in the passage concerning the daily burnt-offering: “And its libation shall be a quarter of a hin for each lamb;

in the sacred place pour a libation of strong drink to the Lord,”

and we expound “in the sacred place” as teaching that it must be burned, as will be explained below. Therefore we expound:

Just as its pouring is performed in sanctity,

that is, in the courtyard,

so too its burning is performed in sanctity.

And we inquire:

What is the implication?

How does “in the sacred place” imply an obligation to burn it?

And Ravina said: It is derived

by means of a gezeira shava,

“sacred, sacred.”

It is written here

with regard to the libations:

“in the sacred place,” and it is written there

[Exodus 29]:

“And you shall burn whatever is left over in fire; it shall not be eaten, because it is sacred,”

and we expound:

Just as the burning of leftover sacrificial meat is performed in sanctity, so too this,

the libations,

its burning is also

performed in sanctity .

Thus, Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok holds that after the libations descend into the channels, they require burning. If so, their mitzva has not been performed until they are burned, and according to him misuse indeed applies to them until that time. But in our Mishna we learned that misuse does not apply to them from the moment they descend into the channels. Therefore the Gemara clarifies: Shall we say that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok?

Thus, Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok maintains that after the wine descends into the shittin, it requires burning. If so, its mitzva has not yet been performed until it is burned, and according to him me’ila indeed applies to it until it is burned. Yet our Mishna teaches that me’ila does not apply from the moment it descends into the shittin. Accordingly, the Gemara asks: Shall we say that our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok?

And we answer: No,

you may even say

that our Mishna is in accordance with

Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok. Rather, the Mishna is speaking of

a case

where he caught it,

that is, he caught the libations while they were still in the air and had not yet descended to the floor.

In such a case, even according to Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok, its mitzva is not burning; therefore, the Mishna states that me’ila does not apply to it .

Tosafot cite a different version in the question and answer of the Gemara, which is the version of the Gemara in tractate Sukkah. According to this version, the question of the first formulation is not a question, because although Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok holds that it requires burning, he can nevertheless hold that there is no me'ila with it, since the prohibition of me'ila is not dependent upon the obligation to burn it.

The version of Tosafot is:

The Gemara asks: Is it to say

let us say

that

our Mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok

and

not that of the Rabbis?!

For if it is the Rabbis,

it is difficult:

but it descended to the depths.

For according to the Rabbis, the wine was absorbed into the ground,

and it is not possible, in reality, to commit me'ila with it. But according to Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok, since the wine collects in the shittin, it is possible to commit me'ila with it.

And we answer:

You may even say

that our Mishna is the opinion of

the Rabbis, but it is speaking of a case

in which

it was collected, meaning that the wine was collected before it was absorbed into the ground, so that it is possible, in reality, to benefit from it; and the Mishna teaches us that one does not commit me'ila with it. [In the version of the work attributed to Rashi and of Shitta Mekubbetzet, there is here “another formulation,” which is the “some say” in tractate Sukkah.]

According to this version, the Gemara clarifies: Is it to say

let us say

that our Mishna is the opinion of

the Rabbis, and

speaks of a case

in which it was collected,

before it descended into the channel, and since from that point it was no longer needed for the sake of Heaven, therefore one does not commit me'ila with it,

for if,

if we establish the Mishna as the opinion of

Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok,

it is difficult: Why did it say that one does not commit me'ila with it?

It nevertheless remains in its sanctity: The wine still retains its sanctity, because there is an obligation to burn it, and until it is burned, its sanctity remains upon it.

And we answer:

You may even say

that our Mishna is the opinion of

Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok,

and he concedes that although it requires burning, nevertheless there is no me'ila with it

. And

the reason is that

there is no object whose mitzva has been performed with which one commits me'ila,

and the libation is, after all, the principal performance of its mitzva.

In our version there is a different wording:

There are those who say:

The Gemara clarifies: Is it to say

let us say

that

the Mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok,

and speaks specifically of a case

in which it was collected

before the wine descended to the floor [the paved floor over the shittin]; therefore there is no me'ila with it. If it had already descended to the floor, the floor sanctifies it, and it must be burned; if so, its mitzva has still not been performed, and one does commit me'ila with it.

And we answer:

No! Actually,

our Mishna is

in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok,

but

even if it was not collected,

and one benefited from what had accumulated on the floor, there is likewise no me'ila.

And

as for what was stated earlier in the beraita, that it requires burning,

that is

by rabbinic ordinance. Since by Torah law it is not subject to burning, therefore there is no me'ila with it, even after it has descended into the shittin.

And we challenge this: How did you explain that it is only rabbinic?

But does he not derive it from a verse? After all, in the beraita Rabbi Eliezer bar Rabbi Tzadok expounded the verses. We answer: Although it is rabbinic, the exposition

is merely an allusion. The Sages associated the obligation to burn it with the exposition of the verses, but it is not from the Torah.

Mishna:

The Mishna continues discussing objects with which one does not commit me'ila.

The ash,

the residue of the incense that was removed from

the inner altar.

And

likewise, the ash of the wicks and oils, the residue that was removed from

the Menora,

one may not benefit from them,

as it is prohibited to benefit from them,

but one does not commit me'ila,

because their mitzva has already been performed.

One who consecrates the ash initially ,

one who took the ash after it had been removed and consecrated it, the consecration takes effect upon it

Sanctity, and

one commits me'ila with it

by Torah law.

We learned in tractate Ḥullin [22a]: “Valid with turtledoves, invalid with young pigeons; valid with young pigeons, invalid with turtledoves. At the beginning of the yellowing, both are invalid.” That is, young pigeons are fit only when they are small, whereas turtledoves are fit only when they are mature.

Therefore:

Turtledoves that have not reached their proper time, and young pigeons whose proper time has passed, one may not benefit from,

it is prohibited by rabbinic ordinance to benefit from them,

but one does not commit me'ila

with them at all.

In the following Mishna Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that one does commit me'ila with turtledoves that have not reached their proper time. This will be explained there.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna [Tamid 28b]: “He descended [the one who took the ash from the altar]; when he reached the floor [the floor of the Courtyard], he turned his face northward, walked along the eastern side of the ramp for approximately ten cubits, and piled the coals on the floor three handbreadths away from the ramp—the place where the crop of the bird and the ash of the inner altar and the ash of the Menora are placed.”

We learn from this that there was a particular place in the Courtyard designated for three things: the place where the crop of the bird was cast, the place where the ash of the inner altar and the Menora was placed, and the place where the ash taken from the outer altar was piled and placed.

The Torah says in the passage concerning the bird burnt offering [Leviticus 1]: “He shall remove its crop [the bird's gizzard] together with its feathers [with its digestive tract] and cast it beside the altar, eastward, to the place of the ash.” We learn several things: The crop [of the bird] was cast on the eastern side of the altar, twenty cubits away from the altar, because “casting” cannot be less than twenty cubits [and the Sages said that it was three handbreadths beside the ramp, which is approximately ten cubits from the base of the ramp], and that this was the place of the ash.

What ash did the Torah refer to as being placed there, in that location?

Simply, it referred to the ash taken from the outer altar, for it says in the passage concerning the taking of the ash [Leviticus 6]: “And they shall place it beside the altar.”

From our Mishna, which says, “The ash of the inner altar and the Menora—one may not benefit from it and one does not commit me'ila,” it is implied that the ash of the inner altar and the Menora was also placed in that same location. And so it states: With the ash of the inner altar one does not commit me'ila; with that of the outer altar, which was placed together with it, one does commit me'ila. For if its place of deposit was outside the camp, the place where the “other ash” of the outer altar was poured, why would one commit me'ila with it? After all, one does not commit me'ila with the other ash of the outer altar as explained above [9a]. Therefore, the Gemara clarifies “From where do we know [and likewise concerning the Mishna in tractate Tamid, cited above] that the ashes of the inner altar and of the menorah were also placed there, in that ‘place of the ashes’?”

Granted