Makkot 3b — the Talmud in English

And even though now,

at the end of the seventh year, when the mitzva of remission of debts applies, nevertheless

“we do not apply to it ‘he may not press’”,

for in any event he could not claim from him then, since the time of repayment had still not arrived, nevertheless we do not say that every debt concerning which the prohibition “he may not press” was not stated is likewise not subject to the commandment “he shall remit every owner of a loan his hand.”

Since

the end,

at the conclusion of the tenth year,

comes

the debt

to the status of

“he may not press.”

And the explanation of the verse is: He may not press his fellow at the time of repayment, since the verse has already designated his debt as “remission” within the period of the loan.

And we raise an objection from our Mishna:

Rav Kahana objected,

for we learned:

They assess how much a person would want to give and have one thousand zuz in his possession, whether [the witnesses intended] to give [them] from now until thirty days or whether [they intended] to give [them] from now until ten years.

And

if you say

that one who lends to his fellow for ten years

the seventh year remits it—

why do they assess the loss that the witnesses intended to cause him only with regard to the period of use of the loan?

But the borrower was destined to be entirely released from his debt by the remission of the debt in the seventh year, which is within the ten years of the loan. And they, through their testimony, rendered him liable to repay the debt and caused him to lose the entire thousand zuz!

And if so,

all of them,

the thousand zuz,

he must also pay them

to the borrower!

And we answer: And we resolve it:

Rava said: Here,

in our Mishna,

with what are we dealing—

with cases in which the seventh year does not remit his debt.

A. For example,

with a loan secured by collateral,

for he has already valued his debt in his hand from the time of the loan, and here he was not prohibited by “he may not press,” since at the time of repayment the lender does not press the borrower to repay his debt; rather, he merely takes money in place of the borrower’s collateral that is found in his possession. B.

And

also,

for example,

with one who hands over his documents to the court,

who writes a prozbul before the court and thereby hands over all his debts to them. Once the debts have been handed over to the court, he can collect all his debts, since it is not he who presses, but the court, to which he handed over his debts, and he claims by their authority.

And the Sages instituted the enactment of prozbul, so that the seventh year would not remit debts, in order that lenders would lend to the poor even during the time of remission.

And as

we learned: A loan secured by collateral, and one who hands over his documents to the court—

the seventh year does not remit them.

There are those who say that he stated the opposite:

that he stated the matter in the reverse manner:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One who lends to his fellow for ten years—

the seventh year does not remit it.

Since when the seventh year took effect, the time of repayment had still not arrived, and here we do not apply “he may not press.”

And even though it comes

that this debt

to the status of

“he may not press”

at the conclusion of ten years,

now, in any event,

now, during the year of remission, we still

do not apply to it

“he may not press.”

And every debt that is not subject to pressing at the time of the seventh year is not remitted in the seventh year.

And according to this version,

Rav Kahana said

a proof for Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel:

We too have likewise learned

that the seventh year does not remit a debt for ten years.

For we learned in our Mishna:

They assess how much a person would want to give and have one thousand zuz in his possession, whether [the witnesses intended] to give [them] from now until thirty days or whether [they intended] to give [them] from now until ten years.

And if you say

that a loan for ten years

the seventh year remits it,

then

all of them,

the thousand zuz,

he must also pay them

for the borrower would have been released from the entire debt in the seventh year; so why do they assess only the loss of the period of use of the loan money?

And we reject this:

Rava said: Here, with what are we dealing,

with cases in which the seventh year does not remit his debt, for example

with a loan secured by collateral, and

for example

with one who hands over his documents to the court.

As we learned: A loan secured by collateral, and one who hands over his documents to the court—the seventh year does not remit them.

And

further

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

One who says to his fellow:

This loan that I am lending you is on the condition

that you will not have the seventh year remit it—

the

seventh year

the condition does not take effect. And if the seventh year passed over his debt, the lender is prohibited from claiming it from him, since

the seventh year remits

it.

And we examine it:

Shall we say

that we should say that

Shmuel holds

that one who stipulates such a condition

is stipulating contrary to what is written in the Torah,

for it is contrary to what is written in the Torah, that the seventh year remits a debt,

and everyone who stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah—

his condition is void!

It is impossible to say that Shmuel holds this! For it was indeed stated: a seller of an object, who says to the buyer,

his fellow:

I hereby sell you this object at this specified price,

on the condition that you have no

right against me

to claim a refund of your money if you find in this sale

overcharging [the prohibition of which is from the Torah]—

Rav said:

the condition does not take effect, and if he sold it to him for more than its value,

he has a claim of overcharging against him,

and the seller is liable to return the amount of the overcharge; and if the overcharge was more than one-sixth of the price, the sale is void.

And Shmuel says: He has no

claim of

overcharging

against him.

And it follows that they disagree over whether, when a person stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition is valid or void, and Shmuel holds that his condition is valid.

And if so, it is perplexing: why did Shmuel say that one who lends to his fellow on the condition that the seventh year not remit it—the seventh year remits it, and the condition is ineffective in preventing the remission of the debt!?

And we answer:

This was stated concerning it: Rav Anan said: For me, Shmuel explained it to me

that the law differs according to the manner in which the condition is made; with regard to overcharging—

if he said,

“on the condition that you have no overcharging against me,”

that is, that the buyer should relinquish his right to claim the return of the overcharge, the condition is effective even against what is written in the Torah. Therefore he held that

“he has no overcharging against him.”

But if he said in his condition,

“on the condition that there is no

overcharging

in it

in this sale,”

then the condition is that he not overcharge him in this sale, and that he sell it to him at its true value; this is not a condition exempting him from the law of overcharging.

Therefore, even according to Shmuel, there is overcharging in it.

And just as we find a distinction in the formulations of the condition concerning overcharging—whether he stipulates with his fellow that he relinquish the overcharge to him, or whether he stipulates with him that there be no overcharging here—

here too,

there is such a distinction in the formulations concerning the seventh year: whether he stipulates with him that he will not remit it in the seventh year, or whether he stipulates with him that the law of remission will not apply to his loan in the seventh year—

if he stipulated and said:

“on the condition that you will not remit me

in the seventh year”—

that is, at the time of the loan the lender makes a condition with the borrower and demands of him that he undertake, of his own free will, to repay the loan even though according to Torah law the debt will be remitted in the seventh year, his condition takes effect.

For although the Torah said to release him,

nevertheless, since the lender stipulated with him that he was lending to him only in this manner, and the borrower agreed to take the loan on this condition, his condition takes effect, and

the seventh year does not remit it,

and the borrower must repay his debt.

And Shmuel holds: one who stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah—in a monetary matter, his condition is valid. But if the lender says to the borrower that he is lending to him “on the condition that the seventh year will not remit me,” that is, the lender wishes to uproot the law of remission of debts from this loan [but does not demand that the borrower undertake to pay even though the debt will be remitted], he has no power to alter the laws of remission. Therefore the condition does not take effect, and the seventh year remits it. It was taught: One who lends to his fellow without specification, and did not establish a time with him for repayment of the debt, may not claim it from him in less than thirty days from the day of the loan.

the seventh year does not cancel the debt,

and the borrower must repay the debt.

And Shmuel holds that when one stipulates against a provision written in the Torah in a monetary matter, his condition is effective.

But if the lender says to the borrower that he is lending to him

Rabba bar bar Hana reasoned before Rav,

while standing before Rav,

to say:

These words,

that he may not claim it in less than thirty days, apply specifically

to a documented loan,

where it is evident from the writing of the document that the loan is not for a short period of less than thirty days, since

a person does not ordinarily

not ordinarily

trouble himself and write a document for a loan that is less than thirty days, thirty days. But an oral loan, where this reasoning does not apply, and a person also borrows for a short period of less than thirty days—

not

do we say, “an unspecified loan is for thirty days”; rather, the borrower must repay his debt immediately when the lender claims that he pay the debt.

Rav said to him: This is what my beloved teacher said [Rabbi Hiyya, who was Rav’s uncle]:

Both a documented loan and an oral loan,

which were lent without specification, cannot have their debts claimed until thirty days have passed from the loan.

It was also taught so: One who lends to his fellow without specification may not claim it in less than thirty days.

Both a documented loan and an oral loan.

Shmuel said to Rav Mattana: Do not sit on your feet,

do not sit on your legs [rather, stand [Tosafot, Nazir 24b]],

until you explain this teaching

that I am telling you:

From where is this matter that the Sages said: One who lends to his fellow without specification may not claim it in less than thirty days, both a documented loan and an oral loan?

He said to him,

Rav Mattana said to Shmuel: The Sages learned this law from

as it is written [Deuteronomy 15], “

The seventh year, the year of remission, draws near.”

And they expounded from the repetition of the wording, which is apparently difficult:

For

from the implication of what is stated, “

The seventh year

draws near,”

do I not know that it is “

the year of remission”?

Rather, what does the Torah teach by stating again

“the year of remission”?—

To tell you: There is another remission that is like this one!

That is, another period whose law is like that of remission.

And which is it?—

This is one who lends to his fellow without specification, who may not claim it in less than thirty days.

And this period is significant like a full year, similar to the year of remission.

For the Master said: Thirty days in a year are considered a year.

And the Gemara mentions additional statements of Rav Yehuda, concerning which Rav Kahana objected.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: One who opens the neck

opening,

who makes an opening for the neck in a new garment and thereby completes the garment,

on Shabbat—

is liable for a sin-offering,

because of repairing the garment, which is a derivative of the labor of “striking the final blow,”

including every repair and completion of a labor.

do I not know that it is

the year of remission?

Rather, what is the meaning

of repeating the phrase

“the year of remission”?

It comes to teach you: There is another period that is like this one!

That is, another period whose law is like that of the year of remission.

And which is it?

It is a loan made to one’s fellow without specifying a term, which may not be demanded within less than thirty days.

And this period is considered like an entire year, similar to the year of remission.

For the Master said: Thirty days in a year are considered a year.

The Gemara mentions additional statements of Rav Yehuda, concerning which Rav Kahana raised a difficulty.

And Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: One who opens the

neck

of a garment—who makes an opening for the neck in a new garment and thereby completes the garment—

on Shabbat

is liable to bring a sin-offering,

because of repairing the garment, which is a derivative of the labor of “striking the final blow,” which includes every repair and completion of a labor.

Rav Kahana raised an objection to him: And what is the difference between this

which is forbidden, opening the neck-opening,

and the barrel bung,

for we maintain [Shabbat 146a] that one may cut the rim of the barrel on Shabbat in order to open it to drink its wine.

Apparently, even in the case of a barrel, he repairs it and completes its preparation for use by opening the bung; why, then, was this action permitted?

And we answer:

He said to him

, Rav Yehuda said to Rav Kahana: One cannot compare a barrel to a garment, for

this

, a garment, until one opens the neck-opening in it, is

a single unit

, entirely one part, and when one opens a new opening in it, he completes it, and therefore he is liable for it on account of striking the final hammer blow.

But

even

this

, the barrel bung, although it is plastered with clay over the mouth of the barrel,

is not a complete joining

sufficient to be considered one part. Rather, we regard the barrel as open, and removing the bung from it is not considered making a new opening; therefore, it is permitted to remove it on Shabbat.

A ritual bath containing forty seahs of water that was not drawn, suitable for immersion, may have drawn water added to it without limit.

By Torah law, there is no difference whether at first there was in the ritual bath drawn water that was invalid, and afterward forty seahs of valid water, not drawn, were added to it, or whether at first there was in it valid water, not drawn, and afterward invalid drawn water was added to it. For in every case, if there are in the ritual bath forty seahs of water that was not drawn, it is a valid ritual bath in which one may immerse.

However, the Sages enacted, so that people would not err and come to immerse in drawn water, that if at the beginning of the formation of the ritual bath there were three log of drawn water within it, the ritual bath becomes invalid even if afterward forty seahs of valid water, not drawn, are added to it.

This decree—that “three log of drawn water invalidate the ritual bath if they were in it at the beginning”—was enacted only when there were initially three log of drawn water in the ritual bath, so that people would not come to err and say that one may immerse in drawn water. But if there were other liquids in the ritual bath, in which one is not fit to immerse, the Sages did not decree that the ritual bath become invalid if afterward forty seahs of valid water were added to them.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Three log of water into which a kortov

a small measure

of wine fell, and

the

appearance

of the three log mixed with wine was visible

as the appearance of wine,

and they fell into the ritual bath,

and it is explained below whether it contains forty seahs or not—

they did not invalidate it.

Even though three log of drawn water invalidate a ritual bath, since these waters appear like wine, we follow their appearance, and the Sages did not invalidate the ritual bath because of them.

Rav Kahana raised an objection to him: And what is the difference between this,

water whose appearance is like wine, which does not invalidate the ritual bath,

and water

with dye,

water into which dye was mixed, which invalidates the ritual bath with three log when it was initially placed into it!

As

we learned: Rabbi Yosei says: Water with dye invalidates the ritual bath with three log

, if it was placed into it initially.

And we answer:

Rava said to him: There,

in the case of water with dye, the reason it invalidates the ritual bath is that the designation “water” remains upon it, and

“

dyed water

” it is called.

But water whose appearance is like wine does not invalidate the ritual bath, since the designation “water” does not apply to it. Rather, “

diluted wine

it is called

, and concerning wine the Sages did not decree that it invalidate the ritual bath if three log of wine were initially placed into it.

And we raise a difficulty:

But Rabbi Hiyya taught

: three log of water into which wine was mixed and which appear like wine

remove the ritual bath

, removing from it the presumption of fitness, and it becomes invalid because of them.

And we answer:

Rava said: It is not difficult!

This

—what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, that we follow the appearance—follows the view of

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri.

Whereas

this

—what Rabbi Hiyya said, that we do not follow the appearance—follows the view of

the Rabbis.

And we find that they disputed this,

as we learned: Three log of water,