Makkot 3b (ג:) — the Talmud in English

And even though now,

at the end of the seventh year, when the mitzva of remission of debts applies, still

we do not apply to it “he shall not exact it,”

for in any event he cannot demand payment from him then, since the time of repayment has not yet arrived, nevertheless, we do not say that any debt concerning which the prohibition “he shall not exact it” was not stated is likewise not subject to the command, “Every creditor shall remit what he has lent his fellow.”

Since

at the end,

at the conclusion of the tenth year,

it comes,

the debt comes

to the status of “

he shall not exact it.”

The meaning of the verse is: He shall not exact payment from his fellow at the time of repayment, because the Torah has already designated his debt as subject to remission during the period of the loan.

And we raise an objection from our Mishna:

Rav Kahana raised an objection:

We learned:

The court assesses how much a person would wish to give in order to have one thousand zuz in his possession, whether the money is to be given from now until thirty days hence or whether it is to be given from now until ten years hence.

And

if you say

that one who lends money to his fellow for ten years

has his debt remitted by the Sabbatical year—

why does the court assess the loss that the witnesses sought to cause him only with regard to the period during which he would have used the loan?

After all, the borrower was destined to be completely released from his debt through remission of the debt in the seventh year, which falls within the ten-year loan period. And through their testimony, the witnesses obligated him to repay the debt and caused him to lose the entire one thousand zuz!

And if so,

all of

the one thousand zuz

must also be paid by them

to the borrower!

And we answer:

Rava said: Here,

in our Mishna,

with what are we dealing—

With circumstances in which the Sabbatical year does not remit his debt.

A. For example,

a loan secured by collateral,

where he already holds the value of the debt from the time of the loan, and the prohibition “he shall not exact it” does not apply here, since at the time of repayment the lender is not exacting payment from the borrower; rather, he is merely taking money in exchange for the borrower’s collateral that is in his possession.

B.

And

for example,

one who transfers his promissory notes to the court,

who writes a prozbul before the court and thereby transfers all his debts to them. Once the debts have been transferred to the court, he may collect all his debts, since it is not he who exacts payment, but the court, to whom he transferred his debts, and he makes his claim by their authority.

And the Sages instituted the enactment of prozbul, so that the Sabbatical year would not remit debts, in order that lenders would continue lending to the poor even during the Sabbatical year.

And as

we learned: A lender who has collateral, and one who transfers his promissory notes to the court—

are not subject to remission.

Some say that he stated the opposite:

that he stated the matter in the reverse manner:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One who lends money to his fellow for ten years—

the Sabbatical year does not remit it.

Since when the Sabbatical year took effect, the time of repayment had not yet arrived, and “he shall not exact it” does not apply here.

And even though it will come

that this debt

to the status of “

he shall not exact it”

at the end of ten years,

at present, in any event,

now, at the time of the Sabbatical year, still

we do not apply to it “

he shall not exact it.”

And any debt that is not subject to being exacted at the time of the Sabbatical year is not remitted by the Sabbatical year.

And according to this version,

Rav Kahana

brought proof for Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel:

We too have learned

that the Sabbatical year does not remit a debt for ten years.

For we learned in our Mishna:

The court assesses how much a person would wish to give in order to have one thousand zuz in his possession, whether the money is to be given from now until thirty days hence or whether it is to be given from now until ten years hence.

And if you say

that a loan for ten years

is remitted by the Sabbatical year,

then

all of

the one thousand zuz

must also be paid by them.

For the borrower would have been released from the entire debt in the Sabbatical year; so why does the court assess only the loss resulting from the period during which he would have used the loan money?

And we reject this:

Rava said: With what are we dealing here—

with circumstances in which the Sabbatical year does not remit his debt, for example,

a loan secured by collateral, and

for example,

one who transfers his promissory notes to the court.

As we learned: A lender who has collateral, and one who transfers his promissory notes to the court, are not subject to remission.

And

further

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

One who says to his fellow:

This loan that I am lending you is on the condition

that the Sabbatical year shall not remit it—

the

Sabbatical year

does not validate his condition. If the Sabbatical year passed over the debt, the lender is prohibited from demanding payment from him, since

the Sabbatical year remits

it.

And we inquire about this:

Shall we say

that we should conclude that

Shmuel holds

that stipulating such a condition

is stipulating contrary to what is written in the Torah,

as it runs contrary to the Torah’s statement that the Sabbatical year remits a debt, and

whenever one stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah—

his condition is void!

It is impossible to say that this is what Shmuel holds!

For

it was stated:

A seller of an article

who says to

the buyer,

his fellow:

I hereby sell you this article for this specified price

on the condition that you have no

right to demand a refund of your money if you find

overcharging in this transaction [which is prohibited by Torah law]—

which is prohibited by Torah law]—

Rav said:

the condition is ineffective, and if he sold it to him for more than its value,

he is subject to a claim of overcharging,

and the seller must return the amount of the overcharge; if the overcharge was more than one-sixth of the price, the sale is void.

And Shmuel says: He has no

claim of

overcharging against him.

It follows that they disagree over whether, when a person stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition is valid or void, and Shmuel holds that his condition is valid.

If so, it is puzzling: Why did Shmuel say that one who lends to his fellow on the condition that the Sabbatical year shall not remit the debt has his debt remitted by the Sabbatical year, and that the condition is ineffective in preventing remission of the debt?!

And we answer:

This was stated concerning it: Rav Anan said: For me, Shmuel explained the matter

to me. Shmuel explained to me that the law differs according to the manner in which the condition is formulated. With regard to overcharging—

If he said, “

on the condition that you have no overcharging claim against me,”

meaning that the buyer waives his right to demand repayment of the overcharge, the condition is effective even against what is written in the Torah. Therefore he held that

he has no overcharging claim against him.

But if he said in his condition, “

on the condition that there is no

overcharging

in this transaction,”

the condition means that he is not overcharging him in this transaction and will sell it to him at its true value; this is not a condition exempting him from the law of overcharging.

Therefore, even according to Shmuel, there is overcharging in this transaction.

And just as we find this distinction in the formulations of a condition with regard to overcharging—whether he stipulates with his fellow that he waive the overcharge, or whether he stipulates with him that there be no overcharging here—

so too here,

this is the distinction in the formulations concerning the Sabbatical year: whether he stipulates with him that he will not remit the debt in the Sabbatical year, or whether he stipulates with him that the law of remission will not apply to this loan in the seventh year—

If he stipulated and said:

“On the condition that you shall not remit my debt”

you

in the Sabbatical year—

That is, at the time of the loan, the lender makes a condition with the borrower and requires him to undertake, of his own accord, to repay the loan even though under Torah law the debt would be remitted in the Sabbatical year, his condition is valid.

For although the Torah said that he is to be released from the debt, nevertheless, since the lender stipulated with him that he was lending to him only on this condition, and the borrower agreed to take the loan on this condition, the condition is effective, and

the Sabbatical year does not remit it,

and the borrower must repay his debt.

Shmuel holds that when one stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah, with regard to monetary matters his condition is valid. But if the lender says to the borrower that he is lending to him

“

on the condition that the Sabbatical year shall not remit the debt,”

meaning that the lender wishes to uproot the law of remission of debts from this loan [but does not require the borrower to obligate himself to pay even though the debt will be remitted], he has no power to alter the laws of the Sabbatical year. Therefore, the condition is ineffective, and

the Sabbatical year remits it.

It was taught: One who lends money to his fellow without specifying a term,

and did not establish a time for repayment of the debt,

may not demand payment from him

within

less than thirty days

from the day of the loan.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana reasoned before Rav,

while he was standing before Rav,

to say:

This statement—

that he may not demand payment within less than thirty days—applies specifically

to a loan documented by a promissory note,

since the writing of the document demonstrates that the loan was not for a short period of less than thirty days, because

a person does not ordinarily—

a person is not accustomed

to trouble himself to write a document

for a loan that is

less

than

thirty days,

thirty days.

But an oral loan,

where this rationale does not apply, and a person also borrows for a short period of less than thirty days—

does not

apply the rule that “an unspecified loan is for thirty days”; rather, the borrower must repay his debt immediately when the lender demands that he pay it.

Rav said to him: This is what my beloved teacher said

[Rabbi Hiyya, who was Rav’s uncle]:

Both a loan documented by a promissory note and an oral loan,

when lent without specifying a term, cannot be demanded until thirty days have passed from the time of the loan.

It was taught likewise: One who lends money to his fellow without specifying a term may not demand payment from him within less than thirty days.

Both a loan documented by a promissory note and an oral loan.

Shmuel said to Rav Mattana: Do not sit on your feet,

do not remain seated on your legs [but stand up [Tosafot, Nazir 24b]],

until you explain this teaching

that I am telling you:

From where is this matter that the Sages said—one who lends money to his fellow without specifying a term may not demand payment from him within less than thirty days, both a loan documented by a promissory note and an oral loan—derived?

He said to him,

Rav Mattana said to Shmuel: The Sages derived this law from

as it is written [Deuteronomy 15], “

Deuteronomy 15]: “

The seventh year, the year of remission, is approaching.”

And they expounded the repetition of the wording, which seems difficult:

Is it not the case that

from the implication of what is stated, “

The

seventh year is approaching,”

do I not know that it is

the year of remission?

Rather, what is the meaning

of stating once again

“the year of remission”?

To teach you: There is another remission that is like this one!

That is, another period whose law is like that of the Sabbatical year.

And which is it?

This is an unspecified loan to one’s fellow, from which he may not demand payment within less than thirty days.

And this period is considered as significant as an entire year, analogous to the year of remission.

For the Master said: Thirty days in a year are considered a year.

The Gemara mentions additional statements of Rav Yehuda, concerning which Rav Kahana raised an objection.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: One who opens the neck

of a garment,

who makes an opening for the neck in a new garment and thereby completes the garment,

on Shabbat—

is liable to bring a sin-offering,

because of the improvement of the garment, which is a derivative of the labor of “striking the final blow,” which includes every improvement and completion of a labor.

Rav Kahana raised an objection: And what difference is there between this

which is forbidden to open the neck of a garment

and the stopper of a barrel,

for we have established [Shabbat 146a] that one may cut the rim of a barrel on Shabbat in order to open it and drink its wine?

Apparently, even in the case of a barrel, he repairs it and completes its preparation for use by opening the stopper; why, then, was this action permitted?

And we answer:

He said to him

Rav Yehuda said to Rav Kahana: A barrel cannot be compared to a garment, for

this

garment, until one opens its neck, is

a single entity

—it is entirely one piece, and when one makes a new opening in it, he completes it; he is therefore liable for it because of makeh be-patish.

And

if

this

stopper of a barrel, although it is sealed with clay over the mouth of the barrel, nevertheless

is not a complete joining

so as to be considered one entity, but rather we regard the barrel as open, then removing the stopper from it is not considered making a new opening, and it is therefore permitted to remove it on Shabbat.

A ritual bath containing forty se'a of non-drawn water, which is valid for immersion, may have drawn water added to it [which is invalid for immersion] without limit.

By Torah law, there is no difference between a case in which the ritual bath initially contained invalid drawn water and forty se'a of valid, non-drawn water were subsequently added to it, and a case in which it initially contained valid, non-drawn water and invalid drawn water was subsequently added to it. In every case, if the ritual bath contains forty se'a of non-drawn water, it is a valid ritual bath in which one may immerse.

However, the Sages instituted a decree, so that people would not err and come to immerse in drawn water: If, at the initial formation of the ritual bath, it contained three log of drawn water, the ritual bath is rendered invalid even if forty se'a of valid, non-drawn water are subsequently added to it.

This decree—that “three log of drawn water render a ritual bath invalid if they were present in it initially”—was enacted only when the ritual bath initially contained three log of drawn water, so that people would not err and say that one may immerse in drawn water. But if the ritual bath initially contained other liquids, in which immersion is not possible, the Sages did not decree that the ritual bath be rendered invalid when forty se'a of valid water are subsequently added to them.

And Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Three log of water into which a kortov

a small measure

of wine, and

their

appearance

the appearance of the three log mixed with wine

is like the appearance of wine,

and they fell into a ritual bath

and it is explained below whether it contains forty se'a or not—

they do not render it invalid.

Although three log of drawn water render a ritual bath invalid, since these waters appear like wine, we follow their appearance, and the Sages did not render the ritual bath invalid on their account.

Rav Kahana raised an objection: And what difference is there between this

water whose appearance is like wine and which does not render the ritual bath invalid

and water

containing dye,

water into which dye was mixed, which renders the ritual bath invalid through three log when it was added to it initially!

As

we learned: Rabbi Yosei says: Water containing dye renders a ritual bath invalid through three log,

when it was added to it initially.

And we answer:

Rava said to him: There

in the case of water containing dye, the reason it renders the ritual bath invalid is that the designation “water” remains applicable to it, and it is called

“dyed water”

.

” it is called.

But water whose appearance is like wine does not render the ritual bath invalid, since the designation “water” does not apply to it. Rather, it is called

“diluted wine”

,

and the Sages did not decree that wine render a ritual bath invalid when three log of wine were added to it initially.

And we challenge this:

But Rabbi Hiyya taught

that three log of water mixed with wine and appearing like wine

remove the ritual bath,

removing from it the presumption of validity, and it is rendered invalid through them.

And we answer:

Rava said: It is not difficult!

This

statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav, that we follow the appearance, is in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri.

Whereas

this

statement of Rabbi Hiyya, who maintains that we do not follow the appearance, is in accordance with the view of

the Sages.

And we find that they disputed this matter,

as we learned: Three log of water,