Makkot 20a (כ.) — the Talmud in English

Therefore, if

the priest ate

this fig without rectifying it,

he receives one set of lashes!

Because of eating the first tithe that he separated within this fig, since terumat ma'aser had still not been separated from it; consequently, he ate first tithe that was still tevel with respect to terumat ma'aser.

And

if

a non-priest [

an Israelite]

ate it, he receives two sets of lashes:

a. Because of first tithe that is tevel with respect to terumat ma'aser. b. Because of the teruma at its stem, which is forbidden to non-priests.

The beraita adds: All this that we said, that the Israelite is liable for two sets of lashes, applies only after the priest’s incomplete separation.

For if

the Israelite ate the fig

at the outset,

when it was entirely tevel, before the priest had separated any terumot or tithes from it, then if he

ate it, he receives lashes

only once,

for tevel alone.

The Gemara infers:

The reason is that it is in Jerusalem.

The reason Rabbi Yosei held the Israelite liable for only two sets of lashes is that Rabbi Yosei presented his case as one in which the non-priest ate the fig while he was in Jerusalem.

This implies

that it is proven that if he ate it

in the provinces,

even before the fig had ever seen Jerusalem, the non-priest would

receive three sets of lashes

for eating the fig, while the priest would receive two sets, since an additional prohibition is present here: eating second tithe outside the wall of Jerusalem.

And it follows

that

one is liable for eating second tithe outside Jerusalem

even though

this second tithe

had not “seen the face of the wall”

!

If so, this is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan, who said that one is liable for lashes for eating second tithe outside Jerusalem only if the produce had already entered Jerusalem and then left it.

The Gemara rejects the proof from this beraita:

You cannot infer from Rabbi Yosei’s words that if one ate the fig outside Jerusalem, he receives lashes also for eating second tithe even if the fig had never been in Jerusalem, for the inference you made from Rabbi Yosei’s words can be established as referring to a case

where he brought it in,

having already brought the second tithe to Jerusalem,

and took it out,

and afterward took it out of Jerusalem to the provinces; only then does he receive three sets of lashes.

But the Gemara wonders about establishing the inference from Rabbi Yosei’s words as referring to a case in which he had already brought the fig to Jerusalem:

If so, what is the point of stating it!?

What novelty is there in Rabbi Yosei’s statement!?

After all, Rabbi Yosei’s basic statements—that a priest receives lashes for eating produce that is first tithe still tevel with respect to terumat ma'aser, and that an Israelite also receives lashes for eating teruma gedola—contain no novelty whatsoever.

Therefore, granted, if we say that one can infer from Rabbi Yosei that one receives lashes for second tithe eaten in the provinces even when it had not seen the face of the wall, this is understandable, as his statement was made for the sake of this novelty.

But according to you, this is difficult: If you maintain that the inference from Rabbi Yosei’s words concerning the prohibition against eating second tithe outside the wall applies only when it was brought into Jerusalem and then taken out, what novelty is there in his statement!?

And we answer:

What are we dealing with here?

This is the inference to be drawn from Rabbi Yosei’s having presented his case as one in which the fig was in Jerusalem: that one receives lashes for eating second tithe outside the wall,

for example, where he brought them in,

having brought the figs to Jerusalem while they were still

in their state of tevel,

and the walls of Jerusalem took hold of the figs, which were tevel, with regard to the status of the second tithe that would eventually be separated from them. From that point onward, even if the produce is taken out of Jerusalem while it is still tevel, and only afterward terumot and tithes [including second tithe] are separated from it, in such a case it is considered that the second tithe has already seen the face of Jerusalem [although it was separated from the tevel only after it had left Jerusalem]. Therefore, if one eats it outside Jerusalem, he also receives lashes for eating second tithe outside the wall.

This is the novelty that Rabbi Yosei introduced in his statement: that one receives lashes for eating second tithe outside the wall even though the fig he ate had seen the face of Jerusalem only while it was still tevel.

And

the reason Rabbi Yosei holds that even a fig brought to Jerusalem in its state of tevel is considered as having had the second tithe destined to be separated from it see the face of Jerusalem is that

he holds

Rabbi Yosei that

gifts

of the priesthood or tithes, even though

they

have not yet

been separated,

have neither been separated nor been given a designation,

are considered as though they had been separated.

Therefore, when he brought the fig that was tevel to Jerusalem, it is considered as though the second tithe that must be separated from it were already present, and it thereby had seen the face of the wall even before it was separated. Consequently, even if he took it out of Jerusalem while it was still tevel and separated the second tithe outside Jerusalem, if he ate it outside, he receives lashes for it, as one who eats outside Jerusalem second tithe that had seen the face of the wall of Jerusalem.

And we challenge this:

And

if

Rabbi Yosei holds, “Gifts that have not been separated are considered as though they had been separated,”

but it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Yosei:

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree concerning produce

whose work had not been completed

with regard to becoming liable for tithe,

and which passed through

the interior of the wall of

Jerusalem: that it may be redeemed,

for it is still possible to redeem the

second tithe of such produce, and it may be eaten anywhere.

Since its work had not been completed, it had not yet become liable for tithe, and the produce is not considered tevel with respect to second tithe until it is possible to say of it, “Gifts that have not been separated are considered as though they had been separated,” as though it had already seen the face of the wall and could no longer be redeemed.

And concerning what did

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree?

Concerning produce whose work had been completed

with regard to tithe

and which passed

while it was tevel

through

the interior of

Jerusalem,

and afterward second tithe was separated from it.

Beit Shammai say:

It is no longer possible to redeem the second tithe contained in it, since the walls of Jerusalem had already taken hold of it while this produce was still tevel. Therefore,

he shall return its second tithe and eat it in Jerusalem.

And Beit Hillel say:

Although pure second tithe that entered Jerusalem no longer has the status of redeemability, in the case of this produce, which entered Jerusalem in its state of tevel, before second tithe was separated from it, it is still possible to redeem the second tithe contained in it. Therefore,

he shall redeem

the second tithe

and eat

the produce

anywhere.

And it follows that Beit Hillel hold that gifts that have not been separated are not considered as though they had been separated.

And the proof is as follows:

And if it enters your mind

that Rabbi Yosei holds

that gifts that have not been separated are considered as though they had been separated,

and produce that is tevel is considered as though the terumot and tithes in it had already been separated, then why do Beit Hillel hold, according to him, that it can be redeemed even if it passed through Jerusalem while it was tevel?

But the walls took hold of it

of Jerusalem.

It is logical that Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with Beit Hillel, since the halakha does not follow Beit Shammai where Beit Hillel disagrees with them. Since Rabbi Yosei presented the statement of Beit Hillel in this manner, it follows that Rabbi Yosei holds that gifts that have not been separated are not considered as though they had been separated. This is difficult in light of what we said above, that Rabbi Yosei introduced the novelty that gifts that have not been separated are considered as though they had been separated.

And we answer:

Rava said:

In truth, Rabbi Yosei holds that gifts that have not been separated are considered as though they had been separated. Therefore, even produce that entered Jerusalem in its state of tevel, left it, and only afterward had second tithe separated from it is considered as though the second tithe itself had seen the face of Jerusalem. Consequently, if one eats it outside Jerusalem, he is liable for lashes.

However, Rabbi Yosei holds, in the statement of Beit Hillel, that all this applies only with regard to

a wall for eating [

with regard to the prohibition against eating outside the wall of Jerusalem], which is a prohibition

from the Torah.

But the matter of

a wall for taking hold [

with regard to the law of redemption, meaning that once the produce has been taken hold of by the walls of Jerusalem, it no longer has the status of redeemability even if it leaves Jerusalem] is only a law

of rabbinic origin,

because according to Torah law, any second tithe that is not currently in Jerusalem may be redeemed; only in Jerusalem itself is it impossible to redeem it by Torah law.

And

therefore Beit Hillel hold that

when the Sages decreed

that it is forbidden to redeem produce after the walls of Jerusalem have taken hold of it, this applies only when the second tithe had seen the face of Jerusalem

because it was present as such,

when the second tithe was physically present, having already been separated. But if the produce had been in Jerusalem only

in its state of tevel [

when it was tevel], and the second tithe was not yet physically present, in such a case

the Sages did not decree

that redemption is forbidden when the produce leaves Jerusalem, even though gifts that have not been separated are considered as though they had been separated.

Ravina said

to resolve the difficulty in another manner: Rabbi Yosei always holds that with regard to produce that is tevel and saw Jerusalem, this is not considered the second tithe having seen the face of Jerusalem, because he holds that gifts that have not been separated are not considered as though they had been separated. There is no distinction between a wall for eating and a wall for taking hold.

And what we inferred from Rabbi Yosei’s words—that a non-priest who ate a fig containing teruma, and first tithe that was tevel with respect to terumat ma'aser, and second tithe outside Jerusalem, receives three sets of lashes—should not be established as referring to a case in which it entered Jerusalem while it was tevel. Rather, it entered Jerusalem after the second tithe had been separated. In truth, Rabbi Yosei holds that produce that saw Jerusalem while it was tevel is not considered to have had the second tithe contained in it see the face of Jerusalem.

The novelty in Rabbi Yosei’s statement is that even if the second tithe itself did not enter Jerusalem, but the case is

for example, where he held it with a pole,

holding the second-tithe produce on a long pole outside the wall while he himself stood inside the wall, even in such a case it is considered as though the second tithe itself entered inside, and one is liable for it if he subsequently takes it out, moves it away, and eats it outside.

And Rav Pappa’s question is thereby resolved

stringently. Earlier he was uncertain about this matter and did not resolve it, but here it is resolved from Rabbi Yosei’s words: even when one holds the second tithe with a pole, it is considered as though he is carrying the second tithe. Wherever the person carrying the second tithe sees the face of Jerusalem, the prohibition against eating the second tithe outside the wall takes effect, even though the produce itself does not see the face of Jerusalem:

Mishna:

The prohibition against rounding the head [shaving the sidelocks], the prohibition against destroying the beard, and the prohibition against making a laceration as an expression of pain and mourning for the dead are stated in the Torah in the passage of Kedoshim [Leviticus 19:27]: “You shall not round the corner of your head, and you shall not destroy the corner of your beard, and you shall not make a laceration in your flesh for the dead.”

Likewise, at the beginning of the passage of Emor, the Torah issued a special warning to priests not to make a baldness on their heads and not to make lacerations in their flesh as an expression of mourning for a deceased relative, and likewise not to destroy the corner of their beard, as it is stated [Leviticus 21:5]: “They shall not make a baldness upon their heads, neither shall they shave off the corner of their beard, nor make any laceration in their flesh.”

And in the passage of Re'eh [Deuteronomy 14:1], the Torah again prohibited everyone from making a baldness or wounding himself for the dead, as it is stated: “You shall not cut yourselves, nor make a baldness between your eyes for the dead.”

The Mishna before us is divided into two parts:

First, the Mishna explains the four prohibitions: two prohibitions stated specifically with regard to making a baldness or a laceration for the dead, and two others stated in every context, concerning rounding the head and destroying the beard.

Then the Mishna explains how many times one receives lashes for these prohibitions:

The first part:

a.

One who makes a baldness on his head

for the dead receives lashes. As it is stated: “Nor make a baldness between your eyes for the dead” (Deuteronomy 14:1), and this verse applies to every person, both priests and Israelites.

b.

And

likewise,

one who rounds the corner of his head,

shaving the sidelocks and making the hair at his temples, on both sides of his head, the same height as the hair behind his ear, thereby making the hair on the upper part of the head resemble a rounded cap, receives lashes. (The Gemara will explain what constitutes rounding the head.) Even if he shaved with scissors, he is liable, as it is stated: “You shall not round the corner of your head” (Leviticus 19:27).

c.

And

likewise,

one who destroys the corner of his beard

with a razor receives lashes, as it is stated: “Neither shall you destroy the corner of your beard.” ( there.)

d.

And

likewise,

one who makes a single laceration for the dead [

who wounded his body, whether with his fingernails or with an implement, because of the pain he felt over his dead]

is liable

for lashes, as it is stated: “Nor shall you make a laceration for the dead in your flesh” (Leviticus 19:28).

The second part: a.

If one makes a single laceration

because of the pain he felt

over five dead people, or

makes

five lacerations

because of the pain he felt

over one dead person, he is liable

for lashes

for each one [

for each person and for each laceration]. As it is stated: “Nor shall you make a laceration for the dead in your flesh.” The verse comes to make one liable for each laceration and for each person.

b.

For

rounding the corner of

the head,

he is liable for

two,

two instances of forty lashes:

one

for shaving the sidelock

on this side,

the right side,

and one

for shaving the sidelock

on this side,

the left side.

c.

For

destroying the corner of

the beard,

he is liable for five sets of lashes, because the beard has five corners:

two on this side—

one on the upper cheek and one at the place where the cheek joins the chin, on the right side.

And two on this side,

on the left side.

And one below,

on the lower part of the chin, in the middle.

Rabbi Eliezer says: If they were all removed [

all the corners of the beard]

at once [

in a single action],

he is liable only

once

for one

set of lashes. Since it is one prohibition, this is comparable to one who eats an olive-bulk of forbidden fat twice after receiving a single warning, who receives only one set of lashes.

And the Mishna adds and says:

And he is not liable

to lashes for destroying the beard

until

he removes it [

shaves it ]

with a razor.

As it is stated concerning Israel: “You shall not destroy the corner of your beard,” and it is stated concerning priests: “Nor shall they shave off the corner of their beard.” What is shaving that entails destruction? You must say that this is shaving with a razor.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if he removed them with a malaket [

with pincers, resembling a small pair of tongs used for picking out and plucking hairs ],

or with a rahitni [

with a plane, an implement used to smooth beams and boards ],

he is liable

to lashes.

According to Rabbi Eliezer, these implements too cause destruction, and it is customary for people to shave with them. Whereas the first tanna maintains that although they destroy the hair, it is not customary for people to shave with them, and therefore one is exempt for using them.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

They taught in a beraita: It is stated with regard to priests whose relative died:

“They shall not make a bald spot

on their heads”

for their dead. (Leviticus 21:5)

One might have thought that even if he made four or five bald spots, he would be liable for only one;

the verse therefore states: “A bald spot.”

The word “bald spot” is superfluous, and comes

to

teach that

he is liable for each and every bald spot

made for the dead, with a separate set of lashes.

“On their heads”—

what does the verse come to teach,

what do we learn from the word “on their heads”?

As it is stated

with regard to an Israelite who makes a bald spot for the dead:

“You shall not cut yourselves, nor make a bald spot between your eyes for the dead,”

(Deuteronomy 14:1),

one might have thought that he would not be liable

for making a bald spot for the dead

except for

a bald spot in the hair

between the eyes alone. From where

do we include a bald spot in the hair of

the entire head?

The verse therefore states

with regard to priests whose relative died: “They shall not make a bald spot

on their heads”—

to include

the hair of

the entire head,

which is prohibited as a bald spot.

And

still

I have not

learned from the words “a bald spot” and “on their heads,” which are written with regard to priests, that one is liable for each and every bald spot and that one is liable for the hair of the entire head just as for the hair between the eyes,

except

to prohibit this practice

for priests,

because

the verse added additional mitzvot for them,

and therefore the verse was more stringent with them, prohibiting a bald spot anywhere on the hair of the head and not only on the bald area between the eyes [as the verse states with regard to Israelites], and making them liable for a separate set of lashes for each and every bald spot.

An Israelite

who is liable for each and every bald spot and who is liable for the hair of the entire head just as for the hair between the eyes—

from where

do we derive this?

It is stated here,

with regard to priests: “They shall not make

a bald spot

on their heads.”

And it is stated there,

with regard to Israelites: “You shall not cut yourselves, nor make

a bald spot

between your eyes for the dead.”

Just as there,

in the verse concerning priests, the verse teaches that

one is liable for each and every bald spot, and is liable for

the entire

head just as for the area between the eyes,

so too here,

with regard to a bald spot made by an Israelite,

one is liable for each and every bald spot, and is liable for the head just as for the area between the eyes.

And just as there

with regard to Israelites, it is explicitly stated that the prohibition against making a bald spot applies specifically

for the dead,

so too here,

with regard to priests, the prohibition against making a bald spot applies only

for the dead.

This concludes the words of the beraita.

The Gemara now discusses its words: We learned at the beginning of this beraita that from the extra word “a bald spot” it is derived that even if one made four or five bald spots, he is liable for each and every bald spot,

and we inquire:

These four and five bald spots

with regard to which the Torah innovated that one is liable for each and every bald spot—

what are the circumstances?

If we say

that he made the bald spots

one after the other, with five warnings,

if so,

it is obvious

that he is liable for each and every bald spot, and no special derivation is necessary for this!?