Makkot 14a (יד.) — the Talmud in English

As we said initially,

although two punishments—[two acts of wickedness]—are not imposed together, a punishment of karet in addition to lashes is not considered an imposition of “two punishments,” since

if

those liable to karet

repent—

the Heavenly Court forgives them.

What can you say?

Perhaps you might say that this is still insufficient for them to be considered exempt from karet at the time the lashes are administered, since at that point

they have not repented;

they have still not repented

yet?

This is not an argument.

Since they can now repent and become exempt from karet,

the matter is not definitively subject to karet—

the punishment of karet is not absolute, but remains contingent upon their repentance. Therefore, we do not exempt them from lashes now on the grounds of “two punishments.”

Rabbi Yitzḥak

disagrees and

says:

All

those liable to karet in general

were included in the passage concerning forbidden sexual relations.

And why was karet for intercourse with one’s sister singled out

and written separately? To teach that there is

judgment by karet

alone

and not by lashes!

And we raise an objection:

But according to the Rabbis,

Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva, who disagree with Rabbi Yitzḥak,

the karet

that the Torah stated

for intercourse with one’s sister—what do I need it for?

Intercourse with one’s sister is included among all the forbidden sexual relations!?

And we answer: The special mention of karet for intercourse with one’s sister was stated

to distinguish.

Lest you say that since all the forbidden sexual relations are written together under one liability of karet, if one transgresses all of them unwittingly, in a single lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one korban chatat for all of them, therefore intercourse with one’s sister was singled out from the general category. This teaches both about itself—that if he committed it along with the other transgressions liable to karet, he must bring a separate korban chatat for it—and about the entire category, that for each and every forbidden sexual relation one must bring a separate korban chatat, even if he committed several distinct transgressions of forbidden sexual relations during a single lapse of awareness.

And this is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s

statement, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he committed all of them during a single lapse of awareness—

he is liable

for a chatat

for each and every one.

But now the Gemara raises the opposite difficulty:

And Rabbi Yitzḥak,

who derives from the karet written concerning intercourse with one’s sister that those liable to karet are liable only to the punishment of karet and do not receive lashes—

for distinguishing

and requiring a separate korban chatat for each forbidden sexual relation—

from where does he derive it?

And we answer:

He derives it from “

And to a woman during the uncleanness

of her menstruation

you shall not come near.”

Since it does not say, “And to a menstruant you shall not come near,” but rather the verse adds, “And to a woman,” the verse teaches

that one is liable for each and every woman

a separate korban chatat.

But if so, the difficulty returns with regard to Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael:

And according to the Rabbis as well, let them derive it from this,

from “And to a woman during the uncleanness of her menstruation you shall not come near”!?

And we say:

Indeed, that is so;

they too derive the distinction between the offerings for each forbidden sexual relation from the verse concerning a menstruant that says “and to a woman.”

But then

what is the purpose of singling out

the karet for intercourse with one’s sister

in order to distinguish,

why do I need it?

It is in order

to make him liable

for a separate offering for each forbidden sexual relation even when he violates several prohibitions of forbidden sexual relations that are “of one category,” such as when he has intercourse

with his sister, with his father’s sister, and with his mother’s sister

all of whom share one category, that of “sister.” The verse comes to teach that if he has intercourse with all three during a single lapse of awareness, he is liable for each and every one.

And we raise an objection:

It is obvious!

It is obvious that one who has intercourse with these three forbidden relatives must bring an offering for each and every one separately, and they are like all the forbidden sexual relations that we learned from the verse concerning a menstruant, which distinguishes them in order to make one liable to karet for each prohibition separately. For

the bodies are separate

as they are three women, and

there are

also

separate categories

of forbidden sexual relations! Each one carries liability by virtue of a different prohibition, and obviously they are not all punished by a single liability of karet.

Rather,

we establish the teaching from intercourse with one’s sister as

making liable

one who has intercourse

with his sister who is

also

his father’s sister,

and

who is

also

his mother’s sister—he is liable for three chatat offerings for intercourse with this one woman.

And

we explain:

How can you find such a case? With an exceedingly wicked person.

That is, he had intercourse with his mother and fathered two daughters, and then had intercourse with one of those daughters, who were also his sisters, and fathered a son from her. The second daughter is therefore forbidden to this son: as his mother’s sister, as his paternal half-sister, and as his father’s sister, since she was born to his father’s wife. Therefore, if he has intercourse with her unwittingly, he is liable to three chatat offerings.

And we raise the difficulty from the other side:

And Rabbi Yitzḥak,

according to whom the superfluous mention of “his sister” is needed to teach that those liable to karet do not receive lashes,

from where does he derive this

that the exceedingly wicked person is liable to three chatat offerings? For the Rabbis derive this from the superfluous mention of “his sister.”

And we answer:

He derives it by means of a kal va-chomer.

As we learned: Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market of Emmaus, when they went to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamliel’s son: One who has intercourse with his sister who is his father’s sister, who is his mother’s sister—what is the ruling?

Is he

liable

for one chatat

for all of them, or is he liable

for one chatat

for each and every one? And they said to me:

This

halakha, we have not heard. But we have heard

the halakha in a similar case:

One who has intercourse with five menstruant women during a single lapse of awareness is liable for each and every one.

And

from this

it appears

that the

matter

is that the exceedingly wicked person is liable to three chatat offerings,

by a kal va-chomer

from the liability of one who has intercourse with five menstruant women:

And if, in the case of a menstruant, which is one category, he is liable for each and every one,

here, where he has intercourse with his sister who is his father’s sister who is his mother’s sister,

which has three

separate categories in this one woman, all the more so

should he be liable to three!

But the other one,

Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael, who required a teaching from the verse to make the exceedingly wicked person liable to three chatat offerings, held that the

kal va-chomer

from the case of the five menstruant women is a kal va-chomer

that can be refuted

.

For it can be rejected by saying:

What is special about a menstruant is that the bodies are separate

and therefore he is liable for each and every one.

But his sister who is also his father’s sister and his mother’s sister is one body, and he should therefore be liable for only one offering even though she has three categories. Therefore, a verse is needed to make him liable.

The Gemara asks:

And the other one as well,

Rabbi Yitzḥak, who did not derive from the verse concerning “his sister” that the exceedingly wicked person is liable to three offerings because he relied on the kal va-chomer—he too concedes that

this

kal va-chomer

is certainly a kal va-chomer that can be refuted.

Rather, he derives it from the “his sister” in the latter part of the verse,

as an additional “his sister” is written at the end of the verse: “He has uncovered the nakedness of his sister.” From this superfluous expression, he derives that the exceedingly wicked person is liable to three chatat offerings.

And we return to the Rabbis:

And according to the other one, what do I need the “his sister” in the latter part of the verse for?

After all, the case of the exceedingly wicked person is derived from “his sister” in the passage of Aharei Mot.

And we establish it as serving

to make him liable for a sister

who is

his father’s daughter and his mother’s daughter,

and although the prohibition of a paternal sister but not a maternal sister, as well as that of a maternal sister but not a paternal sister, is explicit, and we know by a kal va-chomer that a sister who is both his father’s and his mother’s daughter is prohibited, the verse comes, through the superfluous mention of “his sister,” to prohibit her—

in order

to teach that punishments are not derived by logical inference.

A verse is therefore needed to prohibit her, even though we know through a kal va-chomer that she is prohibited.

And we return once more to Rabbi Yitzḥak:

And according to the other one,

from where does he derive the punishment for a sister who is both his father’s daughter and his mother’s daughter, given that punishments are not derived by logical inference!?

If you wish, say: He derives the punishment from the warning.

For regarding the prohibition against a sister who is both his father’s and his mother’s daughter, there is the superfluous phrase, “She is your sister.”

And he derives the law of the punishment from the warning: Just as the verse does not distinguish in the warning between a sister who is his father’s daughter [or a sister who is his mother’s daughter] and a sister who is both his father’s and his mother’s daughter, so too with regard to the punishment, he is liable also for a sister who is both his father’s and his mother’s daughter, just as he is liable for a sister who is his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter. Therefore, no verse was needed for this purpose, and it is not because he “derived it by logical inference.”