Kiddushin 79a (עט.) — the Talmud in English

And if it is not known

who preceded whom,

both give her a bill of divorce

out of doubt. Both the one to whom she became betrothed through her father and the one to whom she became betrothed through the agent. Since it is uncertain to which of them she became betrothed.

And if they wish, one

of them

gives

her

a bill of divorce, and

afterward

one marries

her. For whichever way you look at it, if he betrothed her first, the second betrothal is of no effect. And if his fellow betrothed her first, he has already divorced her, and she is permitted to everyone.

And similarly, in the case of a woman who gave permission to her agent to betroth her, and went

she too

and betrothed

herself, if

her betrothal preceded

his,

her betrothal is a valid betrothal.

And the agent’s betrothal is of no effect.

And if

his betrothal,

the betrothal performed by her agent, preceded hers, his betrothal is a valid betrothal.

And if they do not know

which of them preceded the other,

both give her a bill of divorce

out of doubt.

And if they wish, one

of them

gives

her

a bill of divorce, and one

of them

marries

her.

Gemara:

Our Mishna teaches this same law both with regard to a minor or a maiden, who becomes betrothed through her father, and with regard to an adult woman, who becomes betrothed herself.

And we explain:

And it is necessary

for it to teach us this law in both cases.

For if it had taught us

only

with regard to him,

in the case of a father who sent an agent, I would have said that it is specifically in this case that, if his betrothal preceded the agent’s betrothal, his betrothal takes effect,

because a man is knowledgeable

the man is well versed

in matters of lineage,

and once he found a husband of superior lineage for his daughter, he revoked the agency and betrothed her to him.

But with regard to a woman,

when she herself sent an agent, even if she preceded him and betrothed herself, her betrothal is not made with complete resolve, and she does not intend to revoke the agency, since

she is not knowledgeable about matters of lineage

she is not well versed in matters of lineage, and relies more on the agent to find her someone of proper lineage. And if he indeed finds such a person, she intends that her own betrothal should not take effect. Therefore,

I would say that her betrothal should not be a valid betrothal,

but the agent’s betrothal should take effect. Therefore the Mishna teaches us that if her betrothal preceded his, it is a valid betrothal.

And if it had taught us

only

with regard to her,

I would have said that specifically when she betrothed herself before the agent betrothed her, her betrothal is valid,

because a woman carefully examines a man before marrying him.

She examines the man’s character and status more closely before marrying him, and relies on herself more than on the agent; therefore, she revoked his agency.

But with regard to him

the father, if he sent an agent to betroth her,

I would say that he does not care

whether the agent’s betrothal takes effect rather than his own betrothal. And although he betrothed her first, he did not intend to betroth her except on the condition that the agent would not ultimately betroth her.

Accordingly,

it is necessary

for our Mishna to teach us this law in both cases.

Once a girl reaches the age of twelve years and one day and displays the signs of maidenhood, she is a maiden. Nevertheless, she can still become betrothed through her father. But once six months have passed from the time she became a maiden, or when she displays signs of adulthood during those six months, she is an adult woman and leaves her father’s authority. From that point onward, her father can no longer betroth her; rather, she can become betrothed only through herself.

It was stated: If her father betrothed her on the road, and she too betrothed

herself

in the city

on that same day,

and

now, at the end of the day, she was examined and found to be

an adult woman,

but it was not known whether she had already reached adulthood at the time of the betrothal—

Rav said: She is an adult woman before us.

And for this reason, we attribute that she had already reached adulthood at the beginning of the day as well. Therefore, her betrothal takes effect, and not that of her father, as is the law with regard to an adult woman.

And Shmuel said: We are concerned about the betrothals of both of them,

because it is uncertain whether, at the time of the betrothal, she was still a maiden, in which case her father’s betrothal takes effect, or whether she had already reached adulthood, in which case his betrothal did not take effect and her betrothal took effect.

And we inquire:

When

did this case occur?

If you say it occurred within the six

months between maidenhood and adulthood, this is impossible:

For

would Rav say in this case: She is an adult woman before us?!

During those six months she has the presumptive status of a maiden, so how can we say with certainty that she had already reached adulthood at the beginning of the day? Perhaps only

now

at the time she was examined

did she reach adulthood,

and not earlier.

Rather, necessarily, Rav and Shmuel disagreed in a case where she was betrothed

after

the six

months had passed.

But if so, the opposite difficulty arises:

And would

Shmuel say in this case

that

we are concerned about the betrothals of both of them?!

But Shmuel said: There are only six months between maidenhood and adulthood.

If so, she certainly was an adult woman at the time of the betrothal, and her betrothal is valid.

And we answer:

No, it is necessary. Rather, we must establish that they disagreed in a case where she was betrothed

on the day

on which

she became betrothed through her father and through herself

on the very day on which the six months were completed.

That is, on the day when six months had elapsed from the time she became a maiden, and in the evening she reached the age of twelve years, six months, and one day. Her presumptive status was that on this day she would display signs of adulthood, and in the evening she was examined and signs of adulthood were found on her.

Rav said: She is an adult woman before us.

And

since now

now, in the evening, she is

an adult woman,

we attribute that already

in the morning as well,

she too had already been

an adult woman.

For the entire day she had the presumptive status that she would reach adulthood.

And Shmuel said: Even if we found her in the evening with signs of adulthood, the entire day remains uncertain, because perhaps only

in the evening

now,

in the evening,

did she produce the signs.

And we challenge this:

And

for

Shmuel, what is different

about this law

from

the law of the

ritual bath?

As we learned: A ritual bath

that had the presumptive status of validity as a complete ritual bath, containing forty se'a of water,

which

now

was measured and found

invalid, because it

lacked

the forty se'a, and it is not known from when it had been lacking and had thereby become invalid—

then

all

the

ritual purities performed through it retroactively, whether in the private domain or in the public domain,

are

impure.

That is, all impure people who immersed in this ritual bath in the past, during the period when its validity is in doubt, retain their presumptive status of impurity, and the foods or liquids that came into contact with them are impure.

And although we maintain that uncertainty concerning impurity in the public domain is deemed pure, in this case all ritual purities that came into contact with those impure people [who immersed in this ritual bath] are impure even if they came into contact with them in the public domain. This is because their impurity is not merely an uncertain impurity; rather, we attribute that the ritual bath was certainly invalid at the time of their immersion, and consequently they are certainly impure.

And this is only because whenever the past status of something is uncertain to us, we attribute that its status now was also its status in the past.

If so, this is difficult for Shmuel: Why are we concerned that she was a maiden at the beginning of the day? She is now an adult woman, and one should say that she was so earlier as well.

And we answer:

That case is different

in the case of the ritual bath, for its law is not based on establishing an item according to its current presumptive status. Rather, it is the opposite: we establish it according to its original presumptive status, and render the person impure because

one can say: Establish the impure person according to his presumptive status

that he is impure,

and

therefore

say that he did not immerse

properly, but rather in a deficient ritual bath, and he therefore remains in his original presumptive status of impurity. For it is an established principle: Whenever uncertainty arises as to whether something changed from its former state, we establish it according to its original presumptive status and attribute that it did not change.

But the Gemara challenges this:

On the contrary!

If we take the original presumptive status into consideration, we should say:

Establish the ritual bath according to its presumptive status, and say that it did not become deficient,

as it was initially. What basis is there for relying on the original presumptive status of the impure person more than on the original presumptive status of the ritual bath?!

And we answer: Even with regard to the ritual bath, one can attribute that it became deficient before the immersion, because

it

is

deficient before you,

and we establish it according to its current presumptive status.

And we challenge again: If so,

here too,

in the case of the girl who reached adulthood, let us say:

she

is

an adult woman before you!

And we answer: There is still no proof that she was an adult woman at the time of the betrothal, because perhaps

only now did she reach adulthood.

And we challenge again: If so,

there

in the case of the ritual bath,

too,

let us say:

Only now did it become deficient!

Why, then, do we render it certainly invalid retroactively?

And we answer:

There,

there are

two grounds for disqualification

two deficiencies, in opposition to the ritual bath’s presumptive status of validity:

The person who immersed has a presumptive status of impurity, and the presumptive status of the ritual bath was weakened by the fact that it is now deficient before us. Through the combination of these two factors, we conclusively rule that the person is impure.

But

here, there is only one ground for disqualification,

namely, “she is an adult woman before us.” This reasoning alone is insufficient to resolve the uncertainty.

And

we challenge further: For

Shmuel, what is different

about the case of this girl

from

the law of the

barrel?!

As it was taught: If

a

person

was

examining

regularly

the barrel

of wine to ensure that it had not turned sour, so that he could

separate teruma from it and continue

that is, continually separate teruma from it for other wine that was tevel, each time he came to drink from that other wine—

And afterward it was found

that the barrel had become

vinegar,

and was no longer fit for separating from it for wine, since one may not separate from one species for another, and it is not known when it turned sour—

For all three

days

following the time of his last examination, it has the presumptive status of

certainly

not having turned sour, and all the tevel for which he separated teruma from it is presumed to have been rendered fit.

From this point onward, until it was found to be vinegar, it has the status of

doubt,

and all the tevel for which he separated teruma from it is tevel as a matter of doubt. [

And they raise a contradiction

This is one approach in the Gemara to explaining this beraita. There is one who disputes it and explains it differently.]

And we raise

a contradiction between the law of the

barrel and the ritual bath: What is different here,

in the case of the ritual bath, that we consider it

certainly

invalid from the earliest time at which we are uncertain about it?

And what is different here,

in the case of the barrel, where during the first three days it has the status of

doubtful

souring?!

And

Rabbi Hanina of Sura

said to resolve the matter: Who is the

tanna

who

taught the law of the

barrel?

It is Rabbi Shimon.

For

he likewise disagrees

with regard to the ritual bath,

and there too he

makes it a matter of doubt

renders it so.

As it was taught: A ritual bath that was measured and found deficient,

And if the ritual purifications were performed through it

all ritual purities performed through it retroactively

anything touched by a person who immersed in the ritual bath to purify himself from his impurity,

whether in the private domain or in the public domain, are impure.

And Rabbi Shimon says:

The ritual bath is not retroactively invalid with the status of certainty; rather, it has only the status of a doubtful invalidity during the time when the impure people immersed in it.

Therefore, ritual purities performed through it

in the public domain are pure,

since uncertainty concerning impurity in the public domain is deemed pure.

And if the ritual purities were performed through it

in the private domain,

they have the status of doubtful impurity, for Rabbi Shimon holds that uncertainty concerning impurity in the private domain renders an item impure only as a matter of doubt.

And if these are ritual purities of teruma,

they are left in suspension.

That is, they may neither be eaten nor burned. This is not like impure teruma, whose law is that it must be burned, since teruma may not be burned on account of a doubt. For if it is pure, it is forbidden to destroy it, as it is written: “the safeguarding of My teruma.”

It follows that Rabbi Shimon follows his own reasoning, and it is properly stated that with regard to the barrel as well, throughout that entire period it remains a matter of doubt.

But according to the Rabbis,

since it is now vinegar before us, we attribute with certainty that throughout that entire period it was vinegar. Consequently, all the wine for which he separated teruma from it is

tevel

And we challenge again:

retroactively,

since it is impossible to separate teruma from vinegar for wine.

This is difficult for Shmuel: Why, in the case of the girl who is now found to be an adult woman, was he concerned that perhaps she reached adulthood only now, rather than attributing that she had already reached adulthood at the beginning of the day?

And we answer:

That case is different

in the case of the barrel,

as one can say: Establish the tevel according to its

original

presumptive status, and say that it was not rendered fit.

And we challenge again:

On the contrary, establish the wine according to its

original

presumptive status, and say that it did not turn sour.

And we answer: Even with regard to the wine, one can attribute that it turned sour some time earlier, since

it

now

has turned sour before you.

And we challenge again:

Here too,

in the case of the girl, let us say:

she is an adult woman before us.

And for this reason let us attribute that she had already reached adulthood at the beginning of the day.

And we answer: Nevertheless, it is uncertain, for perhaps only

now did she reach adulthood.

And we challenge again: If so,

there too

let us say:

Only now did it turn sour,

and not earlier.

And we answer:

There,

in the case of the barrel,

there are two grounds for disqualification.

There is the presumptive status of tevel applying to the wine for which he separated teruma, and the barrel itself is now vinegar before us. It is specifically through the combination of these two factors that we conclude with certainty that it had turned sour at the outset.

But

here,

in the case of the girl,

there is only one ground for disqualification

alone,

that exists.

The reasoning “she is an adult woman before us” is by itself insufficient to resolve the uncertainty.

And we inquire: Shall we

say,

that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel is

like

the dispute between these

tannaim

?