Kiddushin 78b — the Talmud in English

This verse

in the Book of Ezekiel,

its beginning

speaks

of the High Priest,

for it is stated at its beginning: “A widow or a divorced woman they shall not take,” and the prohibition of a widow applies only to the High Priest.

And

if

the end

of the verse speaks

of an ordinary priest,

for it is stated at its end: “And the widow who shall be a widow from a priest, they shall take.”

And Rav Naḥman assumed that this is the meaning of the verse, “who shall be a widow from a priest”: only a widow who had been married to one who is genealogically qualified for the priesthood, whose daughter is permitted to a priest, may an ordinary priest take.

But is it possible to say that the words of the verse in its beginning and its end deal with two different priests?

He said to him,

Rava:

Yes!

Indeed, the beginning of the verse is about the High Priest, and the end is about an ordinary priest.

Rav Naḥman returned and asked him:

And

is it

that the verse was written in this manner!?

Is this the way of Scripture, to begin with one matter and move to another matter without stating this explicitly?!

He said to him,

Rava:

Yes.

Indeed, this is the way of Scriptural passages.

For we find this in the Book of Samuel [I, 3:3],

as it is written: “

And the lamp of God

[the lamp of the menorah]

had not yet gone out, and Samuel was lying in the Temple of the Lord.”

And

it is impossible to explain that “the Temple of the Lord” refers to everything stated here, including Samuel’s lying in the Temple,

for behold,

we have established that: “

There is no

permission for

sitting in the Temple courtyard except for the kings of the House of David alone.”

If so, how did Samuel lie there?

Rather,

the verse necessarily says as follows: “

The lamp of God had not yet gone out, in the Temple of the Lord, and Samuel was lying

in his place,

in the house of the Levitical watch,” for the Levites would guard in the Temple, and Samuel was a Levite.

Thus, Scripture moves within the matter from one matter to another.

And the Gemara continues to explain the words of the verse: “

And the widow who shall be a widow from a priest, they shall take.”

And we raise a difficulty: Is it only a widow who became widowed

from a priest, no

[will ordinary priests take her for themselves], whereas widows

from Israelites, not!?

Would the priests not take them as wives?! Surely every widow is permitted to them.

And we answer:

This is what the verse says:

“and the widow who shall be a widow [whether she is a widow from an Israelite or whether she is a widow from a priest]—

from a priest they shall take.”

from a priest they shall take.”

And the word “from a priest” means

from “

the other priests,”

that is, the other priests, who are not High Priests, they

shall take

the widow for themselves as a wife.

It was also taught so: “

From a priest—

they shall take.”

The verse teaches, through “from a priest,” that

the other priests

[and not the High Priest], they

shall take

the widow as a wife!

Rabbi Judah says: This is what the verse says: “a widow from a priest”: only widows who became widowed from men who are

This is what the verse is saying: “A widow of a priest” means that only widows who became widows of men who are

among those who establish women as qualified for the priesthood

[whose daughters are fit for the priesthood],

shall take

the priests as wives. But men whose daughters are disqualified for the priesthood—their widows too are disqualified for the priesthood.

And

Rabbi Judah

proceeds here

according to his position.

For

Rabbi Judah said:

The daughter of a male convert

is

like the daughter of a male ḥalal,

who is disqualified for the priesthood.

And because of this, even the widow of a convert is disqualified for the priesthood.

For the principle is:

Anyone whom

the priest

may marry as a daughter, he may marry

also

as his widow.

And anyone whose daughter he may not marry, he may not marry as his widow.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yose says: Even a convert who married a female convert,

his daughter is fit for the priesthood.

Rav Hamnuna said in the name of Ulla: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yose.

And Rabba bar bar Ḥana likewise said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yose.

And

nevertheless,

from the day the Temple was destroyed, priests practiced an embellishment

[an elevation, a stringency]

upon themselves,

and were stringent

in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov,

not to marry one whose father and mother are converts.

Rav Naḥman said: Huna said to me:

A priest who

comes to consult

initially about marrying a daughter of converts,

they instruct him

stringently,

in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

But after he has

married

her,

they do not remove her

from his authority, for they do not compel him to divorce her; rather, they are lenient with him

in accordance with Rabbi Yose.

Mishna:

This Mishna explains the law of “recognition.” A father

who says

about his son:

“This son of mine is a mamzer”

he is!—

he is not deemed credible

to disqualify him.

And even

his father and mother,

both admit

and say

about the fetus in her womb: “He is a mamzer”,

because she became pregnant from another man in violation of the prohibition of a married woman—

they are not deemed credible.

Because a person is not disqualified from the Jewish community except on the basis of valid testimony of two witnesses. And his father and mother are disqualified from testifying about him because they are his relatives.

Rabbi Judah says: They are deemed credible.

The father is deemed credible to disqualify his son as a mamzer.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Even when both admit concerning the fetus in her womb that he is a mamzer, they are not deemed credible.

And we inquire about it:

What is the meaning of

“and even both of them”?!

What novelty is there in this, beyond the fact that the father alone is not deemed credible?

And we answer: The tan­ nay stated it in the manner of

“it is not necessary to say”;

he says.

It is not necessary to say

to say that

he

[the father] is not deemed credible to say that she became pregnant from another man, because

he does not know

the father [he is not so able to know] whether she became pregnant from him or from another man—

but even she

[the mother],

who knows

[she knows] from whom she became pregnant, she too

is not deemed credible

to say that she became pregnant from another.

And another novelty is introduced in the end: Even concerning a fetus, before its birth, they are not deemed credible to disqualify him.

It is not necessary to say

to say,

where

he has already been born,

that

he already

has a presumption of fitness

[since before they came to disqualify him, he was established among us as fit],

that

it is obvious that they

are not deemed credible,

for they are not deemed credible to remove him from his presumption—

but even a fetus as well, who does not have a presumption of fitness,

also

they are not deemed credible

to disqualify him. And although, if we deem them credible, he was never established as fit, nevertheless they are not deemed credible.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Judah says: They are deemed credible.

And the Gemara explains Rabbi Judah’s reasoning:

As it was taught:

It is written in the section concerning the inheritance of the firstborn [Deuteronomy 21:17], “For the son of the hated one

he shall recognize

to give him a double portion.” And we expound from the word “recognize”:

His father shall make him known

to

others!

Even if no person knows whether he is indeed the firstborn, the father is deemed credible concerning this.

From here Rabbi Judah said: A person is deemed credible to say: “This is my son”—

the firstborn

he is!

And just as a person is deemed credible to say: “

This is my firstborn son

he is,”

so a person is deemed credible,

a priest,

to say: “This is

my son,

the son of a divorced woman

he is.

And this

is my son,

the son of a woman released by ḥalitza

he is!” And thereby to disqualify him from the priesthood. The same applies to disqualifying him from the Jewish community.

And the Sages say: Even though he is deemed credible to say, “This is my firstborn son,”

he is not deemed credible

to disqualify him from the Jewish community or from the priesthood.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: Granted, according to Rabbi Judah, this is why “he shall recognize” is written:

to teach that the father is deemed credible to make him known to others.

But according to the Sages,

“

he shall recognize”—

why do I need it?

And Rava replied: The verse needed to say “he shall recognize”

with regard to

a firstborn concerning whom it is not known whether he is the firstborn, that he

needs

the

recognition

of his father, who testifies concerning him that he is the firstborn.

And

for what halakhic purpose

is it necessary to know whether he is the firstborn?—

To give him a double portion.

For the firstborn takes in his father’s inheritance twice what the ordinary son takes.

And we raise a difficulty: Is it not

obvious

that the father is deemed credible concerning this by virtue of a “migo,” and

why do I need a verse?

That is, with regard to any property that a person is able to give to a particular person, by virtue of the fact that he is able to give it to him, he is also deemed credible to testify that it belongs to that particular person.

And the father too, with regard to his property—

since, if he wished, he could give him a gift

[since he is able to give it to his son as a gift] and favor him over his other sons,

could he not give it to him

[is he not able to give it to him]?! Therefore, it is obvious that he is deemed credible to testify that this son has the right of the firstborn in his property.

And we answer: The novelty of the verse here is that the father is deemed credible to grant him the right of the firstborn even

in property that subsequently came to him

[after he testified concerning him that he is the firstborn]. For now, at the time that he testifies concerning him, he is not able to transfer it to him, since it is not yet in his possession, and it is like property that has not yet come into the world. And a person cannot transfer something that has not yet come into the world.

And we still raise an objection: This principle applies only according to the Sages. But Rabbi Meir disagrees with them.

And according to Rabbi Meir, who says: A person can transfer something that has not yet come into the world,

“

he shall recognize”

why do I need it?!

After all, even concerning property that has not yet come into his possession, the father has a valid migo, for he can transfer it to his son.

And we answer: The law of “recognition” is still needed in order to deem the father credible concerning the right of the firstborn, with regard to property

that came to him while he was dying.

For even according to Rabbi Meir, who holds that a person can transfer something that has not yet come into the world, this applies only if, when the thing comes into the world, he is still capable of transferring it. But if, when the thing comes into his possession, he is no longer capable of transferring it, even the acquisition that he made regarding this thing at that time does not take effect.

And a dying person too is not capable of acquisition, because he is then considered like the dead. It follows that he cannot now transfer to his son property that will come into his possession when he is dying. And for such a case the law of “recognition” is needed.

Mishna:

One who gave permission to his agent to betroth his daughter, and he went

also

and betrothed her himself—

If

the betrothal

of his preceded

the betrothal of the agent,

his betrothal is a valid betrothal.

And the betrothal of the agent is nothing, for she was already betrothed at the time the agent betrothed her.

And if that of

the betrothal of

his agent preceded

his,

his betrothal,

of the agent,

is a valid betrothal,

and his own betrothal is nothing.