Kiddushin 78b (עח:) — the Talmud in English

This verse

in the Book of Ezekiel,

its first part

speaks

of a High Priest,

as it says at its beginning: “They shall not take a widow or a divorced woman,” and the prohibition against marrying a widow applies only to a High Priest.

And

if

the latter part

of the verse speaks

of an ordinary priest,

as it says at its conclusion: “And the widow who is a widow from a priest, they shall take.”

Rav Naḥman assumed that this is the meaning of the verse, “who is a widow from a priest”: only a widow who had been married to someone who is genealogically qualified for the priesthood, whose daughter is permitted to marry a priest, may an ordinary priest marry.

Is it possible to say that the first and latter parts of the verse concern two different priests?

Rava said to him:

Rava:

Yes!

Indeed, the first part of the verse concerns a High Priest, and the latter part concerns an ordinary priest.

Rav Naḥman asked him again:

And

is it

that the verse was written in this manner!?

Is it the way of Scripture to begin with one matter and move on to another matter without stating this explicitly?!

Rava said to him:

Rava:

Yes.

Indeed, this is the way of biblical verses.

For we find this in the Book of Samuel [I, 3:3,

as it is written: “

And the lamp of God

[the lamp of the Menora]

had not yet gone out, and Samuel was lying in the Sanctuary of the Lord.”

And

it is impossible to interpret that “the Sanctuary of the Lord” refers to everything stated here, including Samuel’s lying in the Sanctuary,

for

we have an established tradition that: “

There is no

permission for

sitting in the Temple courtyard except for the kings of the House of David alone.”

If so, how could Samuel have lain there?

Rather,

the verse must be saying as follows: “

The lamp of God had not yet gone out, in the Sanctuary of the Lord, and Samuel was lying

in his place,

in the house of the Levitical guard,” since the Levites would guard the Temple, and Samuel was a Levite.

Thus, Scripture moves within one subject to another subject.

The Gemara continues to explain the meaning of the verse: “

And the widow who is a widow from a priest, they shall take.”

And we raise a difficulty: Is it only a widow who became a widow

from a priest, not

[will ordinary priests take for themselves], whereas widows

from an Israelite, they may not!?

Is it the case that priests may not take such women as wives?! Surely every widow is permitted to them.

And we answer:

This is what

the verse

is saying: “And the widow, who is a widow [whether she is a widow from an Israelite or whether she is a widow from a priest]—

from a priest they shall take.”

And the word “from a priest” means

from “

the other priests,”

that is, the other priests, who are not High Priests, shall

take

the widow as a wife.

A beraita was also taught to this effect: “

From a priest”—

they shall take.”

The verse teaches by stating “from a priest” that

the other priests

[and not the High Priest] shall

take

the widow as a wife!

Rabbi Yehuda says:

This is what the verse is saying: “A widow from a priest”—only widows who became widows from men who are

among those who enable their daughters to marry into the priesthood

[whose daughters are fit for the priesthood] shall

take

as wives. But if the daughters of those men are disqualified from marrying into the priesthood, their widows are likewise disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.

And

Rabbi Yehuda

follows

his own reasoning in this matter.

As Rabbi Yehuda said:

Rabbi Yehuda:

The daughter of a male convert

is

like the daughter of a male ḥalal,

who is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.

And for this reason, even the widow of a convert is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.

For the principle is:

Anyone whom

the priest

may marry as a daughter, he may marry

also

as his widow.

And anyone whose daughter he may not marry, he may not marry as his widow.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei says: Even if a convert married a female convert,

their daughter is fit to marry into the priesthood.

Rav Hamnuna said in the name of Ulla: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

And Rabba bar bar Ḥana likewise said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

And

nevertheless,

from the day the Temple was destroyed, priests adopted an embellishment

[an elevation, a stringency]

for themselves,

and were stringent

in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov,

not to marry a woman whose father and mother were converts.

Rav Naḥman said: Huna said to me:

A priest who

comes to seek guidance

initially, asking whether he may marry the daughter of converts,

is instructed

stringently,

in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

But after he

has married

her,

she is not removed

from his authority, as he is not compelled to divorce her; rather, he is treated leniently

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

Mishna:

This Mishna explains the law of “recognition.” A father

who says

about his son:

“This is my son, a mamzer,”

he is

not deemed credible

to disqualify him.

And even

his father and mother,

both acknowledge

and say

about the fetus in her womb: “He is a mamzer,”

because she conceived from another man in violation of the prohibition against adultery—

they are not deemed credible.

This is because a person is not disqualified from marrying into the congregation except on the basis of valid testimony by two witnesses. His father and mother are disqualified from testifying concerning him because they are his relatives.

Rabbi Yehuda says: They are deemed credible.

The father is deemed credible to disqualify his son as a mamzer.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Even if both acknowledge concerning the fetus in her womb that he is a mamzer, they are not deemed credible.

And we raise a question about this:

What is the purpose of the phrase “

and even both”?

What novelty is there in this, beyond the fact that the father alone is not deemed credible?

And we answer: The tanna stated this by way of

“it is not necessary”

to say.

It is not necessary

to say that

he

[the father] is not deemed credible to say that she conceived from another man, because

he does not know

the matter with certainty [the father is not in a position to know clearly] whether she conceived from him or from another man—

rather, even she

[the mother],

who knows

[she knows] from whom she conceived, is also

not deemed credible

to say that she conceived from another man.

And an additional point is novel in the latter clause: even concerning a fetus, before its birth, they are not deemed credible to disqualify it.

It is not necessary

to say,

where

the child has already been born,

that

he already

has a presumption of fitness

[from the moment of his birth; before they came to disqualify him, he was established in our eyes as fit],

that

it is obvious that they

are not deemed credible,

as they are not deemed credible to remove him from his presumption—

rather, even concerning a fetus, which does not have a presumption of fitness,

also

they are not deemed credible

to disqualify it. And although, if they were believed, it had never been established as fit, nevertheless they are not deemed credible.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: They are deemed credible.

The Gemara explains Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning:

As it was taught:

It is written in the passage concerning the inheritance of the firstborn [Deuteronomy 21:17]: “For he shall acknowledge the son of the hated one,

to recognize

him, to give him a double portion.” And we derive from the word “recognize”:

His father shall make him known

to

others!

Even if no one knows whether he is in fact the firstborn, the father is deemed credible concerning this.

From here Rabbi Yehuda said: A person is deemed credible to say: “This is my son,”

the firstborn

he is!

And just as a person is deemed credible to say: “

This is my firstborn son

he is,”

so a person is deemed credible,

a priest,

to say: “This

is my son,

the son of a divorced woman

he is.”

And this

is my son,

the son of a ḥalutza

he is! And thereby to disqualify him from the priesthood. The same applies to disqualifying him from the congregation.

And the Sages say: Even though he is deemed credible to say, “This is my firstborn son,”

he is not deemed credible

to disqualify him from the congregation or from the priesthood.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda, this is why it is written “to recognize,”

to teach that the father is deemed credible to make him known to others.

But according to the Sages, “

to recognize”—

he shall recognize”—

why do I need it?

And Rava replied: The verse needed to state “to recognize”

with regard to

a firstborn whose status as firstborn is not known, who

needs

his father’s

recognition

that he is the firstborn.

And

with regard to what halakhic matter

is it necessary to know that he is the firstborn?—

To give him a double portion.

The firstborn takes a double portion of his father’s inheritance, twice the portion taken by an ordinary son.

And we raise a difficulty: Is it not

obvious

that the father is deemed credible concerning this by virtue of a migo, and

why do I need a verse?

That is, concerning any property that a person has the power to give to a particular individual, by virtue of the fact that he has the power to give it to him, he is also deemed credible to testify that it belongs to that individual.

And likewise, concerning the father’s property—

since, if he wished, he could give it to him as a gift

[since he has the power to give it to his son as a gift] and favor him over his other sons,

would he not give it to him

[is it not within his power to give it to him]?! Therefore, it is obvious that he is deemed credible to testify that this son has the right of the firstborn in his property.

And we answer: The novelty of the verse here is that the father is deemed credible to grant him the rights of the firstborn even

with regard to property that fell to him later

[after he testified concerning him that he was the firstborn]. For now, at the time that he testifies concerning him, he has no power to transfer it to him, since it is not yet in his possession; it is property that has not yet come into the world. And a person cannot transfer an object that has not yet come into the world.

And we still raise an objection: This principle applies only according to the Sages. But Rabbi Meir disagrees with them.

And according to Rabbi Meir, who says: A person can transfer an object that has not yet come into the world—“

to recognize”

he shall recognize”

why do I need it?!

After all, even concerning property that has not yet come into his possession, the father has a valid migo, since he can transfer it to his son.

And we answer: The law of “recognition” is still necessary to make the father credible with regard to the right of the firstborn, concerning property

that fell to him while he was dying.

For even according to Rabbi Meir, who maintains that a person can transfer an object that has not yet come into the world, this applies only if, when the object comes into the world, he is still legally capable of transferring it. But if, when the object comes into his possession, he is no longer legally capable of transferring it, even the acquisition he made concerning that object at the earlier time does not take effect.

And a dying person is likewise not legally capable of making a transfer, because at that point he is considered like one who is dead. It follows that he has no power now to transfer to his son property that will come into his possession when he is dying. And for such a case the law of “recognition” is necessary.

Mishna:

If one gave permission to his agent to betroth his daughter, and he went

also

and betrothed her himself—

If

the betrothal

of his preceded

the betrothal of the agent,

his betrothal is a valid betrothal.

The betrothal of the agent is entirely ineffective, since she was already betrothed when the agent betrothed her.

But if the

betrothal of

his agent preceded

his own,

his betrothal

of the agent

is a valid betrothal,

whereas his own betrothal is entirely ineffective.