Kiddushin 54b — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

There are two tannaim, and they disagreed

according to

Rabbi Yehuda,

whether Jerusalem is sacred:

The tanna in Tractate Nedarim holds, according to Rabbi Yehuda, that Jerusalem is not sacred; and Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yitzḥak in the beraita holds, according to Rabbi Yehuda, that Jerusalem is sacred.

Ulla said in the name of Bar Pada

to explain the reason of Rabbi Meir in our Mishna, that in an unwitting manner she is not betrothed, and he interprets it according to the approach of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

Rabbi Meir would say:

An offering

with which one committed misuse

intentionally

is

profaned,

but

in an unwitting manner it is not profaned,

because it is a mistaken transaction, for he does not wish that it should be profaned through him;

and they said that in an unwitting manner it is profaned only with regard to an offering,

that is to say: the Sages never said that the offering is profaned through unwitting misuse; rather, they said that in an unwitting manner he is liable for a misuse offering.

And we raise an objection to this:

But since

the offering

is not profaned, for what is he liable for an offering

why should he be liable for an offering

That is to say: the obligation of a misuse offering is for the profanation of the offering; and since it did not become unconsecrated, there is no reason to obligate him for an offering, as was already explained several times above in the notes from Rashi’s words, and so the later authorities understood the intention of the Gemara ; Addition to the sugya: a. The Tosafot wrote: “For what offering is he liable: for he was not liable [that is to say, he should not have been liable] for expenditure, but for eating or for bodily benefit.” The plain meaning of their words is that with expenditure that is a mistake, and the offering is not profaned, there is therefore no liability for misuse; but with eating or bodily benefit, where there is no mistake, he is properly liable [and this assumes that the Tosafot interpret Ulla’s words like Rashi, and not according to the method of the Tosafot of the Ri"D and Rav Ḥai Gaon]. But in Shaar HaMelekh [Misuse 6:5], he understood the intention of their words differently, and explained that their difficulty was from the Mishna brought below [55a]: “There is no misuse after misuse with consecrated property, except with an animal and a service vessel” [that is to say: with other offerings, once the first person committed misuse, it became unconsecrated, whereas an animal and a service vessel are sanctified with bodily sanctity and do not become unconsecrated]. And if we say that there is misuse only when the offering is profaned, then with consecrated property and a service vessel, why did he commit any misuse at all, since the offering does not become unconsecrated ; and for this reason the Tosafot explained that we said that there is no misuse except through profanation only with misuse that is through expenditure from one domain to another, which is the matter under discussion here; but with misuse that is through benefit, there is a liability for misuse even when it was not profaned. And see here Tosafot of the Rosh, in s.v. “except with regard to eating,” where he wrote as follows: “Nevertheless, he does not commit misuse [with regard to an animal and a service vessel] unless he derives benefit worth a peruta, for since it does not become unconsecrated, he has done nothing; but an item sanctified with monetary sanctity, he commits misuse with the intention of theft alone, without benefit worth a peruta, since he causes it to become unconsecrated.” This is in accordance with the words of Shaar HaMelekh. b. Now see in the Ritva, in s.v. “When he came,” [and in the Ramban, s.v. “And they did not say”], who raised a difficulty against the method of Rav Ḥai Gaon [brought in the note above], who holds that according to Rabbi Meir there is no profanation of an offering at all in an unwitting manner, from what we learned: “One who derives benefit worth a peruta from an offering has committed misuse”; and it is not reasonable to say that this is not according to Rabbi Meir; see there One who derives benefit worth a peruta from an offering has committed misuse”; and with misuse that is through benefit, there is misuse even when it did not become unconsecrated. c. In Shaar HaMelekh there, he raised a difficulty on the basis of this sugya against the Rambam there, for it appears from his words that with consecrated property and service vessels there is misuse after misuse even if one merely removed them from one domain to another and did not derive benefit from them; and this is difficult from this sugya, in which it is explained that if there is no profanation there is no misuse [at least with expenditure from one domain to another]. In the book Shemuot Kiddushin [above, 53b, section 137], he brought in the name of Minḥat Barukh, section 86, and in Ḥiddushei Rabbi Aryeh Leib, part II, section 42, that there is a distinction between bodily sanctity and monetary sanctity: with bodily sanctity, such as consecrated property and service vessels, where there is misuse after misuse and this was derived from a verse, included in the expansion is that one is liable for misuse through removing it, even when it did not become unconsecrated, unlike monetary sanctity. See there in Shemuot Kiddushin what he explained concerning this, and what he brought in the name of additional later authorities in resolving Shaar HaMelekh’s difficulty against the Rambam Rather, when Ravin came, he explained in the name of Bar Pada

[he explained in his name] in another manner:

Rabbi Meir would say: An offering is profaned intentionally; in an unwitting manner it is not profaned; and when they said that in an unwitting manner it is

profaned, this is only with regard to eating,

that is to say: if one committed misuse with an offering through expenditure, having sold it or betrothed with it, then it is not profaned because it is a mistake; and when did they say that in an unwitting manner the offering is profaned and one is liable for a misuse offering? Only when he ate the offering, or derived other bodily benefit from it.

Rav Naḥman said that Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

The halakha is according to Rabbi Meir with regard to Second Tithe,

that a woman is not betrothed with it, because Second Tithe is the property of the Most High,

since the tanna stated an anonymous Mishna according to him

[since there is an anonymous Mishna according to him], that Second Tithe is the property of the Most High, as he proceeds to explain.

And the halakha is according to Rabbi Yehuda with regard to an offering,

that it is profaned in an unwitting manner, even through betrothal and purchase, and an offering is not profaned intentionally at all,

since the tanna stated an anonymous Mishna according to him,

as he proceeds to explain.

And we explain: The tanna stated an anonymous Mishna

according

to

Rabbi Meir with regard to Second Tithe,

which is the property of the Most High.

What is it?

For we learned

in Tractate Second Tithe [5:3]:

A fourth-year vineyard

[a vineyard in the fourth year after its planting], which is eaten in Jerusalem; and if the place is distant from it, he redeems it with money and brings it to Jerusalem, as with Second Tithe:

The House of Shammai say: It has no fifth,

its law is not like that of Second Tithe, requiring the owners to add a fifth when they redeem the produce with money to bring it to Jerusalem,

and it has no removal,

its law is not like that of Second Tithe, which is removed from the house in the third and sixth years of the Sabbatical cycle, for it is forbidden to keep it longer, and one must deal with it according to its law.

And the House of Hillel say: It has

a fifth and it has removal, as with Second Tithe.

And they further disagreed:

The House of Shammai say:

Just as concerning an ordinary vineyard the Torah said [Leviticus 19:10]: “And your vineyard you shall not make a full harvesting [a type of grape cluster that the Torah commanded one to leave for the poor], and the fallen grapes of your vineyard you shall not gather,” so

it has

with regard to a fourth-year vineyard

the law of fallen grapes, and it has

the law of

poor man’s clusters,

requiring him to leave them for the poor so that they may eat them in Jerusalem, for a fourth-year vineyard is also included in “your vineyard,” as it is the property of an ordinary person.

And the House of Hillel say:

The entire vineyard

entirely

goes

to the winepress

[the place where grapes are trodden] of the owner, because it is the property of the Most High.

And we explain:

What is the reason of the House of Hillel

in their first dispute, concerning the fifth and removal?

Because

they derive

the House of Hillel through a gezerah shavah: “

Sacred” [“And in the fourth year all its fruit shall be sacred, praises for the Lord”] “

[“In the fourth year all its fruit shall be sacred, for praise to the Lord”],

sacred”

from Second Tithe [“And every tithe of the land, of the seed of the land and of the fruit of the tree, belongs to the Lord; it is sacred to the Lord”]:

[“Every tithe of the land, from the seed of the land and from the fruit of the tree, belongs to the Lord; it is sacred to the Lord”]:

Just as Second Tithe

has

a fifth and has removal, so too a fourth-year vineyard has a fifth and has removal.

And

if

the House of Shammai did not derive

“sacred, sacred”

from Second Tithe.

And from this Mishna one can prove concerning the position of the House of Hillel that they hold like Rabbi Meir, that “Second Tithe is the property of the Most High”:

And

behold,

the House of Hillel, who

, who

say

that the law of a fourth-year vineyard is

like Second Tithe

in every respect,

whose position do they hold

with regard to Second Tithe, concerning the property of an ordinary person and the property of the Most High!?

If it is according to Rabbi Yehuda

that they hold, then

why

did the House of Hillel say that a fourth-year vineyard

all of it goes to the winepress

and it has neither fallen grapes nor poor man’s clusters!?

For he said,

Rabbi Yehuda in our Mishna:

Second Tithe

is the property of an ordinary person,

and the same law applies to a fourth-year vineyard, which according to the House of Hillel is like Second Tithe, and it is called “your vineyard.”

Rather, is it not

necessarily that the House of Hillel

hold according to Rabbi Meir,

who holds that it is the property of the Most High and is not included in “your vineyard”? It follows that the position of the House of Hillel is like that of Rabbi Meir; and since the halakha is according to them, this is an anonymous Mishna according to Rabbi Meir. And this is what Rav Adda bar Ahava said: “The halakha is according to Rabbi Meir with regard to Second Tithe, since the tanna stated an anonymous Mishna according to him.”

We further explain what we said above, that the tanna stated an anonymous Mishna

according

to

Rabbi Yehuda with regard to an offering,

which is profaned in an unwitting manner and not intentionally—

what is it?

For we learned

in Tractate Misuse [21a]:

He sent

the treasurer one peruta of an offering

in the hand

of a

competent

agent to purchase with it from a shopkeeper,

and remembered

the sender remembered, and the agent also remembered,

before he reached the shopkeeper,

they are exempt from misuse, for there is no misuse intentionally; and

the shopkeeper

is the one who

commits misuse when he spends it,

the peruta in expenditure, for he is unwitting.

Behold, we have learned that an offering is profaned through unwitting expenditure, since the shopkeeper committed misuse—he was unwitting when he spent it; and we have learned that it is not profaned intentionally, for if not, the peruta would already have been profaned when it came into the shopkeeper’s hand, since they committed misuse with it intentionally.

And we raise a difficulty concerning what we said: the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir with regard to second tithe, because we learned an anonymous Mishna in accordance with his view, that second tithe belongs to the Most High:

And with regard to Rabbi Yehuda concerning second tithe

, who holds that it belongs to an ordinary person—

did we not learn

[is it true that we did not find an unattributed Mishna that accords with Rabbi Yehuda]!?

And was it not taught

in tractate Maaser Sheni [4:3]:

One who redeems his second tithe adds its fifth

as it is stated: “And if a man redeems, he shall redeem from his tithe, he shall add its fifth to it”

whether

the second tithe was

his own, or whether it was given to him

the second tithe

as a gift,

for even when it was given to him as a gift it is called “his tithe.”

But

whose

view is this Mishna?

If you say it is Rabbi Meir,

this cannot be said, for:

is he able to give it to him

[Can anyone give him second tithe]

as a gift,

and thereby obligate him in a fifth because it is called “from his tithe”!?

But did

Rabbi Meir not say:

second tithe

second

is the property of the Most High

and he cannot give it as a gift?

Rather, is it not

necessarily that this Mishna is

Rabbi Yehuda’s

view, who holds that second tithe is the property of an ordinary person?

And if so, it is difficult: why do we establish the halakha according to Rabbi Meir because Beit Hillel hold like him, when, on the other hand, there is an unattributed Mishna according to Rabbi Yehuda!?

And we answer:

No,

not as you explained, but

in every case

that Mishna is

Rabbi Meir’s

view, who holds that second tithe is the property of the Most High. And regarding what is difficult for you—how was it given to him as a gift—this is not difficult:

Here

in this Mishna

with what are we dealing:

with

a case where he gave it to him while it was still untithed produce

[The owner of the produce gave him the second tithe when it had not yet been separated, and it was still tevel],

and this tanna holds:

this tanna:

gifts

the foreleg, cheeks, and maw, and likewise second tithe—

that have not yet been separated

still

are considered as though they have not been separated,

that is: we do not say that they are as though they had already been separated and that the name “second tithe” applies to them; and if so, there is no impediment to giving them as a gift before they have been separated.

Come and hear

another unattributed Mishna in tractate Maaser Sheni [5:5], which is according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that second tithe is the property of an ordinary person:

As we learned:

One who redeems his fourth-year plantation adds its fifth, whether it was his own or whether it was given to him as a gift.

But

whose

view is this Mishna?

If you say it is Rabbi Meir’s

view, who holds that second tithe is the property of the Most High, this cannot be said, for:

is he able to give it to him

[Can he give] fourth-year produce as a gift!?

But

the tanna of this Mishna necessarily

derived

“holiness, holiness”

from second tithe,

and if not, from where would he derive the fifth for fourth-year produce; and if so, he likewise cannot give it as a gift, like second tithe, according to Rabbi Meir, who holds: “Second tithe is the property of the Most High”!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily

Rabbi Yehuda’s

view, that “second tithe—and likewise fourth-year produce—is the property of an ordinary person”?

And if so, it is difficult: why do we establish the halakha according to Rabbi Meir because Beit Hillel hold like him, when, on the other hand, there is an unattributed Mishna according to Rabbi Yehuda!? And we answer:

In every case

this Mishna

is Rabbi Meir’s

view, who holds that second tithe—and likewise fourth-year vineyard produce—is the property of the Most High. And regarding what is difficult for you—how was the vineyard given to him as a gift—this is not difficult:

and

because

here

in this Mishna—

with what are we dealing:

with

a case where he gave

him the vineyard

when it was

still

in the stage of samdar

[the beginning of the grape fruit after the flower falls, when each berry is distinguishable on its own], and in this state he can give it as a gift, since it is not yet fruit and the name “fourth-year produce” does not yet apply to it,

and

this teaches us this Mishna

that it is not according to Rabbi Yosei, who says: samdar

of orla

is forbidden

for benefit

because it is fruit,

but the tanna of this Mishna holds that the name fruit does not apply to it, neither with regard to orla nor with regard to fourth-year produce.

Come and hear

another unattributed Mishna in tractate Maaser Sheni [4:6], which is according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that second tithe is the property of an ordinary person:

He drew second tithe from him

second

for a sela,

a person drew his fellow’s second-tithe produce when it was worth a sela, with the intention that the money he would give in exchange for it would become sanctified with the sanctity of second tithe,

but did not manage

the one who drew it

to redeem it,

that is: he did not manage to pay the money,

until

the second tithe

stood at two:

Then the purchaser

That one who drew it

gives one sela

only to the seller, as he became obligated at the time of the drawing, and the second tithe is desacralized through it,

and gains a sela

which he does not give,

and his

second tithe

through the drawing, since second tithe is the property of an ordinary person and is acquired through drawing.

But

But

whose

If you say it is Rabbi Meir’s

view, who holds that second tithe is the property of the Most High, then its law is like consecrated property with regard to acquisition, and

why does he gain a sela

because he acquired it through drawing, when concerning consecrated property

“And he shall give the money, and it shall be established for him”

[“And he shall add a fifth of the money of your valuation to it, and it shall be established for him”]

the Merciful One said,

and neither a document nor possession acquires its real estate, nor drawing its movable property, but only money!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily

Rabbi Yehuda

who holds that “second tithe is the property of an ordinary person,” and for this reason it is acquired through drawing.

If so, there is a difficulty: why do we hold in accordance with Rabbi Meir because Beit Hillel agree with him, when, on the other hand, an unattributed Mishna follows Rabbi Yehuda

And we answer:

In every case,

that is: indeed,

Rabbi Yehuda

this Mishna is,

and

nevertheless we establish the halakha according to Rabbi Meir, because

here there is one unattributed ruling,

that is: Rabbi Judah the Patriarch made an unattributed ruling according to Rabbi Yehuda only once, in this Mishna, “He drew from him,”

and here there are two unattributed rulings,

that is: whereas Rabbi Judah the Patriarch made unattributed rulings according to Rabbi Yehuda twice, for he taught that same Mishna—in which Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai disagreed, and Beit Hillel are according to Rabbi Yehuda—both in tractate Maaser Sheni and in tractate Eduyot, and therefore the halakha is according to this Mishna.

And we wonder about it:

And if an unattributed ruling is specifically decisive,

that is: if indeed the halakha follows an unattributed Mishna,

what difference is there between one unattributed ruling and two unattributed rulings

[what advantage is there in two over one]!?

Rather,

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Meir, since we learned it in Bahirata

[tractate Eduyot is called “Bahirata,” because all their statements were testified in the name of the great sages, and the halakha follows them]

like him

like Rabbi Meir, for the words of Beit Hillel were also taught in tractate Eduyot, as was explained.