Kiddushin 50a (נ.) — the Talmud in English

It is written in the passage concerning vows to bring an offering: “If his offering is an olah from cattle, he shall offer an unblemished male; he shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting; he shall bring it for acceptance before the Lord”—

And since the verse has already stated, “he shall offer an unblemished male,” why does it state

“he shall bring it”

? Rather, this

teaches that he is compelled

to fulfill his vow;

One might have thought

even

against his will;

therefore

the verse states: “for acceptance

The later authorities wrote that a special verse is needed to teach that “he is compelled,” even though a person is compelled regarding every positive mitzva, because one might have said: Since it is stated “for acceptance,” complete consent without coercion is required. The verse therefore teaches us that “he is compelled until he says, ‘I want to.’” Shiurei Rabbi Shmuel, beginning of letter 380. A. And if you ask: How can they compel him against his will to bring the offering, when it is impossible to consecrate something against one’s will? The Gemara in Rosh Hashana 6a cites a beraita that derives from “You shall observe and perform what emerges from your lips” a warning to the court that they may compel him ; and we ask: Why do I need this, when it follows from “he shall bring it”? For it was taught: “‘He shall bring it’ teaches that he is compelled. One might have thought, against his will; the verse states: ‘for acceptance.’ How is this so? He is compelled until he says, ‘I want to.’” And we answer: One verse teaches the case of one who made a vow but did not designate an offering, and one verse teaches the case of one who designated an offering but did not bring it ;

If so, it is clear that even when he designated the offering but did not bring it, the verse states “for acceptance.” This is the meaning of “One might have thought, against his will”: If he has already designated the offering, it may be brought without the consent of the owner of the offering; therefore, the verse states: “for acceptance.” B. However, Maimonides wrote in chapter 14 of Ma'aseh HaKorbanot, halakha 10: “If one says: The sin-offering, guilt-offering, olah, and peace-offerings of so-and-so are upon me, if that person consents, he allows him to bring them on his behalf and achieves atonement through them. If he consented at the time of designation but did not consent at the time of bringing and retracted, in the case of an olah and peace-offerings, they are brought and he achieves atonement through them even though he does not presently consent, since he consented at the time of designation. But in the case of a sin-offering or guilt-offering, he does not achieve atonement until he consents from beginning to end.” [Its source is the Gemara in Arakhin 21a, as Maimonides interpreted it.] It is thus explicit in Maimonides that although there is a requirement of consent, even when another brings the offering on his behalf, in the case of an olah and peace-offerings the consent he had at the time of designation is sufficient

;

If so, regarding this verse, which concerns an olah, what does it mean to say “One might have thought, against his will”? Surely designation cannot take place against his will, and it does not appear that the verse concerns another person who designates the offering on his behalf. In light of what was written in Hiddushei Rabbi Shmuel (Kiddushin, section 14), to reconcile Maimonides’ words with the passage in Rosh Hashana 6b—and whose explanation is that Maimonides too agrees that when one designates an offering for himself, his consent is required at the time it is brought [see there, letter 4, s.v. “Ve'im kenim”]—this matter is also resolved. See there carefully.

How is this so: He is compelled until he says:

“I want to.” And

if you say that “unspoken intentions are considered legally significant,” this is difficult:

Why? Surely, in his heart, he is not willing [for in his heart he does not want to]!

Rather, necessarily

it is

Rather, is it not necessarily

because we say that

unspoken intentions—that he does not want to—

are not legally significant.

The Gemara raises an objection to this:

Perhaps

I will actually say that “matters in one’s heart are legally significant,” but

And we challenge this:

Perhaps I will say to you that, in fact, “unspoken intentions are legally significant,” but

there it is different, for we have clear evidence that he desires atonement [as though we are witnesses to the matter, that he indeed wants it in his heart, because he is pleased to attain atonement through the offering].

Rather, from the latter clause

of that same beraita, it is proven that “unspoken intentions are not legally significant”:

For it was taught in the latter clause:

“And similarly you find with bills of divorce”

in the case of those whom the Sages said he must be compelled to divorce with a bill of divorce, such as one afflicted with boils or one who has a polypus [bad breath],

and with the emancipation of slaves,

he is compelled until he says:

“I want to.”

And

if you assume that “matters in one’s heart are legally significant,” the following difficulty arises:

Why!?

After all, in her heart she is not willing!?

And

if you say that “unspoken intentions are legally significant,” this is difficult:

Why? Surely, in his heart, he is not willing!?

Rather, is it not because we say:

“Unspoken intentions are not legally significant.”

And we challenge this:

Perhaps I will say to you that, in fact, “unspoken intentions are legally significant,” but

there it is different, because it is a mitzva to heed the words of the Sages, and we must presume him to be fulfilling a mitzva; even in his heart, he resolved to fulfill the ruling of the court.

Rather, Rav Yosef said: From here,

from the Mishna taught below, on 62a, it may be learned that “unspoken intentions are not legally significant”:

For we learned:

“One who betroths a woman and says:

‘I thought she was a daughter of a kohen, but she is a Levite,’

or he said, ‘I thought she was a Levite, but it turns out that she is a daughter of a kohen’

; or he said, ‘I thought she was poor, but she is wealthy;

’ or he said, ‘I thought she was wealthy, but she is poor’—

or he said: ‘I thought she was

she is betrothed, because

she

did not mislead him

;

rather, he misled himself.

And

if you say that “unspoken intentions are legally significant,” this is difficult:

Why? Surely, he said:

“I thought”,

rather,

necessarily

because we say:

“Unspoken intentions are not legally significant.”

because we say:

“Matters in one’s heart are not legally significant.”

Abaye said to him: Perhaps

Abaye said to him: Perhaps

I will say to you that, in fact, “unspoken intentions are legally significant,” but

there it is different, as a stringency

we presume her to be betrothed. That is, it is possible that the Mishna teaches that she is betrothed only as a stringency: She is not permitted to another man without a bill of divorce. But if she marries another man without a bill of divorce, we do not say that the betrothal does not take effect in her, as it would in the case of an ordinary married woman; rather, she requires a bill of divorce from the second man as well.

from our Mishna itself, one can learn that “matters in one’s heart are not legally significant”:

For we learned concerning a man who stipulated a condition and misled the woman, that

Rather, Abaye said: From here,

from our Mishna, it may be learned that “unspoken intentions are not legally significant”:

For we learned concerning one who stipulated a condition and misled the woman, that

“In all of these cases, even though she said:

‘In my heart, I intended to become betrothed to him nevertheless,’ she is not betrothed.”

And

if you say that “unspoken intentions are legally significant,” this is difficult:

Why? Surely, she said:

“In my heart, I intended”!?

Perhaps I will say to you that, in fact, “unspoken intentions are legally significant,” but

there it is different, because once he stipulated,

the husband, verbally, she is

not empowered

to

uproot her stipulation

by means of an unspoken intention. The woman has no power to uproot his condition through an intention in her heart, since she heard it and did not verbally object, saying: “Nevertheless, I desire you; betroth me without a condition.”

[a case involving matters in one’s heart occurred, and the question was brought before Rav Chisda],

Rather, Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin said: There was an incident at the house of Rav Hisda,

[an incident involving an unspoken intention was brought before Rav Hisda],

and Rav Hisda went to the house of Rav Huna

[to Rav Huna’s house of study, to examine the matter],

and they resolved it

—

in Rav Huna’s house of study—

from this,

from the Mishna in tractate Me'ila:

“One who says to his agent:

‘Bring me from the window

money—consecrated money, of which the sender was unaware and thought it was his own—and go out and purchase with it,’”

or

he said to his agent: “Bring me money

from the chest,”

and he brought him

from the place he had indicated,

even though the owner of the house said: “In my heart, I intended only

the purse

in this place

that I mentioned, and not the purse from which the agent took the money,”

once he brought it to him from this one [from the place he instructed him],

the owner of the house has misused consecrated property.

if you assume that “matters in one’s heart are legally significant,” the following difficulty arises:

Why!?

And

if you say that “unspoken intentions are legally significant,” this is difficult:

Why? Surely, the sender said

“In my heart”!?

Rather, is it not because we say:

The Gemara raises an objection to this:

“Unspoken intentions are not legally significant.”

And we challenge this:

Perhaps I will say to you that, in fact, “unspoken intentions are legally significant,” but

there it is different,

for we do not believe him that he truly did not intend that purse;

perhaps he came in order to exempt himself from an offering [his sole intention is to exempt himself from an offering for misuse of consecrated property, even falsely]. This is not proof of the case discussed by Rava, where we saw that he made an effort to ascend but was prevented, and there is no concern that he is lying.

The Gemara answers the challenge: If his statement were untrue and his entire intention were to exempt himself from the offering, he should have said: “I acted intentionally” [I knew that this money was consecrated], meaning: I knew that this money was consecrated, and one who misuses consecrated property intentionally does not bring an offering. Since he could have made this claim, he is believed in the claim he did make as well, by virtue of a migo.

The Gemara answers the proof: If what he said was not true and his sole intention was to exempt himself from the offering,

he should have said: “I acted intentionally”

[“I knew”], meaning: “I knew that this money belonged to the Temple treasury, and one who intentionally misuses sacred property does not bring an offering.” Since he could have made this claim, he is believed in what he claimed as well, based on the principle of migo—since he could have made a stronger claim.

The Gemara nevertheless raises another objection: Perhaps the reason is that he is suspected of lying, and not that “matters in one’s heart are not legally significant.” As for what you said—that we should believe him based on the migo that he could have said, “I acted intentionally”—this is not a valid migo, because

The Gemara nevertheless challenges this: Perhaps the reason is that he is suspected of lying, and not that “unspoken intentions are not legally significant.” And as for your statement that we should believe him by virtue of the migo that he could have said, “I acted intentionally,” this is not a valid migo, because

a person does not make himself out to be wicked [it is not a person’s way to portray himself as wicked].

Rather, the Gemara answers the challenge: Necessarily, the reason is not concern that he is lying, for he has another migo:

he could have said:

“I remembered

that the money was consecrated after I had already sent him to misuse it,” for

it was taught: When the owner of the house remembered

that the money was consecrated,

but the agent did not remember, the agent has misused consecrated property

—and not the owner of the house.

and not the master of the house.

A case involving

a certain man who sold his property with the intention of going up to Eretz Yisrael [he sold his property with the intention of going up to Eretz Yisrael, and clarified to the buyer that this was the reason he was selling his property]—

He went up

The man went up

but

could not settle there [he went up to Eretz Yisrael but was unable to live there, either because he lacked a livelihood or because he could not find a dwelling].

he ascended to the Land of Israel, but he was unable to live there, either because of a lack of livelihood or because he did not find a dwelling].

Rava said: Anyone who goes up with the intention of living there does so [anyone who goes up with the intention of living there goes up],

anyone who ascends with the intention of residing there ascends],

but he could not settle there [and he is unable to live there]. Thus, this is like a person who was prevented by circumstances beyond his control from going up, and his sale is void, since he explicitly stated at the time of the sale that this was the reason he was selling.

and behold, he is unable to reside there], and this is like one who was prevented by circumstances beyond his control and was unable to ascend, so that his sale is void, since he explicitly explained at the time of the sale that for this purpose he was selling.

Some say that Rava said as follows: He sold only

with the intention of

with the intention of going up

alone,

and he did go up [and he indeed went up], and the sale is not void.

and behold, he ascended], and the sale is not void.

A case involving

a certain man who sold his property with the intention of going up to Eretz Yisrael,

and clarified at the time of the sale that he was selling it with this intention, but

ultimately did not go up [he did not go up] of his own accord—

of his own will -

Rav Ashi said:

He

could go up if he wished [if he wished, he could go up], and the sale is not void.

if he wishes, he can ascend], and the sale is not void.

Some say that Rav Ashi said this rhetorically:

Did he say:

“If he wished, he would not go up?!”

Surely, if he wishes, he can go up; therefore, the sale is not void.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the practical difference between them [what legal difference is there between these two formulations]?

what practical legal difference is there between these two formulations]?

The practical difference between them is

for example, when he did not go up because

a circumstance beyond his control arose on the way [he heard about a danger on the road, such as bandits], and he could protect himself from this danger if he wished—is the sale void in such a case?

and he is able to protect himself from this danger if he wishes—is he then able to retract the sale?

According to the first formulation, the sale is not rescinded, since ultimately, “if he wished, he could go up” with a caravan. But according to the latter formulation, it appears that the sale is not rescinded only because there is no impediment whatsoever; however, if there is any form of impediment, the sale is rescinded.

Mishna:

One who says to his agent: “

Go and betroth a certain woman for me, in a particular place,”

and the agent went

and

betrothed her in another place,

she

is not betrothed, because he specifically instructed him to betroth her in that particular place, as he has friends there who would protest against anyone who wished to speak ill of him.

because he specifically instructed him to betroth her in that particular place, since he has friends there who would prevent anyone from speaking badly about him.

And if he said to his agent: “

She is in a particular place,”

and he betrothed her in another place, she is betrothed, since this does not indicate that he insists that she be betrothed in that particular place; rather, he is telling him where he will find her.

because he was not insisting that she be betrothed in that particular place; rather, he was telling him where he would find her.

Gemara:

And we also learned

that in tractate Gittin we learned a ruling similar to the one stated in our Mishna also

with regard to bills of divorce:

One who says: “

Give this bill of divorce to my wife in a particular place,”

and they gave it to her in another place,

the bill of divorce

is invalid;

but if he said: “

She is in a particular place,”

and they gave it to her in another place,

the bill of divorce

is valid.

And it is necessary

to teach us this ruling both with regard to bills of divorce and with regard to betrothals:

For if it had taught us

only

with regard to betrothals,

I would have said that this ruling applies only to betrothals,

where he comes in order to bring her closer [his purpose is to bring her closer to him], and therefore the betrother thinks to himself:

his purpose is to bring her close to him], and therefore the man performing the kiddushin says in his heart:

“In this place”

where I sent him to betroth her,

“they are fond of me and will not speak ill of me” [I have friends in this place who will not spread an evil name about me]; but

I have friends in this place who will not give me a bad name], but

“in this place”

where the agent betrothed her,

“they hate me”,

and

“will speak ill of me” [but in another place I have enemies, and they will spread an evil name about me]. Therefore, he insists that she be betrothed specifically in the place he indicated.

but in another place I have enemies, and they will give me a bad name], and therefore he insists that he betroth her specifically in the place that he told him.

But with regard to bills of divorce, where he comes in order to distance her [his purpose is to distance her from him], and the matter of “they will speak ill of me” does not apply,

and the concern that “they will speak badly about me” does not apply,

say that he does not care

where he divorces her, and that she should be divorced wherever he divorces her.

Therefore, it teaches us that even with regard to divorce, we assume that he insists upon that particular place.

And if it had taught us

only

with regard to divorce,

I would have said that he insists only concerning divorce, because

“in this place it is agreeable to me to be disgraced” [it is comfortable for me to be disgraced in this place], since one who divorces his wife is thereby disgraced; whereas

because divorcing one’s wife is disgraceful for him; whereas

“in this place it is not agreeable to me”

to be disgraced.

But with regard to betrothals, say that he does not care

where he betroths her—

Therefore,

it is necessary

to teach us that even with regard to betrothals, he insists upon the place.

Mishna:

One who betroths a woman on the condition that she has no vows, and she is found to have vows,

she

is not betrothed.

If he married her without specification

and did not stipulate: “on the condition that she has no vows

,” and she is found to have vows,

she shall leave him with a bill of divorce, but

without a marriage contract, because he says: “I do not want a wife who takes vows.”

because he says: “I do not want a wife who has vows.”

One who betroths the woman

on the condition that she has no blemishes, and blemishes are found in her,

she

is not betrothed.

If he married her without specification and blemishes were found in her, she shall leave him

with a bill of divorce and

without a marriage contract,

for the reason stated with regard to vows.

All the blemishes that disqualify kohanim

from serving in the Temple,

disqualify

also

women,

to release her without a bill of divorce when he stipulated that she has no blemishes, and to release her without a marriage contract when he married her without specification.

Gemara:

And we also learned with regard to marriage contracts [in the tractate dealing with the laws of marriage contracts]

in the tractate dealing with the laws of marriage contracts]

a similar case,

like the entire ruling of our Mishna, and the Gemara explains the reason for the matter:

Here—

in tractate Kiddushin—

betrothals [where the betrothals do not take effect when he stipulated]

that the kiddushin does not take effect when he stipulated]

was necessary for it, and therefore

and therefore

the tanna taught the passage concerning marriage contracts [“If he married her without specification, she shall leave him without a marriage contract”]

if he married her without specification, she shall leave without a marriage contract”]

incidentally to the passage concerning betrothals.

There

in tractate Ketubot,

the passage concerning marriage contracts was necessary

for it,

and therefore

the tanna taught the passage concerning betrothals incidentally to the passage concerning marriage contracts.

Mishna:

One who betroths two women

at once

with one peruta’s worth

which is less than the amount of money required for betrothal for each one,

or

who betroths

one woman with less than one peruta’s worth—

Even though he later sent betrothal gifts [gifts that the groom sends to his betrothed]

gifts that the groom sends to his betrothed]

afterward,

there might have been room to say: He knew that his betrothals were not betrothals, and he sent the gifts for the sake of betrothal—