Kiddushin 50a — the Talmud in English

It is written in the section of the vows of offerings: “If his offering is an elevation-offering from cattle, a male, unblemished, he shall bring it; to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he shall bring it, according to his will, before the Lord”—

And since Scripture had already said, “a male, unblemished, he shall bring it,” why is it stated

“he shall bring it”

? Rather, this

teaches that they compel him

to fulfill his vow;

could it be

even

against his will

? Therefore

the Torah says: “according to his will”.

The later authorities wrote that a special verse is needed to teach that “he is compelled,” even though a person is compelled regarding every positive mitzva, because one might have said: Since it is stated “for acceptance,” complete consent without coercion is required. The verse therefore teaches us that “he is compelled until he says, ‘I want to.’” Shiurei Rabbi Shmuel, beginning of letter 380. A. And if you ask: How can they compel him against his will to bring the offering, when it is impossible to consecrate something against one’s will? The Gemara in Rosh Hashana 6a cites a beraita that derives from “You shall observe and perform what emerges from your lips” a warning to the court that they may compel him ; and we ask: Why do I need this, when it follows from “he shall bring it”? For it was taught: “‘He shall bring it’ teaches that he is compelled. One might have thought, against his will; the verse states: ‘for acceptance.’ How is this so? He is compelled until he says, ‘I want to.’” And we answer: One verse teaches the case of one who made a vow but did not designate an offering, and one verse teaches the case of one who designated an offering but did not bring it ;

How is this accomplished? He is compelled until he says:

“I am willing.”

And

And if you will say that “matters in the heart are [legally] matters,” it is difficult:

Why?!

But in his heart he is not pleased

[for in his heart he does not wish]?!

Rather, necessarily it is

because

we say: Matters in the heart

—that he does not wish—

are not [legally] matters.

are not legally significant.

And we raise an objection to this:

Perhaps

I will always tell you that “matters in the heart are [legally] matters,” but

there it is different, for it is apparent to us that he is pleased with the atonement

[as though we are witnesses concerning the matter, that indeed he wishes in his heart, because he is pleased with the atonement effected by the offering].

Rather, from the final clause

of that same beraita, it is proven that “matters in the heart are not [legally] matters”:

For it was taught in the final clause:

“And similarly you find concerning bills of divorce for women

among those whom the Sages said he must be compelled to divorce her by a bill of divorce, such as one afflicted with boils or one with polypus [bad breath],

and the emancipation of slaves

, they compel him until he says

: “I want.”

“I want to.”

And

if you will say that “matters in the heart are [legally] matters,” it is difficult:

Why?!

But in his heart he is not pleased?!

Rather, is it not because we say

: “Matters in the heart are not [legally] matters”?

And we raise an objection to this:

Perhaps

I will always tell you that “matters in the heart are [legally] matters,” but

there it is different, because it is a mitzva to heed the words of the Sages

, and we must presume him to be one who fulfills a mitzva; even in his heart he resolved to fulfill the words of the court.

Rather, Rav Yosef said: From here

, from the Mishna taught below, 62a, one may learn that “matters in the heart are not [legally] matters”:

For we learned:

“One who betroths a woman and says

: ‘I thought she was the daughter of a koen, but she is the daughter of a Levite

,’ or he said: ‘I thought she was a daughter of a Levite, and she turns out to be the daughter of a

koen

,’ or he said: ‘I thought she was poor, but she is wealthy;

’ or he said: ‘I thought she was wealthy, but she is

poor’

—

she is

betrothed, because she

was

did not deceive him

, but he deceived himself.

And

if you will say that “matters in the heart are [legally] matters,” it is difficult:

Why?!

He says

: “I thought [she was so]”

; rather,

necessarily

because we say

: “Matters in the heart are not [legally] matters.”

Abaye said to him: Perhaps

I will always tell you that “matters in the heart are [legally] matters,” but

there it is different, for we hold this stringently

that she is betrothed—that is, one may say that we taught that she is betrothed only to be stringent, so that she is not permitted to another without a bill of divorce; but if she marries another without a bill of divorce, we do not say that betrothal does not take effect in her, as it would with an ordinary married woman, but she requires a bill of divorce even from the second.

Rather, Abaye said: From here

, from our Mishna, one may learn that “matters in the heart are not [legally] matters”:

For we learned, concerning one who stipulated and misled the woman, that

“in all of them, even though she said

: ‘In my heart I intended to become betrothed to him despite this,’

she is not betrothed.

And

if you will say that “matters in the heart are [legally] matters,” it is difficult:

Why?!

She says

: “In my heart it was”?!

Perhaps

I will always tell you that “matters in the heart are [legally] matters,” but

there it is different, since he stipulated

—the husband, with his mouth—

she has no power

—the woman—

to uproot her condition

, for the woman has no power to uproot his condition through matters in the heart, since she heard it and did not object with her mouth, saying: “Despite this, I desire you; betroth me without a condition.”

Rather, Rav Hiyya bar Avin said: There was an incident in the house of Rav Hisda

, [there was an incident concerning matters in the heart, and the case was brought before Rav Hisda],

and Rav Hisda [went] to the house of Rav Huna

[and Rav Hisda went to the beit-midrash of Rav Huna to examine the matter],

and they resolved it

—in the beit-midrash of Rav Huna—

from this

, from the Mishna in tractate Meila:

“One who says to his agent

: ‘Bring me from the window

money—money belonging to the Temple treasury, and the sender inadvertently thought that it was his—and go out and purchase with it,”

or

he said to his agent: “Bring me money

from the chest,”

and he brought it to him

from the place he had requested,

even though the master of the house said: ‘In my heart I intended only for

the purse

this

that was in the place I mentioned, and not for the purse from which the agent took it,”

since he brought it to him from this

[from the place concerning which he instructed him],

the master of the house committed sacrilege.

And

And

if you will say that “matters in the heart are [legally] matters,” it is difficult:

Why?!

The sender says

:

“In my heart”

; rather, is it not because we say

The Gemara raises an objection to this:

“matters in the heart are not [legally] matters”?

Perhaps

And perhaps

I will always tell you that “matters in the heart are [legally] matters,” but

there it is different

, for we do not believe him that indeed he did not intend for this purse,

for he comes to exempt himself from an offering

[his intention is only to exempt himself from an offering for sacrilege, even falsely]; and this is not proof concerning the case discussed by Rava, where we saw that he took pains to go up [to the Land of Israel] and was prevented by circumstances, and there is no concern that he is lying.

And the Gemara answers the proof: If what he said was not true, and all his intention was to exempt himself from the offering,

he should have said: “I was acting deliberately”

[I was acting deliberately], that is: I knew that this money belonged to the Temple treasury, and one who commits sacrilege deliberately does not bring an offering; and since he could make this claim, he is believed also concerning what he claimed, by means of a migo.

And we still raise an objection: Perhaps the reason is that we suspect him of lying, and not because “matters in the heart are not [legally] matters”; and as for what you said—that we should believe him by means of the migo that he could have said, “I was acting deliberately”—this is not a good migo, because

a person does not make himself out to be wicked

[it is not a person’s way to present himself as wicked].

Rather, the Gemara answers the proof: Necessarily, the reason is not concern that he is lying, for he has another migo, that

he should have said

: “I remembered

that the money belonged to the Temple treasury after I had already sent him to commit sacrilege,” for

it was taught: If the master of the house remembered

that they belonged to the Temple treasury

and the agent did not remember, the agent committed sacrilege

and not the master of the house.

A case involving

a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to the Land of Israel [

he sold his property with the intention of ascending to the Land of Israel, and he explained to the buyer that for this purpose he was selling his property] —

The certain man ascended,

the certain man,

but it was not suitable for him, [

he ascended to the Land of Israel, but he was unable to live there, either because of a lack of livelihood or because he did not find a dwelling].

Rava said: Anyone who ascends with the intention of residing there does so, [

anyone who ascends with the intention of residing there ascends],

but it was not suitable for him [

and behold, he is unable to reside there], and this is like one who was prevented by circumstances beyond his control and was unable to ascend, so that his sale is void, since he explicitly explained at the time of the sale that for this purpose he was selling.

There are those who say that Rava said as follows: He sold only

with the intention of

ascending

alone,

and behold, he did ascend [

and behold, he ascended], and the sale is not void.

A case involving

a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to the Land of Israel,

and he explained at the time of the sale that with this intention he was selling, but

in the end he did not ascend [

he did not ascend] of his own will —

Rav Ashi said:

Behold,

if he wishes, he can ascend [

if he wishes, he can ascend], and the sale is not void.

There are those who say

that Rav Ashi said in an expression of astonishment: But is it so that

if he wishes, he cannot ascend!?

And behold, certainly, if he wishes, he can ascend; therefore, the sale is not void.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the difference between them [

what practical legal difference is there between these two formulations]?

There is a difference between them:

for example, when he did not ascend because

an accident occurred on the road [

he heard of a danger on the road, such as bandits], and if he wishes, he can protect himself from this danger—whether in this situation he can retract from the sale.

For according to the first formulation, the sale is not reversed, since, in the end, “if he wishes, he can ascend” in a caravan; whereas according to the latter formulation, it implies that the sale is not reversed because he has no impediment whatsoever, but if there is any aspect of impediment, the sale is reversed.

Mishna:

One who says to his agent: “

Go and betroth for me a certain woman, in a certain place,”

and the agent went

the agent

and betrothed her in another place,

she is

not betrothed, because he specifically told him to betroth her in a certain place, since he has friends there, and they will protest against anyone who wishes to say bad things about him.

because he specifically instructed him to betroth her in that particular place, since he has friends there who would prevent anyone from speaking badly about him.

And if he said to his agent: “

Behold, she is in a certain place,”

and he betrothed her in another place, she is betrothed,

for this is not an insistence that he betroth her in a certain place, but rather he is telling him where he will find her.

Gemara:

And we also learned

we learned in tractate Gittin something resembling the law stated in our Mishna also

concerning bills of divorce:

One who says: “

Give this bill of divorce to my wife in a certain place,”

and they gave it to her in another place,

the bill of divorce is

invalid;

and if he said: “

Behold, she is in a certain place,”

and they gave it to her in another place,

the bill of divorce is

valid.

And it is necessary

to inform us of this law both with regard to bills of divorce and with regard to kiddushin:

For had it taught us

only

concerning kiddushin,

I would have said that this law applies only to kiddushin

in a place where he comes to bring her close [

his purpose is to bring her close to him], and therefore the man performing the kiddushin says in his heart:

In this place

where I sent him to betroth her,

they love me, and they will not speak ill of me [

I have friends in this place who will not give me a bad name], but

in this place

where the agent betrothed her,

they hate me, and

he

will speak ill of me [

but in another place I have enemies, and they will give me a bad name], and therefore he insists that he betroth her specifically in the place that he told him.

But concerning bills of divorce, where he comes to distance her [

his purpose is to distance her from him], and “they will speak ill of me” is not relevant,

say that he does not care

where he divorces her, and she will be divorced wherever he divorces her.

Therefore it teaches us that even with regard to divorce, we attribute to him an insistence upon that particular place.

And had it taught us

only

concerning divorce,

I would have said that he insists only with regard to divorce, because

in this place it is pleasing to me that I be disgraced [

in this place it is convenient for me to be disgraced], for one who divorces his wife, it is a disgrace for him; whereas

in this place it is not pleasing to him

to be disgraced.

But concerning kiddushin, say: He does not care

where he betroths her —

Therefore:

it is necessary

to inform us that even with regard to kiddushin he insists upon the place!

Mishna:

One who betroths a woman on the condition that she has no vows upon her, and vows were found upon her,

she is

not betrothed.

If he married her without specification

and did not stipulate: “on the condition that she has no vows upon her,”

and vows were found upon her, she shall leave

him with a bill of divorce, but

without a marriage contract,

because he says: “I do not want a woman who makes vows.”

One who betroths the woman

on the condition that she has no blemishes, and blemishes were found upon her,

she is

not betrothed.

If he married her without specification and blemishes were found upon her, she shall leave

with a bill of divorce and

without a marriage contract,

for the reason explained with regard to vows.

All the blemishes that disqualify kohanim

from serving in the Temple,

disqualify

also

women,

to remove her without a bill of divorce when he stipulated on the condition that she have no blemishes, and to remove her without a marriage contract when he married her without specification.

Gemara:

And we also learned concerning marriage contracts [

in the tractate dealing with the laws of marriage contracts]

in this manner,

like the entire law of our Mishna, and the Gemara explains the reason for the matter:

Here—

in tractate Kiddushin—

the kiddushin [

that the kiddushin does not take effect when he stipulated]

was necessary for it, and therefore

and therefore

the tanna of Ketubot [“

if he married her without specification, she shall leave without a marriage contract”]

taught it because of kiddushin.

There

in tractate Ketubot,

the marriage contracts

were necessary for it,

and therefore

the tanna of Kiddushin taught it because of marriage contracts.

Mishna:

One who betroths two women

at once

with the value of one peruta

which is less than the measure of money required for kiddushin for each one,

or

who betrothed

one woman with less than the value of one peruta—

Even though he sent betrothal gifts [

gifts that the groom sends to his betrothed]

afterward,

and it might have been said: He knew that his kiddushin was not kiddushin, and he sent the betrothal gifts for the sake of kiddushin—