Kiddushin 49a (מט.) — the Talmud in English

The Sages instituted that kohanim should divorce with a special bill of divorce whose preparation involves considerable effort, and it is called a “tied bill of divorce”; and this is the essence of the institution. However, once they instituted this, there came to be two types of bills of divorce even for Israelites, who may prepare either a simple bill of divorce or a tied bill of divorce. Likewise, with regard to promissory notes, there are two types of documents, a “tied document” and a “simple document,” and one may prepare whichever one he wishes.

And what is its procedure?

One leaves one line blank and writes on the line following it; then he again leaves one line blank and writes on the line following it, and so on, until there are three or four lines. He folds the first blank line over the written line and sews it, and then folds the second blank line over the written line and sews it. Each stitch is called a knot. The witnesses sign on the outside, on the folds between one knot and the next, and the number of witnesses is equal to the number of knots; there must be no fewer than three knots and three witnesses.

With regard to a simple bill of divorce: its witnesses

sign

inside it,

at the end of the text of the document; whereas with regard to a

tied bill of divorce: its witnesses sign on its back,

on the folds between one knot and the next.

A [

or a promissory note]

simple bill of divorce whose witnesses signed on its back, or a

tied bill of divorce

whose witnesses signed inside it,

both

are invalid,

because they were not prepared in accordance with the institution of the Sages.

Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says:

A tied bill of divorce whose witnesses signed inside it is valid,

because

he can make it into a simple one.

That is to say: If he left blank lines as is done for a tied bill of divorce, and the witnesses signed inside it at the end of the document, this does not invalidate it, because he can choose not to sew it; and although it contains blank lines, that is of no consequence. But the Sages maintain that he cannot make it into a simple bill of divorce, because there is a difference in the date written in a tied bill of divorce and that written in a simple one: In a tied bill of divorce, the year is written as the year following the date on which the bill of divorce was signed.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

If a husband sends an agent to prepare a bill of divorce for him, the agent should prepare

everything according to the custom of the region,

for if their custom is to prepare tied bills of divorce, he should prepare it as a tied bill of divorce; and if their custom is to prepare simple bills of divorce, he should prepare it as a simple bill of divorce.

And we raised a difficulty: But

is it so that

the first tanna [

that is, the first tannaitic authorities, namely, the first tanna and Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel]

does not hold

that the agent should act according to the

custom of the region?

But that is not the matter over which he disagreed; rather, he disagreed about something else!

And Rav Ashi said:

There is certainly another dispute here between the first tannaitic authorities and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, concerning agency. However, if the husband sent him to prepare a bill of divorce for him without specifying which type, then:

In a place where the custom is to use simple bills of divorce [

a place where their custom is to prepare a simple bill of divorce],

and he prepared for him

the agent a

tied bill of divorce—or alternatively, in a place where the custom is to use tied bills of divorce, [

or where their custom is to use tied bills of divorce],

and he prepared for him

the agent a

simple bill of divorce,

in these circumstances

everyone—

both the first tannaitic authorities and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

agrees that there is certainly insistence on following the regional custom.

When they disagree is in a place where the custom is to use either simple or tied bills of divorce, and

the husband

explicitly said to him

to the agent:

Prepare for me

a

simple bill of divorce, and he went

the agent

and prepared for him a tied bill of divorce;

and this is the circumstance in which the first tannaitic authorities and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree:

One—

the first tannaitic authorities—

holds: It is insistence

on the husband’s part, and he intended that the agent prepare specifically a simple bill of divorce.

And the other—

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

holds:

The husband was not particular that the agent prepare specifically a simple bill of divorce; rather,

he was merely indicating a preference,

meaning that if the agent wished, he need not trouble himself to prepare a tied bill of divorce, but if he wished to take the trouble and prepare a tied bill of divorce, the husband would not object.

We have thus learned that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel also holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon’s principle that “he was merely indicating a preference.” The Gemara continues to explain where we find that Rabbi Elazar also holds this way.

Rabbi Elazar,

who holds that “he was merely indicating a preference,” derives it from this

as we learned:

With regard to a woman who said

to her agent: “Go and

receive for me

the

bill of divorce from a certain place,”

and

he went and

received for her

the

bill of divorce from another place,

the bill of divorce

is invalid.

That is to say: The divorce does not take effect, because he is not her agent to receive a bill of divorce in this place.

And Rabbi Elazar deems it valid; evidently, he holds

Rabbi Elazar—

she was merely indicating a preference.

Ulla said:

The dispute

between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon in our Mishna, as to whether she becomes betrothed when he misrepresented himself in a manner advantageous to her, applies specifically

to financial advantage,

such as when he said to her: “On the condition that I am poor,” but he was found to be wealthy—

But

when he misrepresented himself

with regard to genealogical distinction,

a distinction of status, such as when he said: “On the condition that I am a Levite,” but he was found to be a kohen,

everyone—

even Rabbi Shimon—

agrees that she is not betrothed.

What is the reason?

Because she does not want him to be of higher status, as he will become arrogant toward her, as reflected in the proverb commonly used by women:

“I do not want a shoe larger than my foot” [

I do not want a shoe larger than my foot].

It was taught likewise in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon agrees—

who disagreed in our Mishna concerning one who said, “On the condition that I am poor,” but was found to be wealthy, that she is betrothed because he misrepresented himself to her advantage—

that if he misrepresented himself to her advantage with regard to genealogy,

a distinction of status, such as when he said to her: “On the condition that I am a Levite,” but he was found to be a kohen, she

is not betrothed.

Rav Ashi said: Our Mishna

also

is precise

in teaching that Rabbi Shimon agrees with regard to genealogical distinction,

as

this

is what it teaches

in the following Mishna:

One who says to a woman: “You are betrothed to me

on the condition that I am a kohen,”

but he was found to be a Levite;

or he said to her: “You are betrothed to me on the condition that I am a

Levite,”

but he was found to be a kohen;

or he said to her: “You are betrothed to me on the condition that I am a

netin,”

who is disqualified by rabbinic law from entering the congregation,

but he was found to be a mamzer,

whose disqualification is by Torah law; or he said to her: “You are betrothed to me on the condition that I am a

mamzer,”

but he was found to be a netin, who has a more elevated lineage than a mamzer—the betrothal is not valid.

who is of better lineage than the mamzer—she is not betrothed.

And

it is

not the case that Rabbi Shimon disagrees

there, maintaining that she is betrothed when he misrepresented himself to her advantage. Thus, with regard to genealogical distinction, Rabbi Shimon agrees.

Mar bar Rav Ashi challenged this:

Rather—

according to your reasoning, that you infer from the fact that Rabbi Shimon is not mentioned there as disagreeing with the Mishna, and therefore he agrees—

this is what it teaches

in that same Mishna: One who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me

on the condition that I have a grown daughter or maidservant” [

a large one, suitable to serve me],

but he does not have one;

or he betrothed her

on the condition that he does not have one,

a grown daughter or maidservant,

but he does have one,

the betrothal is not valid—

This is financial advantage,

not genealogical distinction;

so too, he does not disagree—

would you say that Rabbi Shimon does not disagree even in this case, in which he misrepresented himself to her advantage and she is betrothed?! Since this is financial advantage, he certainly disagrees.

Rather,

you must necessarily say that

he disagrees—

Rabbi Shimon—

in the first clause [

of our Mishna],

and the same applies to the latter clause [

in the following Mishna], even though this is not explicitly mentioned there.

Here too,

with regard to genealogical distinction, one may say that

he disagrees—

Rabbi Shimon—

in the first clause, and the same applies to the latter clause;

do not infer that Rabbi Shimon agrees with regard to genealogical distinction.

The Gemara challenges this refutation:

Is that so?!

Is the proof comparable to the case under discussion?!

There,

with regard to a grown daughter or maidservant,

both this and that—

both the case stated in the first clause, concerning a poor man and a wealthy man, and the case of misrepresentation to her advantage involving a daughter or maidservant—are misrepresentation

involving financial advantage.

Therefore, one may say:

He disagrees—

Rabbi Shimon—

in the first clause, and the same applies to the latter clause,

as they are one matter, and the editor of the Mishna did not need to mention that Rabbi Shimon also disagrees in this case.

But

here,

with regard to a mamzer who was found to be a netin,

it is genealogical distinction,

and nothing like this is mentioned in the first clause of our Mishna.

If it were so that he disagrees, let it teach it [

if Rabbi Shimon disagreed, maintaining that she is betrothed when he misrepresented himself to her advantage, the tanna should have mentioned this]. Thus, it is necessarily precise even in our Mishna that Rabbi Shimon agrees that when he misrepresented himself with regard to genealogical distinction, she is not betrothed.

If you wish, say

to resolve Mar bar Rav Ashi’s challenge from the case of the daughter or maidservant:

Here,

with regard to a grown daughter or maidservant,

it is also genealogical distinction. Rabbi Shimon indeed agrees in that case, and consequently you cannot prove that he disagrees in the first clause and that the same applies to the latter clause. This is because:

and Rabbi Shimon indeed concedes in that case. Thus, you cannot prove that he disagrees in the first clause and that the same applies to the final clause. The reason is as follows:

Do you think that the meaning of “

grown”

is literally large [

do you think that “grown” means large]?! No; rather,

what is the meaning of “

grown”?

Distinguished [

important]. Rabbi Shimon agrees in this case because

she herself said [

the woman], when he misled her and brought with him a distinguished daughter or maidservant, who, because of her importance, would be likely to tell her neighbors:

“I do not want her to take words from me and go gossiping about me before my neighbors” [

I do not want her to hear what goes on in my home and go tell my neighbors], “making me an object of ridicule and scorn.”

The Sages taught:

One who says to a woman: “You are betrothed to me

on the condition that I am a reader” [

that I can read],

once he has read three verses in the synagogue, she is betrothed;

Rabbi Yehuda says: Until he reads

and translates

them.

And we wondered: Is it possible that he should

translate

even

from his own understanding [

a translation of his own]?!

But it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says:

One who translates a verse according to its form,

who seeks to omit the additions of our translation, saying, “I will translate this verse only according to its form,”

is a liar,

because that is not the translation of the verse!

And one who adds to it,

saying: “Since permission has been granted to add, I too will add wherever I wish,”

is blaspheming and reviling,

for he denigrates the Omnipresent by altering His words.

If so, how could he translate from his own understanding?!

Rather, what is the meaning of “

translation”?

That is to say: Which translation is being referred to? It is

our translation [

our translation], namely, the translation of Onkelos.

And this matter,

that three verses suffice, applies only when

he says to her: “Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a

reader”

reader.

But if he said to her: “Be betrothed to me on the condition that

you should be one who

reads, I” [

I read], she is not betrothed

until he reads the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings with precise pronunciation,

meaning that he must know how to read the entire Torah, Prophets, and Writings with proper precision.

One who says to a woman: “Be betrothed to me

on the condition that I am a scholar” [

one who knows how to study], the amoraim disagree about this:

Ḥizkiya said:

Until he knows how to study

halakhot,

meaning laws transmitted to Moses from Sinai.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Torah.

He raised an objection

from that which was taught in a baraita:

What is “

Mishna”?

Rabbi Meir says: Halakhot,

laws transmitted to Moses from Sinai.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Midrash,

the exposition of the biblical verses, such as the Sifra and the Sifre, which are laws derived through exposition of the biblical verses.

If so, this works out well according to Ḥizkiya, whose statement accords with that of Rabbi Meir. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, this is difficult: The term “scholar” implies the language of Mishna, and there is no one who says that “Mishna” means Torah!?