Kiddushin 3b (ג:) — the Talmud in English

And

if it were

a woman, with less than the value of a peruta

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she would not consent to it!

A woman does not resolve in her mind to acquire herself to a husband through a kinyan chalipin, because it is demeaning for her to become betrothed through such an acquisition, which can be effected even with an object worth less than a peruta.

And since it is demeaning for a woman to become betrothed through chalipin involving an implement worth less than a peruta, the kinyan chalipin is therefore entirely ineffective for a woman. And even with an implement worth a peruta, if it was given to the woman in the language of a kinyan chalipin, she does not become betrothed through it, until he tells her that he is giving it to her as a kinyan, or as an acquisition, or as kiddushin; only then does she become acquired through it by means of a monetary acquisition.

b.

The enumeration at the end

[“And she acquires herself in two ways”] comes

to exclude ḥalitza.

The Mishna needed to exclude ḥalitza, because without the words of the Mishna

it might enter your mind

that one could say:

let

ḥalitza come

by

means of a

kal va-chomer from a yevama,

and enable a married woman to become permitted:

just as

if

a yevama, who does not leave through a bill of divorce,

nevertheless she

leaves through ḥalitza.

This

married woman

who leaves

even

through a bill of divorce,

and

is it not the case

[is this not a kal va-chomer]

that she leaves

also

through ḥalitza?!

Therefore

it teaches us

that the tanna teaches us that a woman acquires herself in only two ways: only through a bill of divorce and through the death of her husband, and she does not acquire herself through ḥalitza.

And we challenge this:

But say that this is indeed so

—why should we not say that a woman does acquire herself even through ḥalitza [by a kal va-chomer from a yevama]?

And we answer:

The verse says

[Deuteronomy 24], concerning divorce: “And he shall write for her

a document of severance,

and he shall place it in her hand.”

The word “severance” teaches us that only

a document

of divorce [the bill of divorce]

severs her,

separating her from her husband,

and nothing else severs her.

From here we learn that ḥalitza does not sever [separate] the woman from her husband.

We learned in the Mishna: “A woman is acquired

with money

and so on.”

Indeed, it was already explained [above, 2a] that the monetary acquisition of a woman is derived through the gzera shava of “taking” and “taking” from the field of Ephron. However, that matter was cited in the course of a give-and-take, incidentally. Now the Gemara discusses and expands upon the matter.

And we inquire:

From where do we know

that a woman is acquired with money?

The Gemara adds that one must also discuss whether the money of kiddushin belongs to the father when he betroths his daughter while she is a minor or a young woman—

and furthermore,

there is also the matter

that we learned

[Ketubot 46b]:

The father is entitled to his daughter

while she is a minor or a young woman

with regard to her kiddushin,

meaning that the father is the “owner” of the matter of his daughter’s kiddushin —

With money,

the father takes the money of the kiddushin, and the money belongs to him. And

with a document,

he receives the document from the husband.

And through intercourse,

he delivers his daughter for intercourse for the sake of kiddushin, even against her will, while she is a minor or a young woman. a.

From where do we know that she is acquired with money?

From where do we know that a woman is acquired with money, as we learned in our Mishna and in tractate Ketubot?

b.

And

from where do we know that the

money

of the kiddushin of a minor or a young woman

of her father

[belongs to her father]

is?

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

These two laws are derived from

as the verse says

[Exodus 21], concerning a Hebrew maidservant:

“And she shall go out

[the Hebrew maidservant leaves the master’s authority upon the appearance of the signs of young womanhood]

free; there is no money.”

The words “there is no money” are superfluous, since it has already been stated, “And she shall go out free.” They were written for the purpose of a homiletic exposition:

To tell you:

There is no money for this master,

the master of the Hebrew maidservant, from whose authority the girl goes free [once she displays the signs of young womanhood]; her release is free, without payment of money.

But there is money—

for another master.

That is, specifically, the girl does not leave the authority of the master of the maidservant through money, but there is another master of the girl from whose authority she leaves through money.

And who is he,

who is that “other master”?—

The father

of the girl!

And the verse teaches that when the daughter becomes betrothed to her husband, thereby leaving her father’s authority and entering her husband’s authority, the kiddushin [which, as stated, is her departure from her father’s authority] are effected through money.

From here we learn that a woman is acquired by her husband with money.

And we challenge this:

But say: to her!

Say that the money should belong to her.

That is, one might still say that the daughter herself receives the money. From where do we learn that the money of her kiddushin, which the husband gives, belongs to the father? The Gemara expresses astonishment at the one who raised the objection:

How can you say that,

how can you say such a thing?!

After all, since

her father

of the young woman

receives

her

kiddushin, as it is written

[Deuteronomy 22], in the passage concerning one who spreads an evil report, where, if a husband falsely claims that he did not find signs of virginity in his wife and alleges that she committed adultery while betrothed to him, the father of the young woman comes to the court and says: “

I gave my daughter to this man!”

The wording of the verse indicates that the authority to betroth his daughter is entrusted to him.

And

if so, is it conceivable that he betroths her, while

she takes the money,

that the daughter takes the money for herself?!

For what purpose did the Torah grant the father authority over his daughter’s kiddushin if not for the purpose of receiving the money?

The Gemara challenges the basis of the astonishment:

Indeed, one can prove from the verse “I gave my daughter to this man” that the father receives his daughter’s kiddushin [and from this one can also learn that the money belongs to him]. But it can still be asked:

But say: this applies only to a minor.

Say that the verse speaks only of the kiddushin of a minor,

who lacks understanding,

who does not have the capacity to receive kiddushin,

and therefore the Torah granted the father ownership of her kiddushin.

But a young woman,

once she has developed two pubic hairs, when she possesses understanding,

who has

[the capacity]

to receive kiddushin,

it is reasonable that the verse did not grant the father her kiddushin. After all, a young woman is considered an adult in every respect, with regard to punishments and to buying and selling: her purchase is a valid purchase, and her sale is a valid sale. [Rashi.]

,

therefore, she should betroth herself and take the money.

She should betroth herself, and take the money of her betrothal for herself!

And if so, it must still be asked: From where do we learn that the father betroths his daughter while she is a na'ara, and that he takes the money?

And we answer:

the verse states [Numbers 30], with regard to a na'ara: “

The verse says [Numbers 30], concerning a young woman: “

While in her youth, she is in her father's house.”

The verse teaches us that as long as she is in her youth, she belongs to her father. From here we learn that

every increase,

financial gain that a woman has during the time of

youth,

belongs

to her father.

And from here it follows that the Torah granted the father ownership of the betrothal of his daughter during her youth, and the money [which is an increase and financial gain] belongs to her father.

But the Gemara rejects this answer:

Rather,

how shall we explain

that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rav:

From where do we learn that the labor

of

the daughter

belongs

to the father? —

As it is stated [Exodus 21]: “

As it is stated [Exodus 21]: “

And when a man sells his daughter as a maidservant.”

The word “as a maidservant” is superfluous [for it is obvious that a person who sells his daughter sells her as a maidservant], and the verse comes to teach us:

Just as “

a maidservant,”

her labor

belongs

to her master [the one who owns her]—

[her owner] —

so too, a daughter [“

his daughter”]

likewise, her labor belongs to her father.

And this verse comes to teach the law of a na'ara, and not the law of a minor girl, because he can even sell a minor girl as a maidservant, and it is obvious that her labor belongs to him; there is no need for a verse to teach this.

But according to you, who derived from the verse “While in her youth, she is in her father's house” that every gain of youth belongs to her father, it is difficult: Why was the verse [“as a maidservant”] necessary to teach us that the daughter's labor belongs to her father?

And surely

this law can be derived

by learning it

from

the verse “

While in her youth, she is in her father's house,”

which teaches that every gain of youth belongs to the father [and labor is included in this as well]]!

Rather,

from here it is proven that the verse “While in her youth, she is in her father's house” is written only

with regard to

the matter of

the annulment of vows,

for the father annuls his daughter's vows while she is a na'ara [as the verse “While in her youth, she is in her father's house” appears in the Torah in the passage concerning the annulment of vows].

And it cannot be learned from that verse that the daughter's labor also belongs to her father. Therefore, the verse had to state “as a maidservant,” to teach that her labor also belongs to her father.

And if so,

here too,

the same rejection can be applied to what you derived from “While in her youth, she is in her father's house,” namely, that her betrothal belongs to her father. For this verse—

with regard to the annulment of vows

alone

is written.

And the Gemara now explains why we do not derive from the annulment of vows that both the betrothal and the labor of the na'ara belong to her father:

And if you would say: Let us derive it from there!

Perhaps you will say: Why should we not learn that the money of a na'ara belongs to her father from the fact that her father has the authority to annul her vows?

The answer is:

We do not derive monetary laws from prohibitions.

Monetary laws [concerning money] are not derived from prohibitions, which are laws governing a person's relationship with God [the annulment of vows]. And now the aforementioned question returns: From where do we know that the father has rights with regard to the betrothal of his daughter who is a na'ara?

And if you would say,

perhaps you will say:

Let us derive it from the fine,

that the betrothal of a na'ara belongs to her father can be learned from the Torah's statement [Deuteronomy 22] that one who rapes or seduces a virgin na'ara pays a fine to her father.

This cannot be said. For

monetary law from a fine—

we do not derive!

We do not derive the law of betrothal money from the law of fine money, because a fine is a novel legal category: the Torah obligates a person to pay even though he caused his fellow no actual loss.

And if so, it is still difficult: From where did we learn that the father betroths his daughter who is a na'ara, and that the money of her betrothal is his?

And if you would say,

perhaps you wish to answer:

Let us derive,

that the money of the na'ara's betrothal belongs to her father from what we learned [Ketubot 40b], that one who rapes the na'ara pays

compensation for humiliation and for diminished value

to her father. And compensation for humiliation and diminished value is not a fine [for it is payment for the humiliation and diminished value that harmed the na'ara, and it comes to compensate for the damage she suffered]. And just as the compensation for humiliation and diminished value belongs to her father, so too the money of her betrothal belongs to him.

This answer is also incorrect, because a distinction must be made between compensation for humiliation and diminished value and betrothal money:

Compensation for humiliation and diminished value is different,

the law of compensation for humiliation and diminished value differs from that of betrothal money, for there is a reason that they belong to the father, namely,

that the father has a stake in them,

for the father too suffers a loss as a result of his daughter's rape, since he could have betrothed her to a repulsive man or one afflicted with boils in exchange for a large sum of money [for the Torah granted him the right to betroth her to whomever he wishes, even if by doing so he disgraces and humiliates her]. The rapist who had intercourse with her deprives him of this money, because he caused people to disdain her and prospective husbands will not eagerly seek her hand. And after rejecting all the possibilities, the Gemara returns to establish the first derivation mentioned above:

Rather,

it is stated [Exodus 21], with regard to a Hebrew maidservant: “And she shall go free without payment [through the appearance of the signs of youth]; there is no money.” The words “there is no money” are superfluous, teaching you that there is no money for this master, but there is money for another master, namely, the father.

That is, the na'ara leaves the master's authority without money, but she leaves her father's authority through betrothal with money.

However, the Gemara raised an objection to this above: Perhaps the intent of the verse is that there is a monetary acquisition when the daughter leaves her father's authority, but the money belongs to the daughter herself!

And concerning this, the Gemara answers here:

It is reasonable

that the intent of the verse is to say that the money belongs to her father—

for when it excludes,

when the verse excludes the departure of the na'ara through betrothal and distinguishes it from the law of the departure of the na'ara from the authority of the master in the case of a Hebrew maidservant [the maidservant leaves the master's authority without money, whereas the daughter leaves her father's authority with money]—