Kiddushin 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

there

, in the latter clause [where we stated that an etrog is comparable to a vegetable in one “way”],

this teaches us

that the tanna came to teach us this:

What is the reason that an etrog is tithed according to the time of its gathering [and not according to the time of its blossoming]? —

Because

its manner [

its way ]

of an etrog

is to grow

in the

manner of a

vegetable —

Just as a vegetable ordinarily grows on “

all waters

”—just as a vegetable requires irrigation with drawn water, and the rainfall that descends on its own is not sufficient for it—

and

therefore,

at the time of its gathering is its tithing—

An etrog as well, its manner is to grow on “

all waters

” [as it requires irrigation with drawn water in addition to rainwater],

and

therefore

at the time of its gathering—

is its tithing.

Therefore, the tanna used the expression “way,” because the fact that its “way” is to grow on all waters [like a vegetable] is the reason for the law stated here—that its tithing follows the time of its gathering.

Now the Gemara cites another Mishna in which we find the word “ways,” and we must consider why it does not say “matters”:

And that which we learned

[Bikkurim 2:8]:

A koy

, an animal concerning which it is uncertain whether it is a wild animal or domesticated animal, its laws are treated stringently because of the uncertainty, both with the stringencies that apply to a wild animal and with those that apply to a domesticated animal:

It has ways

in which it is

equal

to

a wild animal

, for example with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, as the blood of a wild animal requires covering, whereas the blood of a domesticated animal does not.

And it has ways

in which it is

equal

to

a domesticated animal

, for example with regard to eating its fat, as the fat of a domesticated animal is forbidden to eat, whereas the fat of a wild animal is permitted.

And it has ways

in which it is

equal to both a wild animal and a domesticated animal

, for example with regard to slaughter, since both a wild animal and a domesticated animal are forbidden to eat without slaughter.

And it has ways in which it is equal neither to a wild animal nor to a domesticated animal.

It is forbidden to mate it both with a wild animal and with a domesticated animal.

And we must consider the wording of this Mishna:

Let it teach

in it “

matters

”; it would have been appropriate for the tanna to teach “matters,” so why does it say “ways”?

And furthermore

, a similar difficulty may be raised concerning another Mishna, as we learned: “One who brings a bill of divorce from overseas must say: ‘It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.’” [Gittin 2a]

And concerning this matter we learned [there, 9a]:

This is one of the ways in which bills of divorce for women are equal to bills of manumission for slaves

, for one who brings a deed of manumission for a slave from overseas must also say, “It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.”

And this Mishna too must be examined:

Let it teach

“

matters

”; it would have been appropriate to teach “matters”! Why does it say “ways”?

Rather

, this is what must be said:

Wherever there is a dispute—

teach “ways.”

Whenever the Mishna differentiates between its laws, so that in one way the law is one way, and in another way the law is different, the tanna teaches there using the expression “ways.”

But

if

wherever there is no dispute

, whenever the Mishna does not differentiate between its laws,

teach

the tanna uses the expression

“matters.”

Therefore, in our Mishna we learned, “A woman is acquired in three ways,” because there is a way in which a woman is not acquired, namely, by a huppa, as will be explained below in the Gemara.

Similarly, with regard to an etrog we learned “ways,” because in some ways it is like a tree, and in some ways it is like a vegetable.

Similarly, with regard to a koy we learned “ways,” because in some ways it is like a wild animal, and in some ways it is like a domesticated animal.

Similarly, with regard to a zav we learned “ways,” because only the ways mentioned there are considered an involuntary emission, whereas other ways are not considered an involuntary emission.

Similarly, in the Mishna in Gittin we learned, “This is one of the ways in which bills of divorce for women are equal to bills of manumission for slaves,” because there is a case there in which the laws of bills of divorce for women and bills of manumission for slaves differ. And the Gemara brings support for this resolution [that where the laws differ, we say “ways,” and where they do not differ, we say “matters”].

It is precise as well

: it may be inferred that this is indeed the correct resolution:

For the latter clause teaches

, at the end of the Mishna dealing with the law of an etrog [“An etrog is equal to a tree in three ways, and to a vegetable in one way”], it teaches:

Rabbi Eliezer says: An etrog is equal to a tree in every respect.

It may be inferred: Why did the first tanna use the expression “ways,” whereas Rabbi Eliezer said, “An etrog is equal to a tree in every matter”?

Rather, it is proven from here that whenever there is no differentiation in the laws, the tanna uses the expression “matters” and not “ways.” Therefore, since according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no differentiation in the laws of an etrog, he used the expression, “An etrog is equal to a tree in every matter,” whereas the first tanna, who differentiates between the laws of an etrog, used the expression “ways.”

And we conclude: Indeed,

infer from it

from the words of the Mishna that our resolution is correct.

Now the Gemara explains why our Mishna counts the number of ways [a woman is acquired “in three” ways, and acquires herself “in two” ways]. Could we not count for ourselves how many ways there are to acquire a woman? And what benefit is there in stating the number?

Rather, it necessarily follows that our Mishna comes to say that a woman is acquired only in three ways, and likewise acquires herself only in two ways, and no more.

And now we inquire:

a.

The number in the first clause

, the number mentioned in the first clause [“A woman is acquired in three ways”],

to exclude what?

What act of acquisition does it come to exclude?

That is, what act of acquisition might we have thought could be used to acquire a woman, such that the tanna took the trouble to state a number in order to exclude it?

b.

The number in the latter clause [“

and she acquires herself in two ways”],

to exclude what?

What act of acquisition does it come to exclude, to say that a woman does not acquire herself through it?

And we explain:

a.

The number in the first clause

comes

to exclude

the act of acquisition of

huppa.

If the father handed his daughter over to the husband to bring her into a huppa for the sake of kiddushin, she is not betrothed through it.

This is contrary to the opinion of Rav Huna, who says below, 5a, that a huppa acquires a woman with regard to kiddushin, deriving it by means of a kal va-homer from acquisition with money [as explained in the Gemara there].

However, this resolution is correct only according to Rava [below, 5b], who maintains that a huppa does not effect kiddushin.

But

if

according to Rav Huna, who says

below [5a] that

a huppa acquires

a woman

by means of a kal va-homer

, there is still a question: the number that we learned in the Mishna,

to exclude what?

What does this number come to exclude? —

To exclude

the act of acquisition of

exchange.

If one gives a woman an utensil to betroth her with it by means of an exchange acquisition, she is not betrothed.

And the Mishna needed to exclude this, because without the statement of the Mishna,

it might enter your mind to say

the following:

Since he derived

, because the tanna learned by means of a gzera shava

“taking, taking,” from the field of Ephron,

that just as a field is acquired with money, so too a woman is acquired with money [as stated above, 2a]—

therefore, the same should be learned with regard to an exchange acquisition of a woman:

Just as

a

field is acquired [

acquired ]

through exchange

[as we find in the Scroll of Ruth, “He removed his shoe,” with regard to the acquisition of a field]—

so too, a woman is acquired through exchange.

This teaches us

therefore, the tanna taught us through the number in the Mishna that a woman is acquired only through these three ways, and not through exchange.

And we challenge this:

But why not say so as well?

Why should we not say that a woman is indeed acquired through exchange [and derive this by a gzera shava from the acquisition of a field]?

And we explain: An

exchange acquisition exists

, even

with

an utensil worth

less than one peruta.