Kiddushin 3a — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

there,

in the latter clause [where we learned: an etrog is equivalent to a vegetable in one “way”],

this teaches us,

the tanna came to teach us this:

What is the reason that the etrog is tithed according to the time of its picking [and not according to the time of its budding]? -

Because

its way [its customary manner]

that is, its manner

of the etrog

is to grow

as

the way of the

vegetable -

Just as a vegetable, its way is to grow on “

all water,”

just as a vegetable requires irrigation with drawn water, and the rainwater that falls on its own is not sufficient for it,

and

therefore

at the time of its picking is its tithing -

An etrog as well, its way is to grow on “

all water”

[for it requires irrigation with drawn water in addition to the rainwater],

and

therefore

at the time of its picking -

is its tithing.

And therefore the tanna used the expression “way,” because the fact that its “way” is to grow on all water [like a vegetable]—this is the reason for the law stated here: that its tithing is at the time of its picking.

And now the Gemara brings another Mishna in which we learned “ways,” and we must discuss why we did not learn in it “things”:

And that which we learned [Bekhorot 2:8]:

[Bikkurim 2:8]:

a koy,

a living creature that is in doubt whether it is a wild animal or whether it is domesticated livestock, its laws are treated stringently because of the doubt, both with the stringencies that apply to a wild animal and with the stringencies that apply to domesticated livestock:

it has ways

in which it is

equal

to

a wild animal,

such as with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood, for the blood of a wild animal requires covering, whereas the blood of domesticated livestock is exempt.

And it has ways

in which it is

equal

to

domesticated livestock,

such as with regard to eating its fat, for the fat of domesticated livestock is forbidden to eat, whereas the fat of a wild animal is permitted.

And it has ways

in which it is

equal to a wild animal and to domesticated livestock,

such as with regard to slaughter, because both a wild animal and domesticated livestock are forbidden to eat without slaughter.

And it has ways in which it is equal neither to a wild animal nor to domesticated livestock.

For it is forbidden to mate it both with a wild animal and with domesticated livestock.

And we must discuss the wording of this Mishna:

Let it teach

in it “

things,”

the tanna ought to have taught “things” in it, and why did we learn “ways” in it?

And furthermore,

and another similar difficulty must be raised concerning another Mishna: for we learned: One who brings a bill of divorce from overseas must say, “Before me it was written and before me it was signed.” [Gittin 2a]

And we learned concerning this [there, 9a]:

This is one of the ways in which bills of divorce of women are equal to bills of manumission of slaves,

for one who brings a deed of manumission for a slave from overseas must also say, “Before me it was written and before me it was signed.”

And this Mishna too must be discussed:

Let it teach “

things,”

it ought to have taught “things” in it! And why did we learn “ways” in it?

And on the strength of these last two questions, the Gemara retracts all the earlier resolutions and states one rule that is common to all the Mishnayot:

Rather,

this is what must be said:

Whenever there is a dispute—

teach “ways.”

Every matter whose laws the Mishna differentiates, in one way its law is such, and in another way its law is different—the tanna teaches in it the expression “ways.”

And

if

whenever there is no dispute,

in every matter whose laws the Mishna does not differentiate,

teach,

the tanna teaches it with the expression

“things.”

And therefore, in our Mishna we learned, “A woman is acquired in three ways,” because there is a way in which a woman is not acquired, namely huppa, as will be explained in the Gemara below.

And likewise, concerning the etrog we learned “ways,” because in some ways it is like a tree, and in some ways it is like a vegetable.

And likewise, concerning the koy we learned “ways,” because in some ways it is like a wild animal, and in some ways it is like domesticated livestock.

And likewise, concerning the zav we learned “ways,” because only the ways mentioned there are considered an involuntary discharge, but other ways are not considered an involuntary discharge.

And likewise, in the Mishna in Gittin we learned, “This is one of the ways in which bills of divorce of women are equal to bills of manumission of slaves,” because there is there a way in which there is a distinction between bills of divorce of women and bills of manumission of slaves. And the Gemara brings support for this resolution [that in a matter whose laws contain a distinction we learned “ways,” and in a matter whose laws contain no distinction we learned “things”].

It is precise as well,

it may be inferred that this is indeed the correct resolution:

For the latter clause teaches,

at the end of the Mishna discussing the law of the etrog [“An etrog is equal to a tree in three ways, and to a vegetable in one way”], we learned:

Rabbi Eliezer says: An etrog is equal to a tree in every matter.

And it may be inferred: Why did the first tanna use the expression “ways,” whereas Rabbi Eliezer said, “An etrog is equal to a tree in every matter”?

Rather, it is proven from here that in every matter whose laws contain no distinction, the tanna uses the expression “things” and not the expression “ways.” And therefore, since according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no distinction in the laws of the etrog, he used in his wording, “An etrog is equal to a tree in every matter,” whereas the first tanna, who differentiates the laws of an etrog, used the expression “ways.”

And we conclude: Indeed,

it may be inferred

from the words of the Mishna that our resolution is correct.

And now the Gemara explains for what purpose our Mishna counts the number of ways [a woman is acquired “in three” ways, and acquires herself “in two” ways]. Are we not able to count for ourselves how many ways there are in the acquisition of a woman? And what benefit is there in the matter?

Rather, necessarily, our Mishna comes to say that a woman is acquired only in three ways, and likewise she acquires herself only in two ways, and no more.

And from now we inquire into it:

a.

The number in the first clause,

the number mentioned in the first clause [“A woman is acquired in three ways”],

to exclude what?

Which acquisition does it come to exclude?

That is, which acquisition might have occurred to us as one by which a woman can be acquired, such that for this reason the tanna took the trouble to teach a number in order to exclude it?

b.

The number in the latter clause [“and she acquires herself in two ways”],

“and she acquires herself in two ways,”

to exclude what?

Which acquisition does it come to exclude, to say that a woman does not acquire herself through it?

And we answer:

a.

The number in the first clause

comes

to exclude

the acquisition of

huppa.

For if the father handed over his daughter to a husband to bring her into huppa for the sake of betrothal, she is not betrothed through it.

This is unlike the view of Rav Huna, who says below, 5a, that huppa acquires a woman with regard to betrothal, and learned this by a

kal va-chomer from acquisition with money [as explained in the Gemara there]. Rather, this resolution is correct only according to Rava [below, 5b], who holds that huppa does not effect betrothal.

And

if

according to Rav Huna, who says,

below [5a],

huppa acquires

a woman

by a kal va-chomer,

there is still a question: The number that we learned in the Mishna,

to exclude what?

What does this number come to exclude? -

To exclude

the acquisition of

exchange.

For if one gives a woman a utensil to betroth her with it by way of acquisition through exchange, she is not betrothed.

And the Mishna needed to exclude this because, were it not for the words of the Mishna,

it might have entered your mind,

it might have occurred to us to say as follows:

Since he derived,

since the tanna learned by a gzera shava

“taking, taking,” from the field of Ephron,

just as a field is acquired with money, so too a woman is acquired with money [as above, 2a] -

therefore, also with regard to acquisition through exchange in the case of a woman, we shall learn:

just as,

just as

a field is acquired

[is acquired]

through exchange

[as we find in the Scroll of Ruth, “He drew off his shoe,” with regard to the acquisition of a field] -

so too a woman is acquired through exchange.

This teaches us,

therefore the tanna taught us in the number in the Mishna, to teach us that a woman is acquired only in these three ways, and not through exchange.

And we object:

And say this as well?

Why should we not say that indeed a woman is acquired through exchange [and we shall learn this by a gzera shava from the acquisition of a field]?

And we answer: The acquisition of

exchange exists,

it exists even

in

a utensil worth

less than the value of a peruta.