Kiddushin 39b (לט:) — the Talmud in English

For

granted, if he had taught us,

that Rav sowed everything in a single garden bed, while maintaining a certain distance between the species so that they would not draw nourishment from one another, in accordance with the law of distancing kilayim [as stated in the Mishna, Tractate Kilayim, beginning of chapter 3, and explained in Tractate Shabbat 84b], such that he sowed at the precise page location

four

rows of four different species

along the four sides

of the

garden bed, and one

row of a fifth species

in the middle

of the garden bed,

that would be well understood,

as there would then be room to learn from this that it is prohibited to sow kilayim outside Eretz Yisrael.

But here,

since Rav sowed each species in a separate garden bed, there is no proof that he did so because of kilayim. Rather, it is possible that he did so

for the sake of beauty,

so that each species would be distinctly recognizable in its own special garden bed.

Alternatively, it was for the sake of sparing the effort of his attendant,

so that the attendant, who went to gather a particular vegetable from the garden, would not have to trouble himself to search for it among the other species, but would recognize it immediately by its garden bed.

Mishna:

Anyone who performs one mitzva

more than his transgressions, and it is consequently found that his merits are predominant, is considered a completely righteous person, and his reward is that

he is treated favorably

in this world

, and his days are prolonged

in the World-to-Come,

and he inherits the “Land,”

the land of true life, in the World-to-Come.

And anyone who does not perform one mitzva

more than his merits, but his merits are only equal to his liabilities,

he is not treated favorably in this world

and his days are not prolonged

in the World-to-Come,

and he does not inherit the Land,

in the World-to-Come.

Gemara:

The Gemara initially assumes that the intention of the tanna in the Mishna is to say that by performing any mitzva, a person can merit goodness even in this world [and also inherit the World-to-Come].

And he raises a contradiction:

The Gemara challenges the words of the Mishna here, which maintains that one can merit goodness in this world by performing any single mitzva, with the words of the Mishna at the beginning of Tractate Pe'a, which maintains that a person receives reward in both worlds only for certain deeds:

As we learned there:

These are the matters whose fruits a person enjoys in this world, while the principal remains for him in the World-to-Come.

And

these are they: honoring one’s father and mother, acts of kindness, hospitality, bringing peace between one person and another, and Torah study, which is equivalent to them all.

these are they: honoring one’s father and mother, acts of kindness, hospitality, bringing peace between one person and another, and Torah study, which is equivalent to them all. On p. 40a below, the Gemara cites this Mishna and discusses it; it will be explained there in the text and notes.

This implies that only for “these matters,” and no others, can a person merit goodness in both worlds, and not for any single mitzva!

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said: This is what

the tanna in our Mishna

said: Anyone who performs one mitzva

of any kind

more than his merits,

he is a completely righteous person. Therefore,

he is treated favorably

in this world,

and he is considered as one who fulfills the entire Torah,

and for this reason he also inherits the World-to-Come.

The Gemara is astonished:

By inference

you learn from these words

that those,

the mitzvot enumerated in the Mishna in Tractate Pe'a,

even

through the performance of

one

mitzva alone,

also,

a person merits to enjoy its fruits in this world, while the principal remains for him in the World-to-Come.

And it is very difficult to say that even if a person has a majority of transgressions, he is nevertheless entitled to enjoy both worlds as a result of performing only one mitzva, such as honoring one's father and mother or performing acts of kindness.

Rav Shemaya said:

The intention of the tanna in Tractate Pe'a is

to say that if they were equal,

meaning that this person had half merits and half liabilities, and among his merits there was the mitzva of honoring one's father and mother or performing acts of kindness, then

it tips the balance

in favor, and by virtue of it he merits being like a completely righteous person. But the other mitzvot do not have the power to tip the balance; and if his merits and liabilities were equal, he is not considered righteous and is not treated favorably until he performs an additional mitzva.

But the Gemara still challenges what we have now learned:

And anyone who performs one mitzva more than his merits is treated favorably

in this world.

And he raises a contradiction

from the words of a beraita.

As it was taught:

Anyone

who

has more merits than transgressions is treated harshly,

so that his few transgressions will be expiated in this world and he will not be punished for them in the World-to-Come, but will receive reward there alone.

And he is comparable,

with regard to receiving his punishment here,

to one who burned the entire Torah and did not leave even one letter of it.

That is, he is punished severely so that he will be cleansed completely.

And anyone whose transgressions are more numerous than his merits is treated favorably

here, so that he will receive his reward in this world and not in the World-to-Come.

And he is comparable,

with regard to receiving goodness in this world,

to one who fulfilled the entire Torah and did not leave out even one letter of it.

But this contradicts what we learned in our Mishna: that one whose merits are predominant is treated favorably even here.

Abaye said:

Our Mishna does not contradict the beraita.

Rather,

the Mishna,

our Mishna, which says that he is treated favorably or harshly, means something else:

“They prepare for him a good day,”

meaning that one whose merits are predominant is punished here, and thereby a good day is prepared for him in the World-to-Come, since he will not be punished there, having already been punished here. This is the meaning of the Mishna when it says that “he is treated favorably.”

And

conversely, when the Mishna says that he is treated harshly, it refers to one whose transgressions are predominant, so that he will receive his reward here for his few merits, and thereby they prepare for him in the future

a bad day,

as he will forfeit his reward in the World-to-Come because he received it here.

In this way, the Mishna agrees with the beraita, which also maintains that one whose transgressions are few is treated harshly here. The difference is only that the beraita explicitly states that he is treated harshly here, whereas the Mishna states that a “good day” is made for him through this harsh treatment.

As for the beraita,

Rava said

another answer: The Mishna and the beraita disagree in the dispute among the tannaim as to whether there is reward for a mitzva in this world:

This one,

this beraita,

whose opinion is it? It is Rabbi Yaakov’s, who said: There is no reward for a mitzva in this world!

As it was taught: Rabbi Yaakov says: There is no mitzva in the Torah whose reward is stated alongside it for which the resurrection of

the dead is not dependent upon it,

in order to teach you that the reward mentioned for it is in the future, and not here in this world.

The proof of this is that

with regard to honoring one’s father and mother it is written

that reward is stated for the mitzva:

“So that your days may be lengthened and so that it may be good for you.”

And likewise,

with regard to sending away the mother bird it is written

that reward is stated for the mitzva:

“So that it may be good for you and you may lengthen your days.”

But reality demonstrates that the reward is not in this world, for

indeed,

his father said to him: “Climb to the upper chamber and bring me fledglings,” and he climbed to the upper chamber

[a tower containing a dovecote],

sent away the mother, and took the young; and as he was returning, he fell and died.

Where is this person’s goodness of days, and where is this person’s length of days,

which the Torah stated as the reward for the mitzvot of honoring one's father and sending away the mother bird!?

Rather,

necessarily, this is the explanation of the verse:

“So that it may be good for you,” in a world that is entirely good; “and so that your days may be lengthened,” in a world that is entirely long.

And we refute this:

Perhaps that is not what happened?

Perhaps the reward is in this world, and indeed such a situation is impossible: that the son should die while performing a mitzva for which the Torah promises length of days!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yaakov saw an actual incident;

he saw it with his own eyes, and on the basis of what he saw with his own eyes he proved his statement.

The Gemara challenges the proof from the incident:

Perhaps

the person who was killed did not intend to perform the mitzva for the sake of Heaven, but

was contemplating a transgression

while performing the mitzva, and therefore the Torah’s promise of length of days did not protect him?

The Gemara answers:

A mere evil thought

alone,

the Holy One, blessed be He, does not combine with action,

and therefore he should not have been punished while performing a mitzva for which the Torah promises length of days.

But the Gemara continues to challenge:

Perhaps,

he was contemplating idolatry

at the time he performed the mitzva, and for that reason he was killed,

and it is written

with regard to the thought of idolatry,

“So that I may seize the House of Israel in their heart,”

teaching that one is liable for it on the basis of thought alone!?

And we answer:

He,

Rabbi Yaakov,

also said this: If it enters your mind

that there is

reward for a mitzva in this world, why did the reward for the

mitzva

not protect him from coming to contemplate a transgression,

so that he would not come to contemplate a transgression while performing such a mitzva? Rather, from this Rabbi Yaakov proved that there is no reward for mitzvot in this world, and the intention of the verse is to refer to length of days in the World-to-Come.

The Gemara asks: How could one say that Rabbi Yaakov saw an incident in which a person was killed while performing the mitzva of honoring his father?

But Rabbi Elazar said: Those sent to perform a mitzva are not harmed!

And we answer:

There, while they are going

to perform the mitzva,

is different.

But the incident Rabbi Yaakov saw occurred while the person was returning.

But the Gemara still asks:

But Rabbi Elazar said: Those sent to perform a mitzva are not harmed, neither while going nor while returning!?

And it answers:

It was a defective ladder, for the danger was established; and wherever the danger is established, we do not rely on a miracle,

even in a place where a miracle is promised. Therefore, the Torah’s promise of length of days did not avail him here.

As it is written

[in I Samuel, when Samuel heard the command of the Lord to go and anoint David king over Israel],

“And Samuel said

to the Lord:

‘How can I go? Saul will hear and kill me!’”

Thus, Samuel was afraid to go despite having been sent by the Lord’s command and despite being assured that he would fulfill his mission. Since this involved an established danger, on account of Saul’s hatred of David, he did not rely on the promise.

Rav Yosef said: Had “Aḥer” expounded

[Elisha ben Avuya, who turned to an evil culture]

this verse,

concerning the promise of length of days for fulfilling the mitzva of honoring one’s father,

like Rabbi Yaakov, his grandson

[his maternal grandson],

, he would not have sinned.

And what was Aḥer’s

reason for what he saw and for sinning?

Some say: He saw something similar to this,

that which Rabbi Yaakov

saw,

and said: If so, the words of the verse are not true, and therefore he turned to an evil culture.

And some say: It was the tongue of Ḥutzpit the Translator,

the tongue of Rabbi Ḥutzpit the Translator, who was killed as one of the Ten Martyrs,

that he

saw,

that it was being dragged

by

something else [a pig].

He said:

“Aḥer said: Is it possible that

the mouth that uttered pearls should

lick dust!?”

And therefore he denied the providence of the Holy One, blessed be He, and

went out and sinned!

Rami bar Tovi bar Rav Kisna raised a contradiction before Rava

as follows:

On the one hand,

we learned

in our Mishna:

Anyone who performs one mitzva is treated favorably.

And we must infer from the wording of the Mishna that only if he

performed

a mitzva,

yes,

then he is treated favorably. But if he

did not perform

a mitzva act, but only wished to perform a mitzva and did not actually perform it,

no,

he is not treated favorably on account of his thought to perform a mitzva.

And he raises a contradiction

from a beraita:

As it was taught:

If

a person

sat and did not commit a transgression, he is given reward as one who performed a mitzva.

He said to him,

Rava:

There,

where he receives reward without an action, it is speaking

of a case where a transgression came into his hands,

and he subdued his inclination

and was saved from it.

As in the case of Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappi, whom a certain noblewoman solicited,

a gentile woman solicited him to commit a transgression.

He said something, and filled himself with boils and painful sores, and covered his body with boils and suppurating sores. He did this in order to avoid the transgression.

She too did

something

and performed a certain act

[a magical incantation]

, and he was healed,

and she healed him.

He fled,

escaped,

and hid

in

that bathhouse,

a place in which there were such harmful beings,

for when two people entered,

if they entered it in pairs of two,

then

even during the day they were harmed.

The next day the Sages said to him: “Who guarded you?”

Who protected you from the harmful beings there?