Ketubot 9a (ט.) — the Talmud in English

Introduction to the sugya of “I found an open opening.”

He has rendered it, with regard to himself, a forbidden entity:

A. Anyone who declares concerning an item that has been established as permitted that it is forbidden—for example, one who says concerning an item that witnesses established to be fat that it is in fact forbidden fat—is himself forbidden to eat it. The Sages called this: “He has rendered it, with regard to himself, a forbidden entity” [the person has made the item, with regard to himself, like a piece of forbidden food].

As for the rationale, the later authorities concluded that this is based on a person’s credibility with regard to himself. It is derived from what the Torah states [Exodus 22:8]: “Whom he says, ‘This is it,’” from which the Sages learned that a person is believed concerning himself to obligate himself monetarily.

And just as he is believed through his admission to obligate himself monetarily, this verse likewise includes that a person is believed with regard to a prohibition concerning himself.

Doubt and “

compound doubt”

with regard to prohibitions:

A. We hold that “a Torah doubt is treated stringently,” meaning that whenever there is a doubt concerning a Torah prohibition, it is forbidden to transgress it because of the doubt. Whereas “a rabbinic doubt is treated leniently.”

B. The early authorities dispute this law that “a Torah doubt is treated stringently”: Is it of Torah origin or rabbinic in origin?

Rashi and many of the early authorities maintain that it is of Torah origin.

The Rambam, by contrast, maintains that it is only rabbinic in origin.

C. When there is one side indicating that an item is forbidden and one side indicating that it is permitted, and the side indicating prohibition is not certain but itself contains a doubt as to whether the item is forbidden or permitted, this is a “compound doubt,” and it is treated leniently even when the doubt concerns a Torah matter.

For example, in the case of a woman concerning whom it has been established with certainty that she had intercourse before her marriage, and we are uncertain whether she had intercourse after betrothal and thereby became forbidden to her husband as a sota, or perhaps she committed adultery before betrothal and is not forbidden. A second doubt is added to this doubt: Was the intercourse consensual, in which case she became forbidden to her husband, or was it forced, in which case she did not become forbidden to her husband—

since two doubts have combined in the form of a “compound doubt,” this woman is permitted to her husband.

D. We find two rationales for why, in a prohibition, a “compound doubt” is treated leniently:

The first: The basis of the leniency is the law of “majority,” since we have a “majority of sides” indicating that the matter is permitted, as this rationale is explained by the Rashba in his responsa.

The second was written by the later authorities in accordance with the Rambam’s view that “a Torah doubt is treated stringently” is only rabbinic in origin. According to him, when there are two doubts, it is as though we are uncertain whether this matter is included in the law that “a Torah doubt is treated stringently.” For there is no definite Torah doubt here; rather, the doubt is whether a doubt concerning a prohibition is actually before us.

And since, according to the Rambam, a Torah doubt is treated stringently only by rabbinic law, it follows that in a “compound doubt” the doubt concerns only a rabbinic prohibition. And we hold that a rabbinic doubt is treated leniently.

A doubt and a compound doubt in monetary matters:

A. In every doubt concerning monetary law, one follows the person in whose possession the item is established to be. For it is an established principle for us that “the one who seeks to extract from another bears the proof.” This law is of Torah origin.

B. In Tosafot in our sugya [9b], it will be explained whether money may also be extracted by virtue of a compound doubt.

A woman who committed adultery while married—

with regard to prohibition and with regard to her marriage contract:

A. If the wife of an Israelite had consensual intercourse with a stranger while married, she becomes forbidden both to her husband and to the man with whom she had intercourse [even after her husband divorces her or dies].

But if she was raped while married, she is not forbidden to her husband; whereas the law concerning her prohibition to the man with whom she had intercourse will be explained in our sugya.

B. If the wife of a kohen was raped, she is forbidden to her kohen husband.

C. If the husband of an Israelite woman warned her and cautioned her: “Do not seclude yourself with so-and-so!” and she violated his instructions and secluded herself with him, she is called a “doubtful sota,” and she is forbidden, like a definite sota, both to her husband and to the man with whom she secluded herself, until she drinks the bitter waters and is found pure.

D. The sota forfeits her marriage contract, and two rationales were stated for this:

The first: So that the woman should be easy in his eyes to divorce.

The second: Since she was the one who caused herself to become forbidden to her husband, she therefore forfeits her marriage contract.

E. The wife of a kohen who was raped does not forfeit her marriage contract.

There is no matter involving forbidden sexual relations that is established by fewer than two witnesses:

A. We hold that monetary laws may be adjudicated only on the basis of two witnesses, as the Torah states: “By the testimony of two witnesses shall a matter be established.” With regard to prohibitions, however, we accept even the testimony of one witness, for “one witness is believed with regard to prohibitions.”

B. A matter involving forbidden sexual relations—for example, matters of bills of divorce and betrothal, or a case in which the court comes to forbid a woman to her husband—is like monetary law, in that money may be extracted from a person only on the basis of two witnesses.

This law is derived by means of a gezerah shavah from what is stated concerning a matter involving forbidden sexual relations: “For he has found in her a matter of

indecency,” and what is stated concerning monetary law: “By the testimony of two witnesses shall a

matter be established.”

The Sages received through the tradition of transmission that this gezerah shavah comes to teach that a matter involving forbidden sexual relations, too, may be adjudicated only on the basis of two witnesses, like monetary law.

C. Not only is clarification of a matter involving forbidden sexual relations possible only on the basis of two witnesses, but the very establishment of such a matter—for example, a bill of divorce or betrothal—takes effect only if two witnesses saw the matter, and they are called “witnesses of establishment.”

C. Not only may a matter concerning sexual relations be established only through two witnesses, but the very validity of such a matter—for example, a divorce document or betrothal—depends on two witnesses having seen the act. These are called “witnesses who establish validity.”

D. In our sugya, the Gemara will discuss whether the adultery of a married woman, which forbids her to her husband and to the man with whom she had intercourse, likewise does not “take effect” to forbid her except through “witnesses of establishment,” as with bills of divorce and betrothal, since the prohibition of a woman to her husband is a matter involving forbidden sexual relations.

Rabbi Elazar said:

The Gemara now cites Rabbi Elazar’s statement concerning the law of “I found an open opening,” because later in the sugya the Gemara brings a proof for Rabbi Elazar’s statement from our Mishna.

The opening of a virgin’s vagina remains closed until after her first intercourse [unless she was previously struck by a piece of wood or the like, in which case she is called “one injured by wood”; and some maintain that even in the case of one injured by wood, her opening remains closed]. It is customary for virgins to bleed with virginal blood during their first intercourse [unless she is one injured by wood; and some maintain that even one injured by wood has virginal blood].

A husband who married a woman on the presumption that she was a virgin,

who says after having intercourse with her for the first time,

that he had intercourse with her for the first time

“I found an open opening,”

unlike the usual condition of virgins, and it is necessarily the case that she had intercourse before this encounter.

He is

believed to forbid her to himself,

because of the doubt that perhaps she committed adultery between betrothal and marriage and thereby became forbidden to her husband, like a woman who committed adultery while married.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning Rabbi Elazar’s ruling: Even if we indeed believe him that he found an open opening, and she indeed had intercourse with another man, she is nevertheless not forbidden to him—

And why

is she forbidden to him!? After all,

it is a compound doubt

whether her intercourse occurred in a manner that made her forbidden to her husband, and any doubt composed of two doubts is not forbidden.

For here there are two doubts. The first is:

Perhaps

she had intercourse while she was betrothed

to him,

and became forbidden to him under the law of a sota;

perhaps

the intercourse occurred when

she was not

to him,

and she did not become forbidden to him.

And

even

if you would say

that indeed

to him

she had intercourse, there is still a second doubt here:

Perhaps

she had intercourse

under duress

and did not become forbidden to him, as is the law concerning the wife of an Israelite, who does not become forbidden to her husband if she was raped;

perhaps

she had intercourse

willingly

and became forbidden to him.

The Gemara resolves Rabbi Elazar’s statement:

It is necessary:

Indeed, Rabbi Elazar’s statement was not said concerning every woman—

but only

concerning the wife of a kohen,

who is forbidden to her husband even if she was raped. Consequently, her prohibition depends on only one doubt: Perhaps she had intercourse while married to him, and perhaps she did not have intercourse while married to him. And it is a Torah doubt, which is treated stringently.

And if you wish, say:

Even

concerning the wife of an Israelite

it is possible that there is only one doubt, and Rabbi Elazar spoke even in that case:

For example, her father accepted betrothal for her when she was younger than three years and one day

[she was betrothed through her father while she was younger than three years], for then there is no uncertainty that perhaps she had intercourse when she was not married to him. For the signs of virginity of a minor who has intercourse before the age of three return as they were before the intercourse, and it necessarily follows that her opening was opened after she had reached the age of three, at a time when she was already married to him.

The Gemara had thought that Rabbi Elazar’s innovation was that the husband is believed because he is seeking to forbid her to himself, and “he has rendered it, with regard to himself, a forbidden entity” [he has made the woman, with regard to himself, like a forbidden entity]—

and therefore the Gemara raises the difficulty:

What does Rabbi Elazar teach us by this? After all, we have already

by saying this? After all, we have already

learned in a Mishna in tractate Kiddushin [65a] the law that “he has rendered it, with regard to himself, a forbidden entity”!

in a Mishna in tractate Kiddushin [65a] the law that “he has made the item forbidden to himself”!

The woman’s close relatives—her daughter, her daughter’s daughter, her son’s daughter, her sister, her mother, her maternal grandmother, and her paternal grandmother—are forbidden to the husband. And the husband’s close relatives—his son, his brother, his brother’s son, and his father—are forbidden to the woman.

As we learned:

One who says to a woman: “I betrothed you,”

and, since I betrothed you, I am forbidden to marry your daughter, your sister, and your other close relatives,

and she

denies him and

says: “You did not betroth me.”

Then

she,

the woman,

—is permitted to his close relatives,

since she denies his statement, and there are no witnesses who testify in accordance with his claim.

And

if

he,

the man,

—is forbidden to her close relatives,

since “he has rendered it, with regard to himself [her close relatives, with regard to him], a forbidden entity.”

Thus, the Mishna has already taught us the law that “he has rendered it, with regard to himself, a forbidden entity.” For what purpose, then, did Rabbi Elazar need to teach us this law!?

The Gemara answers:

Lest you say,

if Rabbi Elazar had not introduced his innovation—that only

there,

when the husband says, “I betrothed you,”

he certainly knows

[he is certainly expert concerning the matter], is the husband believed with regard to himself.

But here,

when he says, “I found an open opening”—

I might have said that, since this is his first intercourse, as he had not previously been married,

he is not expert in the matter

[he is not familiar with the matter, and it merely appears to him that her opening was open], and she should not become forbidden to him.

He teaches us

that Rabbi Elazar maintains that he is expert in this matter, and therefore she is forbidden to him.

Rabbi Elazar is not coming to innovate that we do not presume the husband to be lying, since it is clear that, with regard to his own prohibition, he is believed, as we learned in the Mishna in Kiddushin. Rather, Rabbi Elazar’s principal innovation is that we do not say that, because of error and lack of expertise, it merely appeared to him that he found an open opening and she therefore became forbidden to him, although in reality her opening was not open.

The Gemara further raises a difficulty concerning Rabbi Elazar’s statement, from another angle:

And did Rabbi Elazar really say this,

that a woman becomes forbidden to her husband through adultery that did not occur in the presence of witnesses who would serve as “witnesses of establishment” for the adultery!?

But Rabbi Elazar said: A woman does not become forbidden to her husband

without witnesses before whom she committed adultery,

except through the matter of warning and seclusion

[her husband warned her, saying, “Do not seclude yourself with a certain man,” and she violated his instruction and secluded herself with him], at which point the Torah innovated that she becomes forbidden to her husband under the law of a sota, even if there are no witnesses who saw the act of adultery —

as in the incident that occurred

with King David, who had intercourse with Bat-Sheva, the wife of Uriah the Hittite, as the Gemara proceeds to explain. The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning this question:

But this reasoning:

do you think that Rabbi Elazar actually said that a woman becomes forbidden to her husband only through a warning and seclusion, as was the case with David, where Uriah’s wife became forbidden to Uriah only after she had relations with David following a warning and seclusion?

But

the incident that occurred

with David—

was it a case of warning and seclusion!?

After all, Uriah never warned her!?

Furthermore,

one can object:

who forbade her,

did they forbid her to Uriah so that Rabbi Elazar could say that she becomes forbidden to her husband only through a warning and seclusion, as they supposedly forbade her to Uriah, the husband of Bathsheba!?

The Gemara answers:

This is not difficult!

If this is the only objection, Rabbi Elazar’s words are not refuted!

For Rabbi Elazar did not cite the incident that occurred with David as an example of a prohibition effected through a warning and seclusion. Rather, he cited it only as proof of his ruling.

And

this is what

Rabbi Elazar

was saying:

A woman does not become forbidden to her husband

through mere adultery, but only through matters of warning and seclusion.

And the proof of this is

from the incident that occurred

with David and Bathsheba,

where there was not,

no

warning and seclusion, and

therefore

she did not become forbidden

Bathsheba to Uriah, despite having committed adultery with David while married to him!

Once these words of Rabbi Elazar have been clarified, the Gemara returns to discuss his statement here:

Nevertheless, there is a difficulty

with Rabbi Elazar’s words in our sugya, for according to Rabbi Elazar’s own statement, it is only through

warning and seclusion—

not

otherwise—that she indeed becomes forbidden to her husband.

But when the husband says,

“I found an open opening,”

—

she does not

become forbidden to her husband, since there were no witnesses who established the adultery.

Yet here Rabbi Elazar said that a woman becomes forbidden through the husband’s statement, “I found an open opening”!?

The Gemara challenges this challenge:

But according to your reasoning,

according to your understanding of Rabbi Elazar’s words there, that a woman becomes forbidden only through warning and seclusion—and on that basis you found a difficulty with Rabbi Elazar’s words in our sugya—

is it possible to say that according to Rabbi Elazar a woman who commits adultery becomes forbidden to her husband only through

warning and seclusion, not

only then? But through

witnesses

who testify to her adultery—

not

does she become forbidden to her husband? Is that what Rabbi Elazar meant by saying: A woman does not become forbidden to her husband except through warning and seclusion!?

After all, the Torah says: “When a man takes a wife and lives with her, and it comes to pass that she does not find favor in his eyes because he has found in her a matter of nakedness, he shall write her a bill of divorce, place it in her hand, and send her away.” The verse explicitly indicates that if he “has found in her a matter of nakedness”—which means that witnesses testified to her adultery, as explained in the Gemara in tractate Sota [3b]—he must divorce her because she has become forbidden to him. If so, it certainly could not have entered Rabbi Elazar’s mind to say this.

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that Rabbi Elazar is not discussing “witnesses who establish the act,” but rather “witnesses who clarify” the matter, who clarify before the court the fact of the adultery. And

this is what he was saying:

A woman does not become forbidden to her husband on the testimony of one witness

who testifies before us that she committed adultery,

but only on the testimony of two witnesses

who testify to this before us.

And

if, after

warning and seclusion [the two witnesses testified that her husband had warned her and that she had secluded herself with the man with whom he had warned her not to seclude herself] —

where two witnesses testified that her husband had warned her and that she had secluded herself with the man with whom he had warned her not to seclude herself] —

even on the testimony of one witness

who testifies that she committed adultery,

also

she becomes forbidden.

Before the Gemara has finished explaining Rabbi Elazar’s words, it explains that there is no contradiction between Rabbi Elazar’s words there and his words in our sugya.

And

since Rabbi Elazar did not require witnesses who establish the act in order to forbid her on account of the adultery, if so—

one who says,

“I found an open opening,”

is trusted to forbid her to himself, since

he is like two witnesses

who testify to her adultery,

as he is considered.

That is, it is clear to him that she had intercourse, and therefore he can forbid her to himself by virtue of the principle, “He has rendered it upon himself as a piece of forbidden matter.”

After the Gemara resolved the seeming contradiction in Rabbi Elazar’s words, it adds and explains the conclusion of Rabbi Elazar’s statement, “And as in the incident that occurred”:

This is how Rabbi Elazar continued his question:

And if you would say: The incident that occurred

with Bathsheba, Uriah’s wife—

why did they not forbid her

to Uriah!?

After all, warning and seclusion are not required in order to forbid a woman to her husband; the adultery itself renders her forbidden. And there were many witnesses to the matter of Bathsheba’s adultery with David, since David brought her into his house!?

There,

in the case of Uriah’s wife, she did not become forbidden because

it was rape!

For she had not had intercourse with David willingly, and therefore she did not become forbidden to Uriah, her husband.

Alternatively,

there is another reason why they did not forbid her:

For this is what Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: