Ketubot 9a — the Talmud in English

Introduction to the discussion of “I found an open vaginal passage.”

He has made the item forbidden to himself

A. Anyone who says about an item that had been established as permitted that it is forbidden—for example, one who says about an item that witnesses had established to be fat that it is actually forbidden fat—may not eat it himself. The Sages called this principle: “He has made the item forbidden to himself” [the speaker has treated the item, with regard to himself, as a forbidden piece].

The later authorities determined that the reason for this principle is that a person is considered trustworthy regarding himself. This is derived from what the Torah states [Exodus 22:8]: “Whom he says this is,” from which the Sages learned that a person’s own statement can make him liable to pay money.

Just as a person is trusted when he admits something that makes him financially liable, this verse also includes the principle that a person is trusted regarding a prohibition that applies to himself.

A doubt and

a compound doubt

regarding prohibitions:

A. We have established the principle: “In a doubt concerning a Torah prohibition, one rules stringently,” meaning that whenever there is a doubt whether a matter is forbidden by Torah law, one may not transgress it because of the doubt. But “in a doubt concerning a rabbinic prohibition, one rules leniently.”

B. The early authorities disagreed about this rule—that in a doubt concerning a Torah prohibition one rules stringently—whether it is a Torah law or a rabbinic law:

Rashi and many of the early authorities hold that it is a Torah law.

Maimonides, however, holds that it is only a rabbinic law.

When there is one possibility that an item is forbidden and one possibility that it is permitted, and the possibility of prohibition is not certain but itself contains a doubt as to whether the item is forbidden or permitted, this is called “a compound doubt.” One rules leniently in such a case even when the doubt concerns a Torah law.

For example, we know with certainty that a woman had intercourse before her marriage, but we are uncertain whether she had intercourse after her betrothal and thereby became forbidden to her husband as a woman suspected of adultery, or whether she committed adultery before her betrothal and is therefore not forbidden to him. Added to this doubt is a second doubt: Was the intercourse consensual, in which case she became forbidden to her husband, or was it forced, in which case she did not become forbidden to him—

Since these two doubts combine to form “a compound doubt,” this woman is permitted to her husband.

D. We find two reasons why, in a prohibition, one rules leniently in a case of “a compound doubt”:

The first: The basis for permitting it is the rule of “majority,” since most of the possible considerations indicate that the matter is permitted, as the Rashba explained this reason in his responsa.

The second was written by the later authorities according to Maimonides’ view that, in a doubt concerning a Torah prohibition, one rules stringently only by rabbinic law. According to him, when there are two doubts, it is as though we are uncertain whether this matter falls under the rule that “in a doubt concerning a Torah prohibition, one rules stringently.” For here there is not certainly a doubt concerning a Torah prohibition; rather, the doubt is whether there is in fact a doubtful prohibition before us.

Since, according to Maimonides, the requirement to rule stringently in a doubt concerning a Torah prohibition is only rabbinic, in a case of “a compound doubt” the doubt concerns only a rabbinic prohibition. And we have established that in a doubt concerning a rabbinic prohibition, one rules leniently.

A doubt and a compound doubt in financial matters:

A. In every doubt concerning financial law, one follows the person who currently possesses the property. This is because we have the general rule: “The one who seeks to take money from another must prove his claim.” This rule is itself a Torah law.

B. The Tosafot in our discussion [9b] will explain whether one may also take money from its current possessor on the basis of a compound doubt.

A woman who committed adultery while married—

with regard to the prohibition and with regard to her marriage contract:

A. If the wife of an Israelite had consensual intercourse with another man while she was married, she becomes forbidden both to her husband and to the man with whom she had intercourse [even after her husband divorces her or dies].

But if she was forced to have intercourse while married, she is not forbidden to her husband. The law concerning whether she is forbidden to the other man will be explained in our discussion.

B. If the wife of a kohein—a man of the priestly family who serves in the Temple—was forced to have intercourse, she becomes forbidden to her kohein husband.

C. If the husband of an Israelite woman warned her, saying, “Do not seclude yourself with so-and-so,” and she disobeyed him and secluded herself with that man, she is called a “woman of uncertain adulterous status.” She is forbidden, as is a woman certainly suspected of adultery, both to her husband and to the other man, until she drinks the bitter waters and is found to be pure.

D. A woman suspected of adultery forfeits her marriage contract. Two reasons were given for this:

The first: So that it will be easy for him to divorce her.

The second: Since she was the one who caused herself to become forbidden to her husband, she therefore forfeits her marriage contract.

E. If the wife of a kohein was forced to have intercourse, she does not forfeit her marriage contract.

A matter concerning sexual relations may not be established by fewer than two witnesses:

A. We have established that financial cases may be decided only on the basis of two witnesses, as the Torah states: “A matter shall be established by the testimony of two witnesses.” In matters of prohibition, however, we accept even the testimony of one witness, since “one witness is trusted regarding prohibitions.”

B. A matter concerning sexual relations—for example, matters of divorce documents and betrothal, or a case in which a court comes to forbid a woman to her husband—is treated like financial law, in which money cannot be taken from a person except on the testimony of two witnesses.

This law is derived by a method of interpretation based on an identical expression from what is stated regarding a matter concerning sexual relations: “Because he found in her an immoral

matter,” and what is stated regarding financial law: “By the testimony of two witnesses a

matter shall be established.”

The Sages received through tradition that this interpretation teaches that a matter concerning sexual relations may likewise be adjudicated only on the testimony of two witnesses, as in financial law.

C. Not only may a matter concerning sexual relations be established only through two witnesses, but the very validity of such a matter—for example, a divorce document or betrothal—depends on two witnesses having seen the act. These are called “witnesses who establish validity.”

в. Не только выяснение вопроса, относящегося к семейным запретам, производится только на основании двух свидетелей, но и само существование такого положения, как разводные документы и обручения, не устанавливается, если только два свидетеля не видели это действие; и они называются «свидетелями установления».

D. In our discussion, the Gemara will examine whether the adultery of a married woman, which makes her forbidden to her husband and to the man with whom she had intercourse, likewise cannot “acquire validity” to forbid her without “witnesses who establish validity,” as in the case of divorce documents and betrothal, since the prohibition of a woman to her husband is a matter concerning sexual relations.

Rabbi Elazar said:

The Gemara now cites Rabbi Elazar’s statement concerning the claim “I found an open vaginal passage,” because later in the discussion the Gemara will bring a proof for Rabbi Elazar’s words from our Mishna.

A virgin’s vaginal passage remains closed until after her first intercourse [unless she had previously been struck by a piece of wood or something similar, in which case she is called one whose virginity was injured by wood; and some hold that even in such a case the passage remains closed]. It is customary for virgins to bleed from the rupture of the hymen during their first intercourse [unless she is one whose virginity was injured by wood; and some hold that even such a woman has blood of virginity].

A husband who married a woman on the presumption that she was a virgin,

says after having intercourse with her for the first time,

the first intercourse,

“I found an open vaginal passage,”

unlike that of a virgin, and it is therefore certain that she had intercourse before this one.

He is therefore

trusted to forbid her to himself,

because of the doubt that perhaps she committed adultery between her betrothal and marriage and thereby became forbidden to her husband, like a woman who committed adultery while married.

The Gemara challenges Rabbi Elazar’s ruling from another angle. Even if we believe the husband that he found an open passage, and even if she indeed had intercourse with another man, she is still not forbidden to him—

And why

should she be forbidden to him? After all,

it is a compound doubt

whether the intercourse occurred in a manner that made her forbidden to her husband, and any prohibition that consists of two doubts is not forbidden.

There are two doubts here. The first is:

Perhaps

she had intercourse while she was betrothed,

while she was under his

authority, and therefore became forbidden to him as a woman suspected of adultery.

Perhaps

the intercourse occurred when

she was not

была

under his

authority, and she did not become forbidden to him.

And

even

if you should say

that indeed

while she was under his

authority she had intercourse, there is still a second doubt:

Perhaps

she had intercourse

under coercion

and did not become forbidden to him, as is the law regarding the wife of an Israelite, who does not become forbidden to her husband if she was forced;

perhaps

she had intercourse

willingly

and became forbidden to him.

The Gemara answers Rabbi Elazar’s statement:

It is necessary;

indeed, Rabbi Elazar’s statement was not said regarding every woman—

but only

regarding the wife of a kohein,

who is forbidden to her husband even if she was forced. Consequently, her prohibition depends on only one doubt: Perhaps she had intercourse while she was under his authority, and perhaps she did not. This is a doubt concerning a Torah prohibition, and one must rule stringently.

Alternatively,

even

regarding the wife of an Israelite

there is a possibility that there is only one doubt, and Rabbi Elazar spoke even in that case:

For example, her father betrothed her when she was younger than three years and one day [

she was betrothed by her father when she was younger than three years old]. In that case, there is no doubt that she may have had intercourse when she was not under his authority, because the hymen of a girl who has intercourse before the age of three returns to its previous state. It is therefore certain that her vaginal passage became open only after she turned three, when she was already under his authority.

The Gemara had thought that Rabbi Elazar’s innovation was that the husband is trusted because he is making the woman forbidden to himself, according to the principle, “He has made the item forbidden to himself” [he has treated the woman, with regard to himself, as a forbidden piece]—

Therefore, the Gemara asks:

What does Rabbi Elazar teach us

by saying this? After all, we have already

learned

in a Mishna in tractate Kiddushin [65a] the law that “he has made the item forbidden to himself”!

The woman’s close relatives—her daughter, her daughter’s daughter, her son’s daughter, her sister, her mother, her maternal grandmother, and her paternal grandmother—are forbidden to the man. The man’s close relatives—his son, his brother, his brother’s son, and his father—are forbidden to the woman.

For we learned in the Mishna:

If a man says to a woman, “I betrothed you,”

and because he betrothed her he is forbidden to marry her daughter, her sister, and her other close relatives,

and she

denies him and

says, “You did not betroth me,”

then

she,

the woman, is

permitted to his relatives,

because she denies his statement and there are no witnesses supporting his claim.

But

if

he,

the man, is

forbidden to her relatives,

because “he has made them forbidden to himself” [he has treated her relatives, with regard to himself, as a forbidden piece].

Thus, the Mishna has already taught us the law that “he has made the item forbidden to himself.” Why, then, did Rabbi Elazar need to teach us this law as well!?

The Gemara answers:

One might have said that if Rabbi Elazar had not taught his innovation, one would have thought that only

if Rabbi Elazar had not introduced his innovation—that only

there—when the husband says, “I betrothed you”—

when the husband says, “I betrothed you,”

he certainly knows

[he is certainly expert concerning the matter], and the husband is therefore trusted regarding himself.

But here,

when he says, “I found an open vaginal passage,” -

one might have said that, since this was his first intercourse and he had not previously been married,

he simply has no expertise

[he is not familiar with the matter, and the passage merely seems open to him], and she should not therefore be forbidden to him.

He teaches us

that Rabbi Elazar holds that the husband is expert in this matter, and therefore she is forbidden to him.

Rabbi Elazar is not teaching that we do not consider the husband a liar, since it is obvious that, with regard to the prohibition that applies to the husband himself, he is trusted, as we learned in the Mishna in Kiddushin. Rather, Rabbi Elazar’s main innovation is that we do not say that, because of error and lack of expertise, the husband merely imagined that he found an open vaginal passage and concluded that she was forbidden to him, although in reality her passage was not open.

The Gemara raises another challenge against Rabbi Elazar’s statement, from a different angle:

And did Rabbi Elazar really say this,

that a woman becomes forbidden to her husband through adultery that did not take place in the presence of witnesses who could serve as “witnesses who establish validity” for the adultery?

But Rabbi Elazar said: A woman does not become forbidden to her husband

without witnesses who saw her commit adultery,

except through the matter of the husband’s warning and her seclusion [the husband warned her, saying, “Do not seclude yourself with a certain man,” and she disobeyed him and secluded herself with him]. In that case, the Torah innovated that she becomes forbidden to her husband under the law of a woman suspected of adultery, even if there are no witnesses who saw the act of adultery —

[her husband warned her, saying, “Do not seclude yourself with a certain man,” and she violated his instruction and secluded herself with him], at which point the Torah innovated that she becomes forbidden to her husband under the law of a sota, even if there are no witnesses who saw the act of adultery —

as in the incident that occurred

with King David, who had intercourse with Batsheva, the wife of Uriah the Hittite, as the Gemara proceeds to explain. The Gemara asks about this challenge:

,And the reasoning:

and do you think that Rabbi Elazar indeed said that a woman becomes forbidden to her husband only through warning and seclusion, and as it was with David, that the wife of Uriah became forbidden to Uriah only once she had relations with David after warning and seclusion?!

And is it so that

the incident that occurred

with David

was through warning and seclusion?!

But Uriah never warned her?!

And furthermore,

one can ask:

who forbade her,

and is it so that they forbade her to Uriah until Rabbi Elazar said that she does not become forbidden to her husband except through warning and seclusion, as they forbade her to Uriah, the husband of Bathsheba?!

And the Gemara answers:

This is not difficult!

If because of this question, Rabbi Elazar’s words are not rejected!

For Rabbi Elazar did not bring the incident that occurred with David as an example of a prohibition brought about through warning and seclusion; rather, he brought it only as proof of his ruling.

And

this is what

Rabbi Elazar

is saying:

A woman does not become forbidden to her husband through adultery alone—

but through the matter of warning and seclusion.

And proof of this:

from the incident that occurred

with David and Bathsheba,

which did not occur,

for warning and seclusion were not present there,

and

therefore

she did not become forbidden

Bathsheba to Uriah, despite the fact that she committed adultery with David while married to him!

Once these words of Rabbi Elazar have been clarified, the Gemara returns to discuss his statement here:

Nevertheless, there is a difficulty

with Rabbi Elazar’s words in our discussion, for according to Rabbi Elazar’s own words, only through

warning and seclusion—

no,

she indeed becomes forbidden to her husband.

But through the husband’s statement,

“I found an open opening”

—

no,

the woman does not become forbidden to her husband, since there were no witnesses establishing the adultery.

Yet here Rabbi Elazar said that the woman becomes forbidden through the husband’s statement, “I found an open opening”?!

And it expresses astonishment at the astonishment:

But according to your reasoning,

according to your understanding, that you understand Rabbi Elazar’s words there to mean that a woman becomes forbidden only through warning and seclusion—and because of this you found difficulty with Rabbi Elazar’s words in our discussion—

is it possible to say that according to Rabbi Elazar only through

warning and seclusion—no,

only then does an adulterous woman become forbidden to her husband, but through

witnesses

who testify to her adultery—

no,

she does not become forbidden to her husband, and this is what Rabbi Elazar said: A woman does not become forbidden to her husband except through warning and seclusion?!

But the Torah said: “When a man takes a woman and marries her, and it shall be, if she does not find favor in his eyes because he has found in her an indecent matter, that he writes her a document of severance and places it in her hand.” And it is explicit in the verse that if “he has found in her an indecent matter”—which is through witnesses who testified to her adultery, as explained in the Gemara in tractate Sota [3b]—he must divorce her because she has become forbidden to him. If so, it certainly could not have entered Rabbi Elazar’s mind to say this.

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that Rabbi Elazar is not dealing with “witnesses establishing the act,” but with “witnesses clarifying” the fact of the adultery before the court, and

this is what he is saying:

A woman does not become forbidden to her husband through one witness

who testifies before us concerning her adultery,

but through two witnesses

who testify thus before us.

And

if, after

warning and seclusion [ [A0073]]for two witnesses testified that her husband had warned her and that she had secluded herself with the one with whom he had warned her not to seclude herself]], —

where two witnesses testified that her husband had warned her and that she had secluded herself with the man with whom he had warned her not to seclude herself] —

even through one witness

who testifies concerning her adultery,

also

she becomes forbidden.

Before the Gemara has finished explaining Rabbi Elazar’s words, the Gemara explains that there is no contradiction between Rabbi Elazar’s words there and his words in our discussion.

And,

since Rabbi Elazar did not require witnesses establishing the act in order to prohibit her because of the adultery, if so—

one who says,

“I found an open opening”,

is trusted to prohibit her to himself, since

he is like two witnesses

who testify concerning her adultery

he is considered.

That is, it is clear to him that she had intercourse, and therefore he can prohibit her to himself by the law of “he makes it upon himself as a piece of forbidden matter.”

After the Gemara resolved the supposed contradiction in Rabbi Elazar’s words, the Gemara adds and explains the conclusion of Rabbi Elazar’s words, “And as was the incident that occurred”:

Thus Rabbi Elazar continued and asked:

And should you say: The incident that occurred

with Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah—

why did they not forbid her

to Uriah?!

But warning and seclusion are not necessary in order to prohibit a woman to her husband; rather, the adultery itself causes the prohibition, and there were many witnesses to the matter that Bathsheba had committed adultery with David, for David had brought her to his house?!

There,

in the case of the wife of Uriah, she did not become forbidden, because—

it was rape!

For she had not had intercourse with David willingly, and therefore she did not become forbidden to Uriah, her husband.

And if you wish, say,

for another reason they did not forbid her:

For this is like what Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: