Ketubot 94a (צד.) — the Talmud in English

Shmuel said:

The dispute is:

for example, when one of them is found among

the fields collected by the first three women,

to be a field that is not his,

meaning: it became known that it had been stolen and was in the husband’s possession, and ultimately the owners will come and take it from them, although the owners have not yet taken the field.

When the fourth woman comes to collect from the fourth field, which is in the orphans’ possession, the woman who collected the stolen field comes and says: “Tomorrow the one from whom it was stolen will come and take his field from me. If you too take the land, I will be left with nothing on either side. Therefore, I want you to swear to me that you did not collect your ketuba during the husband’s lifetime.”

The reason for the dispute between the tanna kamma and Ben Nanas as to whether the fourth woman must swear before she takes the fourth field is:

and

in the law

of a later creditor who preceded and collected,

whether indeed what he collected he has collected—and consequently the earlier creditor will no longer be able to take the field from the fourth woman if the stolen field is taken from her—it is what

they disagree about,

the tanna kamma and Ben Nanas:

The tanna kamma maintains:

a later creditor who preceded and collected,

what he collected, he did not collect—

and therefore the fourth woman need not swear, because if the one from whom it was stolen does come and take his field, the woman who had held the stolen field will take the field collected by the fourth woman, since she has priority over her. Although the later creditor had already collected the field, the collection of a later creditor is not considered collection.

And Ben Nanas maintains:

a later creditor who preceded and collected,

what he collected, he has collected,

and if the fourth woman collects, she will no longer be able to take from her the field that she collected. Therefore, she makes the fourth woman swear first.

Rav Naḥman said

in the name of

Rabba bar Avuha

to explain that, indeed, our Mishna deals with a case in which one of the fields is found not to belong to the husband. However, the tanna kamma and Ben Nanas did not disagree over whether the fourth woman’s collection is considered collection. Rather:

Everyone—

the tanna kamma and Ben Nanas—maintains: a later creditor who preceded and collected,

what he collected, he did not collect,

and the second woman need not fear the fourth woman’s collection itself, because she will take the field from her when the owners come and take the stolen field.

And here, they disagree over whether we are concerned

that perhaps, if the fourth woman collects the field without an oath, she will understand that the reason she differs from the others, in that she takes without an oath, is certainly that the field will not remain in her possession and will ultimately be taken from her; and because of this there is concern

that perhaps she will damage it,

not taking care of the field so that it will not deteriorate, but rather consuming as much as she can—

And it is over this reasoning that

they disagree,

the tanna kamma and Ben Nanas:

One master—

Ben Nanas—

maintains: We are concerned that perhaps she will damage it,

the field. Therefore, they make her swear first, and she will then not damage the field.

And the other master—

the tanna kamma—

maintains: We are not concerned that perhaps she will damage it.

Abaye said

to explain the dispute between the tanna kamma and Ben Nanas differently from the way Shmuel explained it [as referring to a field found not to be his]. Rather, the oath over which the tanna kamma and Ben Nanas disagreed is the oath of “one who comes to collect from the property of orphans”:

And the practical difference

between Abaye the Elder’s ruling

between the tanna kamma and Ben Nanas is:

Abaye the Elder taught

a beraita:

With regard to orphans, concerning whom the Sages said

that “one who comes to collect from them may collect only with an oath”—this refers to

adult orphans, and it goes without saying

that it applies when one comes to collect from

minor orphans.

The tanna kamma does not accept Abaye the Elder’s ruling,

and therefore the fourth woman need not swear to the orphans.

And Ben Nanas accepts Abaye the Elder’s ruling,

and therefore the fourth woman must swear to the orphans.

Rav Huna said:

These two brothers,

who are partners in their father’s inheritance,

and two partners

—or any other two partners—

who have a legal case with a single other party,

meaning that they have a court case with another person concerning a matter belonging to the partnership—

and one of them went—

of the brothers or partners—

with him

with that individual

to court,

and the partner was found liable—

the other one cannot

brother or partner

say to him,

to the litigant:

You are not a litigant of mine

with regard to this case in which my fellow was found liable; rather, I will litigate with you concerning my share.

Rather,

we say that the brother or partner who litigated with the litigant

his agency

of the other, who did not come to court, is what he

carried out,

and the verdict obligates them both.

And when

Rav Naḥman happened to come to Sura, they asked him

when Rav Naḥman happened to come to Sura, they asked him:

such a case

in which one of two brothers or partners stood in court—

what

is the law? Can the other one say: “You are not a litigant of mine”?

He said to them,

to the people of Sura:

The Mishna

our Mishna

is,

as we learned:

The first woman must swear to the second, and the second to the third,

and the third to the fourth.

But with regard to the first woman,

who swears

to the third, it does not teach,

meaning: In our Mishna we find only that the second makes the first swear, but the third can no longer make the first swear—

And

for what reason!?

Is it not because she carried out her agency,

and is the reason not that the second made the first swear as the agent of the other women? We see, then, that we say: She carried out her agency!

And we reject this:

Are the cases comparable?

Is the matter taught in our Mishna comparable to the case about which we raised a doubt?

For

there,

in our Mishna:

One oath for one, and one oath for a hundred,

as though she had sworn to each one.

But

here, one

can

say,

one of the brothers or partners who did not come to court:

If I had been there,

there, I

would have presented a stronger claim

if I had been in court, perhaps I would have argued better than my fellow and would have prevailed in the case.

The Gemara adds a qualification concerning this law:

And we said this—

that the verdict does not obligate the one who did not come to court—

only when he was not in the city

at the time of the trial, meaning that the person who did not come to court was not in the city where the proceedings took place.

But

if

he was in the city, he should have come,

but if that brother or partner was in the city at the time of the trial, he should have come with his brother or partner to court. Since he did not come, he can no longer raise any claim at all.

It was stated: Two deeds

of sale

emerging

from one seller,

on the same day,

for one field, to two different buyers:

Rav said: They divide it,

the field between the two buyers, for each has an equal claim to it.

And Shmuel said: It is decided by the judges’ discretion!

The judges should determine, on the basis of the relative merits and liabilities, which of the two will receive the field.

And we inquire about it:

Shall we say that Rav, who said

that they divide it, maintains

the view of Rabbi Meir, who says that the witnesses’ signatures effect the document’s validity?

They are the essential element in giving the bill of divorce the force of a document of severance.