Ketubot 89b (פט:) — the Talmud in English

He can say -

“I divorced her and gave her payment of her ketuba” .

And we raise a difficulty: How can the Mishna be established as referring to a case in which there are no witnesses to the divorce,

for since it teaches

in the

latter clause

of the Mishna -

“Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: From the time of danger onward, a woman collects her ketuba without a get, and a creditor without a prosbul,”

and this ruling must necessarily

be referring to a case in which there are witnesses to the divorce, for if there are no witnesses to the divorce, by what means can she collect her ketuba?!

She has neither a get nor witnesses, so how do we know that she was divorced? Rather, it is obvious that the ruling is referring to a case in which there are witnesses to the divorce. If so, the first clause, too, must be referring to a case in which there are witnesses to the divorce.

And we answer:

The entire

Mishna

is the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and it is incomplete, and this is what it teaches -

“These women may not collect their ketuba.”

And with regard to the

principal

amount: If she produces a get, she collects it; and if she does not produce a get, she does not collect it. And from the time of danger onward, even though she does not produce a get, she collects it,

because

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: From the time of danger onward, a woman collects her ketuba without a get, and a creditor without a prosbul.”

If so, the first clause of the Mishna is dealing with a case in which there are no witnesses to the divorce, and there is no difficulty with Rav’s statement.

Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav: According to your view,

that if she produces a

get

without a ketuba, she

collects

only the

principal amount, how does a widow whose husband married her collect the principal amount?

After all, she does not have a get in her possession .

Rav said to them: She collects it

through witnesses of his death.

And we raise a difficulty:

But let us be concerned lest he divorced her, and she produces the get and collects through it

the principal amount while he is alive, and after his death she says to the heirs: “Your father never divorced me; give me the principal amount of my ketuba on the basis of witnesses of his death, as is the law for a widow”?

And we answer: Indeed, a widow collects the principal amount of her ketuba only when people recognized

that

she was

living with her husband,

and then we are not concerned that perhaps he divorced her.

And we raise a difficulty:

Perhaps he divorced her shortly before his death,

and the fact that she lived with him throughout his life is no proof of this?

And we answer: There,

he himself caused his own loss,

as he should have established witnesses to the divorce.

And we raise a difficulty: Even so,

how does a widow whose husband was betrothed to her collect her ketuba?

After all, she never lived with him.

And we answer:

Through witnesses of his death.

And we raise a difficulty:

But let us be concerned lest he divorced her, and she produces the get and collects

the payment while he is alive, and after his death claims that he never divorced her and again demands her ketuba as a widow?

And we answer:

Rather,

certainly,

in a place where it is impossible,

for example, when one divorces his betrothed and pays her ketuba,

we write a receipt

for the payment, so that she will not come to collect the ketuba a second time after his death.

And there is proof of this:

For if you do not say so,

with

the witnesses of death

themselves, let us be concerned lest she produce the witnesses of death in this court and collect, and then produce

those same witnesses

in another court and collect

a second time?!

Rather, certainly, in a place where it is impossible, we write a receipt.

Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Hisda, said to Rav Ashi: From where do we know that a widow whose husband was betrothed to her is entitled to a ketuba

by the stipulation of the court, even if he did not write one for her?

If you say it is from this

Mishna that we learned above (54b) -

“If she was widowed or divorced, whether from betrothal or from marriage, she collects the entire amount,”

and it is apparent that a betrothed woman has a ketuba,

that is not proof,

perhaps

it is referring

to a case in which he wrote one for her,

but if he did not write one for her, she does not have a ketuba by the stipulation of the court, as does a married woman.

And if you would say that

the Mishna there is referring to a case in which he

wrote one for her, what is it coming to teach us?!

It is obvious that he is obligated to pay her whatever he wrote for her.

That is not difficult, since the Mishna came

to exclude the

statement

of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who says

there in the Mishna that a widow whose husband was betrothed to her does not have a ketuba, even if he wrote one for her, since he wrote it only

on the condition that he would marry her.

Therefore, the Mishna teaches a ruling contrary to his opinion: Even a betrothed woman has a ketuba. Nevertheless, it may always be said that this applies specifically where he wrote one for her. But from where do we derive that a betrothed woman has a ketuba by the stipulation of the court?

The language of the Mishna also indicates

that it is dealing with a case in which he explicitly wrote one for her -

for it teaches

there:

“She collects the entire amount.” Granted, if you say that he wrote one for her, that is why she collects the entire amount,

including the additional amount;

but if you say that he did not write one for her, what does “she collects the entire amount” mean?

After all, only

one hundred

or

two hundred zuz is she entitled to?

Rather,

the source for the stipulation of the court regarding the ketuba of a betrothed woman is

from what Rav Hiyya bar Avin taught: “His betrothed wife

who dies,

he does not observe the laws of an onen ,

and if he is a kohen,

he does not become impure for her .

And likewise, she

whose husband dies,

does not observe the laws of an onenet and does not become impure for him. If his betrothed wife

dies,

he does not inherit her. If he dies,

she collects her ketuba.”

It is therefore clear that a betrothed woman has a ketuba.

And we raise a difficulty: Even now, there is no proof from here,

perhaps he wrote one for her,

and that is why she collects her ketuba.

And if you would say that

Rabbi Hiyya’s teaching is referring only to a case in which he

wrote one for her, what is it coming to teach us?

It is obvious that he is obligated to pay her?!

That is not difficult, since this ruling -

“If she dies, he does not inherit her” - was necessary

to teach us, and because it taught us that, it also taught us, “She collects her ketuba.” It is still referring to a case in which he wrote one for her. The difficulty nevertheless remains: From where do we know that when he did not write a ketuba for her, she collects it by the stipulation of the court? The Gemara concludes with the question unresolved.

Rav Nahman said to Rav Huna: According to Rav, who says -

“A get enables her to collect the principal amount,” let us be concerned lest she produce the get in this court and collect, and then produce it again in another court and collect

a second time?

And if you would say that

after she collected with it once,

we tear it

so that she cannot collect with it a second time,

that cannot be said, since she

said -

“I need it in order to marry with it,”

and if I tear the get, people will say that I am a married woman.

And we answer:

We tear it and write alongside it [

on the torn pieces of the get]:

“We tore this get, not because the get is invalid, but so that she should not return and collect with it another time.”

With this document she can marry.

Mishna:

A woman who has in her possession

two gittin and two ketubot

from the same man , and the date of the first ketuba precedes the date of the first get, while the date of the second ketuba precedes the date of the second get -

she collects the two ketubot.

However, if she has

two ketubot and one get, or one ketuba

and

two gittin, or one ketuba

and

one get

and

witnesses of

witnesses to

death -

she collects only one ketuba,

even though we know that he married her a second time, since

one who divorces his wife and takes her back

takes her back on the basis of the first ketuba,

until he explicitly writes an additional ketuba for her.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that if she has two ketubot and one get, she collects one ketuba.

And it follows that

if she wishes, she collects with this one, and if she wishes, she collects with that one [

if she wishes, she collects with this ketuba, and if she wishes, she collects with the other ketuba].

And we raise a difficulty:

Let us say

that this Mishna

is a refutation of Rav Nahman, who said in the name of Shmuel. [

Let it be a difficulty against the statement of Rav Nahman, who said in the name of Shmuel.]

For Rav Nahman said in the name of Shmuel: In the case of two documents that emerge one after the other, the second nullifies the first.

Yet the Mishna indicates that the first ketuba was not nullified, and if she wishes, she may return and collect with it.

And we answer:

Was it not stated with regard to it?!

Was it not already said with regard to Rav Nahman’s statement:

Rav Pappa said, and Rav Nahman concedes that if he added to it

in the second document

a date palm, he wrote it as an addition.

The first document was not nullified.

And if so,

here too,

our Mishna is referring

to a case in which he added to it

in the second ketuba a statement concerning the first one. Therefore, the first ketuba was not nullified, and she may collect with it if she wishes.

The Sages taught: If she produced a get and a ketuba, and

brought with them witnesses of

death,

and came to collect two ketubot - one for her first marriage to him, from which he divorced her, and the other for her second marriage to him, from which she was widowed.