Ketubot 86b — the Talmud in English

“They strike him until his soul departs!”

And here too, if he does not fulfill the positive mitzva of repaying a creditor, they strike him until his soul departs.

He asked him

—he asked him—

Rami bar Hama asked Rav Hisda:

One who says to his wife—

“This is your bill of divorce, and you shall not be divorced by it except after thirty days,” and she went

the woman went,

and placed it

the bill of divorce

beside the public domain,

and it was still there after thirty days,

what is the halakha?

Is the side of the public domain like the public domain, and is it not a place fit for acquisition, in which case she did not acquire the bill of divorce at the end of thirty days; or perhaps—the side of the public domain is not like the public domain, and it is a place fit for acquisition, and she acquired the bill of divorce?

He said to him: She is not divorced!

And the proof is—

from

the words of

Rav and Shmuel.

For Rav and Shmuel both say

in the earlier Mishna—

“And this is when they are gathered together and lying in the public domain,” and the sides of the public domain are considered like the public domain.

And they are not a place fit for acquisition.

And we challenge this—

on the contrary, she is divorced! From

the words of

Rav Naḥman.

For Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha—

one who says to his fellow—

“Pull this cow, and it shall not be acquired by you until after thirty days,” he acquires it .

And even

if the cow was

standing in a lake.

And we infer precisely:

Is it not that this is the lake, and this is the side of the public domain,

and it is proven that the side of the public domain is a place fit for acquisition? And we reject this:

No! The lake is one matter, and the side of the public domain is another matter.

And in any event, they are not a place fit for acquisition.

Some say:

There are those who taught the doubt of the Gemara in the opposite way:

He said to him,

Rav Hisda:

She is divorced! From

the words of

Rav Naḥman,

mentioned above,

and the side of the public domain is considered like a lake.

And concerning this we challenge:

On the contrary, she is not divorced! From

the words of

Rav and Shmuel,

mentioned above, and we infer precisely—

Is it not that this is the public domain, and this is the side of the public domain,

and even the side of the public domain is not fit for acquisition? And we reject this:

No! The public domain is one matter, and the side of the public domain is another matter.

And in any event, the side of the public domain is a place fit for acquisition.

Mishna:

One who seats his wife

as a shopkeeper

to sell in his shop,

or appoints

her

as a trustee

over his property,

may make her swear whenever he wishes

that she took nothing from his property .

Rabbi Eliezer says:

He makes her swear

even concerning her spindle and her dough,

that she did not take them from his property.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says that the husband may make her swear even concerning her spindle and her dough.

And the Gemara was uncertain:

It was asked of them,

according to

Rabbi Eliezer,

does he make her swear only

by means of rolling over

an oath—that is, by making her swear the oath of a shopkeeper, he can also roll over upon her an oath concerning her spindle and her dough—

he says ,

Or

perhaps, even

at the outset

he can make her swear.

He says.

And we resolve it:

Come

and

hear

what we learned in a beraita:

“They said to him

the Sages

to Rabbi Eliezer:

If the husband can make her swear concerning her spindle and her dough, how can she live with him? Is it not that

a person does not dwell with a snake in one basket

at once?!

And the Gemara infers precisely:

If you say, granted,

according to Rabbi Eliezer he can make her swear

at the outset, it is well! [That is, the claim of the Sages is understandable: if he makes her swear, a person does not dwell with a snake in one basket.]

That is, the Sages’ argument is understandable: If he makes her take such an oath, a person cannot live with a snake in one basket.

But if you say

that the words of Rabbi Eliezer were stated only

by means of rolling over, what difference does it make to her

that he also makes her swear concerning her spindle and her dough? Is she not in any event already swearing the oath of a shopkeeper?

Rather, it is certainly proven that the words of Rabbi Eliezer were stated also at the outset!

The Gemara rejects this: In any event, I can say to you that he can make her swear only by means of rolling over; and nevertheless, the reasoning of “a person does not dwell with a snake in one basket” applies here, because

she says to him—

“Since you are so exacting with me, I cannot dwell with you.” [Since you do not trust me at all, and are exacting with me, making me swear even concerning my spindle and my dough, I cannot live with you.]

“Since you do not trust me at all, and scrutinize me so closely as to make me take an oath even concerning my spindle and my dough, I cannot live with you.”

The Gemara further resolves it:

Come hear

from what we learned in a beraita:

“If he did not exempt his wife from vows and oaths, [that is, a man who did not exempt his wife from swearing or vowing to him that she took nothing from his property if he claims against her, as will be explained in the following Mishna,]

that is, if a man did not exempt his wife from taking an oath or making a vow that she had taken nothing from his property when he brings a claim against her, as will be explained in the following Mishna,

and seated her as a shopkeeper

in his shop,

or appointed

her

as a trustee

over his property,

then he

may make her swear whenever he wishes

that she took nothing from his property.

But if

he did not seat her as a shopkeeper, and did not appoint

her

as a trustee, he cannot make her swear

that she took nothing from his property. This is the view of the Sages.

But

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even though he did not seat her as a shopkeeper, and did not appoint

her

as a trustee, he may make her swear whenever he wishes.

Because

there is no woman who does not become a trustee for one hour during her husband’s lifetime concerning her spindle and her dough.

They said to him

the Sages: If you say so, she cannot live with him, since

a person does not dwell with a snake in one basket.

And in this beraita, is it not speaking of a case in which he did not make her swear an additional oath concerning trusteeship or shopkeeping? If so,

infer from this

that Rabbi Eliezer held that even

at the outset

he can make her swear concerning her spindle and her dough.

And we conclude that indeed

infer from this

so.

Mishna:

The husband who

wrote

to her, his wife—

“A vow

and an oath I have not against you” [the Gemara will explain from which oath he exempted her,]

—the Gemara will explain which oath he exempted her from—

cannot make her swear.

But he may make her heirs swear,

if he divorced her and she died, and her heirs came to collect her ketuba: they swear the heirs’ oath, that their mother did not instruct us before her death.

And

he likewise makes

those who come by her authority

swear, if she sold her ketuba to others and was divorced and died ; the purchasers swear the heirs’ oath.

But if he wrote to her—

“A vow and an oath I have not against you, nor against your heirs, nor against those who come by your authority,” he cannot make her swear: neither her, nor her heirs, nor those who come by her authority.

But his heirs make her, her heirs, and those who come by her authority swear.

Since their father exempted them only from himself, but not from his heirs.

And if the father said—

“A vow and an oath I have not, nor do my heirs have, nor do those who come by my authority have, against you, against your heirs, or against those who come by your authority,” he cannot make her swear—neither he, nor his heirs, nor those who come by his authority,

and they do not make

either her, nor

her

heirs, nor

those who come by

her authority swear .

A woman whose husband exempted her from the oath ,

and he died, and she

went from her husband’s grave to her father’s house, or returned to her father-in-law’s house, and did not become a trustee

over the property after his death,

the heirs do not make her swear.

Even though her husband exempted her from an oath only from himself and not from his heirs, nevertheless, concerning what occurred during his lifetime, she is believed without an oath.

And if she became a trustee

after his death,

the heirs make her swear concerning the future,

since regarding this he did not exempt her from the oath,

but they do not make her swear concerning what has passed,

that is, concerning what occurred during his lifetime.

Gemara:

It is explained in the Mishna that the husband can exempt his wife from the oath.

And the Gemara asks:

“What is the function of the oath?”

That is, which oath is she obligated to him in such a way that, when he exempted her from an unspecified oath, she was exempted from it?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav—

When he exempted her from an unspecified oath, she was exempted from the oath that she had been obligated to him—