Ketubot 86b (פו:) — the Talmud in English

They strike him until his soul departs!

Here too, if he does not fulfill the positive mitzva of repaying a creditor, they strike him until his soul departs.:

He inquired of [

he asked him]

Rami bar Ḥama of Rav Ḥisda:

With regard to one who says to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce, but you shall not be divorced with it until thirty days have passed,” and she went

the woman

and placed it

the bill of divorce

beside the public domain,

and it was still there after thirty days,

what is the halakha?

Is the area beside the public domain considered like the public domain and therefore not a place suitable for acquisition, in which case she did not acquire the bill of divorce at the end of thirty days? Or perhaps the area beside the public domain is not considered like the public domain, and it is a place suitable for acquisition, in which case she did acquire the bill of divorce?

He said to him: She is not divorced!

And the proof

is from

the statement of

Rav and Shmuel.

As Rav and Shmuel both say

in the earlier Mishna:

“And this is the case when they are gathered together and lying in the public domain,” and the area beside the public domain is considered like the public domain.

And it is not a place suitable for acquisition.

And we raise an objection:

On the contrary, she is divorced! From

the statement of

Rav Naḥman.

As Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said:

With regard to one who says to his fellow:

“Pull this cow, but it shall not be acquired by you until after thirty days,” he acquires it .

And even

if the cow was

standing in a meadow.

And we carefully infer:

Is it not the case that this means a meadow, and this means the area beside the public domain,

and it is thereby demonstrated that the area beside the public domain is a place suitable for acquisition? And we reject this:

No! A meadow is one matter, and the area beside the public domain is another matter.

And in fact, it is not a place suitable for acquisition.

Some say:

There are those who taught the Gemara’s uncertainty in the opposite manner:

He said to him

Rav Ḥisda:

She is divorced! From

the statement of

Rav Naḥman,

mentioned above,

and the area beside the public domain is considered like a meadow.

And concerning this we raise an objection:

On the contrary, she is not divorced! From

the statement of

Rav and Shmuel,

mentioned above, and we infer:

Is it not the case that this means the public domain, and this means the area beside the public domain,

and therefore even the area beside the public domain is not suitable for acquisition? And we reject this:

No! The public domain is one matter, and the area beside the public domain is another matter.

And in fact, the area beside the public domain is a place suitable for acquisition.

Mishna:

One who appoints his wife

as a shopkeeper

to sell in his shop,

or who appoints

her

as an administrator

over his property,

may have her take an oath whenever he wishes

that she did not take anything from his property .

Rabbi Eliezer says:

He may have her take an oath

even concerning her spindle and her dough,

that she did not take them from his property.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says that the husband may have her take an oath even concerning her spindle and her dough.

And the Gemara raised a dilemma:

They inquired:

According to the opinion of

Rabbi Eliezer,

does he have her take an oath only

by means of rolling over

an oath—that is, once he has her take the shopkeeper’s oath, he may also add an oath concerning her spindle and her dough

is that what he said ,

Or

perhaps, even

initially

he may have her take an oath.

Is that what he said?

And we resolve it:

Come

and

hear

what we learned in a beraita:

“The Sages said

to

Rabbi Eliezer:

If the husband may have her take an oath concerning her spindle and her dough, how can she live with him? After all,

a person cannot live with a snake in the same basket

one?!

And the Gemara carefully infers:

Granted, if you say

that according to Rabbi Eliezer he may have her take an oath

initially, that is well! [

That is, the Sages’ claim is understandable: if he has her take such an oath, a person cannot live with a snake in the same basket.]

But if you say

that Rabbi Eliezer’s statement was made only

by means of rolling over, what difference does it make to her

that he also has her take an oath concerning her spindle and her dough? In any event, she is already taking the shopkeeper’s oath.

Rather, it is certainly demonstrated that Rabbi Eliezer’s statement applies even initially!

The Gemara rejects this: In fact, I can say to you that he may have her take an oath only by means of rolling over, and nevertheless the rationale of “a person cannot live with a snake in the same basket” applies here, because

she said to him:

“Since you scrutinize me so closely, I cannot live with you.” [

Since you do not trust me at all and scrutinize me in order to have me take an oath even concerning my spindle and my dough, I cannot live with you.]

The Gemara offers another resolution:

Come and hear

from what we learned in a beraita:

“If he did not exempt his wife from vows and oaths, [

that is, a man who did not exempt his wife from taking an oath or making a vow to him that she had taken nothing from his property, should he bring a claim against her, as will be explained in the following Mishna,]

and appointed her as a shopkeeper

in his shop,

or appointed

her

as an administrator

over his property,

he may

have her take an oath whenever he wishes

that she did not take anything from his property.

But if he

did not appoint her as a shopkeeper, nor appoint

her

as an administrator, he may not have her take an oath

that she did not take anything from his property. This is the opinion of the Sages.

But

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if he did not appoint her as a shopkeeper, nor appoint

her

as an administrator, he may have her take an oath whenever he wishes.

Because

there is no woman who is not an administrator for an hour during her husband’s lifetime, concerning her spindle and her dough.

They said to him,

the Sages: If you say this, she cannot live with him, since

a person cannot live with a snake in the same basket.

And this beraita is speaking of a case in which he did not have her take an additional oath concerning her serving as an administrator or shopkeeper. If so,

learn from this

that Rabbi Eliezer held that even

initially

he may have her take an oath concerning her spindle and her dough.

And we conclude that indeed

learn from this

that this is so.

Mishna:

The husband who

wrote

to her, his wife:

“Vow

and oath I have no claim against you,” [

and the Gemara will explain from which oath he exempted her,]

may not have her take an oath.

But he may have her heirs take an oath,

if he divorced her and she died, and her heirs came to collect her marriage settlement: they take the heirs’ oath that their mother did not instruct them before her death.

And

he may likewise have

those who come through her authority take an oath,

if she sold her marriage settlement to others and was divorced and died ; the purchasers take the heirs’ oath.

But if he wrote to her:

“Vow and oath I have no claim against you, or against your heirs, or against those who come through your authority,” he may not have her take an oath, nor her heirs, nor those who come through her authority.

But his heirs may have her, her heirs, and those who come through her authority take an oath.

Since their father exempted them only with regard to himself, but not with regard to his heirs.

And if the father said:

“Vow and oath I have no claim against you, or against my heirs, or against those who come through my authority, with regard to you, your heirs, or those who come through your authority,” he may not have her take an oath, nor his heirs, nor those who come through his authority,

and they do not have

her, nor

her

heirs, nor

those who come through

her authority take an oath .

With regard to a woman whom her husband exempted from an oath ,

and he died, and she

went from her husband’s grave to her father’s house, or returned to her father-in-law’s house, and did not become an administrator

over the property after his death,

the heirs may not have her take an oath.

Even though her husband exempted her from an oath only with regard to himself and not with regard to his heirs, nevertheless, concerning what occurred during his lifetime she is believed without an oath.

And if she became an administrator

after his death,

the heirs have her take an oath concerning the future,

since he did not exempt her from an oath with regard to this,

but they do not have her take an oath concerning the past,

that is, concerning what occurred during his lifetime.

Gemara:

The Mishna establishes that the husband may exempt his wife from an oath.

And the Gemara asks:

What is the function of the oath?

That is, which oath is she obligated to him to the extent that when he exempted her from an unspecified oath, she was exempted from it?

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

When he exempted her from an unspecified oath, she was thereby exempted from the oath that she was obligated to him—