Ketubot 82b (פב:) — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

One might have said: “And he shall perform levirate marriage with her,” the Torah says, and

even after he has performed levirate marriage with her,

the initial levirate bond still remains upon her,

[that is, this is still not like an ordinary marriage, but like levirate marriage], and therefore

a bill of divorce alone does not suffice for her; she requires ḥalitza.

[like a yevama].

It teaches us

that she is considered like an ordinary married woman.

The Gemara raises another objection: What is the novelty in the statement that

he may take her back

if he divorced her?

It is obvious

that he may take her back, as he may take back any woman.

And we explain:

One might have said

that since in essence she is his brother’s wife, who is forbidden to him, except that now

it is a mitzva that the Merciful One imposed upon him

[there is a special mitzva upon him to perform levirate marriage with her], and therefore when

he performed

[when he made her his wife]

and

divorced her,

now she should stand under the prohibition of a brother’s wife,

as she was at first .

It teaches us

that once he has married her, she is like an ordinary wife.

And we challenge this:

But perhaps that is indeed so?

From where do you know that he is permitted to take her again outside the context of the mitzva of levirate marriage?

And we explain:

The verse says: “And he shall take her to himself as a wife,”

which is a superfluous verse, and it comes to teach:

Once he has taken her, she becomes like his wife.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Provided that her ketuba is secured by the property of her first husband,”

that is, in this respect the yevama differs from other women: he does not become obligated to provide her ketuba from his own property, but from the property of her first husband.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that he does not write her ketuba from his own property?

Since

Heaven granted him a wife,

and he did not marry her of his own will, he is not required to write her a ketuba.

And

nevertheless, the Sages instituted that

if she has no

ketuba

from

the

first husband, she has one from the second husband, so that she should not appear insignificant in his eyes, enabling him to divorce her easily.

We learned in the Mishna:

He may not say to her, “Here is your ketuba”

lying on the table. Rather, all his property is responsible for her ketuba. Similarly, a man may not say to his wife, “Here is your ketuba” lying on the table. Rather, all his property is responsible for her ketuba.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the meaning of “similarly”?

That is, what is the novelty in the statement that a man may not say this to his wife, and so on? Why should his wife be in a worse position than his yevama?

One might have said: It is there, in the case of the yevama, that he did not write for her, “property that I acquired and property that I will acquire”

[specifically, a yavam may not say to her, “Here is your ketuba ...,” since he did not lien the property that he acquired and that he is destined to acquire, and therefore she does not rely on the money’s remaining available, lest it be lost],

but here,

in the case of his wife,

since he wrote for her, “property that I acquired and property that I will acquire,” perhaps she relies on it,

and does not fear that the money will be lost, since other property will become liened to her in its place.

It teaches us

that in any event, since she believes that she has no property in place of it, she does not rely on it, and this will lead to animosity.

We learned in the Mishna:

If

the yavam

divorced her, she has only her ketuba,

and the yavam may sell the remainder.

And the Gemara infers:

If he divorced her, yes; if he did not divorce her, no.

That is, he may sell the remainder only if he divorced her, but as long as he has not divorced her, he may not sell it. And

it teaches us the ruling of Rabbi Abba

mentioned above (81a): the yavam may not sell the property of his brother until he divorces her.

We learned in the Mishna:

“If he took her back, she is like all other women, and she has only her ketuba”:

And we challenge this:

If he took her back—

what does it teach us?

Was it not

taught

in the chapter HaKotev (below, 89b):

“If one divorces a woman and takes her back, he takes her back on the basis of her first ketuba”?

What additional matter has our Mishna taught us?

And we explain:

One might have said

that specifically

his wife

may be taken back on the basis of her first ketuba, because

he himself wrote her a ketuba,

[her first ketuba is secured by his property].

But his yevama, for whom he himself did not write

a ketuba, but whose ketuba is secured by the property of her first husband,

when he divorced her and took her back, one might have said that her ketuba is from him; it teaches us

our Mishna that he too takes her back on the basis of her first ketuba.

Rav Yehuda said: At first they would write

for a virgin two hundred dinars, and for a widow one hundred,

but they would not lien property for them,

and men would grow old without marrying women.

[Since the women feared marrying, lest when a man died the heirs conceal the inheritance money, preventing them from collecting their ketubot].

Until Shimon ben Shetaḥ came and instituted—

“All his property is responsible for her ketuba.”

It was taught likewise—

At first they would write for a virgin two hundred dinars and for a widow one hundred, and men would grow old without marrying women.

And therefore, at first

they instituted

that they should place it

[the ketuba]

in her father’s house, but still

this was insufficient, since

when he was angry with her, he would say to her, “Go to your ketuba.”

They returned and

instituted

that they should place it in her father-in-law’s house

[her husband’s father]. And

wealthy women would make it baskets of silver and gold, while poor women would make it a chamber pot ,

and then they did not fear that the vessel would be lost, since it was their practice to guard this vessel carefully. Tosafot.

But still

this was insufficient, since

when he was angry with her, he would say to her, “Take your ketuba and leave.”

Until Shimon ben Shetaḥ came and instituted that he should write for her, “All my property is responsible for her ketuba.”

We have returned to you, chapter “The Woman Whose Property Fell to Her.”