Ketubot 82a (פב.) — the Talmud in English

Here too, this must be rejected:

perhaps

the Mishna is according to

Rabbi Natan,

as it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Natan says: From where do we derive that

one who

was owed one hundred dinars by another, and that other person was owed money by a third party—from where do we derive that the money is taken from the latter

that is, from the last debtor],

and given to the former

the first creditor]?

The verse states:

“And he shall give it to the one to whom he is indebted”—

and it does not state: “to the one to whom he is a creditor.” And we derive from this that it is given to the one who owns the principal, that is, the first creditor.

So too here: Since the deceased was obligated to pay his wife’s ketuba, and his brother was indebted to him, the debt is now taken from the yavam and given to the woman.

Rather,

this is why it cannot be the Mishna, because

we do not find

any

tanna who imposes two stringencies with regard to a ketuba,

we do not find anyone who is stringent both in accordance with Rabbi Meir and in accordance with Rabbi Natan].

Rather, it is either in accordance with Rabbi Meir,

who holds that movable property is liened for the ketuba,

or in accordance with Rabbi Natan,

who innovated the law of “the lien of Rav Natan.” But the tanna of the beraita adopted both stringencies simultaneously. Therefore, it cannot be the Mishna.

Rava said: If so, this is what I heard Abaye say: “This cannot be the Mishna,” although I did not know what he meant.

When I heard these statements, I understood Abaye’s words when he said, “This cannot be the Mishna,” but I did not know why.]

The Gemara continues on the same subject:

There was an incident involving

a certain man whose yevama fell to him in Mata Meḥasya

His brother died childless in Mata Meḥasya, and his wife fell before him for yibbum, since he was the eldest brother].

One of his brothers wanted to disqualify her from him by giving her a bill of divorce

One of the brothers wanted to give her a bill of divorce so that the eldest would be unable to perform yibbum with her, and they could divide their brother’s assets].

His

elder brother

said to him: “What is your intention? Is it because of the assets? I will divide the assets with you.”

If you wish to share in the assets, allow me to perform yibbum with her, and I will give you a portion of the assets.]

He said to him: “I am afraid that you will do to me as did

the deceitful Pumbeditan.”

I am afraid that you will act like that Pumbeditan mentioned above, who promised his brother that he would share the assets with him but ultimately did not share them with him.]

He said to him: “If you wish, divide it with yourself from now.”

If you wish, acquire your portion from this moment. Although it does not presently belong to you until I either consummate the marriage or perform ḥalitza, nevertheless, when I consummate the marriage and acquire the assets, you will immediately acquire the portion that you acquired now].

Mar bar Rav Ashi said:

the acquisition was ineffective.

This is because

although when Rav Dimi came

when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia],

he said

to us in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan:

“If one says to another: ‘Go and pull this cow, and it shall not be acquired by you until thirty days from now,’ then after thirty days he acquires it, even if it is standing in a marsh,”

and if so, ostensibly here too he should be able to transfer the land to him now, effective after he consummates the marriage,

nevertheless, a distinction must be made:

There,

he can transfer it to him for acquisition at a later time specifically because

it is in his power

to enable him to acquire it even now. Therefore, the acquisition they performed today takes effect at a later time. But

here, it is not in his power

to transfer the inheritance to him now; therefore, the acquisition they performed now is entirely ineffective.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement:

How could Rav Yoḥanan say that it is possible to transfer an object for acquisition after thirty days,

when when Ravin came

when Ravin came],

he said

to us in the name of

Rav Yoḥanan

that in such a case

he does not acquire it?

If so, Rav Yoḥanan’s statements contradict one another.

The Gemara answers:

It is not difficult!

This

statement of Rav Yoḥanan, that he acquires it, refers to a case

in which he said to him: “Acquire it from now,”

whereas

this

statement, that he does not acquire it, refers to a case

in which he did not say to him: “Acquire it from now.”

They asked Ulla:

They questioned Ulla]:

If he performed yibbum and then divided

the assets of his brother,

what is

the ruling? Did his gift take effect?

He said to them:

He accomplished nothing.

This is in accordance with Rav Yosef, mentioned above.

They asked him further: And if he

divided the assets and then performed yibbum, what is

the ruling? Did his actions take effect?

He said to them:

He accomplished nothing.

Rav Sheshet objected: Now, if in the case where he performed yibbum and then divided the assets he accomplished nothing, is it necessary to say that if he divided the assets and then performed yibbum he accomplished nothing?!

Certainly he accomplished nothing; why, then, did they ask him a second question?

The Gemara answers:

There were two separate incidents.

When Ravin came, Reish Lakish said:

Whether he performed yibbum and then divided the assets or divided the assets and then performed yibbum, he accomplished nothing.

And the halakha is: He accomplished nothing:

We learned in the Mishna:

“And the Sages say: Produce attached to the ground belongs to him

the yavam] .”

The Gemara asks:

Why? But all his assets are responsible and serve as collateral for her ketuba,

and produce attached to the ground is considered like land.

Reish Lakish said: Teach

let us read in the Mishna]

“hers.”

We learned in the Mishna:

Once he consummated the marriage, she is his wife.

The Gemara asks:

For what halakhic purpose

what new point is taught by this ruling]?

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: To teach that he divorces her with a bill of divorce

and not through ḥalitza,

and he may remarry her

that is, he may remarry her after the divorce like any other wife, and she is not prohibited to him as the wife of a brother].

The Gemara asks: What is novel about the fact that

he divorces her with a bill of divorce?

It is obvious;

she is like any married woman who is divorced with a bill of divorce.