Ketubot 76a (עו.) — the Talmud in English

In any event,

there is “one presumption in place of two,”

one presumption in place of two presumptions,

and we do not say that one presumption can stand in place of two.

But if he brought proof that she had blemishes

before she became betrothed,

we do not extract money from him.

Although there is the presumption that “a person does not drink from a cup unless he examines it, and this man saw and was reconciled to it,” since

we cannot say, ‘Leave the body in its presumptive status,’

for he proved that the blemishes had already developed in her beforehand,

what presumption is there? The presumption that a person does not drink from a cup unless he examines it, and this man saw and was reconciled to it?

On the contrary,

there is against it

the presumption that a person does not reconcile himself to blemishes.

And

when there is one presumption against another presumption, we say:

“Leave the money in its presumptive status.”

The Gemara brings another answer to reconcile the Mishna:

Rav Ashi said:

Actually, the entire Mishna is in accordance with Rabban Gamliel, who holds that the presumption of the body is superior for extracting money.

If so, it is difficult: Why, in the first clause, must the father bring proof? After all, the presumption of the body supports him.

Rather,

in the first clause,

the father must bring proof because the woman has not yet entered the husband’s authority, and she remains in her father’s authority. Therefore, her claim is:

“You owe my father a maneh,”

that is, you are obligated to pay my father a maneh. And even though the presumption of her body supports her, in any event the presumption of the daughter’s body is not effective for the father. With regard to the father, this is not a presumption of the body, but an ordinary presumption.

Rabban Gamliel concedes in this case that an ordinary presumption, which does not possess the superiority of a presumption of the body, cannot be used to extract money.

And

conversely,

in the final clause,

where she has already entered the husband’s authority and left her father’s authority, and now claims:

“You owe me a maneh,”

her presumption of the body is effective for extracting money from the husband.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, raised an objection

[he challenged]

to Rav Ashi:

Did we not learn in the Tosefta:

“Rabbi Meir concedes

that is, Rabbi Meir mentioned in the Mishna, who said, ‘Once she has entered the husband’s authority, the husband must bring proof’—he concedes

with regard to blemishes that are likely to have come with her from her father’s house, that the father must bring proof”?

Rav Aḥa understood that this refers to blemishes that evidently came from the father’s house, although it is not certain that they developed there. Nevertheless, the father must bring proof even though she has already entered the husband’s authority and the presumption of the body supports her claim,

but why?

After all, there

the claim is, “You owe me a maneh,” is it not?

And we answer:

With what are we dealing here? With

a case in which she had an

extra

finger, which certainly developed while she was in the father’s authority, and in such a case the presumption of the body certainly is not effective.

And we challenge this: If we are dealing with an

extra finger, what proof

could he bring?

That is, how could proof benefit the father? Surely the finger developed while she was in his authority.

And we answer: The father should bring

proof that he saw

that the husband had seen the blemish before the marriage

and had reconciled himself to it.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One who exchanges

a cow for a donkey,

and the donkey was not before us at the time of the acquisition,

and the owner of the donkey pulled the cow, but the owner of the cow did not manage to pull the donkey before the donkey died.

We are uncertain: Did the donkey die before the cow was pulled, in which case the transaction is void and the loss falls upon the owner of the donkey,

or perhaps did it die after the cow was pulled, in which case the owner of the cow had already acquired it and the loss falls upon him?

And Shmuel ruled:

The owner of the donkey must bring proof that his donkey was alive at the time the cow was pulled.

And a tanna teaches a parallel case: “A bride.”

That is, his proof is from the tanna of our Mishna, who taught the matter of a mistaken transaction involving blemishes in a bride.

And we inquire:

Which bride?

From which part of the Mishna did Shmuel bring proof for his ruling?