Ketubot 76a — the Talmud in English

In any event,

it is “one in place of two,”

one presumption in place of two presumptions,

and we do not say [that there is] one in place of two.

But if he brought proof that she had defects

before she became betrothed,

we do not extract money from him.

Even though there is the presumption, “A person does not drink from a cup unless he examines it, and this one saw and became reconciled,” since

we cannot say, “Establish the body upon its presumption,”

for he proved that defects had already developed in her beforehand.

What is there [to say]? There is the presumption that a person does not drink from a cup unless he examines it, and this one saw and became reconciled.

On the contrary,

there is opposite it—

“The presumption is that a person does not become reconciled to defects.”

And

in a case where one presumption is opposed to another presumption, we say—

“Establish the money upon its presumption.”

And the Gemara brings another answer to reconcile the Mishna:

Rav Ashi said:

Actually, the entire Mishna is in accordance with Rabban Gamaliel, for the presumption of the body is superior for extracting money.

And if so, it is difficult: Why in the first clause is the father required to bring proof? After all, the presumption of the body assists him?

Rather—

in the first clause,

the father is required to bring proof, since the woman had not yet entered the husband’s authority, and she was still in her father’s authority. If so, her claim is—

“You owe my father one hundred [zuz] in your possession”

“You owe my father one hundred [zuz],” and even though the presumption of her body assists her, in any event the presumption of the daughter’s body does not benefit the father. And with regard to the father, this is not the presumption of the body, but an ordinary presumption.

And in this Rabban Gamaliel concedes that an ordinary presumption, which does not possess the superiority of the presumption of the body, cannot extract money.

And

on the other hand, in the

final clause,

where she had already entered the husband’s authority and left her father’s authority, and now she claims—

“You owe me one hundred [zuz] in your possession,”

then the presumption of her body is effective for extracting money from the husband .

He challenged him

he raised a difficulty

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, to Rav Ashi:

Have we not learned in the Tosefta—

“Rabbi Meir concedes,

that is, Rabbi Meir mentioned in the Mishna, who said, ‘If she entered the husband’s authority, the husband must bring proof,’ concedes

with regard to defects that are fit to have come with her from her father’s house, that the father must bring proof.”

And Rav Aḥa understood that this concerns defects that it is reasonable came from the father’s house, but it is not certain that they developed there. And nevertheless, the father must bring proof even though she had already entered the husband’s authority and the presumption of the body assists her claim,

and why,

for there—

is it not “You owe me one hundred [zuz] in your possession”?

And we answer—

with what are we dealing here? With

a case where she had an extra finger

extra.

For it certainly developed while she was in the father’s authority, and in such a case, certainly the presumption of the body is not effective.

And we raise a difficulty: If it is dealing with

an extra finger, what proof

does he bring?

That is: What benefit will proof provide the father? After all, it is certain that the finger developed while she was in his authority?

And we answer: The father should bring

proof that he saw that

the husband saw the defect before the marriage

and became reconciled to it.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One who exchanges

a cow for a donkey,

and the donkey was not before us at the time of the acquisition,

and the owner of the donkey pulled the cow, but the owner of the cow did not manage to pull the donkey before the donkey died.

And it is uncertain to us: Did the donkey die before the pulling of the cow, so that the transaction is void? And the loss falls upon the owner of the donkey.

Or perhaps it died after the pulling of the cow, and then the owner of the cow had already acquired it, and the loss falls upon him.

And Shmuel ruled:

The owner of the donkey must bring proof that his donkey was alive at the time the cow was pulled .

And the tanna teaches this as well: “A bride.”

That is, his proof is from the tanna of our Mishna, who taught the matter of a mistaken transaction with regard to the defects of a bride.

And we inquire about it:

Which bride?

From which part of the Mishna did Shmuel bring proof for his ruling?