Ketubot 75b — the Talmud in English

But concerning defects that are visible, he cannot make a claim.

Since he certainly knew of them, and nevertheless agreed to betroth her .

And if there is a bathhouse in that city, even

in

the concealed defects he cannot make a claim

that he did not know,

because he examines her

before the betrothal,

through his female relatives.

Gemara:

Introduction:

We learned above (12b): “If one marries a woman and does not find that she has hymenal blood, she says: ‘I was raped after you betrothed me, and your field was inundated.’ And he says: ‘No, but before I betrothed you, and my transaction was a mistaken transaction.’”

Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is believed.

And Rabbi Yehoshua says: “We do not live from her mouth. Rather, this woman has the presumption of having had intercourse, and she misled him, until she brings proof for her words.”

And, simply, the conclusion of the Gemara there is that the reason of Rabban Gamliel is because of the presumption of the body: she was born a virgin. This establishes for us that she had intercourse after the marriage. Since one should not assume that her body changed—that she had intercourse—except from the time that she is found to have had intercourse, namely, after the marriage. And her husband’s field was inundated, and he is obligated to give her the ketuba.

And Rabbi Yehoshua held that the presumption of ownership is always preferable, and one may not extract money from the husband’s presumption except through definitive proof.

Now our Mishna seemingly deals with a similar case. For according to the woman’s claim, the presumption of the body assists her, to say that the defects developed in her after her marriage.

Whereas according to the husband’s claim, the presumption of ownership assists him, to say that his money may not be extracted from his presumption except through proof.

And the Gemara raises an objection: We learned in the first clause: “If she had defects while she was still in her father’s house, the father must bring proof,” and it is precise—

The reason is that the father brings proof

that the defects developed in her after the betrothal, and only then is the husband not believed;

but

if

the father does not bring proof, the husband is believed!

Whose [opinion]

is this?

It is Rabbi Yehoshua’s! For he says: “We do not live from her mouth.”

And money is not extracted from its presumption except through proof.

Come and hear the latter clause—

“If she entered the husband’s domain, the husband must bring proof,”

and it is precise—

The reason is that the husband brings proof

that she had the defects at the time of the betrothal, and only then is he believed to expel her without a ketuba;

but

if

the husband does not bring proof, the father is believed!

And if so,

we arrive

at

the

words of

Rabban Gamliel, who says: She is believed.

Since the presumption of the body—that she did not have defects—assists her.

And it is difficult: In the first clause we follow Rabbi Yehoshua, and in the latter clause Rabban Gamliel?

Rabbi Elazar said: It is divided!

The words of the Mishna must be divided between two tannaim, for this difficulty has no answer:

The one who taught this—

the first clause, namely Rabbi Yehoshua—

did not teach this—

the latter clause, namely Rabban Gamliel.

And in truth, according to Rabbi Yehoshua, even if she entered the husband’s domain, the father must bring proof. Since the one who extracts from his fellow—the burden of proof is upon him.

And according to Rabban Gamliel, even if she did not enter the husband’s domain, he must bring proof, since the presumption of the body assists her words, to say that the defects developed in her after the betrothal .

In parentheses , Rava explains the words of Rabbi Yehoshua:

Rava said: Do not say

[do not say] that

Rabbi Yehoshua does not follow the presumption of the body at all,

but when Rabbi Yehoshua does not follow the presumption

of the body

only

where there is a presumption of ownership

opposite it, as in our Mishna,

but where there is no presumption of ownership

opposite it, but another presumption, such as the presumption of an unmarried woman ,

Rabbi Yehoshua follows the presumption of the body.

For he too agrees that the presumption of the body is superior to all presumptions .

And the proof is—

for it was taught:

In the laws of skin afflictions, it is stated in the Torah: “And behold, the white hair has turned in the bright spot” (Leviticus 13:25), and we learn from this that only

if the bright spot preceded the white hair, he is impure.

But

if

the

white hair preceded the bright spot, he is pure.

And when there is

a doubt

as to which preceded which, according to the Sages—

he is impure.

And Rabbi Yehoshua says—

it is weakened.

What does “it is weakened” mean?

Rabba said—

weakened—

that is,

pure.

As when the affliction is weakened from its appearance and becomes pure. [And in the Torat Kohanim we read: “It is weakened,” like a person whose teeth are blunted because no attention is paid to his words].

And its reason is that we establish the body according to its presumption, that it has no afflictions.

And it is explained that even according to Rabbi Yehoshua, we follow the presumption of the body where there is no presumption of ownership standing opposite it .

The Gemara returns to explain the Mishna in additional ways:

Rava said:

It is possible to establish the entire Mishna according to Rabban Gamliel , that the presumption of the body is superior; but in the

first clause,

the father must bring proof, despite the fact that the presumption of the body is in his favor, since the doubt is found in his domain—his presumption has been weakened. We say: “

Since

here they were found,

one may say that

here they were

even before the betrothal”.

The latter clause also: Here they were found and here they were .

Abaye raised an objection to him

[Abaye challenged Rava’s words], we learned in the Mishna:

“If she entered the husband’s domain, the husband must bring proof that these defects were in her before she became betrothed, and his transaction was a mistaken transaction.”

And it is precise that if he brings proof

that they were present before she became betrothed, it is effective!

Only then is the proof effective; but if he brings proof that the defects were in her

after she became betrothed, it is not

effective to exempt him from the ketuba.

And

according to Rava’s words,

why

is his proof not effective?

Let us say: “Here they were found and here they were,”

and since he proved that there were defects in the father’s domain, the father must bring proof that they developed after her betrothal, as in the case where the defects were found in the father’s domain after the betrothal?

He said to him:

Rava said: When the defects were found in his domain and the husband brought proof that they were in her

after she became betrothed,

the proof does not help him,

because it can be said:

“There is a presumption that a person does not drink from a cup unless he examines it,”

[that is, he does not marry a woman unless he previously examined what she is like],

and this man saw

the defects

and was reconciled to them

[he agreed to betroth her despite them]. And we raise an objection:

If so,

since he agreed to them, even if he brings proof that the defects developed in her

before she became betrothed as well,

he should nevertheless be obligated to give her a ketuba, since he knew of the defects and waived them?

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that

we say:

“There is a presumption that a person is not reconciled to defects,”

and he certainly did not know of them; therefore, if the defects were before the betrothal, his transaction was a mistaken transaction!

Here too,

why did Rava say, “There is a presumption that a person does not drink from a cup,” when there is opposite it

“a presumption that a person is not reconciled to defects”?

And necessarily he did not know of the defects, and the difficulty returns to its place?

Rather,

it must be explained in another manner: When the defects were found in the husband’s domain and the husband brought proof that they were in her

after she became betrothed,

the proof is not effective

because there are two

presumptions against his words:

A.

A presumption: Establish the body according to its presumption,

that it has no defects, and necessarily the defects did not develop in her until after the betrothal.

B.

And a presumption: “A person does not drink from a cup unless he examines it, and this man saw and was reconciled to them.”

And if so, his proof is entirely ineffective.

What can you say—“There is a presumption that a person is not reconciled to defects”?!

[Perhaps you will say: After all, “there is a presumption that a person is not reconciled to defects” assists his words, for he certainly did not see the defects before the marriage?]