Ketubot 61b — the Talmud in English

Rav Ashi saw Mar Zutra

his face was darkened because of his craving for food.

Rav Ashi took

Rav Ashi

with his fingers and placed it in his mouth so that he would taste from the dish and not endanger himself.

The king’s taster said to

the king’s taster to Rav Ashi:

You have ruined the king’s meal by putting your fingers into his dish, for the king will no longer eat from it.

The king’s officers said to

the king’s officers to Rav Ashi:

Why did you do this !?

He said to them

Rav Ashi said to the king’s officers: It was not I who disqualified the king’s food, but

the one who did this,

the one who cooked this dish, he is the one who

disqualified the king’s food , as he explains and proceeds.

They said to him

the king’s officers said to Rav Ashi:

Why,

for what bad thing did you find in this dish?

He said to them

Rav Ashi said to the king’s officers:

another thing

I saw in it,

I saw the flesh of a leprous pig in the dish.

The king’s officers examined it,

the king’s officers,

but they did not find .

Rav Ashi took

Rav Ashi took the

fingers

of the examiner, and

placed them upon it ,

and placed them on one of the pieces, and

said to them

to those who examined it:

And

did you examine this one here,

did you also examine this piece!?

They examined

that piece, and indeed

they found

that there was leprosy there.

The Sages said to Rav Ashi

to Rav Ashi:

What is the reason

you gave Mar Zutra a taste of the king’s dish and endangered yourself before the king, and

you relied upon a miracle that leprosy would be found in the dish!?

He said to them

Rav Ashi said to the Sages:

I did not rely upon a miracle, but

I saw the spirit of leprosy flying over him , and I understood that necessarily there was leprosy in the dish.

There was a certain Roman who said to a certain woman,

there was an incident involving a Roman who said to a certain woman:

Will

you

marry me ?

She said to him

that woman:

No,

I will not marry you.

He went and brought pomegranates ,

opened them and ate before her , and

all the saliva that distressed her, she swallowed it ,

and he did not give her any until he inflated her .

In the end he said to her

that Roman said to the woman:

And if I heal you, will you marry me ?

She said to him

the woman:

Yes,

indeed I will marry you.

He went, brought pomegranates, opened them, and ate before her , and

said to her

to the woman:

All the saliva that distresses you —

spit it out, cast it out; spit it out, cast it out ,

until there comes out from you something like green grass .

And she was healed .

We learned in the Mishna:

and she performs

work of spinning

with wool:

And the Gemara infers: Spinning

with wool — yes,

indeed she performs it, but spinning

with flax

she

does not

perform.

And necessarily,

the Mishna —

whose is it?

According to whose method is it stated? It is according to the method of

Rabbi Judah!

For it was taught:

the husband

cannot compel

to stand

and serve

before his father, nor to stand

and serve

before his son.

Nor to place straw before his animal,

a horse or donkey, which are well fed and neigh for mating.

But he can compel

to place straw before his cattle,

for cattle are not as eager for mating as a horse, and their inclination is not as recognizable, and the woman is not incited by it.

Rabbi Judah says: He also cannot compel her to work with flax, because

the

flax makes the mouth smell bad,

and stretches out the lips,

she extends her lips like a rod, until they become large, since she must repeatedly soak the flax thread in the saliva in her mouth.

And the Gemara explains Rabbi Judah’s words:

And this matter applies

that he cannot compel her to work with flax —

with Roman flax .

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brought him one hundred maidservants

he can compel her to work with wool, for idleness leads to licentiousness:

Rav Malkiyo said in the name of Rav Adda bar Ahava: The halakha is according to Rabbi Eliezer.

The two amoraim, Rav Malkiyo and Rav Malkiya, had similar names, and they explained six halakhot.

Three halakhot of the six halakhot were stated concerning matters mentioned in the Mishna or in a beraita, whereas the other three halakhot were stated independently.

And since the names of Rav Malkiyo and Rav Malkiya were similar, the amoraim disputed which of the six halakhot Rav Malkiyo had said and which Rav Malkiya had said:

Rabbi Hanina, son of Rav Ika, said,

These three halakhot: the first concerning

a spit , the second concerning

the second concerns

maidservants ,

which is the statement here,

and

the third concerning

dimples —

Rav Malkiyo

is the one who stated them.

And the other three halakhot, which were stated concerning

a forelock ,

stove ash ,

and cheese —

Rav Malkiya

is the one who stated them.

But

Rav Pappa

disagrees with the attribution by Rabbi Hanina, son of Rabbi Ika, of the halakha concerning “maidservants,” which concerns the law of our Mishna, to Rav Malkiyo,

and said:

The statement concerning the law of “maidservants,” which concerns our Mishna — Rav Malkiya is the one who stated it, and not Rav Malkiyo!

For Rav Pappa stated a “rule,” by means of which it is possible to distinguish between Rav Malkiyo’s statements and Rav Malkiya’s statements, and this is the rule:

All the statements dealing with halakhot mentioned in

the Mishna and the beraita , namely: the law of “maidservants” [which concerns the maidservants in our Mishna], the forelock, and cheese — only

Rav Malkiya

stated them, and not Rav Malkiyo.

But the other three statements [the spit, the dimples, and the stove ash], which have the status of

an amoraic tradition

alone —

Rav Malkiyo,

or Rav Malkiya, stated them.

And Rav Pappa disagreed with Rabbi Hanina bar Ika only concerning the maidservant, since it is one of the three halakhot relating to a Mishna and a beraita [maidservants, the forelock, and cheese], for according to Rav Pappa all these halakhot were stated only by Rav Malkiya, and not by Rav Malkiyo.

Therefore Rav Pappa disagreed concerning the maidservant, and said that the halakha concerning maidservants was stated by Rav Malkiya and not by Rav Malkiyo, since this halakha relates to our Mishna.

But concerning the other three halakhot [the spit, the dimples, and the stove ash], which are amoraic traditions, Rav Pappa agrees with Rabbi Hanina bar Ika that of the two statements, the spit and the dimples, Rav Malkiyo stated them, while the third statement, concerning the stove ash, was stated by Rav Malkiya.

And according to him, Rav Malkiya stated four statements [three halakhot relating to a Mishna and a beraita, and one, the stove ash, relating to an amoraic tradition], whereas Rav Malkiyo stated two statements.

And your mnemonic is,

so that you will not exchange the version:

A beraita,

which is feminine in form, is considered like

“a queen” in relation to the amoraic tradition.

(queen) in relation to the traditions of the amoraim.

For the Mishna or the beraita is more important than the tradition, since where an amora teaches a tradition contrary to a Mishna or a beraita, his words are rejected before them.

And since the Mishna or the beraita is considered “a queen” , this will be a mnemonic for the name of Rav Malkiya, who is the one who stated the statement concerning the Mishna.

For the name of Rav “Malkiya” resembles “queen,” which is feminine in form.

Whereas the name of Rav “Malkiyo” resembles “king,” which is masculine in form.

And we raised the matter:

What is the difference between them,

in which statement is there a difference between the words of Rabbi Hanina, son of Rav Ika, and Rav Pappa?

And the Gemara explains:

There is a difference between them: maidservants,

namely, the statement that the halakha is according to Rabbi Eliezer in our Mishna.

According to Rabbi Hanina, son of Rav Ika, Rav Malkiyo is the one who stated it.

But according to Rav Pappa, Rav Malkiya stated it, because according to Rav Pappa, all statements relating to the Mishna were stated only by Rav Malkiya.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

Even one who vows to prohibit his wife from performing work must divorce her and give her the marriage settlement, for idleness leads to melancholy:

And the Gemara objects to this: Surely this law

is

the law of

the first Tanna!

That is, Rabbi Eliezer, who said, “Idleness leads to licentiousness.” What difference is there to me whether it leads to licentiousness or whether it leads to melancholy!?

And we explain:

There is a difference between them,

between Rabbi Eliezer [the first Tanna] and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, in the case of a woman who is not entirely idle, but

who plays with small puppies and nardeshir.

She plays with thin dogs, and with a game [called ishkakish. Rashi]

For if the reason is because of melancholy, this reason does not apply to this woman, since she does not sit in complete idleness, wondering and doing nothing.

But according to Rabbi Eliezer, whose reason is because of licentiousness, there is concern for this even when she plays various games, because laughter and frivolity accustom a person to sexual transgression.

Mishna:

a.

One who vows to prohibit his wife from marital relations,

for example, the husband said: “Let the benefit of your marital relations be prohibited to me by a vow.”

Beit Shammai say:

If he prohibited her by a vow for up to

two Shabbatot and no more, she waits. But if he prohibited her for longer than two weeks, he must divorce her and give her the marriage settlement.

And

Beit Hillel say:

If he prohibited her by a vow for up to

one Shabbat only, she waits. But if he prohibited her for more than one week, he must divorce her and give her the marriage settlement.

[one week] only, she waits. But if he imposed the vow for more than one week, he must divorce her and give her the payment stipulated in her marriage contract.

b.

Students go out for Torah study without permission

of their wives, even though they are bound to them concerning the mitzva of marital relations —

for thirty days.

And

the workers

go out to their work without permission from their wives —

for one Shabbat only.

[one week] only.

The marital interval stated in the Torah,

that every man is obligated to visit his wife, varies according to the husband’s occupation:

those who lead an idle life,

are obligated in this

every day,

and the Gemara will explain who they are.

The workers,

are obligated

twice,

two times

on Shabbat .

[during the week].

The donkey drivers,

who go out to the villages to bring grain to sell in the market —

once on Shabbat.

The camel drivers,

who go out to a distant place —

once every thirty days.

The sailors,

who set out on the Great Sea to the ends of the land —

once every six months.

The words of Rabbi Eliezer.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who vows to prohibit his wife from marital relations: Beit Shammai say two Shabbatot; Beit Hillel say one Shabbat:

And we raise it concerning this:

What is the reason of Beit Shammai?

And the Gemara explains:

They derive [

they learn]

from a woman who has given birth

to a

female,

who is forbidden to her husband for two weeks.

And since we find in the Torah that it requires remaining in separation for two weeks, we have no grounds to compel him to divorce her if he prohibited her by vow for no more than this period of time.

But Beit Hillel derive it from a woman who has given birth to a male,

who is forbidden to her husband for only one week.

And we object:

But Beit Hillel, too, should derive it

they should learn

from a woman who has given birth to a female!?

And therefore the Gemara retracts this explanation and says:

Indeed,

if from a woman who has given birth

it was

that

Beit Hillel derived it [if the source of the words of Beit Hillel had been a woman who has given birth],

so too

they should have learned from a woman who has given birth to a female.

Rather, Beit Hillel,

did not learn their ruling from a woman who has given birth, but rather

from a menstruating woman,

who is forbidden to her husband [by Torah law] for only one week —

they derive it.

And the Gemara explains:

In what do they disagree,

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel? What is the reason for their dispute, that these learn from a woman who has given birth, whereas those learn from a menstruating woman?

One master,

Beit Hillel,

holds:

they learn

a matter

a matter

that is common,

the prohibition of his wife, which is common when he is angry with her,

from a matter that is common,

a menstruating woman. And they do not learn this from a woman who has given birth, which is not so common.

And the other master,

Beit Shammai,

holds:

they learn

a matter

a matter

that he is,

the husband,

causes for her, that he

prohibited her by vow,

from a matter

from a matter

that he causes for her, namely, a woman who has given birth, for he caused her to become pregnant and give birth. And they do not learn from a menstruating woman, for the husband does not cause her prohibition.

a woman who has given birth, since he caused her to become pregnant and give birth. They do not learn it from a menstruating woman, since the husband does not cause her prohibition.

Rav said: The dispute

between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is only

when he specifies

the period of time for which he prohibits her by vow. For if he prohibited her for only one week according to Beit Hillel, and only two weeks according to Beit Shammai, she must wait, and he is not obligated to divorce her and give her the ketuba.

But when it is unstated,

when he did not establish a period of time for his vow — according to

everyone [

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel]

he must divorce her immediately,

his wife, and he may not wait even one week —

and give her the ketuba.

And Shmuel said: Even

when he prohibited her

when it is unstated, too, he must wait —

for Beit Shammai, two weeks, and for Beit Hillel, one week —

perhaps he will find

within this time

an opening for his vow.

And the Gemara is astonished:

But

already

Rav and Shmuel disagreed about it

Rav and Shmuel

one time

in a similar matter, so why did they disagree over the same reasoning twice!?

For we learned

below, in the chapter of One Who Prohibits by Vow [70a]:

One who prohibits his wife by vow from benefiting from him —

if he prohibited her

for up to thirty days —

then he must

appoint a “provider”,

who will support her in his place. And if he prohibited her

for longer than this [

for a period longer than thirty days] —

he must divorce her and give her the ketuba.

And Rav said: They taught

that he should appoint a provider

only when he specifies

that he prohibits her by vow for thirty days.

But when his vow is unstated,

his vow, and he did not specify for how long he prohibited her —

he must divorce her immediately and give her the ketuba.

And Shmuel said: Even when it is unstated, too, he must wait,

the husband thirty days before divorcing her,

perhaps he will find an opening for his vow,

and dissolve it.

And we answer:

It is necessary

to inform us of their dispute in both places.

For if it had been stated

only

in this,

in our Mishna, where he prohibited her from marital intercourse, I would say: only

in this did Rav say

that he must divorce her immediately and give her the ketuba when he prohibited her by vow without specifying a period,

because it is impossible to

fulfill the husband’s mitzva of ona

through a provider.

But in that,

where he prohibited her from sustenance,

where it is possible

to sustain her

through

the agency of

a provider —

say that he agrees with Shmuel

that he must wait, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow.

And

likewise, conversely,

if it had been stated

that the dispute of Rav and Shmuel was only

in that,

where he prohibited her from sustenance, I would say that only

in this did Shmuel say

that he must wait, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow, since it is possible through a provider.

But in this,

in the matter of our Mishna, where he prohibited her from marital intercourse, which cannot be fulfilled through a provider —

say that he agrees with Rav

that he must divorce her immediately and give her the ketuba.

Therefore:

it is necessary

to inform us of their dispute in both cases.

We learned in the Mishna:

Students go out for Torah study

without permission, for thirty days:

And we raise it concerning this:

With permission

of their wives —

how much

time are they permitted to go out?

And the Gemara is astonished at the question: But if they go out with their permission, what is the question of how long they are permitted to go out? Surely

for as much as he wishes,

for as long as they wish it is permitted to them, since they went out with the permission of their wives!