Ketubot 61b (סא:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Ashi saw Mar Zutra [] (Rav Ashi saw Mar Zutra)!(pamud.bmp "Exact page location")

his face was flushed because of his craving for food.

Rav Ashi took

Rav Ashi

with his fingers and placed it in his mouth (Rav Ashi took some of the dish that was intended to be served to the king with his fingers and placed it in Mar Zutra’s mouth), so that he would taste some of the dish and not endanger himself.

The king’s steward said to

the king’s steward said to Rav Ashi:

You have ruined the king’s meal (You have ruined the king’s meal) by putting your fingers into his dish, since the king will no longer eat from it.

The king’s officers said to

the king’s officers said to Rav Ashi:

Why did you do this (Why did you do this and ruin the king’s meal)?

He said to them

Rav Ashi said to the king’s officers: It was not I who rendered the king’s food unfit; rather,

the one who did this

the one who cooked this dish is the one who

rendered the king’s food unfit (rendered the king’s food unfit), as he proceeds to explain.

They said to him

the king’s officers said to Rav Ashi:

Why

and what evil did you find in this dish?

He said to them

Rav Ashi said to the king’s officers:

Another thing (a pig)

I saw in it

I saw the flesh of a leprous pig in the dish.

The king’s officers examined it

the king’s officers,

but they did not find it (they did not find anything as Rav Ashi had said).

Rav Ashi took

Rav Ashi took

his fingers

of the examiner, and

placed them on it (Rav Ashi took the examiner’s fingers)

(and placed them on one of the pieces), and

said to them

said to those who had examined it:

But

did you examine this one here

did you examine this piece as well?

They examined it

that piece, and indeed

they found

that there was leprosy there.

The Sages said to Rav Ashi

the Sages said to Rav Ashi:

For what reason

did you make Mar Zutra taste from the king’s dish and endanger yourself before the king, and

rely on a miracle (rely on a miracle) that leprosy would be found in the dish!?

He said to them

Rav Ashi said to the Sages:

I did not rely on a miracle. Rather,

I saw the spirit of leprosy flying over him (I saw the spirit of leprosy flying over Mar Zutra), and I understood that there must necessarily be leprosy in the dish.

There was a certain Roman who said to a certain woman

there was an incident involving a Roman who said to a certain woman:

Will

you

marry me (will you marry me)?

She said to him

that woman said to him:

No

I will not marry you.

He went and brought pomegranates (that Roman went and brought pomegranates),

split them open and ate them before her (he split them open and ate them before her, without giving her any), and

he swallowed every drop of saliva that distressed her (the woman swallowed every bit of saliva that rose in her mouth because of her craving for the food),

and did not give her any until she was swollen (and he did not give her any of the pomegranates until her face and abdomen swelled and became transparent like glass, as is typical of swollen things).

In the end he said to her

that Roman said to the woman:

And if I heal you, will you marry me (if I heal you, will you marry me)?

She said to him

the woman said to him:

Yes

indeed, I will marry you.

He went, brought pomegranates again, split them open, and ate them before her (that Roman went and again brought pomegranates, opened them, and ate them before her), and

said to her

he said to the woman:

Every drop of saliva that distresses you—

go on, spit it out; spit it out (every bit of saliva that rises in your mouth because of your craving for the food, spit it out and cast it away, spit it out and cast it away),

until something like a green herb comes out of you (until something like a green plant comes out of you).

And she was healed (and the woman was healed).

We learned in the Mishna:

And she performs

the labor of spinning

with wool:

And the Gemara infers: The labor of spinning

with wool—yes

indeed, she performs it, but spinning

with flax

she

does not

perform.

And necessarily,

the Mishna—

whose opinion is it

according to whose approach is it stated? It is according to the opinion of

Rabbi Yehuda!

As it was taught:

the husband

cannot compel (with the letter hei pronounced explicitly—“he cannot compel his wife”)

to stand

and serve

before his father, nor to stand

and serve

before his son.

Nor to place straw before his animal

a horse or donkey, which are well fed and neigh for mating.

But he may compel her (he may compel her)

to place straw before his cattle

for cattle are not as eager for mating as a horse, their inclination is not so evident, and the woman is not incited by it.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He also cannot compel her to work with flax, because

the

flax makes the mouth smell bad

and makes the lips protrude

she stretches out her lips like a rod until they become large, since she must continually moisten the flax thread with the saliva in her mouth.

And the Gemara explains Rabbi Yehuda’s statement:

And this applies

when he cannot compel her to work with flax—

with Roman flax (Roman flax).

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brought him one hundred maidservants

he may compel her to work with wool, because idleness leads to licentiousness:

Rav Malkiyo said in the name of Rav Adda bar Ahava: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

The two amoraim, Rav Malkiyo and Rav Malkiya, had similar names, and they explained six halakhot.

Three of the six halakhot were stated concerning matters mentioned in the Mishna or a beraita, whereas the other three halakhot were stated independently.

Since the names of Rav Malkiyo and Rav Malkiya were similar, the amoraim disputed which of the six statements was said by Rav Malkiyo and which was said by Rav Malkiya:

Rabbi Hanina, son of Rav Ika, said,

These three halakhot: The first concerns

a spit (Beitza 28b); the second concerns

the second concerns

maidservants (which is the statement here);

which is the statement here,

and

the third concerns

dimples (Nidda 52a)—

Rav Malkiyo

is the one who stated them.

And the other three halakhot, which concern

the forelock (in tractate Avoda Zara 29a),

ashes of parched wood (in tractate Makkot 21a),

and cheese (in tractate Avoda Zara 35b)—

Rav Malkiya

is the one who stated them.

But

Rav Pappa

disagrees with Rabbi Hanina son of Rabbi Ika’s attribution of the halakha concerning “maidservants,” which relates to the law of our Mishna, to Rav Malkiyo, and

said:

The statement concerning the law of “maidservants,” which relates to our Mishna—Rav Malkiya is the one who stated it, and not Rav Malkiyo!

For Rav Pappa stated a “rule” by means of which it is possible to distinguish between the statements of Rav Malkiyo and those of Rav Malkiya. This is the rule:

Every statement concerning halakhot mentioned in

the Mishna and the beraita (in the Mishna and the beraita)—namely, the law of “maidservants” [which concerns the maidservants mentioned in our Mishna], the forelock, and cheese—was stated only by

Rav Malkiya

and not by Rav Malkiyo.

But the other three statements [the spit, dimples, and ashes of parched wood], which are merely

traditions

(the traditions of amoraim, which do not relate to a Mishna or beraita)—

Rav Malkiyo

or Rav Malkiya stated them.

Rav Pappa disagreed with Rabbi Hanina bar Ika only concerning maidservants, since it is one of the three halakhot relating to a Mishna or beraita [maidservants, the forelock, and cheese]. According to Rav Pappa, all these halakhot were stated only by Rav Malkiya, and not by Rav Malkiyo.

Therefore, Rav Pappa disagreed concerning maidservants and said that the halakha concerning maidservants was stated by Rav Malkiya and not by Rav Malkiyo, since this halakha relates to our Mishna.

But concerning the other three halakhot [the spit, dimples, and ashes of parched wood], which are traditions, Rav Pappa agrees with Rabbi Hanina bar Ika: Rav Malkiyo stated the two statements concerning the spit and dimples, while Rav Malkiya stated the third statement, concerning ashes of parched wood.

According to him, Rav Malkiya stated four statements [the three halakhot relating to the Mishna and beraita, and one, ashes of parched wood, relating to a tradition], whereas Rav Malkiyo stated two statements.

And this is your mnemonic

so that you will not exchange the versions:

A beraita,

which is feminine, is considered like

“queen”

(queen) in relation to the traditions of the amoraim.

For the Mishna or beraita is more authoritative than a tradition, since when an amora states a tradition contrary to a Mishna or beraita, his words are rejected in their favor.

And since the Mishna or beraita is considered a “queen” [malketa], this serves as a mnemonic for the name Rav Malkiya, who is the one who stated the statement concerning the Mishna.

For the name Rav “Malkiya” resembles “queen,” which is feminine.

Whereas the name Rav “Malkiyo” resembles “king,” which is masculine.

And we raise a question about it:

What difference is there between them

in which statement is there a difference between the words of Rabbi Hanina son of Rav Ika and Rav Pappa?

And the Gemara explains:

There is a difference between them: maidservants

that is, the statement that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer in our Mishna.

According to Rabbi Hanina son of Rav Ika, Rav Malkiyo stated it.

But according to Rav Pappa, Rav Malkiya stated it, since according to Rav Pappa all statements relating to the Mishna were stated exclusively by Rav Malkiya.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

Even one who prohibits his wife by vow from performing labor must divorce her and give her the ketuba, because idleness leads to dullness:

And the Gemara raises an objection to this: This law

is identical to

the law of

the first tanna!

That is, Rabbi Eliezer, who said, “Idleness leads to licentiousness.” What difference does it make whether it leads to licentiousness or whether it leads to dullness!?

And we explain:

There is a difference between them

between Rabbi Eliezer [the first tanna] and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, regarding a woman who is not entirely idle, but rather

plays with small dogs and plays games.

She plays with small dogs and with a game [called ishkakish, according to Rashi].

For if the reason is dullness, this reason does not apply to this woman, since she is not sitting, pondering, and entirely idle.

But according to Rabbi Eliezer, whose reason is licentiousness, there is cause for concern even when she plays various games, because frivolity and levity accustom a person to sexual transgression.

Mishna:

1.

One who prohibits his wife by vow from marital relations

for example, the husband said: “The benefit of your marital relations is forbidden to me.”

Beit Shammai say:

If he imposed the vow for up to

two weeks (two weeks) and no longer, she must wait. But if he imposed the vow for more than two weeks, he must divorce her and give her the ketuba.

And

Beit Hillel say:

If he imposed the vow for up to

one week

(one week) only, she must wait. But if he imposed the vow for more than one week, he must divorce her and give her the ketuba.

2.

Students may leave to study Torah without their wives’ permission

even though they are obligated to them with regard to the mitzva of conjugal relations—

for thirty days.

And

laborers

may leave for their work without their wives’ permission—

for one week (one week) only.

[one week] only.

The conjugal obligation stated in the Torah,

which requires every man to visit his wife, varies according to the husband’s occupation:

those who lead an idle life

are obligated to do so

every day

and the Gemara will explain who they are.

Laborers

are obligated

twice

times

in a week (in a week).

[during the week].

Donkey drivers,

who go to villages to bring grain to sell in the market, are obligated—

once a week.

Camel drivers,

who travel to distant places, are obligated—

once every thirty days.

Sailors,

who set out on the open sea to the ends of the earth, are obligated—

once every six months.

These are the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who prohibits his wife by vow from marital relations: Beit Shammai say, two weeks; Beit Hillel say, one week:

And we raised an objection to this:

What is the reasoning of Beit Shammai?

And the Gemara explains:

They derive it [

they learn it ]

from a woman who gives birth to

a

female, who is forbidden to her husband for two weeks.

Since we find in the Torah that one is required to remain separated for two weeks, we cannot compel him to divorce her if he prohibited her to himself for no more than this period.

And Beit Hillel derive it from a woman who gives birth to a male,

who is forbidden to her husband for only one week.

And we challenge this:

But Beit Hillel, too, should derive it

they should learn it

from

a woman who gives birth to a female!

The Gemara therefore retracts this explanation and says:

Indeed,

if it were from a woman who gives birth

that

Beit Hillel derived it [if the source of Beit Hillel’s ruling were a woman who gives birth],

it would indeed be so:

they should have learned it from a woman who gives birth to a female.

Rather, Beit Hillel,

did not derive their ruling from a woman who gives birth, but rather

from

a menstruant,

who is forbidden to her husband [by Torah law] for only one week—

they derive it.

And the Gemara explains:

In what do

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel

differ? What is the reason for their dispute, that one derives the matter from a woman who gives birth, while the other derives it from a menstruant?

One—

Beit Hillel—

holds: One derives

something

from a matter

that is common—

the withdrawal of a husband from his wife, which is common when he is angry with her—

from something that is common, namely, a menstruant. One does not derive this from a woman who gives birth, which is not as common.

And the other—

Beit Shammai—

holds: One derives

something

from a matter

that he—

the husband—

causes her, that he

prohibited

himself to her,

that is, he vowed to prohibit her to himself,

from something

from a matter

that he causes her, namely, a woman who gives birth, since he caused her to conceive and give birth. One does not derive this from a menstruant, whose prohibition is not caused by the husband.

Rav said: The dispute

between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies only

when he

specified the period of time for which he prohibited her to himself. If he prohibited her for only one week according to Beit Hillel, or only two weeks according to Beit Shammai, she must wait, and he is not obligated to divorce her and give her her ketuba.

But when he made the vow without specification,

without setting a period of time for his vow—according to

everyone [

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel ], he must

divorce her immediately

and not wait even one week—

and give her her ketuba.

And Shmuel said: Even

when he prohibited her

without specification, he must likewise wait—

two weeks according to Beit Shammai, and one week according to Beit Hillel—

lest he find

during this period

an opening for his vow.

And the Gemara is astonished:

But

Rav and Shmuel already

disagreed about this

once before,

on a similar matter; why did they dispute the same principle twice!?

As we learned

later, in the chapter HaMadir [folio 70]:

One who prohibits his wife by vow from benefiting from him—

If he prohibited her

for up to thirty days,

this is

what he does: appoint a “provider

”

who will provide for her in his place.

And if he prohibited her for longer than this [

for a period longer than thirty days ]—

he must divorce her and give her her ketuba.

he must divorce her and give her the payment stipulated in her marriage contract.

And Rav said: The statement that he appoints a provider applies only

when he

specified

that he was prohibiting her for thirty days.

But when he made his vow without specification,

and did not specify for how long he prohibited her—

he must divorce her immediately and give her her ketuba.

And Shmuel said: Even when he made his vow without specification, he must likewise wait,

the husband must wait thirty days before divorcing her,

lest he find an opening for his vow

and have it annulled.

And we resolve the difficulty:

It is necessary

to state their dispute in both places.

For if it were stated

only

in this case,

in our Mishna, where he prohibited her from conjugal relations, I would say that only

in this case Rav said

that he must divorce her immediately and give her her ketuba when he made the vow without specification,

because it is impossible to

fulfill the husband’s mitzva of conjugal relations

through a provider.

But in that case,

where he prohibited her from sustenance,

as it is possible

to feed her

through

the agency of a

provider—

I might say that Rav concedes to Shmuel that he must wait, lest he find an opening for his vow.

And,

conversely,

if it were stated

that the dispute of Rav and Shmuel applied only

in that case,

where he prohibited her from sustenance, I would say that only

in this case Shmuel said

that he must wait, lest he find an opening for his vow, since it is possible to provide for her through a provider.

But in this case,

in the matter of our Mishna, where he prohibited her from conjugal relations, and it is impossible to fulfill this obligation through a provider—

I might say that he concedes to Rav

that he must divorce her immediately and give her her ketuba.

Therefore:

It is necessary

to state their dispute in both cases.

We learned in the Mishna:

Students go forth to study Torah

without their wives’ permission for thirty days:

And we raised an objection to this:

With permission

from their wives—

for

how long

may they go forth?

And the Gemara is astonished at the question: If they go forth with their wives’ permission, what is the question of how long they may go forth? After all,

as long as they wish,

they are permitted to go forth, since they left with their wives’ permission!