Ketubot 56b — the Talmud in English

And it is established for us: What is “writes” —

which we learned in that same Mishna — means

“says”.

It follows that even if he only said it and did not write it for her, his condition is effective to relinquish [the claim], and the Sages did not make a strengthening for their enactment!?

Said

he answered,

Abaye:

There is a distinction between the ketuba and the enactment concerning the eating of produce, because:

All

women

have a ketuba, but not all

husbands

have produce,

because there are women who bring nothing into their marriages.

And therefore, the ketuba, which is

a common matter

[it is a common matter],

the Sages made a strengthening for it.

But produce, which is

a matter that is not common

so much,

the Sages did not make a strengthening for it.

And we still ask:

Behold, “the donkey-drivers,” who are common

[it is a common matter],

and the Sages did not make a strengthening for them;

and what is different from a ketuba, concerning which you say, according to Rabbi Yehuda, that the Sages made a strengthening for their words!?

For we learned

in tractate Demai:

The donkey-drivers,

unlearned people,

who entered the city

with their produce,

and one of them said

two distinctions regarding the quality of his fellow’s merchandise in comparison with his own merchandise:

a.

Mine is new,

meaning that it is not so good because it has not dried completely,

and my fellow’s is old,

and better than mine.

b.

Mine is untithed,

for its tithes have not been removed,

and my fellow’s is tithed,

it is.

They are not

considered

trustworthy,

because we are concerned about reciprocal favors, that his fellow will repay him in another city by praising his own.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

They are

trustworthy,

and we are not concerned about reciprocal favors.

It follows that according to Rabbi Yehuda, even regarding Demai, which is of rabbinic status, the Sages did not make a strengthening and did not fear reciprocal favors!?

Said

he answered,

Abaye:

Certainly, regarding a matter of their words, the Sages made a strengthening.

But the prohibition of Demai, which is only

a doubt concerning a matter of their words,

lest the unlearned people did not tithe the produce, therefore

they did not make

for it

a strengthening, the Sages.

Rava said:

They were lenient regarding Demai

more than regarding an ordinary doubt concerning a matter of their words, because it is not even a doubt, since most unlearned people do tithe; rather, it is merely a rabbinic stringency.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Meir says: Whoever deducts

from the two hundred for a virgin, and from that amount for a widow, behold this is intercourse of prostitution:

The Gemara infers:

“Whoever” deducts

we learned, and it implies

even

if he deducted from her only

by

a manner of

a condition,

such as where she did not write to him, “I have received,” but said orally that it was merely a condition, which does not take effect, and ultimately she will be able to collect her entire ketuba, even so, his intercourse is intercourse of prostitution —

Apparently,

it is proven that

he holds,

Rabbi Meir: A condition contrary to what is written in the Torah,

his condition is void, and she has

a complete ketuba —

And since

in the end he has

said to her: “You have only one hundred,” her mind is not relying

[the woman does not rely on her mind that she will receive her ketuba],

and

therefore

his intercourse is intercourse of prostitution!

But if so, this is difficult:

Yet we have heard Rabbi Meir

himself

say:

“Whoever makes a condition contrary to what is written ‘in the Torah”

such as food, clothing, and marital relations,

his condition is void; but one who makes a condition

in a rabbinic matter,

his condition is valid!?

And we answer:

He holds, R

abbi

Meir: A ketuba

is from the Torah,

and therefore his condition is void, since he made a condition regarding something that is from the Torah!

Rabbi Meir says: Whoever deducts from two hundred for a virgin and from that amount for a widow —

behold this is intercourse of prostitution.

Rabbi Yosei says: He is permitted

to deduct, and even if she said it to him orally, his condition is valid.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If she said it only orally, he may not deduct, because regarding a rabbinic ketuba the Sages made a strengthening, so that one who makes a condition concerning it has a void condition, even though it is a monetary matter —

But if he

wished,

he may

write for a virgin a document for two hundred, and she writes to him, “I have received from you one hundred”; and for a widow, one hundred, and she writes to him

“I have received from you fifty zuz.”

And we ask:

A

if

Rabbi Yosei holds that he is permitted,

even though she has no ketuba!?

And we juxtapose [another teaching]:

“One does not make a woman’s ketuba movable property,

that is, one does not designate movable property for the ketuba,

because of the betterment of the world,

lest they be lost or their value decrease.

Rabbi Yosei said: And what betterment of the world is there in this!?

For indeed their

value

is not fixed,

ever, but they become more expensive or cheaper,

and

it turns out that at times

the movable property decreases

below what it was appraised at initially, and it does not contain the amount of the ketuba that he is obligated to her; and the Gemara explains this and proceeds.

But this is difficult concerning Rabbi Yosei’s words, for his reasoning is to say that this is why one does not make a woman’s ketuba movable property; and now it is difficult:

For the first tanna also says, “One does not make”,

and in what does Rabbi Yosei disagree with him!?

Rather, is it not that this is what

the tanna of the beraita

said:

“When are these words applicable, that ‘one does not make a woman’s ketuba movable property,’

when he did not accept responsibility

if the movable property should be lost.

But

if he

accepted responsibility

if it should be lost, even though he did not accept responsibility for a decrease in value —

one does make.

And Rabbi Yosei came to say: If he accepted responsibility

for loss but not for a decrease in value,

why should one make it!?

For they are not fixed in value, and they decrease.

And once Rabbi Yosei’s words in the beraita have been clarified, the Gemara raises its difficulty:

Now, and if there, where

it is only a concern

lest they decrease

[lest the movable property decrease from what it was appraised at initially, and the woman have less than the amount of her ketuba],

Rabbi Yosei is concerned

about this

and said, “One does not make.”

said, “One may not designate them.”

Here,

in Rabbi Yosei’s words, where he said, “He is permitted” —

the ketuba certainly decreases

from its original amount,

all the more so

that he should not be permitted!?

And we answer:

How now,

the case under discussion is not comparable to the proof!?

For

there,

regarding “one does not make a woman’s ketuba movable property” —

she did not know

that the value of the movable property would decrease below the amount of the ketuba, in order

that she would begin.

But

here,

from the outset

the woman knew

that her ketuba was reduced,

and she relinquished.

The sister of Rami bar Hama was married to Rav Avya

[Rami bar Hama’s sister was married to Rabbi Avya] —