Ketubot 56b (נו:) — the Talmud in English

And we maintain: What is the meaning of “writes”—

that which we taught in that same Mishna—this means

“says”.

It follows that even if he merely said it and did not write it for her, his stipulation is effective to waive the obligation, and the Sages did not reinforce their enactment—

He said

that is, he answered,

Abaye:

There is a distinction between the ketuba and the enactment granting the husband the right to consume the produce, because:

All

women

have a ketuba, but not all

husbands

have produce,

as there are women who bring nothing into their marriages.

Therefore, the ketuba, which is

a common matter

(it is something common),

the Sages reinforced.

But produce, which is

an uncommon matter

to such an extent,

the Sages did not reinforce.

The Gemara nevertheless asks:

But “ass-drivers,” who are common

(it is something common),

the Sages did not reinforce their status;

and what is different about the ketuba, concerning which you say, according to Rabbi Yehuda, that the Sages reinforced their enactment!?

As we learned

in tractate Demai:

Ass-drivers,

unlearned people,

who entered a city

with their produce,

and one of them said

two distinctions regarding the quality of his fellow’s merchandise as compared with his own:

a.

Mine is new,

meaning that it is not of such good quality, because it has not dried sufficiently,

whereas my fellow’s is old,

and better than mine.

b.

Mine is untithed,

as its tithes have not been removed,

whereas my fellow’s is tithed

produce.

They are not

considered

credible,

because we are concerned that they will reciprocate: his fellow may reciprocate for him in another city by praising his produce.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

They are

credible,

and we are not concerned that they will reciprocate.

It follows that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, even with regard to Demai, which is of rabbinic origin, the Sages did not reinforce their enactment and were not concerned about reciprocation!?

He said

in answer,

Abaye:

Certainly, with regard to a matter of rabbinic origin, the Sages did reinforce.

But the prohibition of Demai is only

a doubt concerning a matter of rabbinic origin

—perhaps the unlearned people did not tithe the produce— therefore

they did not reinforce

it;

the Sages.

Rava said:

They were lenient with regard to Demai

more than with regard to other rabbinic doubts, because it is not even a doubt: most unlearned people do tithe. Rather, it is merely a rabbinic stringency.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Meir says: Anyone who reduces

the amount for a virgin below two hundred dinars, or for a widow below one hundred, her intercourse is intercourse of licentiousness:

The Gemara infers:

“Anyone who reduces”

is what we learned, and this implies

even

if he reduced it for her only

by

means of a

stipulation,

for example, she did not write to him, “I have received [the amount],” but merely said orally that it was only a stipulation, which is ineffective, and ultimately she will be able to collect her entire ketuba— even so, his intercourse is intercourse of licentiousness—

Apparently,

it is evident that

Rabbi Meir holds: A stipulation contrary to what is written in the Torah,

is

void, and she has

a full ketuba—

And since

ultimately he

said to her: “You have only one hundred,” she does not rely on his word

(the woman does not rely on the expectation that she will receive her ketuba),

and

therefore

his intercourse is intercourse of licentiousness!

If so, this is difficult:

But we heard Rabbi Meir

himself

say:

“Anyone who stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah,”

such as the husband’s obligations of food, clothing, and conjugal relations,

his stipulation is void; but if he

stipulates

with regard to a rabbinic matter, his stipulation stands!?

And we answer:

Rabbi

Meir

holds: A ketuba is

of Torah origin,

and therefore his stipulation is void, since he stipulated contrary to a matter of Torah origin!

Rabbi Meir says: Anyone who reduces the amount for a virgin below two hundred or for a widow below one hundred—

her intercourse is intercourse of licentiousness.

Rabbi Yosei says: He is permitted

to reduce it, and even if she said so to him orally, her stipulation stands.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If she said it only orally, he may not reduce it, because with regard to a rabbinic ketuba the Sages reinforced their enactment: a stipulation contrary to it is void, even though it concerns a monetary matter—

But if he

wished,

he may

write a document for the virgin stating two hundred, and she writes to him, “I have received one hundred dinars from you”; and for the widow, one hundred, and she writes to him

“I have received fifty zuz from you.”

And we ask:

A

nd does

Rabbi Yosei hold that he is permitted,

even though she has no ketuba!?

And we juxtapose:

One may not designate movable property as a woman’s ketuba,

meaning: one may not designate movable property for the ketuba

for the betterment of society,

lest it be lost or decrease in value.

Rabbi Yosei said: And what betterment of society is there in this!?

For are their

values not

fixed

at all, but rather do they not increase or decrease in price?

And

it follows that at times

the movable property decreases

below the value at which it was initially appraised, and it does not contain the amount of the ketuba that he is obligated to her. The Gemara proceeds to explain his statement.

But Rabbi Yosei’s words are difficult, since his position is that this is why one may not designate movable property as a woman’s ketuba. Now the difficulty is:

The first tanna also says, “One may not designate”,

so in what way does Rabbi Yosei disagree with him!?

Rather, is this not what

the tanna of the beraita

said:

In what case is this statement

said, that “one may not designate movable property as a woman’s ketuba”?

When he did not accept responsibility

but

if he

accepted responsibility

for their being lost, although he did not accept responsibility for a decrease in value—

one may designate them.

And Rabbi Yosei came to say: When he accepted responsibility

for loss but not for a decrease in value,

why may one designate them!?

For their value is not fixed, and they decrease.

Once Rabbi Yosei’s statement in the beraita has been clarified, the Gemara raises its question:

Now, just as there,

where it is only a concern

that perhaps they will decrease

[perhaps the movable property will decrease below the value at which it was initially appraised, leaving the woman with less than the amount of her ketuba],

Rabbi Yosei is concerned

about this,

and

said, “One may not designate them.”

Here,

in Rabbi Yosei’s statement that he is permitted—

where she certainly reduces

the ketuba below its original amount—

all the more so

should she not be permitted!?

And we answer:

How can these cases be compared?

The subject under discussion is not analogous to the proof!?

For

there,

with regard to the prohibition against designating movable property as a woman’s ketuba—

the woman did not know

that the value of the movable property would decrease below the amount of the ketuba, so that she would

suffer a loss.

But

here,

from the outset

the woman knew

that her ketuba was reduced,

and she waived the difference.

The sister of Rami bar Hama was married to Rav Avya

(Rami bar Hama’s sister was married to Rabbi Avya)—