Ketubot 56a — the Talmud in English

And on the basis of this objection, the Gemara explains the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Natan whether the halakha is according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya in another manner:

Rather, both of them —

both Rav and Rabbi Natan —

follow estimation!

And this is in what they disagree:

The one who says: The halakha

is according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya —

properly,

for they follow estimation! And

the one who says: The halakha is not

according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya —

here too, it is an estimation of the mind,

in the opposite direction —

Because of the drawing-near of the mind [A0016]the drawing-near of the mind

mental closeness ]

is

that he wrote for her,

and the mind was drawn near to him

even though he did not take her into his house.

Rav Hanina sat

and

read

before Rabbi Yannai, and said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

He said to him,

Rabbi Yannai to Rabbi Hanina:

Go out and read your reading outside [go and say your words outside]! For

go and state your words outside ]! For

the halakha is not according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

Rav Yitzhak bar Avdimi said in the name of our teacher [A0032]he is Rav:

he means Rav ]:

The halakha is according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

And likewise

Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: The halakha is according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

And Rav Naḥman himself,

not in the name of Shmuel,

said: The halakha is not according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

And the scholars of Nehardea said in the name of Rav Naḥman: The halakha is according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and although he [A0043]cursed

cursed ]

Rav Naḥman and said: Any judge who judges according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, so and so shall befall him [any judge who judges according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, so and so shall befall him],

even so, the halakha is according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

And the Gemara adds:

And

the members of the academy reached a decision and concluded:

The practical halakha

is according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

follows Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

Ravin raised a question: If she entered the bridal chamber but had no intercourse, what is

the question: does she have an additional amount according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya [whose ruling is the halakha], who holds that a widow from betrothal does not have an additional amount, since he wrote for her only with the intention of taking her into his house?

And the Gemara explains the uncertainty:

Is the affection of the bridal chamber

what

acquires

the additional amount, that is, did he write the additional amount for her with the intention of the affection of the bridal chamber?

Or

perhaps the affection of the bridal chamber is not sufficient, but

the affection of intercourse

is what

acquires

the additional amount, for he wrote for her only with the intention that he would have intercourse with her?

Come and hear

from this

that Rav Yosef taught

in the words of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya:

For he wrote for her —

the additional amount —

only on account of “the affection of the first night”. -

If you say that the affection of the bridal chamber

is what

acquires

the additional amount,

this is what he said: “the first night”,

since there is a bridal chamber only on the first night.

But if you say that “the affection of intercourse”

is what

acquires,

and is it so that

intercourse is only on the first night

that it

exists, while

from then onward

again

it does not exist [and does a man have intercourse only on the first night and not have intercourse again afterward]!?

does a man have intercourse only on the first night and not thereafter ]!?

And the Gemara rejects this and proves the opposite:

But rather, what is it?

The intention is

the bridal chamber!?

Does

the bridal chamber

only

exist at night, while

during the day

it does not exist [and does one make a bridal chamber at night and not during the day]!? And why does he teach: the affection of “night”!?

And the Gemara expresses astonishment at the proof:

But according to your reasoning,

that you wish to prove from this precision that the intention is intercourse, you should also raise this objection: is

intercourse

only

present at night, while

during the day

it is not present!?

For although intercourse is forbidden during the day,

Rava said: If he was in a dark house,

it is

permitted

to have intercourse even during the day, and if so, intercourse during the day can occur!

And the Gemara resolves the proof:

This is not difficult!

That which he teaches “the affection of night” concerning intercourse is entirely fitting, because

common practice [A0119]proper conduct

the way of the world ]

teaches us that intercourse is at night.

Rather,

if you say that the intention is

the bridal chamber, then indeed it is

difficult

why does he teach “night”!?

And if so, it is proven from the beraita that the intention is intercourse and not the bridal chamber.

And the Gemara rejects this:

The bridal chamber too is not difficult

— this that he teaches that the bridal chamber is at “night,”

because

since an ordinary bridal chamber is intended for intercourse [A0133]an ordinary bridal chamber is intended for intercourse,

an ordinary wedding canopy is intended for intercourse ],

common practice teaches us that

intercourse is

at night. Since intercourse is at night, the tanna stated in his wording that the bridal chamber is at night, to teach us incidentally that intercourse is at night.

Поскольку близость бывает ночью, таннай выразился так, будто свадебный навес бывает ночью, чтобы попутно сообщить, что близость бывает ночью.

Rav Ashi raised a question: She entered the bridal chamber, and menstruation began,

and he separated from her, and the husband died,

what is

the ruling? Does she have an additional amount according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya?

The Gemara explains the uncertainty:

And the Gemara explains the uncertainty:

If you should say:

the affection of the bridal chamber acquires

the additional amount —

a wedding canopy fit for intercourse [

Is it

a bridal chamber fit for intercourse [fit for intercourse] that obligates him in the additional amount,

but a bridal chamber not fit for intercourse does not

acquire, and she has no additional amount —

Or perhaps it makes no difference?

And we conclude:

teyku.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: If he wishes, he writes for a virgin

a document of two hundred, and she writes, “I have received from you one hundred”; for a widow, one hundred, and she writes, “I have received from you fifty zuz”:

And we raise an objection concerning what we learned: and she “writes,” “I have received from you one hundred”:

And

does Rabbi Yehuda happen to

hold that one who repaid part of his debt cannot say, “Return my document to me, and I will write you a new document for the remaining debt,” but rather

one writes a receipt,

even though the debtor will have to guard his receipt from the mice, for otherwise the creditor will produce the document in which the entire debt that existed was written, even though part of it was repaid.

But we learned: One who repaid part of his debt:

Rabbi Yehuda says: He shall exchange

the debtor shall exchange with the creditor the document for another document for the remaining amount, and he shall tear up the earlier document; and the creditor cannot say to him, “Here is a receipt,” because the debtor would then have to guard his receipt from the mice.

Rabbi Yose says:

If the creditor wishes,

he shall write for him,

for the debtor,

a receipt

that he repaid part of his debt; and the debtor cannot compel the creditor to give him another document, for the creditor would thereby lose his lien from the original time!

It follows that according to Rabbi Yehuda one does not write a receipt, unlike our Mishna, which states this in his name!?

He said,

he answered,

Rabbi Yirmeya: When she breaks it from within,

that is, within the document itself, before the witnesses sign, the woman should write: “I have received,” and then the reason that she would have to guard her receipt from the mice no longer applies. Abaye said,

he answered:

You may even say that she does not break it from within; in that case, there is no difficulty

for there

the debtor

certainly paid him [indeed the debtor paid the creditor part of his debt], and we are concerned:

perhaps the receipt will be lost [A0196]perhaps the debtor will lose the receipt

perhaps the receipt will be lost

and he will produce it

the creditor

the document and then collect a second time, [A0200]and the creditor will produce the document and collect a second time.

will produce the document and collect a second time, [

But

here,

in our Mishna, is it so that

the husband

certainly gave her [and did he indeed give her any payment at all]!?

For

it is merely a matter of words that she said to him [his wife merely said words to him]!

And therefore,

if he guards it —

he shall guard it [A0211]if he guards the receipt, all the better; and

if he safeguards it —

if he does not guard it —

he himself has caused his own loss, [A0214]and if he does not guard it, he has caused himself loss by not guarding it.

if he does not safeguard it —

And the Gemara explains:

It is understandable that Abaye did not say

to answer

according to Rabbi Yirmeya,

because

it does not teach

in our Mishna:

“She breaks it from within”!

But Rabbi Yirmeya, for what reason did he not say

to answer

like Abaye!?

And we answer: Rabbi Yirmeya holds that even “she breaks it from within” should not be done according to the one who says “one does not write a receipt,” because

there is a decree concerning the receipt here,

which is inside the ketuba,

on account of an ordinary receipt,

which is not inside the document!

The Gemara raises another objection against our Mishna:

The reason is that she wrote for him

the woman, “I have received,”

but

if the woman said so

orally,

which is merely a condition —

not

is it effective, because making a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah renders the condition void!

it

is not effective, because one who stipulates contrary to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void!

And why!?

For the condition is concerning

a monetary matter, and we have heard Rabbi

Yehuda

himself

say:

in

a monetary matter, his condition is valid!?

a monetary matter, his condition is valid!?

денежном обязательстве его условие действительно!?

For it was taught:

“If one says to a woman: ‘Behold, you are betrothed to me on the condition that you have no claim upon me for maintenance, clothing

maintenance and clothing

and conjugal rights

that the husband is obligated to provide his wife—

she is betrothed, but his condition is void

and he is obligated to provide her with all these, because he stipulated contrary to what is written in the Torah: “He shall not diminish her maintenance, her clothing, or her conjugal rights,” and anyone who stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition is void

—the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Judah says:

that same condition that he stipulated

concerning a monetary matter

namely, “that you have no claim upon me for maintenance and clothing

—his condition stands!”

And if so, even though it is only a condition, it should have been effective, for it is a monetary matter, and according to Rabbi Judah himself his condition stands

?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Judah holds: the primary obligation of

the ketuba

is

from the Rabbis

it is,

and the Sages made a stronger safeguard for their words than for Torah law

so that one who stipulates concerning it, even though it is a monetary matter, his condition is void.

And we raise an objection against this

: Behold, produce

that the husband eats from his wife’s property whose enactment

by the Rabbis

is,

and the Rabbis did not make a safeguard for it

so that his condition would be void if he stipulated to relinquish his right to eat its produce

?! For we learned:

One who writes to his wife, “I have no legal claim or involvement in your property and its produce,” he does not eat the produce during her lifetime.

Rabbi Judah says: Forever

even if he wrote to her, “I have no legal claim or involvement in your property and its produce”—

he

the husband

eats the produce of the produce, until he writes to her: “I have no legal claim or involvement in your property, in its produce, and in the produce of its produce forever.”