Ketubot 56a (נו.) — the Talmud in English

And because of this objection, the Gemara explains the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Natan as to whether the halakha follows Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya in a different manner:

Rather, both of them —

both Rav and Rabbi Natan —

follow presumptive intent!

And this is what they disagree about:

The one who says: The halakha

follows Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya —

well and good,

for they follow presumptive intent! And

the one who says that the halakha does not follow

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya —

here too, it is an assessment of intent,

but in the opposite direction —

It is because of the drawing close of their minds [

mental closeness ]

that

he wrote the additional sum for her,

and his mind was drawn close to her

even though he did not consummate the marriage.

Rav Ḥanina sat

and

read

before Rabbi Yannai, and said: The halakha follows Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

Rabbi Yannai said to him,

Rabbi Ḥanina:

Go read your verse outside [

go and state your words outside ]! For

the halakha does not follow Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said in the name of our teacher [

he means Rav ]:

The halakha follows Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

And likewise

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha follows Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

And Rav Naḥman himself,

when not speaking in the name of Shmuel,

said: The halakha does not follow Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

And the scholars of Nehardea said in the name of Rav Naḥman: The halakha follows Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and although he [

cursed ]

Rav Naḥman and said: May every judge who rules in accordance with Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya suffer such-and-such, [

may every judge who rules in accordance with Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya suffer such-and-such ],

even so, the halakha follows Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

And the Gemara adds:

And

the members of the academy reached a conclusion:

The practical halakha

follows Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya!

Ravin asked: If she entered the wedding canopy but the marriage was not consummated, what is

the law? Does she receive the additional sum according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya [whose view is the halakha], who holds that a widow from betrothal does not receive the additional sum, since he wrote it for her only on the condition that he consummate the marriage?

The Gemara explains the uncertainty:

Is it the affection of the wedding canopy

that

acquires

the additional sum—that is, did he write the additional sum for her with the wedding canopy’s affection in mind?

Or

perhaps the affection of the wedding canopy is insufficient; rather,

it is the affection of consummation

that

acquires

the additional sum, as he wrote it for her only on the condition that he have intercourse with her?

Come and hear

from this

which Rav Yosef taught

in the words of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya:

He wrote it for her —

the additional sum —

only because of “the affection of the first night.” -

Granted, if you say that it is the affection of the wedding canopy

that

acquires

the additional sum,

this is why he said: “the first night,”

since the wedding canopy is only on the first night.

But if you say that it is “the affection of consummation”

that

acquires

the additional sum,

is it only on the first night that there is intercourse,

and

from then onward there is none [

does a man have intercourse only on the first night and not thereafter ]!?

The Gemara rejects this and proves the opposite:

Rather, what

is the meaning? It refers to

the wedding canopy!?

Does

the wedding canopy exist only

at night—

is it present at night—while

during the day

it is not present [

does one conduct the wedding canopy at night and not during the day ]!? And why did he teach: the affection of “the first night”?

The Gemara challenges this proof:

But according to your reasoning,

that you seek to prove from this precise wording that it refers to intercourse, you can also challenge it: Is

intercourse only

at night—

is it present at night—while

during the day

it is not present!?

Although it is prohibited to engage in marital relations during the day,

Rava said: If one was in a dark room —

it is permitted

to engage in marital relations even during the day, and therefore intercourse during the day is possible!

The Gemara resolves the proof:

That is not difficult!

If the expression “the affection of the night” refers to intercourse, it is entirely understandable, for

it is proper conduct [

the way of the world ]

to teach us that intercourse is at night.

Rather,

if you say that it refers to

the wedding canopy,

then indeed it is

difficult: Why did he teach “the first night”!?

Why did he teach “the first night”!?

And therefore it is proven from the beraita that it refers to intercourse and not to the wedding canopy.

The Gemara rejects this:

The wedding canopy is also not difficult. The reason he taught that the wedding canopy is on the “first night” is

because

since an ordinary wedding canopy is intended for intercourse [

an ordinary wedding canopy is intended for intercourse ],

it is proper conduct, and it teaches us that

intercourse is

at night. Since intercourse takes place at night, the tanna used language indicating that the wedding canopy is at night, in order incidentally to teach that intercourse is at night.

Rav Ashi asked: If she entered the wedding canopy and became a menstruant,

and he separated from her, and the husband died,

what is

the law? Does she receive the additional sum according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya?

The Gemara explains the uncertainty:

If you can say:

the affection of the wedding canopy acquires

the additional sum —

Is it

a wedding canopy fit for intercourse [

fit for intercourse ] that obligates him in the additional sum,

but a wedding canopy not fit for intercourse does not

acquire it, and she does not receive the additional sum —

Or perhaps there is no difference?

And we conclude:

Teyku.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: If he wishes, he writes for a virgin

a document for two hundred zuz, and she writes, “I have received from you one hundred”; for a widow, one hundred, and she writes, “I have received from you fifty zuz”:

The Gemara challenges what we learned: And she “writes,” “I have received from you one hundred”:

And

is it so that

Rabbi Yehuda holds that

when one has repaid part of his debt, the borrower may not say, “Return my document to me, and I will write you a new document for the remaining debt,” but rather

one writes a receipt,

even though the borrower will have to protect the receipt from mice, since otherwise the lender could produce the document stating the entire original debt, part of which had been repaid.

But we learned: One who repaid part of his debt:

Rabbi Yehuda says: He shall exchange

the document: the borrower gives the lender another document for the remaining amount, and the earlier document is torn up. The lender may not say to him, “Here is a receipt,” since the borrower would then have to protect the receipt from mice.

Rabbi Yosei says: If the lender wishes,

If the creditor wishes,

he writes for him

the borrower

a receipt

stating that he repaid part of his debt. The borrower cannot compel the lender to give him another document, since this would cause the lender to lose his lien dating from the original loan!

Thus, according to Rabbi Yehuda, one does not write a receipt, contrary to what is stated in our Mishna in his name

!? Rabbi Yirmeya said

in explanation:

When she breaks it from within,

that is, inside the document itself, before the witnesses sign it, the woman writes, “I have received,” and the reason that she would otherwise have to protect her receipt from mice no longer applies.

Abaye said

in explanation:

Even if you say that she does not break it from within, there

is nevertheless

certainly a repayment [

the borrower indeed repaid the lender part of his debt ], and we are concerned:

perhaps the receipt will be lost

[

lest the borrower lose the receipt ] and

the lender

will produce the document and collect a second time, [

the lender will produce the document and collect a second time ].

But

here,

in our Mishna, did he

certainly give her [

did he indeed give her any payment at all ]!?

For

it is merely a statement that she made to him [

his wife merely said words to him ]!

Therefore,

if he safeguards it —

he safeguards it [

if he protects the receipt, that is well ], but

if he does not safeguard it —

he himself caused his own loss, [

if he does not protect it, he has caused his own loss by failing to safeguard it ].

The Gemara explains:

It is understandable that Abaye did not say

in explanation

in accordance with Rabbi Yirmeya,

because

it does not teach

in our Mishna:

“She breaks it from within”!

But Rabbi Yirmeya, why did he not say

in explanation

in accordance with Abaye!?

And we answer: Rabbi Yirmeya holds that even “she breaks it from within” should not be done according to the one who says, “One does not write a receipt,” because

there is a decree concerning the receipt here,

which is inside the ketuba,

on account of an ordinary receipt,

which is not inside the document!

The Gemara raises another difficulty against our Mishna:

The reason is that she wrote for him

“I have received,”

but

if the woman said this

orally,

as merely a condition,

it

is not effective, because one who stipulates contrary to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void!

Rather, this is certainly what he means: The reason is that she wrote for him a receipt, because he wrote for her a complete ketuba and married her with a complete ketuba; but if he stipulated with her orally from the outset to reduce her ketuba, even according to Rabbi Yehuda his stipulation is void. He calls it an oral condition because whenever you say that the condition is valid and that he may marry her under this condition, the husband need not write a separate document reflecting it; rather, he writes her a ketuba according to what they stipulated, and so forth. See also the novellae of the Ra’ah and the Penei Yehoshua. And

why!?

For this is a condition concerning

a monetary matter, and we have heard Rabbi

himself

Yehuda

say

that: In

a monetary matter, his condition is valid!?

It was taught:

If a man says to a woman: “You are betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim against me for food and clothing [

nourishment and clothing]

and conjugal rights

for which the husband is obligated to his wife -

she is betrothed, and his condition is void

and he is obligated to provide her with all of these, because he stipulated contrary to that which is written in the Torah: “He shall not diminish her food, her clothing, or her conjugal rights,” and whenever one stipulates contrary to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void -

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

The very condition that he stipulated

concerns a monetary matter

, namely, “You have no claim against me for food and clothing,”

and his condition stands!

And if so, even though it is merely a condition, it should be effective, since it concerns a monetary matter and, according to Rabbi Yehuda himself, his condition stands!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yehuda holds:

The principal obligation of the

ketubah

is of

Rabbinic

origin,

and the Sages reinforced their enactments more stringently than Torah law

, so that if one stipulates contrary to it, even though it concerns a monetary matter, his condition is void.

And we raise an objection to this:

What of the produce

that the husband consumes from his wife’s property whose enactment

is Rabbinic

?

Yet the Sages did not reinforce it

so that his condition would be void if he stipulated that he forgoes his right to consume it!?

As we learned:

One who writes to his wife, writing for her: “I have no claim or involvement in your property or in its produce,” does not consume produce during her lifetime.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Forever -

even if he wrote for her: “I have no claim or involvement in your property or in its produce” -

he

the husband

consumes the produce of the produce, until she writes for him: “I have no claim or involvement in your property, in its produce, or in the produce of its produce forever” -